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ABSTRACT
Contemporary theology increasingly is concerned with ‘inter-disciplinary 
dialogue’. There has, however, been little work done on the under-girding sti'uctures 
of such a dialogue. The centr al concern of this thesis is to explore the methodological 
foundations for the relation between ‘theology’ and ‘secular* discourse’. Although 
there are many possibilities for testing the relation between theology and secular 
discourse, theological anthropology and the doctrine of sin are used as the primary 
testing grounds because they are central to the concerns of much contemporary 
systematic theology as well as being areas to which the secular* world has much to 
contribute. Alistair McFadyen’s and Karl Barth’s work in these areas is adopted as 
the particular focus of the thesis. Together their work offers a rich environment for 
analysing the methodological issues at stake in the relationship between theology and 
secular discourse. The primary aim of the thesis is to offer an approach to inter­
disciplinary dialogue which maintains ‘the priority of God’ in theological method 
whilst recognising that engagement with secular discourse enables theology ‘to do its 
job better’. Drawing from McFadyen’s and Barth’s work in theological anthropology 
and the doctrine of sin, some methodological foundations for structuring the relation 
between theology and secular discourse are laid out and stated in a more widely 
applicable form.
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CHAPTER 1
Approaches to the Relation between Secular 
Discourse and Theology:
John Webster and David Ford
1. Introduction
Let me begin with a brief story.' A company which had been successful in the 
production of drill bitts entered a time when their sales and profits began to fall. In 
order to address the problem, consultants were brought in to advise the company 
about what it should do. The consultants who were employed at great expense took 
some months to look at the business and interview staff and customers before making 
their report. The day came when they reported to the Board and did so with only 
three Power Point visuals:
1. This company thinks that it is in business to malce drill bits.
2. It isn’t.
3. This company exists to make holes.
At this point the consultants sat down and the Board members were perplexed 
at the brevity of the presentation given the scale of the expense. However, the money 
had been well spent as tire firm later became a world leader in using laser technology 
to make holes. The point of the story in a Christian context is that the church often 
confuses ends with means and (so to say) tries hard to be more effective in
‘ I am indebted to my father, the Venerable Norman A. Russell, for tins illustration. It is an illustration 
that has gone round some clergy circles and neitlier he nor I are sure of its origin.
manufacturing drill bits when it needs to be clear about its core task and the nature of 
the changing context within which it is placed.^
This, I suggest, is a challenge that is also faced by contemporary theology. It 
is a necessary task of the Christian theologian to reflect critically on the trinitarian 
self-revelation of God as testified to in the Christian scriptures, doctrine, tr adition and 
history, as well as attending to the situation in which the theologian functions. 
Analogous to the company mentioned in the story above, the challenge lies in 
identifying the core tasks of Christian theology in such a way that the concerns of the 
contemporary world are addressed, but the distinctive Cliristian content remains. 
Often the problem is approached in theology by adopting one of three broad positions 
in one form or another.^ The first, the ‘liberal’ position, adopts an open attitude to the 
demands of the present possibly at the expense of the authority of the past. The 
second ‘conservative’ position strongly maintains the authority of the past sometimes 
at the expense of present concerns. The final ‘radical’ position is open to fundamental 
change in the present usually through re-interpreting the roots of Christianity. 
Although these distinctions may be useful as general designators and set the scene for 
our broader concerns, they ar e too general to be of much value as a typology. What 
they do highlight is the general question which lies at the very core of this thesis; 
^How ought Christian theology to be done?'.
 ^I am reminded of a well known quotation from Bartli; “I did not have anything new to say in that first 
issue of Theological Existence Today apart from what I had always endeavoured to say: that we could 
have no other gods than God, tliat holy scripture was enough to guide tire chinch into all truth, that the 
grace of Jesus Christ was enough to forgive our sins and to order our life. The only thing was tliat now 
I suddenly had to say this in a different situation. It was no longer just an academic theory. Without 
any conscious intention or endeavour on my part, it took on the character of an appeal, a challenge, a 
battle-cry, a confession. It was not I who had changed: the room in which I had to speak had changed 
diamatically, and so had its resonance. As I repeated this doctrine consistently in this new room, at the 
same time it took on a new depth and became a practical matter, for decision and action.”. (Cited in 
Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life fi'om Letters and Autobiographical Texts, London: SCM Press 
Ltd., 1976, p227).
 ^ I follow David F. Ford in this characterisation and in the appeal to Hans Frei’s ‘types’ which are to 
follow shortly {Theology: A Veiy Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp20f.). 
Cf. also Trevor A. Hart, Faith Thinking: The Dynamics o f Christian Theology, London: SPCK, 1995, 
esp. Chapter 8.
This chapter seeks first to set out briefly a more appropriate typology so that 
the pairicular concerns of the thesis can be positioned with regard to a broader 
theological landscape. Second, two positions fi'om the typology which are to become 
the polar positions for this thesis will be explored in more detail using a recent debate 
between John Webster and David Ford which highlights many of the key issues. 
Finally, some indication will be given of the direction the thesis will take and some 
important terms will be introduced. Before doing this it is worth pausing to take heed 
of a comment firom Hans Frei:
Somebody rightly said, “A person eitlier has character or he invents a method”. I 
believe that I have been trying for years to trade metliod for character, since at heart I really 
don’t believe in independent metliodological study of theology (I think the theory is dependent 
upon the practice), but so far I haven’t found that I am a seller to myself as a purchaser.'^
In the opening chapter of what is a thesis on theological method, Frei’s 
comment is especially poignant. Two preliminary points are worth making here. 
First in echoing Frei, the primary task of the theologian is to ‘do’ theology, not to 
engage in a second (or third) level order of reflection on how to do theology. 
However, as Frei also stated, theory is dependent upon practice, and so theological 
method can only become clear by ‘doing’ theology. It is hoped that although the 
concern of this thesis is primarily with theological method, some valuable theology is 
also produced in the process. And second, pmi of the process of ‘doing’ theology is 
to reflect on how it should be done, what the implications are of doing it in a certain 
way, and indeed, what theology actually is. In other words, approaching theology 
through theological method brings to the fore the very heai't of what it might mean to 
be a theologian. Attending to theological method in this way prevents the theologian 
fi'om pressing on with the manufactme of (hill bits as it were, and re-evaluating once 
again the core tenets of the Christian faith. Following firom this, one of the main aims
Hans W. Frei, Types o f  Christian Theology, New Haven; Yale University Press, 1992, pl9.
of this thesis is to outline an approach to theology whereby the theologian can be 
responsible within the present context, but is not responsible to that context. We 
begin with a typology that addresses some ways in which theology can be done.
2. Types of Christian Theology
Hans Frei rightly recognised a polaiity which is faced by the theologian.^ On 
the one hand, Christian theology is an instance of a general class or generic type. As 
such, it is to be subsumed under general criteria of intelligibility, coherence and tmth 
which is shared with other academic disciplines. On the other hand, theology is an 
aspect of Chiistianity and is therefore partly or wholly defined by its relation to the 
cultiu'al or semiotic system that constitutes that religion. In this case, theology tends 
to have two main tasks: a first order descriptive task whereby the ‘giammar’ or 
‘internal-logic’ of Cliristian beliefs and practices are articulated, and a second order 
critical task to judge such articulation a success or failure according to the nonns 
governing Christian use of language. In short, the distinction that Frei is identifying is 
between approaching Christian theology from a position external to its own 
rationality, or fr om within it.
Frei’s distinction is closely related to many such polarities which also operate 
within Christian theology and may also be approached tlnough the typology outlined 
below. Perhaps the classic typology of this sort is H. Richard Niebulir’s polarity 
between ‘Christ’ and ‘cultui'e’.^  Even though Niebuhr ’s typology is highly influential
 ^Frei, Types o f Christian Theology, p2.
® H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, Harper Torch Books, 1975.
and remains widely accepted, Frei’s typology will be used/ There are three main 
reasons for this. First, Frei’s polarity is closer to the polarity operative in this thesis -  
theology and secular discourse. Second, Niebuhr* wrongly understands ‘culture’ as 
both monolithic and autonomous.^ And third, a strong case can also be made for 
Niebuhr’s picture of ‘Christ’ also being deficient.^ Having said this, it is wor*th 
emphasising that Niebuhr’s typology remains dominant, particularly in the United 
States.*® However, Frei’s typology is widely used and, in the United Kingdom, it has 
perhaps received most attention from David Ford who opens his undergraduate 
lectures in systematic theology with it.**
One of the main problems of any typology is that exceptions can always be 
found to each type and few people like thinking of their thought as easily placed 
within (or reduced to) a category. This is certainly evident in the reception and use of 
both Niebuhr ’s and Frei’s typologies (not to mention a number of others).*^ As with 
any typology, its usefulness can only be determined in accordance with it use -  that is, 
how helpful the categories are in furthering our understanding of its object -  which in
’ Another typology which could have potential mileage for this thesis is set out in Roberts, Richard H. 
‘Theology and tlie Social Sciences’, in Ford, David F., (ed.). The Modern Theologians: An Introduction 
to Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp700-719.
* Tliis point amongst others is made in a magnificent critique of Niebuhr by Jolin H. Yoder ( ‘How H. 
Richard Niebuhr Reasoned: A Critique of Christ and Culture’, in Stassen, Glen H., Yeager, D, M., and 
Yoder, John H. (eds.). Authentic Transformation: A New Vision o f Christ and Culture, Abingdon Press, 
1996). See also Christoph Schwobel. ‘Once Again, Clirist and Culture: Remarks on the Christological 
Bases of a Theology of Culture’, in Colin E. Gunton (ed.). Trinity, Time, and Chm'ch: A Response to 
the Theology o f Robert W. Jenson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
 ^Again see Yoder, ‘How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned’.
Altliough according to David Ford, one of Frei’s most significant achievements is to cany “forward 
the Yale tlieological tradition of his teacher H. Richard Niebulu”  (David F. Ford, 'On Being 
Theologically Hospitable to Jesus Christ: Hans Frei's Achievement', Journal o f  Theological Studies 
46.2, October, 1995, p532.).
" This is reflected in Ford’s introductory book on theology {Theology, pp20f) as well as other 
publications. See for instance: David F. Ford, 'Hans Frei and the Future o f Theology', Modern 
Theology 8.2 (April 1992), pp203-14, and Ford, 'On Being Theologically Hospitable to Jesus Christ: 
Hans Frei's Achievement', pp532-46.
Colin Gunton, for instance, has raised some question about his ‘conceptual redescription’ o f Barth 
(Colin Gunton, ‘Review: Types of Christian Theology’, in Scottish Journal o f Theology, 49/2, 1996, 
pp233-234). It is also wor1h bearing in mind that one of Frei’s main aims of his ‘Types’ was to do 
better justice to tire Christian tradition tliari other typologies and he may well have been successful in 
tliis -  even if there remains room for further improvement.
the case of this thesis, will be evident in two main ways. The first, is to set out briefly 
the ‘geography’ of the theological landscape vis-à-vis ‘secular discourse’, and the 
second is to develop two particular ‘types’ in accordance with the aims and concerns 
of the thesis. These two ‘types’ will be redefined and developed at length below.
Frei develops a typology which highlights five possible approaches to his 
polarity. The typology might be thought of as a continuum between these two poles 
with vaiying priority given to each. Before setting this out, it is worth noting that 
there may be a fuither possible type between Types 3 and 4 which Frei himself has 
acknowledged but has never developed.*^ The possibility of a fuither type will be 
considered in some length in Chapter 6 below. Echoing Frei’s own concerns, this 
thesis will focus on Types 3 and 4. We turn now to the five-fold typology.
Typel. This type gives absolute priority to the first pole, that is, approaching 
Christian theology from without. Theology is understood as a philosophical 
discipline in the academy which talces complete priority over Christian self­
description. Theology of this type tends to emulate the philosophical character of the 
discipline to which it occupies a subordinate position. The ‘pressure of 
interpretation’*"* moves from a philosophy, worldview, or practical agenda to 
Christian theology.
Type 2. Type 2 is similar to Type 1 in that theology is treated as a 
philosophical or academic discipline from the outside, but the specificity of the
To my knowledge tliis is yet to be explored. David Ford reports Frei as saying that “he would 
probably place himself between Types 3 and 4” (Ford, 'On Being Theologically Hospitable to Jesus 
Christ: Hans Frei's Achievement', pp538, 544), but I am yet to find any other mention of tliis in the 
literature. However, Ford also recognises the possibilities of defining the existing types in otlier, more 
diverse ways and indeed emphasises tins (Ford, 'Hans Frei and the Future of Tlieology', p205, and 
Ford, 'On Being Theologically Hospitable to Jesus Christ: Hans Frei's Achievement', p536).
For tliis plirase I am indebted to Professor Alan J. Torrance, who adopted it from Professor Daniel 
W. Hardy. It is an expression referring to the movement or direction of a framework of understanding. 
See Alan J. Torrance, Persons in Communion: An Essay on Trinitarian Description and Human 
Participation with Special Reference to Volume One o f Karl Bath’s Church Dogmatics, Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1996, p201.
Christian religion is taken seriously in such a way that the external description and 
self-description become merged, hi other words, an approach is adopted whereby the 
foundational starting point lies in a particular philosophy or worldview but is adopted 
in such a way as to accommodate the uniqueness of the Christian message. 
Contemporary thought is used as a model for re-interpreting what is taken to be core 
Chiistian commitments. Again the pressure of interpretation moves from philosophy 
to theology.
Type 3. Type 3 is the midpoint between the two poles. In this type, theology 
is an academic discipline in its own right, but it is equally dependent upon a general 
philosophical approach and Chiistian self-description. It does not recognise the 
adequacy of any single framework but does recognise that many philosophies and 
worldviews are usefril resources for doing Christian theology. Generally this 
approach proceeds by way of a ‘con'elation’ between issues raised by the Christian 
faith and those raised outside it. The aim is to develop a ‘dialogue’. Neither pole 
holds ultimate primacy. Insofar as possible, priority is not given to theology or 
philosophy.
Type 4. This type gives priority to Christian self-description. Theology is not 
philosophically founded, and what makes theology an orderly and systematic 
procedure is not a set of formal, universal criteria but mles which develop from 
within. To this extent, philosophy is subordinate to theology, and although many 
useful insights can be derived from philosophy, the pressure of interpretation moves 
from theology to philosophy. No other framework or worldview can dictate how to 
understand the Christian faith.
Type 5. Type 5 gives absolute priority to the second pole -  approaching 
theology from within. It does not even offer a subordinate place for philosophy
within theology. The criteria for coherence, adequacy, and appropriateness are 
derived solely from Christian self-description. There is no place for any worldview or 
philosophy for deteimining the form or content of Christian theology. All of reality is 
interpreted in teiins of a traditional imderstanding of Chiistianity and there is limited 
scope for dialogue. The pressme of inteipretation moves irreducibly from theology to 
any other worldview or framework.
Both Types 1 and 5, the polar positions, inteipret all of reality exclusively 
from within their own fr ames of reference -  whether Christian or secular. There is a 
limited possibility of dialogue between the two positions. By way of contrast. Types 
2-4 place a different priority on the significance of the polar positions in the shaping 
of their standpoint, but are by and large open to some kind of dialogue between the 
various positions. This is clearly most evident in Type 3 where a coiTelation is sought 
between the two poles.
The main concern of this thesis is to attempt to do justice to two necessary 
aspects of theology.*^ The first is to reflect critically on Christian doctrine, tradition, 
and history giving special weight to God’s self-revelation in Christ tlnough the Spirit 
fr om the perspective of the Cliristian faith. The specific meaning of this will become 
clear during the thesis. The second aspect is to engage critically with the social, 
cultural, and intellectual world in which we are living. It is to be argued that these are 
not two tasks but two aspects of a single task. Put more strongly, these dual aspects 
of a single task are necessary (but insufficient) conditions for doing Christian 
theology. It is this very point that we find being made in the introduction to Paul 
Tillich’s three volume Systematic Theology when he suggests two basic needs for
See Alistair I. McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theoiy o f the Individual in Social 
Relationships, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pplO-11; Hart, Faith Thinldng, esp. 
Chapter 10.
theology: “[1] the statement of the truth of the Chiistian message and [2] the 
interpretation of this tmth for every new generation”.*® Let me unpack this further.
On the one hand, theology is a second (and third) order level of reflection 
upon the core tenets of the Christian faith, doctrine, practice, and life. Theology is 
therefore in large part about Chiistian self-description (Frei’s second pole). This is to 
detemiine both the form and content of theology -  that is, how theology is to be done. 
In large part this is what Karl Barth was referring to when, in an article written in 
Bonn in 1933, he argued that it was important to do “theology and only theology... as 
though nothing had happened"}^ In other words, theology is not dependent upon the 
detemiinate situation in any way. T. F. Torrance echoes this view in an introduction 
to a volume of Baifh’s papers when he suggests that Barth’s intention was to create “a 
radical séparation between theology and culture, which he felt to be eminently 
necessary if we were to think clearly again about God, and about man, and of their 
reconciliation in Jesus Christ”.*® Even though Torrance is overstating Barth’s case, 
the issue to be faced here is whether or not theology is in any way dependent upon 
engaging with cultuie, and if so, whether this is best served by doing theology ‘as 
though nothing had happened’.*^
On the other hand, theology is not done in a vacuum. It is precisely because of 
this that it has been argued, for instance, that the Barth-Brunner debate of 1934 was
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Volume /, London: Nisbet & Co., 1951, p3. Interestingly, tliere is 
a strong resemblance here to a theological approach adopted by a tliinker from Type 4 (Tillich is Type 
3). I am refening specifically to ‘contextualization’ as expounded in Lesslie Newbigin, The Gospel in 
a Pluralist Societ)), London: SPCK, 1989, esp. Chapter 12.
Cited in Busch, Karl Barth, p226 [my italics].
Karl Barth, Theology and the Church, London, 1962, p22, cited in J. W. Thomas, ‘The Problem of 
Defining a Theology of Culture witli Reference to the Theology of Paul Tillich’, in R. W. A. 
McKinney (ed.). Creation, Christ, and Culture: Studies in Honour o f T F. Torrance, T & T  Clark, 
1976, p272..
It might be wortli adding tliat in tlie context of 1933 Germany, Barth’s approach to theology was 
indirectly a political commitment as is evident by liis refusal to open lectures wiüi a Hitler salute as 
was required, opting for a prayer instead (Busch, Karl Barth, pp234, 242).
highly engaged with cultme?® Bai'th believed Brunner’s position to be giving 
consent, albeit tacit, to the German Chiistian’s embrace of National Socialism. All 
theology, indeed all human activity, is necessaiily bound to its particular socio- 
historical location. This is not to say that this location cannot be transcended, rather, 
that all theology is a product of its time. Consequently, it is a major task for all 
theology to re-thinlc and re-inteipret the deposit of faith for each particular time. Paul 
Tillich’s ‘method of correlation’ is perhaps the definitive example of a theology in 
which the content of theology is largely oriented by the detenninate situation.^* The 
issue to be faced here is the extent to which culture (or Frei’s first pole) should be 
determinative for theology.
However, the concern of this thesis is not to present a ‘theology of culture’, 
although there will be significant implications for a ‘theology of culture’. Rather, the 
concern is with how Frei’s two poles should be related within Christian theology. 
The polar positions of Frei’s typology -  Types 1 and 5 -  will not be considered here 
as neither attempts to do justice to the dual aspects of the theological task. The focus 
will be more specific -  examining the nature of the ‘dialogue’ between Frei’s two 
poles. Of particular interest here are Types 3 and 4 as it is these that appear to do the 
most justice to the twofold task of Christian theology as previously stated.^^ The 
significance of these Types in relation to this thesis is brought out well in a recent 
exchange between John Webster and David Ford to which we now turn.
The debate can be found in Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, Natural Theology, Peter Fraenkel (trans.), 
London; The Centenary Press, 1946. See also Trevor A. Hart, ‘The Capacity for Ambiguity: Revisiting 
die Barth-Brunner Debate’, in Regarding Karl Barth: Toward a Reading o f His Theology, IVP, 1999; 
and Jolm W. Hart, Karl Barth Vs. Emil Brunner: The Formation and Dissolution o f  a Theological 
Alliance, 1916-1936 (Issues in Systematic Theology, Vol. 6), New York: Peter Lang, 2001.
See Tillich, Systematic Theology Volume I, Chapters 1 and 2, esp. pp67f..
Notably it is these two Types towards which Frei is inclined and examines in depth. See Frei, Types 
o f Christian Theology, Chapter 6.
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3. The John Webster/David Ford Debate
David Ford’s recent book Self and Salvation represents a way of doing 
theology that is becoming increasingly popular.^^ In teims of Frei’s typology. Ford’s 
Self and Salvation might be placed in Type 3 (albeit with a leaning toward Type 4).^ "* 
However, Ford’s thought can be placed in Type 3 for different reasons than other 
theologies of this Type such as Paul Tillich’s/® Whereas Tillich functions with an 
existential (universal) framework from which he approaches theology, Ford 
emphatically rejects any such framework. His work generally proceeds on the basis 
of ad hoc conelations between particulars. This said. Ford’s work does not give 
explicit priority to either theology or his conversation partners and therefore falls into 
Type 3.^ ® In this regard it is worth citing Frei:
The third type also seeks to correlate theology as a procedure subject to formal, 
imiversal, and transcendental criteria for valid thinking, with theology as specific and second- 
order Cliristian self-description; but imlike the second type, it proposes no super-theory or 
comprehensive structure for integrating them, only ad hoc procedm*es... f
Where Ford’s work can be placed in Type 3, John Webster’s work fits firmly 
in Type 4 (possibly with a leaning toward Type 5).^ ® The emphasis in Webster’s 
work is definitely placed on theology at the expense of secular discourse.
There aie a number of reasons why we might be concerned with this debate -  
both are heavily indebted to Barth and end up in very different positions; one is 
Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge (Ford), the other is Lady
David F. Ford, Self and Salvation: Being Transformed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999.
This would not be true of Ford’s earlier work which would fit with Type 4 (for instance in David F. 
Ford, Barth and God’s Story: Biblical Narrative and the Theological Method o f Karl Barth in the 
Church Dogmatics, New York: Peter Lang, 1985). It is significant that Ford first had a grounding in 
‘dogmatics proper’ before entering into a more imaginative theological metliod. In this chapter when I 
refer to Ford, it is tlie Ford of Self and Salvation.
It is worth noting tliat Frei does not place Tillich firmly in Type 3, mstead he uses Schleiermacher as 
the example.
^ I suspect that Ford would prefer to diink o f his thought as Type 4 -  if, tliat is, he was prepared to 
place it in a type!
Frei, Types o f Christian Theology, p3.
^ See for instance his most recent book: John Webster, Word and Church: Essays in Christian 
Dogmatics, Edinbmgh: T&T Clark, 2001.
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Mai'garet Professor of Divinity in the University of Oxford (Webster) -  but there are 
two main reasons why we aie looking at it. First, their respective approaches to 
theology conespond to two major ways in which the concerns of this thesis can be 
approached -  the relation between theological and secular discomse. As such, their 
thought (Types 3 and 4) represents the polar positions operative in this thesis. And 
second, the debate is still current, raises many of the key issues with which the thesis 
is concerned, and focuses on a book that is in the same series as the book which is the 
main focus of Chapter 3 (‘Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctiine’). As such, the 
debate functions as an excellent introduction to the respective positions of Alistair 
McFadyen and Karl Bai th.
The debate is contained in a review article of Self and Salvation by John 
Webster with a response by David Ford.^  ^ At the core, it is concerned with how 
theology ought to be done. We begin by drawing out the key challenges which 
Webster poses, then consider Ford’s response. Finally, a brief evaluation of the 
debate will be offered. Insofar as possible, I will only focus on the key 
methodological points that are raised and not on the detail. The significance of the 
debate here is to raise the key issues for the thesis, not to evaluate the accuracy of the 
review.
3./ John Webster^s Review
Jolm Webster’s opening comments do not refer so much to the content of Self 
and Salvation as to “its style and geni*e” by which “the reader is overwhelmed by the
John Webster, ‘Article Review: David F. Ford: Self and Salvation', and David F. Ford, ‘Salvation 
and the Nature of Theology -  A Response to John Webster’s Review of Self and Salvation: Being 
Transfoi'med', mSJT, 54/4, 2001, pp548-575,
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possibilities for reflection which are opened up”.^ ° Webster wiites: “this is not a 
piece of straight systematics. It is an exploratory and interrogative reflection on a 
number of themes in Christian soteriology and anthropology, undertaken in 
conversation with strands of phenomenology and some more informal materials 
concerning human practices”.^  ^ In other words, it is clear from the outset that 
Webster’s main concern with Self and Salvation is not with the content but with the 
style, i.e., how it does what it is trying to do.^^
Self and Salvation is split into two parts, both of which Webster considers.^^ 
In the first part, Ford enters into dialogue with various thinlcers. Even though Webster 
does raise some question about Ford’s choice of interlocutors,^"  ^ “the real question 
raised by part one of the book is: what sort of theology is this?”.^  ^ Webster suggests 
that part one is “best read as an attempt at an elliptical prologue to Christianity”, and 
consequently poses the question: “why not just cut to the chase?”.^  ^ The issue is, in 
short, one of how theology is to be done. Webster puts this in question form:
in the absence of sustained engagement with either some of the major biblical 
testimony on soteriology or classical Christian teaching, how can tire book be protected from 
being driven by concerns which -  however evocative, however pertinent to bits of liigh culture -  
are not immediately recognisable as emergmg from attention to the Christian gospel but rather 
seem to derive from elsewhere? ... Is there a given shape, a (flexible) canon of texts and 
problems in which it is the first task o f the theologian to be instructed and in die face of which 
originality is imimportant? Or is Christian theology a kind of poiesis, a free Christian 
commentary on a great range of sources of stimulation whose aim is not so much catechetical as 
one of ‘inspiring a diversity of investigations and discussions, acting as a framework for 
creativity, encouraging a new look at familiar problems, ambiguities and dilemmas, and opening 
fresh lines of dialogue witii otiier soteriologies’ (p.4)?^’
The question Webster is posing, is in a different foim, that of whether 
theology should be done according to Type 3 or Type 4. At this point, Webster
Webster, Review, p548.
Webster, Review, p548 (my italics).
It is worth adding that it is not possible to separate form and content like tiiis as we shall see time and 
time again below. The form of tire argmnent directly affects the content, and so Webster’s concern is 
also witii die content.
The Parts are titled (respectively); ‘Dialogues: Levinas, Jiingel, Ricoeur’; and ‘Flourishings’.
Webster, Review, p552.
Webster, Review, p550.
Webster, Review, p551.
Webster, Review, p551.
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clearly places Ford in Type 3, but is indicating that he thinks theology should (can 
only?) be done in Type 4/^ This comes through further in his consideration of Part 2 
of Self and Salvation.
Regarding Pait 2, in which the reader might be Teft rather breathless after this 
highly-charged, very busy, book’, Webster poses two sorts of questions, one about 
doctrinal commitments (focusing largely on Christology and what he considers the 
elusiveness of the book’s central concept -  the dead face of Christ), and the other 
about the nature of Christian theology. In engaging with the book’s doctrinal 
commitments, Webster is drawn into some of the detail, and so we simply note that he 
believes that the book “concentr ates largely on Christianity as a form of human life or 
religion, and only secondarily or derivatively is it concerned with God in se [Type 
2?]”.^  ^ With regard to the nature of Christian theology, Webster ‘wonder[s] about the 
dogmatic frnitfulness of the mode of theology here pursued’. The aim of the book, 
Webster recognises, is simply ‘to respond to God’. As a result Ford is drawn into a 
rich and imaginative engagement with a plethora of voices: philosophers, musicians, 
poets, antliropologists, and historians to name but a few. By way of contr ast, Webster 
suggests that theology should be conducted differently, and I quote at length:
There would be a quite different way of going about a tiieology of salvation, even a 
theology of self  and salvation. Tins would involve, not engagement in conversations of ever 
increasing range and complexity, but a focused attentiveness to and concentration upon a 
relatively small set of themes as they emerge in a canon of texts, at whose centre is Holy 
Scripture, aroimd which are arranged the greater and lesser commentaries which we call tlie 
Christian tradition. Engagmg in tliis kind of dieology would requhe the theologian a kind of 
ascesis, a laying aside, an inattention to all sorts of stimuli, and a dogged persistence in 
attendmg to a set o f given problems which at first sight are not very attractive or interesting or 
fruitful, but will in the end break oiu wills and so teach us true joy. Might it not be that such a 
tlieology -  a bit stiff, a bit formal at times, clumsy and gauche to the cultural élite -  will turn out 
to be not just edifying for tlie church but also for the church’s conversation partners?'^ '^
It is worth clarifying tiiat Webster seems to be agamst Type 3 pei' se, and thinks that Ford’s book is 
Type 3 done badly.
Webster, Review, p553. 
Webster, Review, p559.
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At the close of his review, Webster is posing the question of whether theology 
should be done according to Type 2/3 or Type 4/5. Clemly Webster sees this as an 
‘either/or’ and takes the second option. Only if this is done, can theology be ‘straight 
systematics’ (‘as though nothing had happened’).
3.ii David Ford's Response
David Ford rightly recognises that the heart of Webster’s critique is the 
question ‘how ought Christian theology to be done?’, and his response centres around 
this question.
Ford begins by setting out the themes which Webster would have addressed 
had he written the book which would qualify as a piece of ‘straight systematics’. He 
also welcomes such a book. This already highlights a key difference between 
Webster’s and Ford’s understanding of theology -  Ford’s is much broader."^  ^
However, Ford also rightly points out that other thinkers of the Type 4 approach often 
share a broader understanding of theology than Webster does. Ford notes that 
“Aquinas and Barth, for example, did not only comment on scriptiue and tiadition: 
they daringly took on extiaordinarily broad theological responsibilities in their 
situations’’."^  ^ He continues: “Our task is not only to comment on what they and the 
rest of the tradition have said but also to do something analogous to what they did”."^  ^
This brings Ford to the key question, that is, not to question whether or not Webster’s 
approach is worthwliile (he takes this for granted), but to ask whether it is normative 
in a way that excludes other approaches. Ford argues that approaches to theology
Broader in die sense that it accommodates more than a single model, and probably more than a single 
purpose,
 ^Ford, Salvation, p560.
Ford, Salvation, p560.
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should not be restricted to the ‘either/or’ alternatives which Webster appears to 
suggest.
Ford then considers what kind of theology it is that he offers in Self and 
Salvation (if it is not ‘straight systematics’). His first point is that the book is ‘one 
book in a series’ -  that of ‘Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine’. This has two 
main effects. One is that it means that Ford does not have to woixy about covering all 
aspects of systematic theology as many of the other books address core dogmatic 
themes. Secondly, and most importantly for our purposes, in being a book in a series. 
Ford had to agr ee to write it according to the brief that he was given. The series 
editors describe the aims thus:
The series aims to engage critically with the traditional doctrines of Clnistianity, and at 
tlie same time to locate and make sense of them within a secular context. Without losing sense 
of the autliority of scripture and the traditions of the church, the books in this series will subject 
pertinent dogmas and creedal statements to careful scrutiny, analysing them in the light of both 
church and society, and will thereby practise theology in the fullest sense of the word.'^ '^
These aims are of particular interest for two reasons. First, the books in this 
series seek to approach theology from the perspective outlined above: to reflect 
critically on Christian doctrine, tradition and history; and to engage critically with the 
social, cultmal, and intellectual world in which we are living. And second, the book 
which is the subject of Chapter 3 is written according to the same brief."^  ^ This brief 
therefore describes a set of approaches to theology which is the concern of this 
thesis,"^ *’ and also introduces in broad temis one of the core books upon which the 
thesis rests.
Ford, Salvation, pp562-563. It might be worth adding tliat tliis is largely a circular consideration as it 
is Professor Daniel W. Hardy’s vision wliich lies substantially behind tlie series!
Alistair I. McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust, and the Christian Doctjine o f Sin, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
One of my supervisor’s own books also appears in this series: Jeremy S. Begbie, Theology, Music 
and Time, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Although very different from Ford’s and 
McFadyen’s books, Begbie’s book definitely adheres to a set of approaches implied in the brief. To a 
large extent, Begbie puts into practice the kind of method being developed in this thesis.
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Most of Ford’s other points involve arguing for a broader conception of 
theology than that which is suggested by Webster (as well as arguing that Webster has 
misunderstood him in many cases). For example, Ford comments that his approach to 
theology is one type of architecture in the theological city, or, that his approach is a 
conversational theology based upon the premise that a God who relates to everyone 
and everything can have potentially unlimited questions and conversations. Ford then 
hones in on the core: “[Webster’s] main worry seems to be that all those 
conversations lead away from focusing on the cential truths [of Christianity]. An 
alternative view is that the central truths are such that they cry out to be related to the 
whole of reality and to eveiy human being, with intensive conversation as one 
important way of doing this”."^^
Ford’s important distinction is not quite right. Webster’s main woiTy is not 
that the conversations will lead away from focusing on the central truths of 
Christianity, although this is undoubtedly a worry for him, but that the conversations 
might deteiinine the form and content of the cential truths (Types 1 and 2)."^  ^
However, Ford’s point stands.
3.ÜÊ Reviewing the Webster/Ford Debate
David Ford’s and John Webster’s approaches to theology represent Frei’s 
Types 3 and 4 respectively. Webster appears to be affiiming that there is only one 
main way in which theology should be approached (by giving significant priority to 
Frei’s second pole). His aim is to do ‘straight systematics’ with the implication that 
this should be done ‘as though nothing had happened’. Whereas Ford’s approach to
Ford, Salvation, p567.
It will become clear time and time again throughout the tliesis that form and content cannot be 
separated. ‘Form’ refers to the shape and method which a theology adheres to, whereas ‘content’ 
identifies the material considerations of a theology.
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theology is considerably broader. Ford acknowledges that Webster’s position 
encapsulates a key, if not necessaiy, aspect of theology, but that it is by no means 
sufficient for theology. Instead theology benefits greatly from wider conversations, 
many of which may not be explicitly theological.
The key question underlying both the Webster/Ford debate as well as this 
thesis, is the extent to which Frei’s first pole -  culture/ secular discourse -  should 
determine the form and content of Christian theology (both rightly take the second 
pole for granted). Webster clearly gives little weight to this, and would align himself 
with the theological tradition of which Karl Barth is a major exponent. Against 
Webster, it will be argued below that Baifh offered a far greater place to secular 
discourse than is implied by Webster’s position outlined here. Ford gives a much 
greater weight to Frei’s first pole in determining the form and content of his theology, 
and in this respect may be closer to Paul Tillich than Barth. Although he remains 
keen to emphasise the uniqueness of Christianity, he is far less dogmatic in his 
approach. It will be aigued below that Alistair McFadyen walks this tight-rope more 
convincingly than Ford. If, in broad teims, Webster’s and Barth’s work can be placed 
in Type 4, and Ford’s in Type 3, it might be argued that McFadyen’s work is to be 
located between Types 3 and 4. This, I will suggest, is how theology should be 
approached, hi doing his theology between Types 3 and 4 McFadyen does indeed 
walk a tight-rope, and may on occasions fall on one side or other. However his 
position, which is the one that will be argued for in this thesis, does justice to both of 
the polar positions in a way wliich Webster’s and Ford’s do not. Webster gives 
insufficient place to secular discourse, and Ford overestimates the significance of 
secular discourse. This position does not have to be resolved by the ‘either/or’ that 
Webster implies. Rather, there is scope for a more multifaceted position that
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maintains the strengths of both Webster’s and Ford’s positions, even though it is one 
that may be difficult to maintain consistently (hence McFadyen does fall off the tight­
rope periodically)."^  ^ The significance of Frei’s typology and the Webster/Ford debate 
will be made clear in the following section.
4. The Concerns of this Thesis
The chapter began by considering Hans Frei’s fivefold typology. This both set 
the concerns of this thesis in relation to is wider theological context and intioduced 
some useful categories for describing various theological positions. Two positions 
were then developed in more detail -  Types 3 and 4 -  by referring to a recent debate 
between John Webster and David Ford. This debate helped raise some of the key 
issues of this thesis as well as introducing the polar positions. It is the purpose of this 
section to develop fmfher the implications of Frei’s typology and the Webster/Ford 
debate for the thesis. More specifically, some key tenns will be set out and clarified, 
and the argument will be stated (although not supported).
David Ford (Type 3) and John Webster (Type 4) represent the polar positions 
of this thesis. Although highly indebted to Barth’s approach, in terms of method Ford 
appears to be closer to Tillich’s ‘method of correlation’ -  that is, attempting to 
maintain the uniqueness of the truth of the Christian Gospel, and to reinteipret this 
tmth in such a way that it is ‘relevant’ to d a y .T illic h  writes of this in terms of 
explaining “the content of the Christian faith tlirough existential questions and
An allusion might be made to tlie difficulties in trinitarian theology of trying to maintain the balance 
between the One and Tlnee, or the nature of tlie relation between Fatlier, Son and Spirit.
It is worth emphasising again that although also in Type 3, Ford’s method is very different from 
Tillich’s, functioning primarily from ad hoc correlations.
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theological answers in mutual interdependence”.^  ^ By way of contiast, Webster is 
(admirably) concerned to do ‘sti'aight systematics’ ‘as though nothing had happened’. 
In this respect Webster’s approach is closer to Barth’s. As previously mentioned, 
Alistair McFadyen’s work can be positioned somewhere between Types 3 and 4, and 
additionally this position is extremely difficult to maintain consistently.
One of the main ways in which McFadyen’s position can be maintained is by 
making an important distinction between ultimate and operative primacy. Following 
the Webster/ Bai'th line, it will be argued that Frei’s second pole must always have 
ultimate primacy. That is, God’s self-revelation in Clnist through the Spirit is 
necessarily the first and foundational concern. It is where the ‘buck’ stops. To this 
extent, theology is to be understood in tenns of ‘strai^t systematics’. However, 
given the ultimate priority of theology determined in this way, ‘secular discourse’ can 
adopt operative primacy at any paificulai* point. Engagement with Frei’s first pole -  
culture, secular discourse -  is ultimately conditioned by the ‘priority of God in 
theological mediod’, but within this constiaint it can have free reign. So for example, 
the theological antliropology explored below centres on an understanding of the self 
as relational. To explore and expound these relations, non-theological discourse may 
hold the fort but does not do so unconditionally. In other words, an account of human 
relations may be offered by the social sciences, but this account is ultimately to be 
interpreted fr om within a theological framework.
Most of the thesis will be discussed in terms of the distinction between 
ultimate and operative priority, and significant use will be made of the expression 
‘pressure of inteipretation’. However, there is a danger that this might be understood 
in static teims. This is not the intention. As will be made clear in the Chapter 6
Tillich, Volume I, p68.
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below, theology can remain true to its ultimate priority without refemng to it at all. In 
this sense, it might be better to think in terms of a ‘field of force’ in which theology 
functions. Put differently, theology can fimction with integrity within its own 
theological fi'amework whilst having space to manoeuvre (albeit within limits), and 
without having to refer explicitly to its ultimate priority or the pressiue of 
interpretation deriving fiom it.^  ^ This said, in the interest of clarity the more dynamic 
expression ‘field of force’ will have to give way.
Although I am arguing that McFadyen’s position rests between Ford’s and 
Webster’s positions, my argument will be developed only in relation to Type 4 
(Webster/ Barth). In part this is because of space restrictions, but more importantly, 
because Frei’s second pole should hold ultimate primacy. As there is a tendency to 
fall off the tight-rope between Types 3 and 4, it is important to veer towards Type 4 
rather than Type 3 as this does better justice to the uniqueness of the Chiistian 
message which I suggest is more important than being ‘engaged’. If we have to fall 
off the tight-rope it should be on the side of Type 4. In this respect Webster is right. 
A dialogue with Type 4 should function as a useful check for the tight-rope walk, as 
well as giving ulthnate priority to Frei’s second pole. Therefore, the central concerns 
of this thesis will be developed through a dialogue between McFadyen’s thought and 
Barth’s.
The main concern of this thesis is more limited than Frei’s polar positions or 
the references to culture mentioned above might suggest. The main distinction to be 
explored below is between theological and secular discourse. Some of the key aspects 
of this distinction can clarified at the outset. Let me begin by offering a brief
Jeremy Begbie’s book Theology, Music and Time might be a good example o f theology conducted in 
this way.
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definition of ‘discourse’ before exploring further what is meant by ‘theological’ and 
‘secular’ discourse.
The word ‘discourse’ has been used widely in a number of academic 
disciplines, so much so that its meaning is often assumed and therefore left imdefined. 
Traditionally, it has refened to a speech, lecture, written treatise or other foiins of 
communication typically of a formal nature. This more naiTow understanding of 
‘discourse’ is still common place paificulaiiy in literary theory, semiotics and 
linguistics. More recently however, there has been an increasing proliferation of 
‘discourse about discourse’ in the social sciences which means that whilst the 
narrower rmderstanding remains, a significant number of people rmderstand 
‘discomse’ in much broader categories. Jacques Derrida, for instance, understands 
discomse as synonymous with the entire social system.^  ^ An even broader use of 
‘discomse’ is evident in some contemporary ‘discomse analysis’ which now includes 
mass media such as advertising, film, and even the news.^ "* hr this regard, it might be 
best to think of ‘discourse’ in its broadest sense as ‘the domain of communication’. 
Michel Foucault was perhaps the most significant thinker who helped broaden the 
meaning of ‘discomse’. Foucault writes:
Instead of reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word ‘discourse’, I believe 
tliat I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as tlie general domain of all 
statements, sometimes as an mdividualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated 
practice tliat accounts for a number of statements.^^
Within this statement, three key definitions can be identified.^^ First, the 
broadest miderstanding of discourse is apparent as ‘the general domain of all
Jacques Derrida, Writing and Dijference, London: Routledge, 1978, p280.53
Term A. van Dijk (ed.). Discourse and Communication: New Approaches to the Analysis o f Mass 
Media Discourse and Communication, Berlin/ New York: Walter de Gniyter, 1985, Guy Cook, The 
Discourse o f Advertising, London: Routledge, 1982.
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology o f Knowledge, (trans.) Sheridan Smitli, A. M., London: 
Tavistock, 1972, p80, cited in Sara Mills, Discourse: The New Critical Idiom, London: Routledge, 
1997, p6.
I am following Mills’ analysis at this point {Discourse, p7).
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statements’. In this regard, all utterances or texts which have meaning are understood 
as discourse. This definition has been developed at length by structuralists, post- 
structuralists and postmodernists in the direction we have aheady seen indicated by 
Jacques Denida leading ultimately to include various ‘media’ as fbims of 
‘discourse’.C o n seq u en tly , on the odd occasion when film is used as a point of 
comparison, this is the definition that is operative. The second definition -  ‘an 
individualizable group of statements’ -  refers to gioups of utterances which seem to 
be regulated in some way and which seem to have a coherence and force in common. 
This is the kind of ‘discourse’ that will be referred to when wiiting of ‘theological’ 
and ‘secular’ discourse and will therefore be the dominant definition throughout the 
thesis. The third definition -  ‘a regulated practice that accounts for a number of 
statements’ -  refers to the rules and stinctures that both produce and govern 
utterances and texts. Insofar as this thesis is concerned with the primary and 
operative criteria of theology, it is this form of ‘discourse’ to which reference is being 
made. Like most discourse theorists’ work, all these definitions can be used 
interchangeably and overlaid on the other. However, it is to be emphasised that the 
second definition is dominant in the thesis bamng the occasions just cited. It is now 
possible to define ‘theological’ and ‘secular’ discomse more precisely.
In this thesis, ‘theological discourse’ refers to any form of discomse that is 
explicitly theological (in the Christian tradition). Following fiom the discussion of 
‘discourse’, this is a broad definition although it can be qualified in certain respects. 
In general terms, it refers to the kinds of discussions about the subject-matter of 
Cliristian theology which occurs in universities, colleges and churches around the
In fact, the focus of Mills’ book is to see “how Michel Foucault’s ideas have been integrated mto 
various disciplines in different ways” (Discourse, plO). See also David Howard:, Discourse, 
Buckingham; Open University Press, 2000.
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world. Because of the diversity of approaches and content in theology, a precise 
meaning cannot be pinned down. However, certain key aspects can be identified.
First, ‘theological discourse’ is primarily discourse about the subject-matter of 
theology. This can take a number of forms which range from engagement with 
written texts, visual media, discussions, dialogues, seminars, lectures, sennons, 
conferences and so on. However, it is crucial to emphasise that it is the subject- 
matter of theology, that is the ‘object’ of theological discourse which is unique and 
sets theology as a discipline apart from ‘secular* discourse’. There is nothing inherent 
to theological language itself which sets it apart from secular discour se other than the 
imique nature of its object. It is quite possible, therefore, for theology to share much 
of the same language as other disciplines, but this is to be understood fr om within its 
own ‘language-game’ which in the case of theological discourse is to be determined 
by the object of theology. To put it another way, the same words may be used in both 
secular and theological language, albeit in ways that may only be analogically related.
Second, the core subject-matter (or object) of theology is ultimately ‘God’, 
particularly as revealed in Jesus Christ and to whom witness is borne in the Christian 
scriptures and the ensuing disputes giving rise to the creeds and Christian tradition. 
Given that we are dealing with the God of Christianity, having ‘God’ as the object of 
theology also involve a study of creation, humanity and other key doctrines which are 
imderstood to be central to the theological task.
Third, the practice of theology at the very least involves critical engagement 
with its key sources: the biblical texts, church history and tradition, and theological 
writings across the centuries, hi addition to this core, it usually involves engagement 
with a far wider range of dociunents, sources, and disciplines. These disciplines 
include secular disciplines, some of which will be considered in more detail in the
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following chapters. One key question which will be addressed at length below, is the 
extent to which God’s self-revelation in Christ should determine the form and content 
of theology with respect to other potential sources of knowledge of God.
Fomth, the norms, rules and functions of theological discourse are shaped by 
its subject-matter and in this respect theology is like other discourses. However, as a 
form of ‘discourse’, there is an extent to which theology is also governed by the 
norms, rnles and functions operating in other discourses in addition to being governed 
by its particular subject-matter. For our purposes this means that theology operates as 
an academic discipline, but that the subject-matter of theology retains ultimate priority 
at the expense of the other ‘canons’. The point is that theological discoirrse does 
indeed operate according to norms, rnles and fimctions which are shared with other 
disciplines (and in this respect is not unique), but imlike other forms of discourse, 
theological discourse can be disloyal to the norms, rules and functions of discourse if 
demanded by its own particular subject-matter. The object of theology retains 
ultimate priority.
By way of contrast, ‘secular discourse’ refers to any discomse which is not 
explicitly theological (both in the sense of not having the subject-matter of theology at 
the centre of its concerns, but also in the broader sense of theorising about religion 
and the transcendent). Perhaps even more so than ‘theological discourse’, ‘secular 
discourse’ in this sense rests upon the full range of definitions of ‘discourse’. This 
thesis is concerned particularly with forms of academic discomse, especially the 
social sciences and philosophy, but hopefully will address in passing most significant 
forms of discomse whether academic or not. hr this regard, both the arts and sciences 
will be referred to under the designator ‘secular ‘discomse’ as well as the occasional 
use of more popular forms of discomse such as film.
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It will be immediately apparent that this distinction cannot be maintained in a 
hard form. This will be an issue discussed at length throughout the thesis (in which 
the usefuhiess of the distinction will also become evident), but at the outset we can 
make two claiificatory points. First, the distinction cannot be maintained as neatly as 
is implied here. ‘Secular discourse’ has in the past often been defined by its relation 
to theological discomse, even if it is a relation of explicit antagonism. Many forms of 
secular discomse have arisen fiom explicit rejection of a theological framework (e.g.
Nietzsche, Mar*x, and Freud). In this regard, secular discomse is heavily indebted to 
theological discourse even it the relation is one of antagonism. On the other hand, 
much secular discomse has also arisen with a strong debt to a Christian theological 
framework. Therefore, secular discomse can often contain either explicit or implicit 
theological (or even quasi-theological) assmnptions. Just as there can be no ‘pme’ 
form of theological discomse which uses language not already learned in a secular 
context, most if not all forms of secular discomse are also loaded with metaphysical 
and quasi-theological assumptions. To highlight one of many possible examples, it 
has been argued plausibly that ‘modem science’ developed in large part because of a |
I
Christian heritage.^^ The Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo meant amongst other |
things that God was distinct from the world which gave considerable impetus to the 
development of scientific experimentation. Much of what the Greeks understood as 
science depended upon observation on accoimt of the (quasi)divinity of creation. The 
point is that although I am making a hard distinction between theological and secular 
discomse, in many cases theological and non-theological thought are far more
See Michael B. Foster, ‘The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modem Natural Science’, 
in Mind, 43, 1934, pp446-468; Reijer Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise o f Modem Science, Edinburgh: 
Scottish Academic Press, 1972; Eugene M. Klaaren, The Religions Origins o f Modern Science: Belief 
in Creation in Seventeenth Centurt Thought, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977; Colm E. Gunton, The 
Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998, 
p i Ilf..
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intertwined than is suggested here (perhaps especially in the use of analogical terms 
which are unavoidable for the theologian). The distinction is made to aid clarity of 
thought regarding theological method.
Second, within the thesis itself, this distinction requires further clarification, 
hr many places ‘theological discourse’ refers to ‘straight systematics’ in the Webster 
sense. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the exposition of Barth. Barth’s work is 
difficult to approach by distinguishing between theological and secular* discourse 
because his concern is primarily with the extent to which all thought forms are 
determined by the Word of God -  whether or not they are explicitly theological. In 
this respect, Barth epitomises the point that it is the peculiar object of theology which 
makes ‘theological discourse’ unique. Therefore, in the chapters on Bar*th, there are 
thinkers who are referred to as ‘secular*’ because they are not theological in this 
narrow sense, even though they may be theological in a broader* sense (i.e. that they 
are concerned with broadly theological issues and write fiom within a department of 
theology). One example of this might be Martin Buber, whose thought is 
undoubtedly theological in the broad sense although his thought is not ‘straight 
systematics’. A better* distinction for Barth may be between thought determined by 
the Word of God and thought that is not (which would cerlainly include much 
theology!). This clearly shifts the boundar*ies of theological and secular discourse and 
will be discussed fur*ther in later chapters. However, there remains significant scope 
for examining Barth’s work with the distinction between theological and secular 
discour se in the broad sense defined above.
The specific concer*n of this thesis is to investigate the role of secular 
discourse in theological anthropology and the doctrine of sin. To some extent, the 
actual content is not significant for the investigation of theological method -  that is
27
how secular discourse relates to theology. Although other areas of dogmatics might 
have been chosen for the study (theological ethics would also have been a good 
testing ground), theological anthropology and the doctrine of sin are especially good 
areas for investigation. It is important that the areas chosen are mainstream concerns 
for Christian dogmatics as well as areas to which secular discomse can contribute. 
Both of these conditions have to be met if the distinctive contribution theology can 
make to the academy is to become clear*.
It will also be seen time and time again that form and content are inseparable. 
This means that it is not possible to consider theological method without at the same 
time considering the content of theology, if not actually ‘doing’ it. In this respect, the 
areas of dogmatics chosen for investigation are significant for the relation between 
theological and secular discomse. It may be that other* ar eas could have been chosen, 
but these areas have their* own distinctive contributions to make. For example, in 
terms of content, the doctrine of sin has a significant impact on theological method. 
Both McFadyen and Barth attempt to incorporate the ‘brokemiess’ of human thinking 
brought about in large part by sin into their theology. Whether or not they are 
successful remains to be seen, but the present point is that issues of theological 
method are necessarily worked through in relation to specific content, and that 
specific content impinges upon theological method.
The centr*al argument of the thesis is in order to be ‘true to itself, it is crucial 
for* theology to rmderstand and reflect critically upon Christian doctrine, tradition and 
histor*y on the one hand, and the social, cultural and intellectual world in which we are 
living on the other. One of the major ways in which this is facilitated is by engaging 
with secular discomse. However, it is also to be added quickly that this is not a 
necessary condition for* theology, rather that account has to be taken of theology’s
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own locatedness and what this might mean. It will be argued that McFadyen’s 
thought is to be understood as being in direct continuity with Bailh’s thought and that 
McFadyen has further developed Barth’s basic orientation to secular* discomse. More 
specifically, McFadyen is more willing to enter into dialogue with secular discomse 
than Bar th, but the roots of this approach are evident in Barth. However, it will also 
be argued that (paradoxically) Barth takes secular discomse more seriously than 
McFadyen. hr a number of places Barth engages critically and rigorously with a wide 
range of secular approaches whereas McFadyen’s ‘dialogue’ is more limited, hr his 
first book (Chapter 2 below) McFadyen effectively engages with one thinker whose 
thought happens to fit ver*y well with the theological approach outlined. There is 
significant improvement in this regard in McFadyen’s second book (Chapter 3 
below), but McFadyen still does not engage with a sufficiently broad range of secular* 
discourses to the extent that he ultimately offers a ‘sti*aw-man’ argument. However, 
McFadyen’s general approach is to be embraced with open arms. Both McFadyen’s 
and Barth’s work offer extremely r*ich grounds for testing the relation between 
theological and secular* discomse.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to intr oduce Hie key themes, terms, and argument 
of the thesis. This was done first by setting the thesis within a broader* theological 
context with Hans Frei’s fivefold typology. Two positions which are to become the 
polar positions of this thesis were explored with reference to a recent debate between 
John Webster* and David Ford. The core question at this point was about how 
theology ought to be done. Finally, the specific concei*ns of the thesis were 
introduced. The main concern was to investigate the role of secular discomse in
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theological antlii'opology and the doctrine of sin using Alistair McFadyen’s and Karl 
Barth’s thought as the testing ground.
The main argument will be that in order to be ‘true to itself, it is crucial for 
theology to understand and reflect critically upon Christian doctrine, tradition and 
history on the one hand, and the social, cultural and intellectual world in which we are 
living on the other. Additionally, one of the major ways in which this is facilitated is 
by engaging with secular discourse. It will also be argued that McFadyen’s thought is 
to be understood to be in direct continuity with Barth’s, although he extends Baifh’s 
basic line further. Although McFadyen is more willing to enter into dialogue with 
secular discomse than Barth, Barth takes it more seriously. In the final analysis, 
argument will be made for McFadyen’s basic method with some qualification.
The thesis will continue by focusing in detail on the relation between theology 
and secular discourse first in McFadyen’s anthropology (Chapter 2) and doctrine of 
sin (Chapter 3), and then Barth’s anthropology (Chapter 4) and doctrine of sin 
(Chapter 5). Some conclusions will be drawn from their approaches which will then 
be stated in a more widely applicable form as nine these (Chapter 6). A retmm to the 
terms of the Ford-Webster debate will also be included here. The aim is not only to 
explore theological method, but also to show that the method developed can be stated 
in a form applicable for other areas of theology.
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CHAPTER 2 
Secular Discourse in Alistair McFadyen’s 
Theological Anthropology
1. Introduction
The primary task in this chapter is to examine the role of secular discourse in 
Alistair McFadyen’s theological anthropology. This will be done by means of the 
secondary task, viz., explication of his theological anthropology. Broadly speaking, 
most of McFadyen’s publications are centred around either theological antliropology 
or the doctrine of sin. For the most part McFadyen’s earlier works focus on the 
former, and his more recent works on the latter. This chapter will consider 
McFadyen’s theological anthropology concentrating predominantly on his first book. 
The Call to Personhood, but all of his publications concerned with theological 
antliropology will also be considered.^ It was approximately 1993 when McFadyen’s 
publications shifted from theological anthropology to the doctrine of sin.^ These later 
works reveal an important development primarily in content but also in form. 
Consequently they will be considered in Chapter 3.
Before engaging in the primary task, it is worth highlighting two important 
influences on McFadyen’s thought. The first is Karl Barth. Barth’s thought can be
 ^ Alistair I. McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory o f the Individual in Social 
Relationships, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 [hereafter CTP]; Alistair I. McFadyen, 
‘The Call to Discipleship: Reflections on Bonhoeffer’s Theme 50 Years on’, in SJT, 43, 1990, pp461- 
483; Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘The Trinity and Human Individuality: The Conditions, for Relevance’, in 
Theology, 95, 1992, pplO-18; Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘Tmth as Mission: The Cliristian Claim to 
Universal Tmth in a Pluralist Public World’, in SJT, 46, 1993, pp437-456.
 ^ 1993 does not represent a break in McFadyen’s work, rather a general sliift. There is o f course strong 
continuity between his earlier and later works, the later often being dependent upon categories 
developed in tlie former.
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seen to impact McFadyen’s thinking at virtually every point, perhaps no where more 
clearly than in his methodology. Because one of the main tasks of the thesis is to 
compare McFadyen’s and Barth’s thought, no more will be said on this here. The 
other significant influence on McFadyen’s thought is his foiiner doctoral supervisor, 
Daniel Hardy. Haidy’s approach to theology can be seen to under-gird McFadyen’s 
thinking in a number of ways. In teims of form, it is probably fair to say that 
McFadyen’s work lies in tension between Hardy’s and Baith’s approaches.^ That is, 
McFadyen is impressed by the Barthian emphasis on revelation and the 
methodological primacy of Christology as well as Hardy’s concern to conduct 
theology through what David Ford calls ‘the interplay of disciplines’."^ hi terms of 
content, a number of key themes which are central to McFadyen’s work are 
prefiguied in Hardy’s. Perhaps most importantly is the centrality of the Trinity 
understood in both dynamic and relational teims. In this regard. Hardy often 
describes God in terms of “a dynamic stmctured relationality” -  a plirase which could 
easily have been written by McFadyen’s hand.^ Other key themes which occur 
fiequently in Haidy’s work which are also evident in McFadyen’s are: the emphasis 
on relationality and community, the importance of praise and worship (which is 
understood as the orientation of life to God), the ‘ecology’ of God and creation, 
ecclesiology and, of course, engagement or ‘interweaving’ with other disciplines.^
 ^ Notably tliis might also be argued for David Ford whose work carries some strong resemblances to 
McFadyen’s, especially in terms of the Bartliian influence combined with the desire for ‘conversations’ 
witli otlier disciplines. Ford has also been heavily influenced personally by Daniel Hardy whilst 
teaching in Bhmingham.
David F. Ford, ‘Introduction: The Arcliitecture of Life with God’, in David F. Ford and Dennis 
Stamps (eds.). Essentials o f Christian Community: Essays for Daniel W Hardy, Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1996, p3.
 ^Daniel W. Hardy, ‘The Question of God in “God’s Action in the World’”, Consultation on Theology 
and Science, CTI, Princeton, 1994 (Unpublished), cited in ‘Introduction: The Architecture of Life with 
God’,p l7 .
® See for instance: Daniel W. Hardy, ‘Christ and Creation’, in Thomas F. Tonance (ed.), The 
Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed À.D. 381, Edinburgh: The 
Handsel Press, 1981, pp88-110, Daniel W. Hardy and David F. Ford, Jubilate: Theology in Praise,
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Having highlighted two key influences on McFadyen’s theological 
development, we can now set out the structure of this chapter. We will begin by 
considering McFadyen’s self-understanding of his task (method). We will then 
consider what McFadyen actually does by focusing on some key aspects of his 
anthropology (content). This will not be so much a summaiy of his anthr opology as a 
review of the broad outlines or key loci of his thought. McFadyen’s argument can get 
very detailed and at times a little opaque, and so it is by considering his overall 
structur e, both as he intends it and as we read it, that we can see more clearly the role 
of secular- discourse in his theological anthropology. Finally, we will focus 
specifically on the role of secular- discourse in McFadyen’s theological anthropology.
2. McFadyen on Method
Three of McFadyen’s concerns which are crucial for revealing his 
understanding of his method can be identified early on in The Call to Personhood'. the 
task of theology, the book’s genesis, and its overall structure. These will be talcen in 
turn.
1. McFadyen’s understanding of the task of theology is crucial for 
understanding both the form and content of the bulk of his publications, and is also
London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984, Daniel W. Hardy, ‘Created and Redeemed Sociality’, in 
Colin E. Gunton and Daniel W. Hardy (eds.), On Being the Church: Essays on the Christian 
Community, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989, pp21-47, Daniel W. Hardy, ‘God and the Form of Society’, 
in Daniel W. Hardy and Peter H. Sedgwick (eds.), The Weight o f Gloiy: A Vision and Practice for 
Christian Theology. The Future o f  Liberal Theology: Essays for Peter Baelz, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1991, pp l31-144, Hardy and Sedgwick (eds.). The Weight o f Glory, Daniel W. Hardy, ‘The Future of 
Theology in a Complex World’, in Hilary D. Regan and Alan J. Torrance (eds.), Christ and Context: 
The Confrontation between Gospel and Culture, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993, pp21-42, Daniel W. 
Hardy, ‘The Spirit o f God in Creation and Reconciliation’, in Hilary D. Regan and Alan J, Torrance 
(eds.), Christ and Context: The Confrontation between Gospel and Culture, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1993, pp237-258, and Daniel W. Hardy, ‘A Magnificent Complexity: Letting God be God in Church, 
Society and Creation’, in David F. Ford and Dennis Stamps (eds.), Essentials o f Christian Community: 
Essays for Daniel W. Hardy, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996, pp307-356.
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critical for the broader concern of this thesis. For these reasons I cite him at some 
length:
The theological task, in my understanding of it, has two poles: to understand and 
critically reflect upon Chiistian doctrine, tradition and history on the one hand, and the social, 
cultmal and intellectual world in which we are living on tlie other. .., These are not two tasks 
but dual elements of a single task. Critical engagement with the world as a whole is an 
essential element of the theological task of formulating an understanding of Chiistian tradition 
and of the contemporary situation wliich illuminates Christian faith together witli the world 
and tiiereby clarifies what responsible existence in it might mean/
To put it another way, the very task of theology necessarily involves engaging 
with secular discourse. McFadyen rightly recognises both the need for critical 
reflection upon the ‘deposit of faith’, and also upon our situation. As ‘dual elements 
of a single task’, McFadyen also highlights the fact that all theology is necessarily a 
culturally embodied activity, and so it is an essential, if not the primary task of 
theology to engage critically with both of these poles.^ Although most theological 
reflection recognises the determinacy of the situation, it does not often take the step of 
engaging specifically with the second pole. McFadyen rightly argues that critical 
engagement with the contemporary situation, is not only an element of Christian 
theology, but that Christian theology is illuminated by engagement with secular 
discourse and helps clarify how we are to live responsibly in the contemporaiy 
situation. In short, engagement with seculai* discomse is not a choice for the 
theologian, it is part of the very process of doing theology.
McFadyen’s distinctive contribution to theological method can be seen in his 
view that engagement with secular discourse illuminates Christian theology. This key 
element is clear in the backgroimd to The Call to Personhood and falls right at the
" CTP, pp 10-11.
® It might have been helpful to have had some discussion from McFadyen about the position, from 
which this is to be done. There is no ‘neutral’, or ‘objective’ position from which both poles can be 
critically assessed.
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heart of his following book Bound to Sin? It is for this reason that McFadyen is 
prepared to, and indeed does take seculai' discourse seriously as part of the theological 
task. For McFadyen, this entails ‘two rules of theological discomse’, which again I 
quote in some length:
The first [Rule] represents the Barthian understanding of the primacy o f God in 
theological method which has somehow to reflect and to retain the fact that God comes first 
and transcends all human reality. The second [Rule] is the understanding that, 
notwithstandhig the primary orientation of theology on God alone, theology and theologians 
are itiformed by their determinate situation which constitutes, in part, a culturally specific way 
of going about and perceiving things. It is my belief and hope that accepting die socially 
determinate character of Cliristian faith and dieology, and bringing then insights into open 
dialogue with secular thought, will lead to a mutually emiching encounter in which the 
perspectives of the participants, whilst never ceasing to be distinctively dieir own, are 
transformed and are brought into ever closer engagement with one anodier as we consider 
how we and our world are best to be understood and responsibly transformed}^
Although prepared to take secular discomse seriously, McFadyen is keen to 
avoid reducing theology to anthropology. Consequently, McFadyen’s First Rule 
affirms unambiguously the (Barthian) priority of God in theological method. 
However, it is worth mentioning at this point that McFadyen does not explain exactly 
what is meant by the priority of God in theological method. At the very least 
McFadyen is referring to the general point that the pressure of interpretation moves 
from a theology determined by God’s self-revelation to secular discourse. However, 
this could have a more specific reference, refemng for instance to the priority of 
grace, of theological language, of the doctrine of God, Christology, and so on. 
McFadyen’s Second Rule is more straightforward and recognises that the First Rule 
camiot be applied apaif from within a deteiminate, or culturally embodied situation, 
hi short, McFadyen’s First and Second Rules are, for him, necessaiy but insufficient 
conditions for the theological task.
 ^Alistair I. McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust, and the Christian Doctrine o f Sin, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
CTP, p l2  (my italics).
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These Rules clearly have important implications for McFadyen’s method in 
which he wants to bring theology into ‘open dialogue’ with secular thought. 
McFadyen intends a ‘dialogue’ such that the distinctive contributions of both theology 
and secular thought aie maintained and taken seriously on their own terms (i.e. from 
within their own frameworks of understanding), but also that they can be mutually 
enriching. Theology can learn from secular discourse and secular discourse can learn 
fr om theology. Again the distinctness of McFadyen’s approach is clear. He does not 
want to subsume secular discomse within theology, nor does he want to 
‘accommodate’ the Chiistian faith to contemporary cu ltu re .R ather, the keeping of 
McFadyen’s two Rules will ensme that theology is done responsibly within culture, 
without being responsible to cultme. hi other words, theology is done with a critical 
awareness of secular discomse, but the operative criteria for theology are detennined 
by the Chiistian faith not secular d i s c o u r s e . I t  is McFadyen’s concern for the 
responsible transformation of the world that leads to the second aspect of McFadyen’s 
understanding of his method.
2. From the outset McFadyen emphasises both that the genesis of the book 
aiises from his own experience of nmsing in a psychiatric hospital, and that his 
concern throughout is with practice. The book has a practical root and is ultimately
And so McFadyen does not fall into either of the two polar positions of H. Richard Niebuln’s well- 
known typology (H. Richard Niebulir, Christ and Culture, New York: Harper Torch Books, 1975).
“What I intend, Üierefore, is not simply a new recourse to traditional Christian apologetics, and much 
less is it a simple recoiuse to a Barthian form of Dogmatic theology. I am more willing to take tlie 
risks of a meaningful and open dialogue with non-CIiristian thought than the latter would allow. As 
regards the former, I am not seeking to justify to non-Christians conclusions reached within tiie circle 
of faMi tlirough independent theological reflection by dressing them up in the language of secular 
tliought.” (CTP, ppl 1-12).
McFadyen’s concern with praxis is not exclusive to liis early works. In many ways, it is not until he 
develops his doctrine o f sin that the practical relevance of his anthropology becomes clear. See: 
Alistair I. McFadyen, with Helga Hanks, and Catli Adams, ‘Ritual Abuse: A Definition’, in Child 
Abuse Review, 2/1. 1993, pp35-41; Alistair I. McFadyen, witli David F. Ford, ‘Praise’, in Peter 
Sedgwick, (ed.), God in the City, London: Mowbray, 1995, pp95-104; Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘Crime
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intended to have some kind of practical application. McFadyen’s theological interest 
in ‘what it is to be a person’ (cf. Rule 1) arose from an actual situation in which he 
was confronted by ‘what it is to be a person’ (cf. Rule 2). Put differently, 
McFadyen’s concern with practice is a concern to engage with the world and for this 
reason has significant implications for the ‘theology of culture’. This of course ties in 
well with McFadyen’s ‘basic premise’ that: “We become the people we are through 
our relationships with others”. At this point it becomes cleai' that the content is to 
have an important bearing on the form and also our broader concern for the relation 
between secular* discourse and the theology.
McFadyen’s theological concern to answer ‘some very basic questions’ -  
“Wliat is a person? What is individual identity, and where does it come from? What 
makes us the people we are?” -  arises from practical experience and is intended to 
mfluence the way we live. These questions are to be answered through an ‘open 
dialogue’ with secular thought.'^ Thus, at the very heart of McFadyen’s agenda, lies a 
connection between the two Rules, and also between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. To put it 
another way, the content (‘we become the people we are through our relationships 
with others’) necessarily determines the form of the argument (the relation between 
Rule 1 and Rule 2), and at the same time, the form (the relation between Rule 1 and 
Rule 2) is to deteimme the nature of the content (‘we become the people we are 
tlu'ough our relationships with others’). In trying to make sense of the various 
dimensions of personal existence -  “the psychological, the social, the interpersonal.
and Violence: The UFA as the Place of Demons?’, in Peter Sedgwick, (ed.), God in the City, London: 
Mowbray, 1995, ppl78-190; Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘The Abuse of the Family’, in Hugh S. Pyper, (ed.). 
The Christian Family: A Concept in Crisis, Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1996, ppl02-117; Alistair 
I. McFadyen, ‘Healing the Damaged’, in David F. Ford, and Dennis Stamps, (eds.). Essentials o f  
Christian Community, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996, pp91-103.
CTP, pxi.
"C 2P ,p l.
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the material, the political, the institutional, the teclinical and the spiritual”^^  -  
McFadyen necessarily ties Rules 1 and 2 together, as well as theory and practice. It 
therefore comes as no surprise that the epilogue to an otherwise largely theoretical 
book seeks to “step further into the conceptuality I have been developing by exploring 
some of the ways in which it might be brought to beai* on practical situations... [and 
for readers] to find their own ways out of this theoretical interlude back into their own 
practical situations and continue their way of conceiving person and community 
there”.
Theological anthropology as McFadyen intends to develop it, is therefore 
inextricably connected to secular discourse. For McFadyen’s argument, ‘what it is to 
be a person’, can only be answered by attending to both theological and secular 
thought. The theological contribution is necessary because a secular* account of 
personhood is inadequate, lacking an understanding of what it is to be a creature 
before God. This aspect will come through par*ticularly clearly in Karl Barth’s 
anthropology in Chapter 4 below, but McFadyen also argues that personlrood is 
primarily a theological category. However, most theological accounts of personhood 
assume that it is legitimate to move immediately from relational concepts of the 
Trinity to human personlrood. These positions often overlook the question of how 
one moves from divine to human relations, and furthermore, rarely develop human 
relations with reference to sociological accounts. The result is often a relational 
theological anthropology that has taken insufficient account of the actual relations 
through which persons are constituted, most notably institutional relations. By way of 
contrast, the content of McFadyen’s theological anthropology means that his
CTP, p2.
CTP, p271.
One of McFadyen’s great strengths is that he unambiguously avoids both traps. See CTP, and esp. 
McFadyen, ‘The Trinity and Human Individuality’.
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argument takes the form of both theological and secular accounts. In short, because 
he takes account of both theological and secular theories, his anthropology is more 
developed than many other relational anthropologies. We turn now more directly to 
his method.
3. The overall structure of The Call to Personhood clearly demonstrates both 
McFadyen’s understanding of the task of theology, and his desire to have his ‘theory’ 
connect with ‘practice’. It also indicates the way in which McFadyen intends secular 
discourse to interact with theology. The book is divided into four parts, hi Part I, 
McFadyen considers persons in relation to God. Consequently, he lays out his basic 
theological axioms: a doctrine of the Trinity conceived in terms of inter-personal 
relations, and an understanding of call as central to redemption. Part II focuses on 
social relations, or the socio-psychological aspects of personlrood by drawing from 
the work in psychology and philosophy of science of Rom Harré. hr short, persons 
are formed by the ‘sedimentations’ of their relationsliips. Part m  turns more directly 
to interpersonal relations, that is, how persons are redeemed through relationships in a 
process of ‘recontextualisation’, and Part IV considers the role of political relations or 
institutions in constituting personhood.
McFadyen is keen to stress that his theology and social thought have 
developed in intrinsic interrelation and have been mutually informative.’^  
McFadyen’s Rules 1 and 2 are indeed intended to be part of a single task. Although 
Part I is the most exclusively theological, it is informed by the social thought 
following it. Similarly, Pari H, which is probably the least explicitly theological, is 
intrinsically theological as ar e Paris III and IV. The latter parts are intended, in part,
This is o f course true more widely as stated in Chapter 1 above.
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to clarify and develop the theological position set out in Part I. As such, the structure 
of the book is to take the form of a dialogue between theological and secular thought. 
This again is tied to the content, in two ways.
First, McFadyen’s “basic conception of the person in this discussion is both 
dialogical (formed through social interaction, thr'ough address and response) and 
dialectical (never coming to a rest in a final unity, if only because one is never 
removed fi'om relation)”.^  ^ hr regard to content, this enables McFadyen to develop 
his imderstanding of personhood as relational subjects of communication which 
makes it impossible to think of persons as having a clearly defined ‘centre’, hr regard 
to method, there is similarly no straightforward centre, rather a dialogue and 
dialectical interaction between two forms of discourse; theological and secular. As a 
dialogue, both forms of discourse can be mutually informative and critical of the 
other, as well as maintaining their own distinctness.^’ As dialectic, there is an 
ongoing dialogue between theological and secular discourses because they will not 
come to a final resolution. Because of the dialogical interplay of the dialectic, 
McFadyen describes his central themes as ‘interweaving’. This means that it is not 
possible to identify an all-embracing centre to McFadyen’s anthropology. Rather, the 
key elements have to be identified in the aclmowledgement that it is in the 
interweaving of these themes, the constant dialogical interplay of the dialectic, that a 
gradual picture can emerge.
Secondly, McFadyen’s aim in the book is to steer “something of a mid-course 
between individualism and collectivism, which can do justice to personal fr eedom and
CTP, p9.
There may be forms of Üieological and secular discourse that are simply incommensurable. That is, 
the distinction between theology and some forms of secular discourse may be so vehement and in 
explicit antagonism to each other that there is simply no possibility for dialogue. McFadyen does not 
mention this possibility but it is important to recognise that it might not always be possible for a 
‘mutually illuminating dialogue’.
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autonomy whilst simultaneously acknowledging the role of social relations and 
institutions”/^ It is precisely his attempt to constmct a ‘third option’ that leads him  to 
engage with secular discourse. Form the outset, McFadyen acknowledges his 
indebtedness to social philosophy which would noimally fall beyond the bounds of 
many theological discussions, but this engagement is a direct result of his attempting 
to construct a ‘third option’. Again this means that McFadyen necessarily engages 
with secular* discourse because of his content and so his content informs his method, 
but his method -  that of engaging with secular discoiuse -  also necessarily informs 
his content. Form and content camiot be separated. Hence, my primar*y aim (to 
examine McFadyen’s use of secular discourse in his theological anthropology) can 
only be done with recourse to the secondary aim (explication of his theological 
anthropology). It is to the secondary aim that we now direct om* attention.
3. McFadyen's Content
It is clear* by now that McFadyen intends to engage with secular* discourse as 
par t of his theological task, and that this is necessary given his intended content, but 
we will now consider what McFadyen actually does. Does he successfully integrate 
theological and secular discourse, maintain Rules 1 and 2, as he intends? More to the 
point, how does McFadyen actually integrate theological and secular discourse? To 
what extent is his dialogue a ‘genuine’ dialogue?
hi this section, I intend to identify the key streams of McFadyen’s thought that 
‘interweave’ forming his ‘content’. As stated above, this is not so much a surmnar*y 
of his anthropology, although to some extent it is this by necessity, as a review of the 
broad outlines of his thought so that the interaction between theological and secular
22 p5 sgg also p224.
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discourse will become more apparent. In doing this I will follow McFadyen’s 
structure but try to identify the key loci functioning in each part rather than giving a 
straightfoiwai'd summary of the parts. This will be done with an eye open to the way 
theological and secular discour se interacts throughout the book.
3.i Persons in Relation to God
Two key theological axioms can be identified in McFadyen’s thought: human 
existence in the image of the trinitarian God/^ and the normativity of the call of 
Christ for personal identity.^'’ In developing both axioms, McFadyen also places 
some of the central concepts of the book into a theological setting, and further, 
suggests that this is the most adequate way of doing justice to personhood. hr short, 
secular accounts of personhood are inadequate on their own. McFadyen’s ‘basic 
position’ is that persons have to be understood in social terms, that is, they are 
somehow the product of their relations, both vertically and horizontally. It is in 
developing this basic ar-gument that a theological approach is outlined centring around 
these two axioms which will now be considered in their respective order.
1. McFadyen develops his understanding of human beings as relational by 
developing the theological concept of human existence in the image of the trinitarian 
God. He begins by making a distinction between the vertical image, the constitution 
of human beings through relation to God, and the horizontal image, the constitution of 
human beings in the sphere of human relations. Both the vertical and horizontal
CTP, Chapter 1; McFadyen, ‘The Trinity and Human Individuality’,
CTP, Chapter 2; McFadyen, ‘The Call to Discipleship’; McFadyen, ‘Tmth as Mission’.
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images are developed through some fundamental categories which are important for 
the book as a whole.
A ‘personal relationship’ is defined by McFadyen as: “an encormter between 
two or more partners who are different, who have some independence and autonomy 
in the relation and who may therefore engage with each other on the basis of fr eedom 
rather than coercion. ... [A] personal relation is one characterised by the call and 
response, the gift and retrmi of dialogue”.^  ^ The two key expressions here are ‘call 
and response’ and ‘dialogue’, which in one way or another undergirds the relational 
structure of personhood throughout the book.
hr relation to the vertical image, thanks and praise are thought to be the 
appropriate response to God’s creative, sustaining, and redemptive activity, hr 
providing space for free human response to the divine address, human being is 
intended to be God’s dialogue-partner. Consequently, human being is to be described 
as ‘being-in-partnership ’ with God. Human being as dialogue-partner is emphatically 
not a static conception, but an active response to an external address and therefore an 
ongoing communication in dialogical form. This dynamic is to be understood in 
terms of grace. That is, from God’s side there is respect for freedom and 
independence and an absence of over-determination or coercion. However, in 
creating the possibility of a free response of thanksgiving, there is also the possibility 
of misunderstanding, wrong orientation, and therefore a corrupt or distorted response, 
hr the very structme of freedom given in the divine intention for dialogue-parlnership, 
there is therefore the possibility of distortion. This means that the image of God can 
be corrupted or distorted, but not lost. It is an ontological structm e of human being.
^ CTP, ppl 8-19.
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The ontological stincture of freedom is the necessary (but insufficient) 
condition for human response to God’s address, and it is the making of such a 
response that is fundamental to personhood. McFadyen writes: “When grace (the 
determination of the relation from God’s side) is met with thanksgiving (the 
responding acceptance of this determination on the human side), then htmian life has 
an undistoried structure”.^  ^ Put another way, as an ontological statement about the 
constitution of human being, it is important to attend to the kind or quality of 
relations. McFadyen argues that the appropriate response to God’s Word is a ‘being- 
in-gratitude’ which constitutes the vertical image. Although this may be the ‘right’ 
response, human beings are free not to respond and therefore not to answer the call to 
be God’s dialogue-partners, hr such cases, human beings remain in relation to God 
but in a fundamentally distorted way. As McFadyen puts it: “the form of God’s 
address determines the structure of human being as response without determining the 
form or content of that response”.^  ^ hr McFadyen’s thinking, as God’s address 
constitutes the ontological structur e of human being as relational, and for McFadyen 
the vertical image is primary, this means that accounts of personhood that do not take 
into consideration theological discourse are fundamentally inadequate. This too is 
why McFadyen places the theological account at the beginning so that the primacy of 
God is maintained in theological method (theocentric theology), and theological 
anthropology is in less danger of talk of humanity replacing talk of God 
(antliropocentric theology).
hr relation to the horizontal image, the divine image remains first and foremost 
a theological term not an anthropological term even though it is to apply to the social 
refraction of the history of response. Put differently, to rmderstand the form of social
^CTP,p21. 
CTP, p22.
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beings imaging God (analogatum), McFadyen starts by enquiring about the God who 
is reflected in human form {analogans)?^ This God is of course the trinitarian God.
McFadyen proposes an orthodox understanding of the Trinity as “a imique 
community of Persons in which Person and relation are independent moments in a 
process of mutuality”.^  ^ The Father, Son, and Spirit are Persons in relation and 
Persons only through relation. They are only Persons insofar as they exist in and for 
others. Consequently, ‘personal identity’ refers to “the communicative form (the 
stance in relations; the form taken in call and response) wliich a person habitually 
takes and which endiues through a plurality of relations within which personal being 
is both given and received”.^ ’’ The identity of the Persons of the Trinity depends upon 
the Persons’ incommunicable Personalities, that is, the unique pattern of 
communication which establishes the individual and non-exchangeable nature of each 
person such that one is not reducible to the character of the relations between the 
Persons. The Persons of the Trinity both share the divine nature and have their 
particular unique identities existing as Persons only in relation. They are Persons only 
insofar* as they are related, but are distinct from one-another and are not reducible to 
one or the totality of their relations.^’ It is the orientation toward the other, living 
beyond one’s borders, and a radical opermess to and for one another which constitutes 
personal existence in this imique commrmity. hr shor*t: “personal identity and
^ Again I emphasise that McFadyen avoids a methodological flaw (postulating a direct correlation 
between divine and human personhood) which characterises many relational anthropologies which he 
outlines in ‘The Trinity and Human Individuality’.
CTP, p27.
CTP, p27.
Contra Harriet A. Harris, ‘Should we say that Personlrood is Relational?’, in SJT, 51/2, 1998, pp214- 
234, in which Hanis takes issue with die implication in McFadyen’s thought that persons are reducible 
to their relations. McFadyen explicitly negates this; “Persons are a manifestation of their relations, 
formed tiirough though not simply reducible to them” {CTP, p40).
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individuality are neither asocial nor presocial, but arise out of one’s relations and 
community with others”/^
The structure of the Trinity is not only open with regard to the internal 
relations but also the external relations, that is, towards creation. Through the 
trinitarian history of creation-redemption human beings are drawn into a form of life 
which is a creaturely reflection of the trinitarian God. Therefore, “[j]ust as the 
Persons of the Trinity receive and maintain their identities through relation, and 
relations of a certain quality, then so would human persons only receive and maintain 
their identities through relation with others and would stand fully in God’s image 
whenever these identities and relations achieved a certain quality”.^  ^ The image of 
God is therefore to be conceived in relational terms.
The key notion here, adding to the earlier categories of ‘call and response’ and 
‘dialogue’, is ‘mutuality’. All three categories are used to explicate the horizontal 
image more fully, mainly through male and female relations, but also marriage, 
family, and fall-redemption. Sexual differentiation is considered as a paradigm for 
humanity and points to the fact that God intends both distinction and relation in God’s 
image. Humanity is only fully in the image of God where it is lived in dialogical 
encounter, call and response, and reciprocal mutuality. As such it is diachronic 
(proceeding tlrrough time), dialectical (does not overcome difference, never coming to 
a final imity), and dialogical (a relation of mutuality and reciprocity). The image 
refers to the form of relation and not any specific medium or content of it.
As the image is construed in relational terms, the structure of human and 
personal being can be seen to be ex-centric, that is, persons are orientated on
CTP, p29. 
"CTP, p31.
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themselves or ‘centied’ by moving towards the reality of others/'’ In short, human 
being “is defined by the form of its response to God’s offer of dialogue partnership”/^ 
The doctiine of original sin means that instead of entering into free and thankful 
relation with God we have become orientated upon ourselves and are therefore in 
God’s image in a distorted way and consequently also relate to ourselves in a distorted 
way.
2. McFadyen’s second theological axiom is the call to discipleship or the call 
of Christ. Although the call-response dynamic was important in the previous section, 
McFadyen now develops it more fully Christologically. As the Word of God, Jesus 
Christ is God’s redemptive address to humankind. But he is also the perfect human 
response to that address from the human side. To put it another way, it is in Jesus 
Christ that God’s call and proper human response coincide, and as such, Christ is the 
enacting of the image in its frillness. Therefore, “[t]o be frilly in God’s image, to 
make a right response to God and others, is... to be conformed to Chiist”.^  ^
‘Confbimity to Christ’ is, for McFadyen, another key category for personhood. Clrrist 
is the paradigmatic form of God’s redemptive address, and also the paradigm of the 
intended form of response, and so, it is by conforming to Christ that our relationships 
are properly structured. This hasic position is unpacked hy McFadyen in a number of 
ways.
First, McFadyen considers the original calling of the disciples by Clrrist. The 
call individualises them by forcing them to ‘stand out’ from their present context, and
Cf. John Zizioulas who writes; “personhood implies the ‘openness of bemg’, and even more than 
that, tlie ekstasis o f being, i.e. a movement towards communion wliich leads to a transcendence of the 
boundaries of the ‘se lf and thus to fi'eedom'^ (Jolin D. Zizioulas, ‘Human Capacity and Human 
Incapacity: A Theological Exploration o f Personhood’, SJT, 1975, p408).
"  CTP, p44.
CTP, p47.
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to this extent they are ‘decontextualised’. The disciples are removed from their 
relational and social context. But they are then ‘reconstituted’ as new individuals as 
they are incorporated into a different relation and relational context. The emphasis is 
therefore placed on the recontextualisation in response to an external address (call).^  ^
It is the call of Jesus that reconstitutes the disciples as new individuals, and not the 
linear development of their previous identities. They ar e transformed in the creative 
power of the call.
Second, the call comes to and transforms concrete persons. The old identity is 
involved, and is somehow still recognisable, but there is a transformed orientation, a 
reconstituted identity empowered by an external address. Consequently, there is 
discontinuity between the old and the new, hut not to the extent that there is a 
completely new beginning, as well as continuity in that the new is a transformation of 
the old. The old endures in a transformed way.
Third, the call shatters all claims to independence and self-orientation. The 
disciples self-orientation has been displaced by orientation to Christ. They were 
empowered through the Holy Spirit for this new orientation, and so were no longer- 
dependent upon their own resources.
And fourth:
Individuality is reconstituted in tins response [to the call] tluough a 
recontextualisation in which tlie relation witli God (the God context) becomes absolutely 
determinative. It is a recontextualisation in a double sense, tlien: as one is placed in the 
context of God’s redemptive communication one receives a new orientation in one’s social 
context, and so a new form of communicative subjectivity, a new way of being in relations.^®
All this is to say that discipleship means orientation out of oneself in the 
service of others. Consequently, “[a] properly orientated individuality and a
McFadyen’s position here is not dissimilar from Miroslav V olfs dynamic of ‘exclusion and 
embrace’, or more specifically fire receiving of the self o f a ‘new centre’ which is actually a de-centred 
centre. See Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration o f  Identity, Otherness, 
and Reconciliation, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996, Chapters II and III, esp. pp69-71,
"  CTP, p56.
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genuinely responding relation must be thought of in Chiistiaii terms as confoimity to, 
and the presence of, Christ”/^ It is only in conforming to Christ that our relations 
take on an undistorted character. A relation is conformed to Christ insofar as Christ is 
present in it, that is when it tends towards an undistorted dialogical structure of call 
and response. It is in and through this dialogical relatedness that the partners are 
properly structured and conform to Christ. Conformity to Christ, therefore, concerns 
both elements of being-in-relation, that is, individuality and relation.
McFadyen’s second axiom -  the call to discipleship or the call to Christ -  
develops some of the categories of the first axiom: dialogue, mutuality, and especially 
call and response. This dynamic is thought through Christologically taking Christ’s 
call of the disciples as the paradigm. The call of Christ ‘recontextualises’ the 
disciples’ relational nexus as they are conformed to Clrrist. ‘Conformity to Christ’ 
becomes a key category which stmctures properly constituted relations and therefore 
persons.
McFadyen’s argument opens by setting out a theological framework for 
understanding personhood. The placing of the most explicitly theological section of 
the book at the begimiing suggests that McFadyen thus far is keeping Rule 1, the 
priority of God in theological method. Furthermore, the form of his argument 
(method) is necessitated by his understanding of the ontological structure of human 
being determined by the form of God’s address (content). This leads McFadyen to 
develop four main categories, to which a fifth will be added shortly. These four 
categories can he summarised as the dynamic of call and response; dialectical 
dialogue, reciprocal mutuality; and confonnity to Clrrist. The fifth category, which
"  CTP, p58.
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will be developed in the next section, is the process of ‘sedimentation’. All of these 
categories also ‘inteiweave’ and are thereby closely connected. What is important to 
note at tliis stage is that they have been developed primarily on the basis of a 
theological approach, and will be worked through in relation to secular discourses. It 
is to this aspect that we now turn.
3./7 Social Relations
McFadyen’s main concern in the book is to conceive of personhood in social 
and communicative terms. We have already considered the theological axioms under- 
girding this aim, and so we now follow McFadyen as he focuses on how persons are 
formed. In doing this, McFadyen looks at the social context which determines the 
way in which persons enter into frameworks of communication, which in turn order 
the pattern of relations from which personal identity is ‘sedimented’. These ‘neutral’ 
structures which constitute personlrood are ontological.'”’
McFadyen’s basic position is that “individuals are formed through social 
processes, their identities sedimented from histories of significant relation”.'” Put 
another way, social relations take place within a given social context, and so personal 
identity is hound to the societal structures which constitute the relational nexus. 
Interpersonal exchanges are therefore conducted according to a social code, a 
semantic system. The recognition that personhood is dependent upon both the wider 
social network and individual relations is to be developed primarily on the basis of 
secular discourse, in this case the psychology and philosophy of science of Rom
McFadyen wrongly calls these structures ‘neutral’ {CTP, p71), on the basis that distorted and 
undistorted relations may occur. If these ontological stmctures are the processes tinough which 
personhood is constituted, they are anything but neutral, rather, they are ambiguous.
CTP, p72.
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HaiTé. McFadyen’s Rule 2 (critical engagement with the determinate situation) is 
now coming to the fore. He has sketched some key facets of personhood on the basis 
of a theological framework, which are now to be explored by taking secular discourse 
seriously on its own terms, i.e., without imposing a procmstean theological 
framework on them. He allows non-Christian discourses their own voice. McFadyen 
identifies some key structures on the basis of Hairé’s work which we now briefly 
summarise.
1. A person is socially and physically embodied. The hasis for a person to be 
a responsible subject of communication is that he/she recognise themselves to be a 
singular, unified self. This self-recognition of themselves as persons is secondary and 
derives from public recognition which is primary. It is primarily through a public 
structure that a person is recognised as a potential subject of and locus for- 
communication. Persons are publicly recognisable as distinct and continuous 
locations, and therefore afforded a public identity by virtue of the fact of their 
embodiment in the physical and social dimensions of the public sphere. Public 
embodiment (socially and physically) and public recognition are the primary sources 
of personal identity, hr short: “The fact of this ernhodirnent in both dimensions of the 
public world as a imique point location, and its consequent recognition hy others in 
communication and relation with one, together constitute the source of the 
imderstanding of one’s identity as distinct and personal, and for the particular and 
unique character of identity”.'’^
The possibility of communication is founded upon the physical world, but the 
communication itself upon the social world. More specifically, the body is an
“®crp,p77.
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important element in public recognition of personal identity (the physical world), but 
individuals ar e constituted as persons thr ough social processes of communication and 
exchange (the social world), not physical processes, hr other words, the body is a 
crucial aspect of personal identity, but identity cannot be reduced to the body, nor can 
the body be rmderstood in static terms. Rather, the hody itself has a communicative 
dynamic and the person is formed through cormnunication and relation. ‘Personal 
identity’ “denotes the way in which one enters communication and relates to 
others”.'’^  Persons ar e foimded upon physical emhodiment but ar e primarily social.
2. Persons can be located in space time by using two ‘locating grids’: physical 
space-time and social space-thne. Both grids are important and used together, they 
map the co-ordination of persons and the content of their commimication. This is 
done primarily through the use of indices which locate the communication hoth in 
physical space-time (‘here’, ‘there’, ‘then’, ‘now’, ‘next’), and in social space-time 
(personal pronoims). The former relates to spatio-temporal location of the body, and 
the latter to socio-psychological phenomena which constitute personal and social life. 
These grids must be anchored by a particular location, in these cases the ‘I’, but can 
also be located by proper names which are publicly identifiable. However, use of 
proper names only indicates competence in the procedures for public identification of 
persons, whereas use of a pronoun indicates a more generalised communicative 
competence -  to contribute to and participate in social communication. In the second 
case, the ‘I’ has the ability to locate others spatio-temporal location and their inter- 
cormnunication. Put simply, one ‘body-in-motion’ has recognised another ‘body-in- 
motion’ as a potential interlocutor. The ‘I’ has become a subject of communication.
" CTP, p78.
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3. Communication processes are conducted thr ough a determinate but relative 
social code. There are various groimd rules, often implicit, which structure or codify 
the relation by indicating the socially valid ways in which the T’ can be indexed, i.e., 
when it is appropriate for ‘me’ to be the subject, object or referent of communication, 
and also what the appropriate content of the communication may be.'’'’ For example, a 
different social code governs the way I relate to my wife, colleagues, bank manager, 
shop assistant, and so on, both physically and temporally. Access to social space-time 
in a local context will have different rules regulating what may or may not be 
appropriate. In short: “These social codes determine when, where and how, in 
relation to others and to their communication, a person may be recognised and 
expected as a contributor to social interaction”.'’^
The social world is structured through inter-personal communication. This 
means that social codes arise from previous personal communications, but also that 
they structure such commimications: “persons and the social structures and processes 
through which they are formed must be considered as codetermining and 
ontologically coincident realities”.'’^  hr addition to this (primary) social structure, a 
secondary structure can also be identified. This second structure constitutes the 
specific way in which a particular society is ordered: the regulation, distribution, and 
organisation of labour; social status; and internal psychological structures which 
regulate a person’s communication. The primary structure identifies persons as 
simple locations, but it is through the secondary structure that persons acquire a 
psychological structure which reflects the way in which the social world is structured 
enabling interaction with it.
4“* CTP, p83.
CTP, p84.
CTP, p85.
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These stmctures have significant implications for the understanding of the 
‘self. First, the self is essentially a public stmcture. By this McFadyen means that 
“the internal stmcture of persons (a psychological complex of ‘self) which organises 
a person’s communication is primarily a public stmcture and only secondarily 
appropriated by individuals as a private psychological complex”.'’’^ Second, the public 
stmctures which constitute personal identity are privately appropriated through 
‘personal centring’ (a person’s sense of identity). There is no personal core to the 
self, rather, personal centring is enabled by holding a belief or theory about oneself 
though which experience, communication, self-control, and responsibility become 
possible. Such a belief is also socially acquired primarily tiirough the use of language 
(especially personal pronorms). The locating grids of physical and social space-time, 
in which the world is refened to oneself, are crucial factors for personal centring.
Third, selfhood is an organisational process. It is therefore, not some kind of 
quasi-possession, rather, a theory which people have about themselves which 
facilitates personal existence. “The self’, in McFadyen’s words, “is an hypothesis 
used to refer to the organisational properties of an underlying ordered stmcture of 
which there is and can be no direct empirical experience”.'’^  This leads to a ‘distance’ 
between two aspects of selfhood. On the one hand, the ‘underlying ordered structure’ 
of the self is deeply embedded and removed fr om par ticular relations, what McFadyen 
calls the ‘deep self. The deep self is a transcendent point of unity behind a number of 
lower-level selves. On the other hand, a model of the self is generated by the deep 
self, which stmctures and organises communication and experience in a particular 
context. This is the ‘practical’ or ‘local self.
CTP, p90. 
CTP, plOO.
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All of the structures outlined above, and the resulting implications for an 
imderstanding of selfhood, can be centred around one guiding concept which can be 
added to the previous four categories of the dynamic of call and response; dialectical 
dialogue, reciprocal mutuality; and conformity to Christ. The fifth category is the 
process of ‘sedimentation’. Having considered the social relations through which 
persons are constituted, what McFadyen calls the process of ‘sedimentation’ should 
be reasonably clear without much description. As with the earlier four" categories, the 
process of sedimentation can be seen to under-gird loosely much of the above 
discussion, but is rar ely explicitly formulated.
‘Sedimentation’ can be described as “[t]he process whereby personal identity 
[the imique way of being and relating to an individual person] is accumulated thr ough 
a significant history of address and response which has flowed around a particular 
point location and gathered aroimd it in a unique way, so stiircturing a uniquely 
centred personal identity”.'’^  In other words, person is not a circumsciibable, static, 
self-contained object, rather, person is a dynamic category, an organisational centre, 
which is built up and changes over time. Identity is that aspect of a person which is 
‘settled’ or ‘deposited’ through a history of significant relations. It is a sedimented 
history of response which endures through time.
In summary, using Harré’s psychology and philosophy of science (secular 
discourse), McFadyen charts some physical and social sti*uctm*es through which 
relations are conducted. These structures lead to an understanding of the self which is 
essentially a puhlic stmcture where one’s sense of self is determined thr ough personal
CTP, p318.
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or internal centiing. As such, the self is an organisational process centring ar ound a 
personal core.
These social relations or structures are guided by sedimentation -  the process 
in which personal identity is constituted through significant histories of call and 
response. Sedimentation is a further category which can he added to the dynamic of 
call and response, dialectical dialogue, reciprocal mutuality and conformity to Christ, 
all of which are crucial loci for identifying and describing the self. These categories 
transcend both the theological and secular approaches from which they originated, as 
they are equally applicable in both kinds of discourse.
Thus far, McFadyen has remained trne to Rules 1 and 2: the primacy of God in 
theological method and critical engagement with the determinate situation. The first 
two parts correspond to these Rules, Part I being predominantly theological, and Part 
n  predominately secular. Rules 1 and 2 work together but in separate ways at this 
stage. Part I offers an essentially theological account of personhood as constituted by 
relations, and Part II offers a non-theological account of the structur e of relations 
primarily from a psycho-social perspective. In other words. Rules 1 and 2 
complement each other and describe important dimensions of personhood, but are not 
yet integr-ated in ‘dialogue’. The only obviously ‘dialogical’ material at this point are 
the five categories which highlight key aspects of personhood which shape both form 
and content. It is only in the next section that McFadyen begins to integrate Rules 1 
and 2 more fully and hence enter into a more genuine dialogue.
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3.ÜÎ Interpersonal Relations
McFadyen’s concern here is to offer an account of how persons are redeemed 
in their relationships, primarily through the process of ‘recontextualisation’. That is, 
McFadyen considers the modification that social relationships undergo when 
approached through the transfonnation that is brought about in relation to God. As 
human relations with God are reconstituted through Christ, so are horizontal relations. 
Redemption provides a new firamework of meaning, hut it is one that takes place 
within the already existing fi*ameworks in the social world. However, it transforms 
and relativises social fiameworks by providing a more significant context of 
communication. “Redemption”, according to McFadyen, “is a recontextualisation 
which brings a person into a new community with a redeemed pattern of 
intersubj ectivity”.^ ’’
All of the five categories: the dynamic of call and response, dialectical 
dialogue, reciprocal mutuality, conformity to Christ, and sedimentation are now 
crucial for the interweaving of the theological and secular- poles (Rules 1 and 2) in an 
account of redeemed relations.
As we have seen, McFadyen identifies the form of properly constituted 
relations as dialogue. Dialogue “is the undistor-ted form of relation tiirough which 
undistor-ted personal identities may he formed, as one becomes a person only by 
intending others as persons and by being so intended by others”. ’^ Put differently, 
dialogue is a structure of reciprocal intentions, a mutual co-intending. As such, it can 
be developed through the dynamic of call and response.
CTP, p i 15.
CTP, p 116.
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The identity of a person is formed (or deformed) tiirough the calTof others and 
God. Persons are called into heing by the expectations of others, which are mediated 
through their form of address. The range of communicative possibilities is restricted 
by the sedimentation of identity, that is, a tendency to enter into relations and 
communication in a certain way. As persons with particular identities and 
sedimentations of communicative histories, there are two possibilities for any 
particular relation. First, partners may simply reduplicate their previous identities 
without being changed into ‘different’ persons in any sense. One example of this 
might be the interaction between a shopkeeper and a customer, where, imless 
something decisive happens (a robbery? Or, even meeting at the railway station!), 
neither shopkeeper nor customer will understand their identity in a new way. Or 
second, the relation proves to he of such personal significance that the partners’ 
identity may be transformed by it. In this case, the ‘new sedimentation’ is always 
deposited upon a previously sedimented base, which is a prime determinant for 
meaning and significance for the person, although this may be restructured in the 
process.
In both of these cases, the past communication is orientated towards the future, 
but they can he of such a foim that no ‘development’ occuis, rather, there is such a 
discontinuity between the past identity and the future sedimentation that a breakdown 
of identity can occur. In both cases the new identity is a transformation of the old, but 
one is undistorted and the other is distorted. Undistoited relations are foimed to the 
extent that they conform to Christ and respond to Chiist’s call.
Jesus’ personal identity was marked by its liberatory aspect, that is, his call 
took the form of an open invitation to establish relations with people on a different 
basis from which they were currently contextualised. In short, Jesus found people in
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closed, broken and distorted communication contexts, and set them free by placing 
them in an alternative communication context from which a new identity could be 
sedimented. The significant difference between undistorted and distorted 
communication is that:
Interpersonal relations conformed to and transformed by the redemptive presence of 
Clnist are dialogical in form. In dialogue an address intends the other as a person, as an 
autonomous subject of communication. This means that... the addressee is none the less 
intended and expected as one who is not wholly determined by the initiating communication.^^
The undistorted form of address intends the other as a responsible subject 
orientated towards a genuine mutuality of understanding in dialogue. There is 
therefore an intention of unforced mutuality in an open dialogue. If one partner has a 
hidden agenda, and is therefore not genuinely present in the communication, his/her 
dialogue is not genuine and becomes distorted. There is consequently a relation 
between the form and content of an addiess. A mutuality of understanding occurs 
when the form and content of the relation match that which is intended in the 
communication.
A person is conformed to Christ in making a genuine response to the address 
of God and others. In conforming to Christ, one becomes a person for others which 
involves a radical openness to God and others in such a way that our present way of 
being and miderstanding of ourselves may be transformed by new information as we 
recognise a significant difference in the other. Response involves attending and 
returning to the other as he or she is present in communication. There is an openness 
to allow the call of others to transform us in response which leads to a renewed 
orientation or centredness on oneself and the other. However, identity is not 
structured by a total openness as this would lead to a vacuous self, but also a closure 
proper to an individually centred identity. There is, in other words, a (dialectical)
" CTP, pi 19.
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interplay between the identity intended by the caller and the self-intention and identity 
of the called. The process of self-foi-mation happens hoth diachionically and 
synchi'onically thiongh the sedimentation of the histoiy of significant relations. In 
short:
Call denotes tlie way in which one’s identity is informed by the spirit in which 
significant others enter mto relation with and intend one in communication. Response refers 
to the way in which one is defined by one’s own spirit of relation, the form in which one 
intends oneself and others in communication.^®
McFadyen brings both the theological and secular poles together in giving an 
account of redeemed relations. Thus far the focus has been on McFadyen’s use of the 
dynamic of call and response which draws into it some of the other categories: mutual 
reciprocity, dialectical dialogue, sedimentation, æid conformity to Christ. McFadyen 
further develops this basic framework by extending it to include ethical 
transcendence, (mutual) expectation, reflection, a more detailed consideration of 
dialogue, personal integrity, fidelity and commitment, and identification and 
resistance of distorted communication. However, as the basic elements are clear by 
now, further detail will only detiact from seeing the interaction between theological 
and secular discourses more clearly.
Methodologically, most of the categories that McFadyen has been using have 
been derived from the theological pole but transcend it and are therefore relevant for 
secular discourse as well. McFadyen’s discussion of Hairé suggests that these 
categories could have been developed without recourse to theological discourse.^'’
"  CTP, pl22.
A number of books have appeared since McFadyen’s, which are written from a secular perspective 
but pick up and develop many of these aspects. Most notable perhaps is Paul Ricoeur’s account of 
‘narrative identity’ as a response to tlie problem of personal identity. Whereas McFadyen identifies 
fidelity and commitment as important loci for die permanence of die self in time, Ricoeur expands 
these loci by focusing on character and keeping one’s word. See Paul Ricoeur, Oneself As Another, 
(dans.) Kathleen Blarney, Clncago: Cliicago University Press, 1992, esp. Chapters 5 and 6. Anodier 
very important book that is highly hidebted to Ricoeur’s analysis is Calvin O. Schrag, The Self After 
Postmodernity, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. To a lesser extent, Charles Taylor’s 
audioritative book also overlaps in places, especially Part 1 (Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self: The 
Making o f the Modem Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). See also Anthony
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Writing as a theologian, it obviously aids McFadyen’s task if theological dialogue 
transcends its own sphere, but this does not indicate why theological discourse is 
necessary to antliropology, especially when considered fonn a secular perspective. In 
short, if these categories could have come about without theological discouise why is 
theology actually pertinent to the discussion of personhood? One reviewer 
summarises the problem and McFadyen’s solution thus:
It is doubtless true that an entirely secular account of die formation of persons by the 
sedimentation of relationships can be given -  but not by McFadyen. ‘Clnist’ for him becomes 
an ontological principle, not just the norm for relationsliips, more a description of that power 
which enables redeemed relationships to be at all.^ ^
The answer, in other words, is that for McFadyen, ‘the presence of Christ’, 
‘confoimity to Chiist’ and ‘the call of Christ’ function as an ontological and foimal 
principle for undistorted relations and therefore fully realised personlrood 
(McFadyen’s second theological axiom in Part I). An account of all of the other main 
categories: the dynamic of call and response, dialectical dialogue, reciprocal 
mutuality, and sedimentation can he given without explicit reference to theology, but 
for McFadyen, this would not offer an adequate account of personhood as it would 
miss the most important dimension -  what it is to he a creature before God. This 
aspect is what a theological account can offer distinctively from a secular account.
However, a further problem arises. Although cmcial to McFadyen’s task, and 
also our discussion of the relation between theological and secular discourse, it is not 
always clear how ‘Chiist’ as an ontological or formal principle actually functions.^^ 
Three forms of the principle recur and are used interchangeably: the presence of
Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age, Oxford: Polity Press, 
1991; and Robert G. Dunn, Identity Crises: A Social Critique o f Postmodernity, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998.
Timothy Gorringe, ‘Review: The Call to Personhood’, in SJT, 46/1,1993, p i 15.
In addition to Hie issues explored in tlie main text, the danger of tliis kind of approach is that a 
‘principle’ tends not to recognise particularity. This is a charge often levelled against Barth’s 
Cliristology (see John Thompson, Christ in Perspective: Christological Perspectives in the Theology o f  
Karl Barth, Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1978, p5).
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Christ, confomiity to Chiist, and the call of Chiist. Recalling McFadyen’s second 
theological axiom in Part I, the call of Christ or the call to discipleship, there are a few 
clues:
Individuality is reconstituted in tins response [to Christ’s call] through a recontextualisation in 
which the relation with God (the God context) becomes absolutely determinative. It is a 
recontextualisation in a double sense: . . . a  new orientation in one’s social context, and... a 
new way o f being in relations.
Christ’s call recontextualises persons into a new meaning frame. ... [T]hey are 
recontextualised in a world which has remained objectively the same but which is transformed 
in their subjectivities and which is therefore intended by them in a different way in 
communication which may, in turn, lead them to ti'ansform it.^ ®
A relation is conformed to Christ... when it tends towards an undistorted dialogical sti'ucture 
o f call and response.^^
The key loci deriving fi'om the ‘Christ principle’ appeal* to be 
recontextualisation of the person’s orientation and meaning framework, and 
communication that tends towards an undistorted structure of call and response. 
However, when the principle is applied in Part HI when Rules 1 and 2 are placed into 
a genuine dialogue, it is not always apparent how the principle actually functions. 
There seems to be a number of ways in which the principle is significant for personal 
identity: the Christ principle individuates; ex-centrically orientates; centies; opens the 
self to the other, change, disappointment, and suffering; sti*uctures, recontextualises, 
transfoims and secures personal identity; explicates, provides a rational basis for 
communication; and reciprocally co-intends. The significance of McFadyen’s second 
theological axiom is appaient in general teims and appears throughout his argument, 
but the application becomes a bit more ‘fuzzy’ when applied to concrete situations. 
Part of the problem is that many secular accounts would also postulate many of these 
facets about personhood without reference to Christ. Of the variety of uses of the 
Chiist principle, two functions appear to be particularly significant.
C7P,p56 (my italics).
^^CTP,p57 (my italics).
^^CTP, p60 (my italics).
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First, a person is orientated or centred on him or herself as an autonomous 
subject of communication. Self-orientation is properly constituted only when it 
accompanies and seiwes an external orientation and responds to the communicated 
presence of God and others. The form of God’s Word communicates a particular 
intention and understanding of what it is to be a person in relation to God, and 
Chiist’s call is to make this understanding oui* own in a responsible existence before 
God and others. The presence of Christ is a formal principle of the relation informing 
expectation, intention, and understanding of self and the other. Put differently, God’s 
intention of and for us infoims a new self-understanding. It is in providing an 
affiimative response to God’s call that we are transformed into becoming full and 
genuine persons. In short, right response in and through confoi*ming to the presence 
of Clnist’s call enables us to become fully persons.
Second, thi*ough the orienting of the self toward God, the relationship to the 
other is recontextualised into a divine communication context in which it is possible 
to attend to the other as he or she should be. This is what it means to respond to the 
call of Christ: “The call of the person is genuinely heard when it is heard as the call of 
CMst present in that person as structuring a genuine individual identity. And the 
response is genuine when it is orientated towards a mutuality of understanding which 
is conformed to Chi*ist.”.‘^° In other words, the relation is structmed and ordered by 
the redemptive presence of the Word, not the words of the partner. Ultimately, it is 
Christ who is the formative principle.
It is not only the presence of Chi*ist that shapes personhood, but also the Holy 
Spirit. McFadyen gives surprisingly little place to the role of the Spirit in constituting 
identity, but there is one clear way in which the Spirit informs identity:
®®C7P,pl41.
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The Holy Spirit may also be understood in terms of energy, as tire divine energiser 
which dwells and acts in the world as the life-giving organisational energy o f open systems. 
The Holy Spirit may indwell and empower an individual's spirit, and so inform the person’s 
orientation towards ‘se lf (centredness) and openness to oüiers, the world and God. WTiere the 
Holy Spirit co-inlieres with that of Christ, divine energy is divinely ordered. When this co- 
inherence occius within a personal life, centredness and self-transcendence are genuinely 
stnrctmed as one is for oneself and otliers in a genuine way. *^
The Spirit’s role does go beyond the centring of individuals. In the 
“empowering co-inlierence of the Father, Son and Spirit” the hope of reaching a 
genuine mutuality of understanding can be sustained by f a i t h . Wh a t  is a bit peculiar 
in relation to McFadyen’s method and content, is that although human existence is in 
the image of the Trinity (McFadyen’s first theological axiom in Part I), very little 
attention is given to the significance of the (economic) Trinity (as distinct from the 
work of Clirist) for constituting personhood, and similarly the work of the Spirit in 
bringing about ‘conformity to Clnist’.^  ^ Additionally, McFadyen’s Christo logy is 
concerned primarily with the horizontal relation between Jesus and the rest of 
humanity, not the vertical relation between Jesus and the Father. Conversely, 
McFadyen’s explication of human relation fimction both vertically and horizontally. 
It is not clear, therefore, what the mediating role of Jesus’ divinity plays in this regard 
(i.e. humanity-Jesus-God?).
Related to this, McFadyen underestimates the role of eschatology in the 
constitution of the person, and especially personal identity (or, what it means to be ‘in 
Christ’). Although McFadyen is very strong on what Paul Ricoeur calls ‘naiTative 
identity’ on account of ‘sedimentation’, he places insufficient attention on the 
relationship between eschatology and theological anthropology.^"  ^ Eschatology is
CTP, ppl55-156. See also p63. 
®^C7P,pl66.
^ This has been noted by OoiTinge, ‘Review’, p i 15.
To some extent, McFadyen addresses this problem in his later work in relation to praise, the doctrine 
of sin, and especially child abuse. See: esp. McFadyen, ‘Healing the Damaged’; also McFadyen, ‘The 
Abuse of the Family’; and McFadyen, and Ford, ‘Praise’. Cf. Chapter 7 below.
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crucial for at least two reasons.^^ First, theological anthropology is concerned with 
the new creatuie of God: “[the] ontology of the human is shaped by that 
eschatological event in which the creature’s goal is confirmed even as the creature is 
put to death and made alive in Chiist”.^ *’ In other words, theological anthropology is 
concerned with convertedness and the new life in the Spirit. Second, theological 
anthr opology is eschatological in that its account of human identity is possessed of a 
distinct teleology. Christian personal identity is to be related to the eschaton, i.e., 
construed not only in terms of the past but also the future. However, this it to move 
beyond our immediate concerns.
In summary, McFadyen brings together theological and secular discourse, 
Rules 1 and 2, without losing the distinctness of either discourse and draws them into 
dialogue. He further isolates the distinctive contribution of theology to discussion of 
the self in the form of the Christ principle, that is, the presence of Christ, conformity 
to Clirist, and the call of Christ. This means that the categories which McFadyen 
developed on the basis of theological discourse cannot be thought of in solely secular 
terms imless a less adequate understanding of personhood is to be offered.
In the final section, McFadyen extends the fr amework of his anthropology to 
socio-political relations or institutions and organisations. The basic framework that 
McFadyen has been developing, persons as organisational centres, is both applicable 
to, and dependent upon institutions.^^ Corporate relations too are fallen and so in 
need of redemption. Undistorted relations even at the institutional level are also 
dialogical in character. What does come through in this last section is McFadyen’s
John Webster, ‘Eschatology, Anthropology, and Postmodemity’, in International Journal o f  
Systematic Theology, 2/1, March 2000, ppl4-15 (reprinted in John Webster, Word and Church: Essays 
in Christian Dogmatics, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001, Chapter 9). See also, John Webster, 
‘Eschatology, Ontology and Human Action’, in Toronto Journal of Theology, 1, 1991, pp4-18.
^  Webster, ‘Eschatology, Antliropology, and Postmodemity’, pl4.
For instance, CTP, p201.
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concern for praxis. Tliroughout the book McFadyen does indicate some of the ethical 
implications of his anthropological framework and this is perhaps clearest in Part IV. 
However, McFadyen’s basic framework and method are clear by now, and although 
significant for the content of McFadyen’s argument as a whole, this section does not 
add to the analysis of the relation between theological and secular discourse.
4 Secular Discourse in McFadyen's Anthropoiogy
In this section I will summarise McFadyen’s argument, consider the relation 
between secular* discourse and his theological anthropology, and finally raise the 
question about whether possible weaknesses in McFadyen’s anthropology result from 
the integr ation of theological and secular discourse.
4.i The Basic Outline of McFadyen”s  Anthropology
It is clear by now that McFadyen’s basic argmnent takes a dialectical form. 
Broadly speaking, the basic framework consists in a thesis, the theological pole (Part 
I); an antithesis, the secular pole (Part II); and a synthesis, a genuine dialogue between 
the theological and secular poles (Parts HI and IV). As such, McFadyen’s content has 
remained true to his self-imderstanding of his method, hr particular, McFadyen’s 
method is structured by his understanding of the task of theology, ‘to imderstand and 
critically reflect upon Christian doctrine, tradition and history on the one hand, and 
the social, cultural and intellectual world in which we are living on the other’. 
Following from McFadyen’s understanding of the task of theology, his enquiry was 
structured by two Rules: affirming the priority of God hr theological method, and
6 6
critically engaging with the deteiininate, and culturally embodied situation. 
McFadyen’s First and Second Rules are both necessary but insufficient conditions for 
the theological task.
McFadyen’s theological task is structured by two key theological axioms: 
human existence in the image of the trinitarian God, and the call of Christ. On the 
basis of these axioms, McFadyen develops four main categories which structure the 
constitution of personliood and transcend theological discourse: the dynamic of call 
and response, dialectical dialogue and reciprocal mutuality, and conformity to Christ. 
At this stage the categories have been developed primarily on the basis of a 
theological approach and will be worked through in relation to secular discourses.
McFadyen then tiuiis from theological discourse specifically to secular 
discourse using HarTé’s psychology and philosophy of science. On the basis of 
Harré’s work, McFadyen charts some physical and social stnrctures through which 
relations are conducted. This leads to an understanding of the self which is essentially 
a public structure where one’s sense of self is determined through personal or internal 
centring. As such, the self is an organisational process centring around a personal 
core. These social relations or structures ar e guided by the process of sedimentation -  
the process in which personal identity is constituted tlrrough significant histories of 
call and response. Sedimentation is a firrther category which can be added to the 
dynamic of call and response, dialectical dialogue and reciprocal mutuality, and 
conformity to Christ, all of which ar e cr*ucial loci for identifying and describing the 
self. These categories transcend both the theological and secular approaches from 
which they originated as they ar e equally applicable in both kinds of discourse.
Thus far* McFadyen has successfully maintained Rules 1 and 2: the primacy of 
God in theological method and critical engagement with the determinate situation.
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u p  to this point Rules 1 and 2 complement each other and describe important 
dimensions of personhood, but are not yet integrated in ‘dialogue’. In the next section 
McFadyen brings together theological and secular discourse. Rules 1 and 2, without 
losing the distinctness of either discourse and draws them into dialogue. He isolates 
the distinctive contribution of theology to discussion of the self in the foim of the 
Christ principle: the presence of Christ, confoiinity to Clnist, and the call of Christ. 
This means that the categories which McFadyen developed on the basis of theological 
discourse cannot be thought of in solely secular terms unless a less adequate 
imderstanding of personhood is to be offered, hr shorl, as one reviewer puts it, 
“individuals can only attain firll, centred, and autonomous personhood by entering 
into an undistorted relationship of dialogue with Clirist, in and through a genuine 
response to the address of other persons”.^ ^
4.a Secular discourse In McFadyen’s  Anthropoiogy
The key aspect of McFadyen’s thought for om* concern with the relation 
between theological and secular discour se is his rmderstanding of the task of theology 
and the ensuing two Rules which strnctur*e his approach. The rest of the book is the 
working out of this key in relation to one specific area of theology; anthropology. For 
McFadyen, a ‘genuine’ and ‘open’ dialogue between theological and secular* 
discourse entails an openness to learning fiorn, and being criticised by the other form 
of discourse in such a way that the distinct contribution of each mode of discourse can 
be maintained. By extension, such a dialogue between theological and secular
Jean Porter, ‘Review: The Call to Personhood’, in Theological Studies, 53, 1992, p366.
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discourse is open and undistorted to the extent that it ‘conforms to Christ’. However, 
here we come up against a problem that McFadyen does not address.
hr the dialogue between theological and secular discourse, there are two or 
more disciplines which function from within their own hermeneutical circles 
according to their own operative criteria. McFadyen is clear* that following Rule 1, 
the priority of God is to be maintained in theological method and also that dialogue 
does not necessarily entail agreement between the par*tners, but that willingness to be 
open to hearing and understanding the other* in an ongoing dialectical process is 
required. But what happens when, say, a branch of psychology makes a discover*y 
that calls into question an aspect of theological anthropology. For instance, it could 
be plausibly argued on an empirical basis that relations are the consequences, not 
constituting factors, of personal identity. Thr ee options are open to the theologian: 
ignore the discover*y, accormnodate the discovery within an already pre-existing 
theological framework, or revise the theological framework in the light of the 
discovery. The problem is that the different forms of discourse operate fr om within 
different frameworks of understanding. This ‘discovery’ may only be acceptable 
from within the parameters of psychology and not theology. But say that the 
parameters ar e to be acceptable to the theologian. This leaves options two and three 
open. The choice of either option would then hinge upon the primar*y operative 
cr*iteria (or ultimate criteria) that are in play, in McFadyen’s case the primacy of God 
in theological method. But if McFadyen opts for option two, there is a question about 
the extent to which he really is open to being criticised by secular discoruse, and for* 
option tbr*ee, secular discourse and not theology has operative (and ultimate?) 
primacy. What, then, does it actually mean to maintain the primacy of God in
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theological method? Does this Rule draw too hard a distinction between form and 
content?
The characterisation of operative criteria in theological and secular discourse 
that has just been offered does rest upon a monological reading of secular discourse. 
It fails to accoimt sufficiently for the complexity of secular* discomse(s); ‘ar*e all forms 
of secular discourse to be attributed the same weight?’, ‘how are we to distinguish 
between them?’, ‘what kind of criteria might we apply to evaluate secular* 
discourse(s)?’. However, the reason the characterisation stands, and the reason that 
McFadyen cannot help us answer these questions, is that he too has lar gely adopted a 
monological reading of secular discoruse. Although there is some reference to 
Habermas and a few other secular thinlcers, McFadyen’s account of secular discourse 
is almost entirely dependent upon Rom Har*ré, whose thought we might add, fits very 
well with the theological approach being offered (Macmunay, Buber, Levinas, and 
Ricoeur might have served just as well). There is not even a mention of Marx, 
Engels, Freud, Weber, Smith, Keynes, Popper, Foucault, Giddens, Baumen,^^ or* many 
other key secular theorists, whose thought would be difficult to appropriate in the 
same way as Harré’s.^ ® However usefril Harré’s thought may be, it is simply 
inadequate to focus on one person to represent secular approaches to the self. 
Paradoxically it is Karl Barth and not McFadyen who takes the breadth of secular 
discourse seriously in this way. Although McFadyen does enter into dialogue with 
secular discourse in a way which Barth does not, it can be argued that Barth takes 
secular discourse more seriously on its own terms because he engages with a far 
broader range of thinkers, albeit critically. In anticipation of Chapters 4, we simply
It is wortli noting tliat McFadyen makes good use of Bauman in particular in Bound to Sin.
A similar criticism is made by Jolin Webster against David Ford’s Selfatid Salvation, which in many 
ways attempts a similar task to McFadyen’s in respect of a dialogue between theological and secular 
discourse (John Webster, ‘Article Review: David F. Ford: Self arid Salvation', SJT, 54/4, 2001, p552). 
See Chapter 1 above.
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note at this stage that in his antliropology, Baith systematically engages with key 
thinkers from at least four significant schools of thought on their own terms: 
naturalism (Zockler, Otto, Titius, and Poitmaim), idealism (Fichte), existentialism 
(Jaspers) and theistic anthiopology (Bmmier), not to mention his well-known critique 
of Nietzsche/^ This said, insofar' as McFadyen does enter into dialogue with secular 
discoruse his approach is highly instructive. Let us turn to consider first some of the 
benefits that are gained from a dialogue between theological and secular discourse, 
and then some possible drawbacks of the dialogue for the theologian.
For a genuine dialogue between theological and secular discourse, the 
communication necessarily moves in both directions. What do secular discourses 
gain from McFadyen’s theological approach? First, if one is to accept McFadyen’s 
argument, theological anthr opology gives a more adequate description of personliood 
than secular discourse because the hiunan creatine can only be properly imderstood as 
a creature of God. Again this will become more evident in Chapter 4 when 
considering Barth’s anthropology. Furthermore, given the conditions of the Fall, all 
forms of discourse are rendered both provisional and incomplete. Additionally, the 
doctrine of sin plays a crucial constituting role of personal identity after the Fall, and 
this remains primarily within the theological domain. The implications of this will be 
expanded at length in Chapter 3.
Second, if the theological framework offered for rmderstanding personhood is 
accepted there are significant ethical implications. A relational understanding of the 
person is not an abstract doctrine, but necessarily affects the way we live and relate to 
others. In McFadyen’s case, the ‘Christ principle’ structures relations on both the
Karl Bartli, Church Dogmatics Ill/ii: The Doctrine o f Creation, (eds.) Bromiiey G. W., and Tonance 
T. F., T&T Clark, 1998, pp77-132; 231-242. Cf. footnote 8.
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individual and corporate levels. By extension, as McFadyen’s main focus in The Call 
to Personhood is on undistorted relations, this provides a criterion from which 
distorted relations can be judged. This becomes especially important for McFadyen 
in his publications on the doctrine of sin, and particularly in cases of child abuse to 
which we will turn in the following chapter.^^
The dialogue also moves in the other direction (secular* discourse/ cultme to 
theology). In fact, McFadyen’s engagement with secular discourse is so strong that 
he has been charged with not presenting “a thoroughgoing theological 
reconceptualizing of the self or of human personhood”.^  ^ Interestingly this comment 
was made by someone whose understanding of the task of theology, much like 
McFadyen’s, is to portray “Christian beliefs as a comprehensive, coherent whole, as 
well as relating the Cliristian belief mosaic faithfully and relevantly to contemporary 
culture’’* Furthermore, Stanley Grenz, from whom this quotation was taken, wants 
to prior*itise the imago Dei as central to personhood. hr other words, a theologian who 
broadly speaking stands in the same tradition as McFadyen, who is sympathetic with 
his approach, whose own approach to anthropology is similar both in that it is 
relational and derived from an understanding of God as Trinity, and also wants to 
engage with secular discouise, does not find McFadyen’s account to be ‘theological 
enough’. This, however, is not so much a comment upon Grenz’s reading of
McFadyen, ‘Ritual Abuse’; McFadyen, ‘Praise’; McFadyen, ‘Crime and Violence; Alistair I. 
McFadyen, ‘Sins of Praise: The Assault on God’s Freedom’, in Colin E. Gunton, (ed.), God and 
Freedom: Essays in Historical and Systematic Theology, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995, pp32-56; 
McFadyen, ‘The Abuse of the Family’; McFadyen, ‘Healing tlie Damaged’; McFadyen, Bound to Sin; 
Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘Sin’, in Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason, and Hugh Pyper, (eds.), The Oxford 
Companion to Christian Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; McFadyen, Forgiveness and 
Truth.
Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology o f  the Imago Dei, 
Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001, pl4. Grenz does however note that McFadyen’s 
anthropology is not “devoid of theological engagement” (pl4). In contrast, whilst acknowledging 
McFadyen’s indebtedness to secular discourse a more theological reading o f his work has been given 
by Robin Greenwood, Transforming Priesthood: A New Theology o f Mission and Ministry, London: 
SPCK, 1994, pp104-107; and Francis Watson, Text, Church, and World: Biblical Interpretation in 
Theological Perspective, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994, pp 107-115.
Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self, pix (my italics). See also ppx; esp.8-9; 14; 20.
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McFadyen -  the comment certainly has some weight to it -  as an observation about 
relational theological anthi'opologies more generally. And this is where the 
significance of McFadyen’s dialogue, and more specifically, the positive role that 
secular discouise plays in his theology can be seen most cleaiiy.
The basis for relational approaches to theological anthiopology usually rests 
upon a perichoretic understanding of God as Trinity and emphasises the continuities 
between divine and human personhood, as indeed does McFadyen. But McFadyen’s 
engagement with secular discourse prevents him from falling into some theological 
difficulties that are common amongst many other relational antluopologists.^^
Because McFadyen engages with secular* discourse he is acutely aware of the 
way in which the form of communication affects the content.^ *" Consequently 
McFadyen recognises that even God’s address is encoded in a determinate form in 
order to be understandable.^^ This has thi*ee major theological implications for 
McFadyen’s theology that remain a weakness in many other relational theological 
antliropologists who, broadly speaking, can be placed in the same tr adition. The first, 
as mentioned earlier, is that most theological accounts of personhood make a 
methodological assumption that relational concepts of the Trinity can be immediately 
applied to human personhood. These approaches tend to overlook the question of 
how one moves from divine to human relations, and consequently often underestimate
For example: Ray S. Anderson, On Being Human: Essays in Theological Anthropology, Grand 
Rapids: Eerdraans, 1982; Ford, Self and Salvation; Colin E. Gunton, and Cliristoph Schwobel, (eds.). 
Persons, Divine and Human: King’s College Essays in Theological Anthropology, Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1991; Colin E. Gunton, The Promise o f Trinitarian Theology, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991; 
Colin E. Gunton, The One The Three, and The Many: God, Creation and the Culture o f  Modernity; The 
1992 Bampton Lectures, Cambridge University Press, 1995; Grenz, The Social God and the Relational 
Self; Antliony C. Tliiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self: On Meaning, Manipidation and 
Promise, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995; Alan J. Torrance, Persons in Communion: An Essay on 
Trinitarian Description and Human Participation with special reference to Volume One o f  Karl Bath‘s 
Church Dogmatics, T&T Clark, 1996; Zizioulas, ‘Human Capacity and Human Incapacity’; John D. 
Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church, New York: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1985.
Cf. Marshall McLuhan’s well-known slogan ‘the medium is tire message’ (Marshall McLuhan, and 
Quinten Fiore, The Medium is the Massage: An Inventoty o f Effects, Harmondswoith: Penguin, 1967).
CTP, ppl95f.
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tlie discontinuities between divine and human persons/^ This is paiticularly clear in 
John Zizioulas’ theological anthropology which tends to underestimate the boundaries 
of the self/^ The under-emphasis on the discontinuity between divine and human 
persons is also evident in his understanding of salvation in which “the personal life 
which is realised in God should also be realised on the level of human existence”. 
For Zizioulas, it is not entirely cleai* what differentiates divine and human 
personliood, which is a direct result of paying insufficient attention to method and the 
role of secular discourse in stmctuiing human relations.
The second weakness follows from the first. Relational anthropologies often 
take insufficient accoimt of the actual relations tlnough which persons ai e constituted, 
most notably institutional relations. Apart fr om McFadyen, Colin Gunton has perhaps 
tried to engage with this aspect of personhood more than most, having written a 
number of books that are concerned, at least in part, with the way in which human 
beings subsist in c r e a t i o n . B u t  even Gunton is concerned with the continuity 
between human beings and culture only at the most general level. In short, most 
relational accounts of human being by theologians lack a consideration of the actual 
relations tlirough which human beings are constituted, and this is one of the gieat 
strengths of McFadyen’s book which comes directly from engaging with secular 
discourse. Put another way, most relational anthi'opologists argue that personhood is 
predominantly the result of relationships between the particulai* person and God, 
others, the self, and the world, but because McFadyen engages with secular discourse
See esp. McFadyen, ‘The Trinity and Hiunan Individuality’.
See Edward J. N. Russell, ‘Reconsidering Relational Antlnopology: A Critical Assessment of John 
Zizioulas’ Theological Anthropology’, mlntei'iiational Journal o f  Systematic Theology, fortlicoming. 
Zizioulas, Being as Communion, p. 50.
Gimton, The Promise o f  Trinitarian Theology; Colm E. Gunton, Christ and Creation: The Didsbwy 
Lectures, Carlisle: The Paternoster Press, 1992; Gunton, The One The Three, and The Many; Colin E. 
Gunton, The Triune Ci'eator: A Historical and Systematic Study, Edinburgh: Edinbmgh University 
Press, 1998.
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he is able to consider the shape of the actual relations through which persons are 
constituted thus giving a more adequate anthropology.
And third, related to insufficient attention being given to the actual relations 
through which human being is constituted many relational anthi'opologies 
underestimate the gi'avity of sin.^  ^ A strong doctrine of sin is cmcial for theological 
anthropology, hi the first place, this ensmes the proper systematic relation to other 
doctrines (especially the cross and resunection), and in the second place, when 
interpreted in conjunction with eschatology, it enables an imderstanding of human 
embodiment in the world, or, what it means to live in the world but not be o f the 
world. To incorporate this into theological anthropology involves considering both 
theological and non-theological loci. Such an understanding necessarily considers the 
role of seculai* discomse in self-constitution. This aspect of McFadyen’s 
anthropology, which again is ensured by engaging with secular discourse, does not 
come tlnough particulaily strongly until after the 1993 shift, although fallenness does 
appear more stiongly in McFadyen’s account than in those of many other relational 
anthi'opologists.^^
Before considering a possible weakness in McFadyen’s method, it is worth 
clarifying McFadyen’s position with regard to apologetics. Because of McFadyen’s 
concern with ‘dialogue’ it might appear at first glance that McFadyen’s task is 
essentially an apologetic one. There is a sense in which this is die case. Like Barth, 
McFadyen see a relationship between theology and secular discomse in which 
theology is both to bonow selectively from the seculai' in order to expound aspects of
See Russell, ‘Reconsidering Relational Antlnropology’.
McFadyen, ‘Ritual Abuse’; McFadyen, ‘Crime and Violence’; McFadyen, ‘The Abuse of die 
Family’; Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘Healing the Damaged’; McFadyen, Bound to Sin; Alistair I. 
McFadyen, and Marcel Sarot, (eds.). Forgiveness and Truth, Edinburgh; T&T Clark, 2001.
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theology and offer distinctive illumination to aspects of ‘secular discourse’. The latter 
point is significantly more pronounced in McFadyen’s thought in contrast to Barth’s, 
which would be the main reason for seeing McFadyen’s task as apologetic. However, 
like Barth, McFadyen emphatically rejects any form of apologetics insofar as 
apologetics can be understood as offering some kind of a defence of the Chiistian 
faith according to the canons of secular rationality. Again like Bai'th, McFadyen 
gives ultimate priority to God’s self-revelation in Christ through the Spirit and only 
operative priority to secular discourse. In this respect, McFadyen is not concerned to 
make the Christian faith appear (or even argue that it is) ‘reasonable’ to the secular 
mind. He does, however, give greater operative priority to secular* discourse than 
Barth does as we shall see below.
4./// A Weakness?
Having highlighted some of the strengths of a dialogue between theological 
and secular discourse, let us now turn a more critical eye towards McFadyen’s 
anthr opology, and see whether a perceived weakness results from this dialogue.
A major weakness that appears consistently throughout The Call to 
Personhood is identified in Hariiett Har*ris’ provocative article. She rightly 
recognises that “[a] frequently occiming problem in McFadyen’s work and elsewhere 
is that discussions about personality or about the sense of one’s self are treated as 
discussions about personliood (what it is to be a person) and about personal identity 
(what it is to be the same person over time)”.^ "^  As is evident from this chapter, 
McFadyen consistently conflates the distinctions between personality, person(hood).
Harris, ‘Should we say that Personliood is Relational?’, pp216-217.
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present character, sense of myself, sense of myself as a person, and personal identity, 
hi short, McFadyen fails to distinguish sufficiently between personhood and personal 
iden t i ty .H am s  is again instructive here. She comments: “The underlying problem 
of all of the relational accounts considered here [McFadyen, Elaine Graham, and 
Vincent Brimimer] is failure to attend to how notions of personal development which 
have been informed by social science should relate to notions of personhood which 
are intended to be normative or ontological”.^ ®
Although Harris rightly recognises that the failure to distinguish between 
personliood and personal identity is not exclusive to McFadyen, she indicates that one 
reason for this might be the role of secular discourse (especially social science) in 
theological anthropology. Most seculai* approaches to the self are rarely concerned 
with personhood (what it is to be a person) so much as personal identity (a 
sedimentation of the history of personal interaction). This is especially true for the 
social sciences with which McFadyen is mainly concerned. The social sciences focus 
on personal identity, that is, the interaction between persons, how they are formed and 
so on, not what makes them a person. This is specifically the domain of personal 
identity and not personhood which may reflect a difference between social scientific 
approaches to the self and theological conceptions of the self as well as some secular 
accoimts (for instance, some philosophical approaches). In this respect, McFadyen 
would be well advised to recognise a greater breadth and diversity of approaches in 
‘secular* discourse’ which would help eliminate this kind of confusion. For* example, 
McFadyen’s theological pole is largely the domain of the person, i.e., a theological 
ontology of our ‘make-up’; whereas the secular pole (with the possible exception of
The Christological ramifications of a parallel distinction are set out well in Stephen W. Sykes, ‘The 
Theology of the Hmnanity o f CMst’, in Stephen W. Sykes, and Jolni P. Clayton, Christ, Faith and 
History: Cambridge Studies in Christology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
Harris, ‘Should we say drat Personliood is Relational?’, p223.
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philosophy) is largely concerned with ‘identity’, the sedimentation of relations, hi 
actual fact, because McFadyen consistently conflates this distinction he deals with 
both person and identity in both poles and the following interaction between them in 
Parts m  and IV, This arises in lai'ge part from giving insufficient attention to the 
differences between philosophical/ theological approaches to the self and social 
scientific approaches.
There are two main ways that McFadyen could have avoided this problem, hi 
the first instance, if he consistently maintained the distinction between person and 
personal identity, he could have done so across both disciplines with some caie. hi 
the second instance, he could have offered first a theological account of the ontology 
of the person, and then a secular* account of how the relations between persons are 
foi*med. To some extent, McFadyen seems to want to do both at the same time. The 
content of his book lends itself to the first option, but the structure to the second. This 
is not a problem that necessarily results from engagement with secular discourse, it 
has come about in large part due to insufficient clarity of thought on this issue by the 
author, but engagement with the social sciences certainly fuels the problem. In 
fairness to McFadyen, this problem is not exclusive to this book, but is shared by 
many theological anthropologies as Har*ris shows.
5. Conclusion
The primary task of this chapter was to examine the role of secular* discourse 
in Alistair McFadyen’s theological antliropology. McFadyen considers engagement 
with secular discourse to be a necessary but insufficient condition of the task of 
theology. Consequently, secular discourse plays a crucial role in his theological 
anthropology which is developed tlirough a dialectical dialogue between theological
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and secular discourse. This dialogue is to be guided by two Rules: the primacy of 
God in theological method and critical engagement with the deteiminate situation. 
Adherence to these two Rules will mean that theology is responsible in the cuiTent 
context but not to it.
Some attention was directed to the positive role of the dialogue for both the 
theological and the secular poles of the discourse. A weakness was also highlighted 
in McFadyen’s content which was found to have been fuelled in part by this dialogue. 
Overall, McFadyen’s method illustrates extremely well both the importance of 
maintaining both the theological and secular* poles as part of the theological task and 
also how to engage the two poles. The next chapter will follow McFadyen’s further 
development of this dialogue which to some extent rests upon the framework outlined 
in this chapter.
The secondar-y task of this chapter was to explicate McFadyen’s theological 
antlnopology. In doing this five key categories became clear*: the dynamic of call and 
response, dialectical dialogue and reciprocal mutuality, sedimentation, and confomiity 
to Christ. All of these categories were crucial for identifying the self and transcend 
both the theological and secular approaches horn which they originated. The primar*y 
task of the chapter could only be conducted by way of the secondary task. This 
consideration and much of the content illustrates that foi*m and content are 
inseparable. In McFadyen’s terminology it would be fair to say that there is a 
necessary ‘interweaving’ between them.
The following chapter charts significant developments in both McFadyen’s 
form and content. With regard to content, McFadyen’s focus shifts from the self to 
the doctrine of sin, although these doctrines are not uncomiected. With regard to
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fomi, McFadyen extends his dialectical dialogue between theological and secular 
discourse in a particularly impressive way.
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CHAPTER 3 
Secular Discourse in Allstair McFadyen’s 
Doctrine of Sin
1. Introduction
The central concern of this chapter is to highlight some significant 
developments in the form and content of Alistair McFadyen’s later theology. This 
will shed further light on the interaction between theological and secular discomse. 
The indebtedness to his earlier work will become clear, but a greater depth and clarity 
of thought is evident in his more recent work which focuses lai*gely on the doctrine of 
sin. The most comprehensive example of McFadyen’s later work can be seen in his 
book Bound to Sin which will be the main focus of this chapter.^ Again, other 
publications of this period will also be considered.^
My mgument can be set out as follows. Initially, McFadyen’s self- 
understanding of his method in Bound to Sin will be presented. Attention will then be
‘ Alistair I. McFadyen, Bound to Sin: Abuse, Holocaust, and the Christian Doctiine o f Sin, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000 [hereafter 571S],
 ^ Alistair I. McFadyen, with Helga Hanks, and Cath Adams, ‘Ritual Abuse: A Definition’, in Child 
Abuse Review, 2/1. 1993, pp35-41; Alistair I. McFadyen, with David F. Ford, ‘Praise’, in Peter 
Sedgwick, (ed.), God in the City, London: Mowbray, 1995, pp95-104; Alistah I, McFadyen, ‘Crime 
and Violence: The UFA as the Place of Demons?’, in Peter Sedgwick, (ed.), God in the City, London: 
Mowbray, 1995, ppl78-190; Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘Sins of Praise: The Assault on God’s Freedom’, in 
Colin E. Gunton, (ed,), God and Freedom: Essays in Historical and Systematic Theology, Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1995, pp32-56; Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘The Abuse of the Family’, in Hugh S. Pyper, (ed.). 
The Christian Family: A Concept in Crisis, Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1996, ppl02-117; Alistair 
I. McFadyen, ‘Healing die Damaged’, hr David F. Ford, and Dennis Stamps, (eds.). Essentials o f  
Christian Community, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996, pp91-103; AUstah I. McFadyen, ‘Cliristians in 
Public Life: The Theological Challenge’, in David Clark, (ed.), Changing World Unchanging Church?, 
London: Continuum International Publishing Group- Mowbray, 1997, pp60-63; Alistair I. McFadyen, 
‘Sin’, in Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason, and Hugh Pyper, (eds.). The Oxford Companion to Christian 
Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Alistair I. McFadyen, and Marcel Sarot, (eds.), 
Forgiveness and Truth, Edinburgh; T&T Clark, 2001; Alistair I. McFadyen, and John Inge, ‘Art in a 
Cathedral’, in Jeremy Begbie (ed.). Sounding the Depths: Theology Through the Arts, London: SCM 
Press, 2002.
81
directed towards some of the key aspects of the content of liis argument. In particular, 
we will focus on the secular readings of the two pathologies that McFadyen considers: 
the sexual abuse of children and the holocaust, the role of the will, feminist and 
Augustinian doctrines of sin, and the question of ‘standards’ from which sin should be 
judged. Because McFadyen’s argument is a cumulative one, it is necessary to enter 
into the detail of it to understand its force. Analogous to the previous chapter, some 
of the positive and negative implications of the dialogue between theological and 
secular discourse will be explored. It will be concluded that McFadyen’s approach is 
highly infomiative for the relation between theological and secular discourse, 
although again he may not have taken sufficient account of the intricacies of secular 
discourse.
2. Method in Bound to Sin
The core of Bound to Sin is the thesis that the doctrine of sin can function as a 
test of om* ability to speak of God in relation to the world, and consequently, provides 
greater explanatory and descriptive power in relation to concrete pathologies than 
secular discourse.^ This means that McFadyen is putting his understanding of the task 
of theology (engaging with both ‘the tradition’ and ‘cultur*e’ -  Rules 1 and 2) to the 
test, and facing the challenge head on. Both theological and secular discourses will be 
allowed their own voices, and in doing this the distinctive contribution of theological 
discourse to two concrete pathologies will become evident. If it does not, if theology 
cannot contribute any further descriptive or explanatory power, the very purpose of
 ^Altliough the doctrine of original sin plays an important role in the book, tlie "central commission” is 
emphatically not, as one reviewer suggests “to restore tlie doctrine of original sin to tlie centre of tlie 
Western theological lexicon” (Elaine Graham, ‘The Real Questions are Theological. Review: Bound to 
Sin' hi Reviews in Theology and Religion, 8/3, June 2001, p256).
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theology is called into question, hi short, unless theology can make a contribution to 
the understanding of pathologies that cannot be made with secular discouise, there is 
little point to doing theology and God is indeed ‘operationally excluded’ from the 
affairs of the world.
McFadyen’s concern is that modern theology does not collapse talk of God 
into secular frames of reference, nor reduces God to a ‘God of the gaps’ in which 
most of empirical reality occurs without any functioning reference to God. Theology 
is, in part, the discernment of God’s presence and activity in the world and therefore 
must live in a critical and dialectical relationship to secular disciplines. Put 
differently, comprehension of the world is inadequate without functioning reference 
to God. Let me unpack some of the methodological implications of this.
The task of theology is:
to understand botli God and reality from the perspective of God’s concrete presence 
and activity in the world, and in relation to our concretely lived experiences of being in the 
world. ... Sin is a way o f speaking of tlie patliological aspects of the world encountered by 
human beings as they live in it. ... If the doctrine of sin has no relation to empirical reality, 
cannot be tested by it in any way, then it is meaningless.'^
Note the shift in McFadyen’s understanding of the task of theology from his 
earlier work. Wliereas previously he was concerned with a dialectical dialogue 
between theology and secular discourse, he now has such confidence in the ability of 
theology to have greater descriptive and explanatory power than secular discourse that 
he extends the dialogue into a form of empirical testing -  one in wliich the veiy 
purpose of theology is called into question. Consequently, the descriptive and 
explanatoiy power of the doctrine of sin is pitted against the analyses of secular 
discourse in relation to concrete pathologies. And so, the first methodological thesis 
becomes clear: The doctrine o f sin is to be subjected to empirical testing. But it is not 
yet cleai* how, or indeed if, this can happen.
‘‘57y,p44.
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A problem immediately presents itself. The doctrine of sin cannot be 
subjected to direct empirical testing. Doctrines of sin tend to be presented in an 
absti'act and general foim, which, like general theories of science, cannot be subjected 
to direct empirical testing. In both cases, general theories ar e only capable of indirect 
testing tln ough the mediation of theories or models with a more specific and localised 
reference. And so, the doctiine of sin is capable of indirect testing when inteipreted 
in conjunction with other theories or models with a specific reference which may 
themselves be empirically tested -  viz., some fornis of secular discourse. The second 
methodological thesis is a development fi om the first: The doctrine o f sin is to be 
subjected to indirect empirical testing through conversing with secular theories or 
models that are capable o f direct empirical testing by having a specific and localised 
reference. The two situations which McFadyen has chosen to test the doctiine of sin 
aie the sexual abuse of childien and the holocaust.®
The sexual abuse of childien and the holocaust provide particularly rich 
enviromnents for testing the doctrine of sin, not least because there is extensive 
literature written on both pathologies, but also because they are almost universally 
recognised as having reality, being pathological, and perhaps most importantly, 
without recourse to a specifically Clnistian or theological mode of discernment.® In
 ^ On McFadyen’s use of tlie rather cumbersome phrase ‘the sexual abuse of children’ see McFadyen, 
‘The Abuse of tlie Family’, ppl03-105. In short, this pluase focuses on the abuse o f power, trust, and 
responsibility which occurs when cliildren are abused by members of the family significantly older 
tlian themselves, in contrast to ‘incest’, which tends to refer to tlie breaking o f social taboos, or at least 
does not emphasise the disjunction in age and power. See also: McFadyen, ‘Healing the Damaged’; 
McFadyen, Hanks, and Adams, ‘Ritual Abuse: A Definition’.
® However, in both cases there are an increasing number of subversive voices which do not adhere to 
this. Paedophilia has been receiving an increasing amoimt of attention in tlie British media in recent 
montlis. There are voices, generally from paedophiles, that argue that they camiot help the way they 
are and consequently sexual relations with children are ‘natural’ (and tlierefore morally acceptable). 
Additionally, although not legal, child prostitution is now a global industry tliat is growing significantly 
in both the East and the West (see esp. Rita N. Brock, and Susan B. Thistlethwaite, Casting Stones: 
Prostitution and Liberation in Asia and the United States, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996). 
Regarding the holocaust, tliere is an increasmg number of neo-Nazi groups in both Europe and the 
U.S.A., some of whom deny that the holocaust actually happened, others tiiat it was ‘good’. In fact, 
recent elections in France and Denmark have turned marginal fascist parties into the main opposition.
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other words, if these situations are recognised as pathological without reference to the 
Chiistian God, the question of whether anything more or different can be said about 
them by Christian theologians is posed particularly acutely. The third and fourth 
methodological theses are now apparent: The sexual abuse o f children and the 
holocaust are not used as examples, but as concrete fields o f testing encounter. 
Engaging these concrete phenomena requires an engagement and conversation with 
the secular disciplines in which they are analysed, interpreted, and resisted. Put 
differently, McFadyen is trying “to understand and to test the doctrine of sin in and 
thi'ough a consideration of these two situations, which diaws theology into 
conversation with secular foims of discernment and description”.^  The puipose of 
this can be seen in a fifth methodological thesis: to engage in a conversation in which 
the theological and secular interpretation o f the pathological dynamics are both 
tested by each other *s understanding and by the empirical realities o f the situation.
This process of testing means that theology may need to be open to change 
and coiTection if shown to be inadequate to the concrete realities of the pathology by 
seculai* discourse. It may, in short, need to be reconfiguied. For McFadyen, this is 
part and parcel of the task of a theological tradition:
Being traditional, being shaped by tradition and handing it on (jtradere), is an active, 
historical responsibility that is always, and can only be, worked out in die contingencies of 
concrete situations and through ad hoc conelations and conversations. ... The point is rather 
that tradition is something we take responsibility for in the making.®
It is cleai*, then, that McFadyen is not only open to theology being criticised 
(and reconstructed) by seculai* discomse, but that the “truth of God can only be found 
tlnough conversation with non-theological (and, in om* cultme, that means
The point is that these pathologies are not ‘universally’ accepted as wrong. McFadyen does not 
mention any of these kinds of subversive voices.
’ BTS, p48.
® BTS, p50. Cf. Karl Bartli: “dogmatics as such does not ask what the apostles and the prophets said 
but what we must say on the basis of the apostles and prophets” {Church Dogmatics LI: The Doctrine 
o f the Word o f God, (eds.) Bromiiey, Geoffery, W., and Torrance, Thomas, F., Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1995, pl6).
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pragmatically atheist) contemporaiy foims of understanding and practice”.^  This 
means that, and this is the sixth and final methodological thesis, in order to be 
intelligible and true to itself, theology must necessarily engage in dialogue with 
secular forms o f public explanation, understanding, and truth, which both confront 
and permeate the situation o f a living theological tradition}^ hi other words, and this 
is important, engagement with secular discourse not only remains a necessaiy 
condition of the task of theology, as in McFadyen’s earlier work, but that it is a 
necessary (but insufficient) condition for theology to be ‘tme to itself. The 
uniqueness and distinctness of theology is maintained precisely in, through, and by, 
conversing with secular discourse, not by withdiawing from the world. Thus, 
McFadyen assumes that “theological discourses do refer and apply to reality in a way 
that makes a significant difference to inteipreting and living in it”.^  ^ This is precisely 
what McFadyen intends to test in relation to concrete pathologies -  that there is a 
theological dimension to them winch seculai* fr ameworks are incapable of bringing to 
adequate expression. If theology -  the docti ine of sin -  cannot bring this pathological 
dynamic to expression, it has failed.
Part of the theological task is to discern and show secular discourse its own 
inner truth. If the concrete pathologies operating in the sexual abuse of children and 
the holocaust cannot be adequately understood without reference to the denial of and 
opposition to God, then a seculai* understanding of the world cannot properly exclude 
God on its own terms (i.e. from within is own interpretive framework). In other 
words, if seculai* discourses fail to incorporate adequately into themselves reference to
 ^BTS, p51. It should be clear now why McFadyen’s thought was placed between Frei’s Types 3 and 4 
in Chapter 1 below.
'®J5r5,p52.
“ 571S,p52.
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the activity of the triune God, this is a failure, not according to theological discourse, 
but according to seculai* disciplines’ own truth.
The main difference in method from his earlier work can be seen in a different 
kind of dialogue, or conversation, as he now tends to call it. In McFadyen’s earlier 
work, there was definitely a concern to maintain the distinctness of theological and 
secular discourse, and for each to inform and be criticised by the other. But in his 
later work, it is by infoiining and critiquing the other that the distinctness of each 
discourse is maintained. The distinctness of theological discourse is maintained by, 
not in spite of, engaging with secular discourse. We will now listen to the secular 
voices, notably, without any explicit reference to theology.
3. Secular Analyses of Two Concrete Pathologies
In this section, attention will be directed towards McFadyen’s reading of 
secular analyses of two concrete pathologies: the sexual abuse of children and the 
holocaust. McFadyen’s aim is to give phenomenological descriptions of these 
pathologies on their own tenns, without bringing them into explicit relation to 
theology. This engagement is not an'attempt to offer a straightforward representation 
of secular descriptions, but a constructive engagement in which an attempt is made to 
understand the concrete situations described and analysed. The later theological 
account will be tested against these pathologies.
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3.i The Sexual Abuse of Children
McFadyen does not attempt to describe ‘the’ experience of childhood sexual 
abuse, but to offer an account of the core, pathological dynamic in which sexually 
abused childien are trapped. We will begin with the definition he offers:
Children are sexually abused when they are involved in sexual activity, are exposed 
to sexual stimuli or are used as sexual stimuli by anybody significantly older than they are.’^
An important factor in this definition is that the abuser is ‘significantly older’ 
than the child, not necessarily an adult. Significant age-difference is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for sexual involvement to constitute abuse. This is because of 
differentials in laiowledge, understanding, physical strength, social power, and status. 
In other words, whenever there is sexual activity where these differentials aie 
significant, it is impossible for the involvement not to be exploitative, even if the child 
appears to be consensual. The main task of a definition of child abuse is to render 
criteria by wliich behaviour may be classified and recognised as sexually abusive, 
whereas a description aims at understanding the pathological dynamic, and this is 
what McFadyen is concerned to do. The former tends to focus on acts of abuse, and 
the latter is better thought of in tenns of relation.
BTS, p59. ‘Sexual activity’ can be defined as “anytliing tliat would coimt as such if  transacted 
between adults” (p59n.). It is important to note that this does not require the abuser to intend or 
achieve sexual stimulation alüiough this is often the case. To make stimulation a necessary condition 
would preclude many possible instances of abuse, such as the abuser not gaining sexual stimulation. It 
would also make the classification of abuse dependent upon the abuser’s motivation and turn attention 
away fioni the child. Similarly, physical abuse is not to be made die primary and controlling factor in 
defining sexual abuse as there are forms which involve no tactile contact, for example, masturbating in 
front of the child or invoking the child to masturbate in front of him, exposme to pornography or 
others’ sexual organs, viewing others engaged in sexual activity, receiving obscene telephone calls, 
being photographed for the sexual use of others (BTS, p60; McFadyen, ‘Healing the Damaged’, pp92- 
92; 93n).
On the significance of a definition in cases of abuse see McFadyen, Hanks, and Adams, ‘Ritual 
Abuse: A Definition’.
BTS, p60; McFadyen, ‘Healing the Damaged’, esp. pp92-94; McFadyen, ‘The Abuse of the Family’, 
pl05.
The key factor is not that the core dynamic of abuse is that of a distorted and 
distorting relationality (even though this occui's long after all physical trauma has 
healed), but that abuse encloses and traps the child in its distortions. This is brought 
about in large part by the pathological dynamics of abuse to which we now tum.'^ 
Following McFadyen’s organisation of similar material elsewhere, this will be 
presented under three main headings: damaging relationality, the bonds of secrecy, 
and internalising the damaging energy -  restmcturing identity.
Damasins relationality
The key dynamics can be presented as follows:
1. Isolation and seclusion. The physical, psychological, and social presence of 
others is the most effective constraint in a situation of potential abuse. The child has 
to be isolated ftom the care, concern, and interference from other adults for abuse to 
occm*. The physical seclusion of the place and time ft om other adults is the most 
simple means of isolating the child. This, however, is neither a necessaiy nor 
sufficient condition for abuse to occur, since some abusers are willing to abuse in 
public space. Psychological and social isolation are especially important if abuse is to 
occur over a significant period of time. The power of other adults to take effective 
action must be incapacitated or circumvented by removing the laiowledge-base for 
action. Where psychological and social isolation occurs, physical seclusion is less
This section draws extremely heavily from 571?, pp62-78.
McFadyen, ‘Healing the Damaged’. James Poling’s fouifold summary of the dynamics of abuse 
bears a striking similarity to McFadyen’s analysis: “1. A potential offender needed to have some 
motivation to abuse a child sexually. 2. The potential offender had to overcome internal inhibitions 
against acting on that motivation. 3. The potential offender had to overcome external impediments to 
committing sexual abuse. 4. The potential offender or some other factor had to undermine or 
overcome a child’s possible resistance to the sexual abuse.” (James N. Poling, The Abuse o f Power: A 
Theological Problem, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991, p62).
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relevant as the child is already isolated from frameworks of social meaning and 
action, and so the abuser’s actions are left unchallenged/^
2. False normality. The differentials in laiowledge and understanding enable 
the abuser to construct a false, but persuasive, perception of noimality. Abuse might 
be presented as noimal, and is therefore indistinguishable fr om non-abusive behaviour 
and relationships. This may happen by incorporating abuse into the everyday routines 
of washing, changing, and going to the toilet. Because these hygienic proceduies take 
place in private and the touching of genitals is often necessaiy, this effectively shields 
knowledge of the abuse from other adults, if not making it appear nonnal to them. To 
the child, this has the effect of presenting it as normal to wider social noims and 
conventions, if not explicitly giving peimission for the ‘hygienic’ tasks to be 
performed. Consequently, the abuse may draw parasitically from the wider situation 
and authority structui*e for its own legitimation.^^
3. Illusions o f consent. Where the abuser had convinced the child that she has 
consented in some way to the abuse, the child internalises feelings of guilt, blame, and 
responsibility, and therefore is inextricably bound into the realities of the abusive 
relationship, and subsequently inhibited from disclosing to others. The appearance of 
consent is often initiated ‘by degrees’, and so the boundary between acceptable and 
abusive behaviom* is bluned. There is a gradual increment in behaviour, and so no 
great boundaiy-lines aie crossed between one time to the next, but there is a 
significant shift when comparing the first and last acts.
“An abuser might sit a child on his lap, in contact with his erection, or might find a way of touching 
breasts, buttocks or genitals, even inserting fingers into anus or vagina, in a way which is eitlier hidden 
from tlie direct view of otliers or appear to others to be a social, even loving embrace” {BTS, p64n).
Where abusive acts are incorporated mto well-known games such as tickling, or ring-o’-roses, in 
ignorance of what is really occurring, this may be explicitly legitimated by otlier adults -  T used to 
enjoy tliat when I was your age’; ‘that is Daddy’s way of showing he loves you’; ‘get up to the 
batlnoom, Daddy is waiting for you’ (BTS, p65). .
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4. Wanting a good relationship. The abuser tends to be already in a situation 
where the bonds of the relationship are stronger than with other adults. Where the 
relationship to the abuser has become the main functioning source for emotional 
nourishment, the cost of disclosing the abuse may seem unbearable if not an 
acceptable pay-off when weighed against other benefits.
5. Rewards. Emotional enti apment may occur by the offering of inducements 
(money, sweets, etc.) to the child inmiediately prior to the abuse. This implies a 
contract between the abuser and the child, for which the inducement is a fee for 
perfonning this act. The child is trapped by his desire for the reward, which may even 
lead to the child initiating the abuse and foster the illusion that he is consenting to the 
abuse. By offering inducements the abuser creates a confused conflation between 
wanting the abuse and desiring the reward, and further creates the appearance of 
consent, especially where this is accompanied by the physiological effects of sexual 
arousal.
The Bonds o f Secrecy
Wliere the abuser is not a stranger, he has to ensur e continuing secrecy. The 
child is literally ‘bound in silence’. This is brought about in two main ways:
1. Threats. Threats concerning the consequences of disclosure establish a 
claim on the child in times and places distanced from the context of abuse (violence.
On the lack of use of inclusive language I follow McFadyen and quote: “Since the vast majority of 
abusers are male, it would not serve the interests of truth to hide that fact by using inclusive language. 
So, although it is true tliat the relatively small number of female abusers are incorporated into tliis male 
semantic reference and rendered invisible, ... the use o f male pronouns is more than simply generic. 
The use of gender-inclusive language... would overexpose them [female abusers]... . [According to 
Poling’s research, about 80-95% of sexual violence is peipetrated by men (Poling, The Abuse o f  
Power, p62)]. In referring to children who are abused, however, I do alternate between male and 
female pronouns, even tliough the best statistics show a preponderance of female victims. To use the 
female pronouns exclusively for victims and survivors, however, might create the dangerous and 
misleading impression tliat abuse of boys is atypical, botii quantitatively and qualitatively.” {BTS, 
p60n).
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family break-up, imprisonment of the breadwinner, other’s emotional reactions, etc.). 
The abuser coimnunicates to the child that he is more powerful than they, even when 
no longer in physical proximity. This fear often remains even for adult survivors. 
Because the child feels threatened fear of disclosure may invade other relationships 
and therefore weaken the bonds of trust in others, whilst strengthening the bond to the 
abuser. The child’s fear of the consequences is all that is necessary to inhibit 
disclosure.
2. Secrecy. The injunction to secrecy closes off the immediate context of 
abuse from other contexts, intensifying the isolation, strengthening the bonds to the 
abuser, and weakening those to others. Secrecy is designed to prevent others 
becoming aware of the infoimation. However, the social isolation effected by the 
inj miction to secrecy, not only prevents the child from bringing the infonnation to 
public expression, but more significantly, inhibits her processes of understanding, 
judging, and evaluating the information represented by the abuse. Consequently the 
child may be unable to imderstand what has happened to her, or, to miderstand it as 
abuse. Secrecy interdicts her access to other frameworks of meaning which would 
enable her to process and interpret the information.
Internalisins the Damasins: Enersv -  Restructuring Identity
Damaging relationality, and the bond of secrecy have significant implications 
for future identity. Some key factors can be summarised:
1. Internalising abuse. The tlueats and injunction to secrecy give the child 
the illusion of power -  he will bear responsibility for the consequence of disclosure. 
Often this is read back into the abusive situation: Tf I am in contiol of the secret and
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feai' its exposme, then I must be responsible for the abuse’. B e c a u s e  the child’s 
confusion cannot be resolved with recourse to public frameworks of meaning, it is 
rationalised and internalised in the form of distorted-beliefs concerning her identity, 
perhaps especially that the abuse is the fault of the child. The rationality of the abuse 
is substituted with the (distorted) rationality of the child’s internal structuies and 
fr ameworks of meaning. Consequently, the child’s recourses for survival permit the 
abuse to cany on, and further confirm and embed its reality. Because the child cannot 
prevent the abuse and is inhibited fr'om disclosing it, there is an organisation of 
identity around the core reality of abuse. Abuse then becomes the prime informant of 
identity, but does so in a hidden and distorting way.
2. Four dynamics. Four further dynamics are identifiable in situations of child 
abuse: a) Traumatic sexualisation. Childhood sexual abuse introduces children to 
sexual activity inappropriately and prematurely (psychologically, emotionally, 
spiritually, and physiologically). It may then become a significant factor in shaping 
the development of sexuality, and survivors may in the future become confused about 
their sexual identities, rules, codes, and nonns applying to sexual behaviour in wider 
society, b) Betrayal. All sexual abuse includes an element of betrayal (of trust), most 
notably from the abuser, but also from other adults who treat the disclosure with 
disbelief, c) Powerlessness. Abuse is experience of extieme powerlessness, d) 
Stigmatisation. The abuser’s injunctions to prevent disclosuie tend to negate 
estimations of the child’s worth and communicate an expectation of public 
stigmatisation. This tends to be experienced in tenns of deep-seated guilt and shame, 
low self-esteem.
571?, p71.
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3. a The Holocaust
Centi*al to McFadyen’s reading of secular theories about the holocaust, is the 
idea that the policy of genocide was aiiived at gradually as other policies proved to be 
inadequate for solving the ‘Jewish problem’?  ^ It was not a progiammatic intention of 
Hitler’s from the start. The idea of genocide arose as a result of pragmatic and 
instrumental reason, not theoretical deliberation. However, the racial ideology of the 
Nazis does form the context within which Germany in general believed that there was 
a ‘Jewish problem’ to be solved by the action of the state.
The key difference between the holocaust and most other fonns of violent 
anti-Semitism is that the holocaust did not depend upon the incitement of popular 
emotion in the fonn of violent blood-lust,^^ nor the retreat of a modern, civilised 
nation into the baibaiic iirationality of a previous time. Rather, the holocaust was 
understood as being a highly rational project for the betterment of society. As a 
triumph of rationality in planning and action it stands in deep continuity with the 
optimism of modemity.^^ Any element that did not fit the dream of a perfectly 
rational social order based upon the pmity of race was eliminated. Consequently, the 
mentally handicapped were the first victims as tliey imposed a burden on the state and 
families, as well as representing a dilution of the pure, Aryan race. '^  ^ All the 
undesirable elements were exterminated tluough a rational, bureaucratic,
Tills is clearly a contested point amongst historians, but there is significant evidence to support tliis 
view. For example, Hitler approved a memorandum from Himmler as late as 25**' May 1940, about a 
plan to expel all Jews to Madagascar. See BTS, pp80-82, and p80n for references.
This may or may not be true as a general point but tliere are obvious exceptions which McFadyen 
does not mention such as tlie Nuremberg rallies or Kristallnacht.
For his reading of the holocaust, McFadyen is heavily indebted to Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and 
the Holocaust, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989.
On the ‘Jewish question’, i.e., why the Jews posed a problem for Nazi ideology, see BTS, pp85-88 
and references.
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adminisfrative, and therefore ‘civilised’, legal process. The phenomenological 
dynamics vyill now be briefly impacked.^^
1. Rational problem solving: means, not ends. Analogous to any other 
modem, centralised government, once broad policy goals were foiinulated, the matter 
was handed over to technical and administrative (rational) advisers to devise the most 
expedient and efficient means for implementation. Once a policy has reached this 
stage, it is no longer a matter of subjective opinion and values, rather, it is now a 
matter of the ‘objectivity’ of rational instiumentalisation of policy. Any debate about 
the policy is now about the ‘means’ of implementation, not the ‘ends’. A t  this very 
early stage of the procedure, to object on personal, moral, or subjective grounds 
would be to introduce ‘non-rational’ elements into the equation, and therefore such 
objections do not play a part. McFadyen cites Bauman:
Physical extermhiation was chosen as tlie most feasible and effective means to the 
original, and newly expanded, end. The rest was the. matter of co-operation between various 
departments of state bmeaucracy; of careful planning, designing proper teclinology and 
teclniical equipment, budgeting, calculating and mobilising necessaiy resources: indeed, the 
matter of dull bureaucratic routine. ... [T]he choice o f physical extermination as the right 
means to the task o/Entfernung [tr. elimination, expulsion, removal] was a product o f routine 
bureaucratic procedures: means-ends calculus, budget balancing, universal rule application.^*'
There is a shift of attention from the ends of action to the means, which is 
accompanied by a further shift in the criteria for evaluating action -  from the moral to 
the instrumental. Technical-instrumental expertise and bmeaucracy now play an 
ideological function without provision for external or more foundational fi'ameworks 
of understanding.
2. Standing by a reasonable policy. Under the Third Reich, all matters 
pertaining to the Jews were regulated and governed by a single agency ofbmeaucratic
^ This section draws heavily from 5T?, pp88-103.
Clearly, identification of tlie ends is a key factor m the idea of genocide. McFadyen does give some 
attention to this, but for me to do so would be to deter fr om the overall aim of the chapter. McFadyen 
is again closely following Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust.
BTS, p89, citing Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, ppl6f.. (Italics in original).
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action. At the same time, Gennan Jews were separated from the biological, 
psychological, social and geogiaphical bonds of a common commimity. Again citing 
Banman, persons were “[r]educed like all other objects of bm*eaucratic management, 
to pme, quality-free, measurements”?^ They were dehumanised. Efficient 
bmeaucracy deals with persons not as subjects but objects. Through the action of a 
single bureaucratic body, the Jews giadually disappeared as human subjects, and 
fiutheimore, a ‘rational’, ‘objective’ process encouraged other Germans to put aside 
their moral scmples in favom* of the rationality of state action.
3. Rationally compelled to dirty work. The moral inhibitions and sense of 
disgust of those charged with the face-to-face killing had to be overcome to the extent 
that this was actually a gieat concern for Himmler. Five main factors are evident. 
First, there was the conviction that the task was a necessaiy, hygienic, and sanitaiy 
undertaking cairied out amidst the national emergence of total war. Second, concern 
was shifted away from the victims to the burden of pity borne by the perpetrators. 
The distastefulness of the task was a sign of its necessity in the pm suit of the greater 
good. Third, as a cog in the bureaucratic machine, it was a burden placed on the 
perpetrator by a chain of command, hence, blame and accountability were shifted.^^ 
Fourth, individual taste and will were understood as matters to be overcome in the 
fulfilment of a gr eater, objective principle. Consequently, this was a matter of destiny 
for which the responsibility lay elsewhere. Fifth, many killing units developed an 
ideological component (especially loyalty to one’s peers) to the their willingness to
BTS, p92, citing Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p i03.
In a very different setting, Yale University, Stanley Milgram demonstiated many of tliese dynamics 
in a highly controversial experiment. The experiment demonstrated (rather too effectively for comfort) 
botli tlie ease with winch people could apparently inflict considerable pain on complete and innocent 
strangers, as well as their readiness to evade responsibility. The similarity between tlie pathological 
dynamics between the perpetrators of death camps, and the American public at Yale University is 
striking. See Stanely Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, New York: Haiper & 
Row, 1974; referenced in Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., Not the Way I t ’s Supposed to Be: A Breviaiy o f  Sin, 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995, ppl73f..
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discharge such duties. Not canying out an individual’s duty would place a greater 
burden of the responsibility on a colleague, and carrying out such tasks together 
would further embed group loyalty and pride.
4. Further separation o f means and ends -  participating at a distance. The 
‘final solution’ required the paiticipation of vast numbers of ordinary Germans in 
ordinary occupations (railway employees, accountants, engineers, etc.). Their tasks 
looked the same as their counterpaits in other countries, and as their own had done 
prior to the incoiporation of genocide. Consequently, many of the participants in the 
‘final solution’ found it difficult to appreciate the ends to which their work was being 
directed, and furthennore, if they could have, it would have been hai'd for them to take 
responsibility for them on account of the bureaucratic process. A worker’s task is 
functionally separated from other tasks and may therefore never require them to meet 
or understand what others are doing. In many ways the meaning of one’s activity is 
hidden since meaning derives in large part from an understanding of the whole. 
Bureaucratic action draws attention away from the telos to one’s own specialisation. 
Furtheimore, since there is an infinite regi ess of responsibility, both up and down the 
hierarchy, personal responsibility is simply not locatable. Hence even those 
confronted with the face-to-face killing experience the act as the impersonal means of 
instmmentation of others’ intentions. Morality is sequestered by technical- 
instrumental criteria and right and wi*ong become defined in teims of whether or not a 
person is doing his/her job efficiently.
5. Incorporating the rationality o f victims. The creation of a rationally 
regulated world invites the belief that one may influence the outcome thr ough the use 
of one’s own rational resources. In the eaidy stages, the Nazis’ legislative measures of 
deportation were considered by some to be potentially beneficial since they bore some
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resemblance to Zionist hopes. Many Jews, therefore, actively co-operated with their 
implementation. The Nazis deliberately incorporated the reasoning and willing of 
their victims, and in may instances, offered apparent authority to Jewish leaders to 
manage affairs in the ghettos. Securing Jewish compliance and administration in the 
ghettos was a much more efficient means of implementing anti-Jewish measines than 
deploying other Germans to do the same work. To the Jewish mind, they continued to 
be fiinctioning under the conditions of normal life under abnormal conditions of 
separation. Jewish leaders co-operated out of a sense of responsibility for their 
communities in the hope that they could help administrate the measures in a more 
humane manner. The fact that the Jewish leaders’ power and responsibilities (within 
the parameters set by the Nazis) were formally total made it more difficult to 
recognise that they were materially powerless. Without the knowledge of the Nazis’ 
ultimate intention and the relation to other major objectives, it was impossible for 
Jewish leaders to calculate the ‘rationality’ of various options. Rationality again 
becomes a focus on the means. This dynamic was posed even more starkly in the 
death camps where the optimisation of self-interest -  one’s own suiwival -  usually 
meant the decrease of another’s chances (passive collusion).
Although McFadyen’s interpretation of the pathological dynamics of the 
sexual abuse of children and the holocaust is not comprehensive, and my summary 
even less so, it does not need to be. McFadyen has captured some of the core 
pathological dynamics of these situations as stated by ‘secular discourse’, even if 
there is much more to be said. And McFadyen’s aim is not so much to write a book 
on child abuse and the holocaust as to use these concrete situations as test cases for 
the descriptive and explanatory power of the doctrine of sin. Having set out
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McFadyen’s reading of the pathological dynamics of two concrete situations as 
offered by ‘secular discourse’, we now turn to McFadyen’s theological reading.
4. The Significance of the Will
McFadyen’s primary concem is to assess whether the doctrine of sin can 
function as a test of our ability to speak of God in relation to the world, and 
furthennore, provide greater explanatory and descriptive power than secular discourse 
in relation to two concrete pathologies. Two requirements have to be fulfilled from 
both sides of the debate if the test is to be adequate. First, fr om the side of secular 
discourse, a significant and specific dimension of the pathological dynamic needs to 
be identified that is common to both, but one that does not falsely synthesise the two 
pathologies and consideration of which leads to the whole. Second, from the 
theological side, in the absence of a core common to all doctrines of sin a move back 
to the formal essentiality of the language of sin must be made -  that it is a theological 
language, i.e., if God is not brought into the conversation it has failed as a theory and 
as a theological language. For this task, McFadyen chooses the phenomenon of 
human willing.
From the theological side, the general theory of sin that affords the best chance 
of testing the theological referent of sin-talk is that wliich most forcefully resists 
tr anslation into secular terms -  the doctrine of original sin as traditionally construed.^® 
The doctrine of original sin is possibly the most offensive doctrine to modernity, 
precisely because it chafes against the central axiom of the primacy and inalienability 
of freedom. Because of this, much modem theology has dropped, or at least
McFadyen has developed this at length (BTS, Chapter 2). As it does not fall at the heart of the 
conversation between theological and secular discourse, I have not developed it.
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weakened, the doctrine, which is generally to be interpreted in moral, rather than 
theological tenus. With the traditional understanding of original sin, the doctrine 
necessarily retains its theological character and therefore the ability to speak of an 
intrinsic relation between God and the world, hisofar as that distinctness is 
theological, the results are potentially generalisable for all doctrines of sin. In short, 
the test is for the explanatory and descriptive power o f an understanding o f sin that is 
not reducible to the moral.
However, the doctrine of original sin is too general to function as a model 
amenable to empirical testing, so an even more localised reference needs to be found. 
On the basis of its conflict with moral frames of reference which tend to rely on 
modernity’s axiom of freedom, McFadyen identifies the bondage of the will. This is 
specific enough to be amenable to concrete testing by asking whether people are 
personally incorporated into the pathological dynamic through their free willing, or 
thr ough their operative (but not free) willing. At this stage, McFadyen is asking about 
the descriptive adequacy of a moral framework of understanding, and whether such a 
framework is sufficient to describe the nature of the pathology without explicitly 
theological reference. And so we now (re)tiuii to the concrete pathologies.
4.1 The Sexual Abusers o f Children
hr order to examine the natru e of pathological willing in cases of sexual abuse, 
McFadyen shifts the focus from the child to the abuser although this is by no means
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necessary?* According to McFadyen’s research, the incidence of physical or 
emotional abuse in the pre-history of sexual abusers is high?^ He writes:
The presence of a history of abuse in tlie background of a significant proportion of 
abusers strongly suggests tliat tlieir own disposition to abuse is not an artefact o f their pure 
intemality, having no other explanation tlian tlieir arbitrary free decision. Rather, the personal 
history of tliese abusers seems to have shaped their basic patterns of intentionality, tlieir 
character or personal identity, tlie fr ameworks wiüiiii which will operates. ... abuse seems to 
be a means for resolving issues of personal identity that reflect distorted identity stiuctures 
sedimented through histories of distorted interaction.^^
In addition to manifesting McFadyen’s clear indebtedness to his earlier work 
on theological antlnopology, McFadyen’s main point is evident: the sexual abuse of 
children does not occur in a social and psychological vacuum. '^* Sexual abusers are, 
to bonow McFadyen’s title, ‘bound to sin’ in and through their will being caught up 
in the pathological dynamic.
Few abusers appear to possess an innate sexual attraction to children, and 
consequently, whilst the means for resolution of the identity issues has become 
sexualised, neither they, nor the issues being resolved are intiinsically sexual. In the 
cases of those who do experience a prior sexual interest in children, imaginative 
rehearsal of sexual acts whilst masturbating significantly shapes and conditions the 
willingness to realise the acts of the imagination. In both cases, the abuser is 
emphatically not in a position to make a fi'ee, neutral decision, but rather is in the grip 
of a dynamic beyond rational decision making, similar to those experienced by people 
struggling with addiction. The abuser is already ‘bound’.
It is also evident in the abused child. See BTS, ppl21-125.
BTS, p ll4 . By way of contrast: “For men tliere is no clear correlation between childhood 
experiences of abuse and becoming an adult perpetrator. Some men who have been victims of sexual 
violence do not become perpetrators. ... [Wliereas,] [s]ome men who have not been victims of sexual 
violence become perpetrators of sexual violence on others.” (Poling, The Abuse o f Power, p61). 
^^5ra,pll4.
Wlietiier or not there is a correlation between childliood experiences of abuse and becoming an adult 
perpetrator, there is a strong correlation between experiences of abuse and prostitution and pimping. 
Current social research statistics indicate tliat 80% of women in prostitution in the United States have 
suffered childliood sexual abuse. Many people working with prostitutes estimate somewhere between 
90-100%. (Brock, and Thistlediwaite, Casting Stones, p26; see also Chapter 6; andpp4; 8; 29-30; 184- 
185).
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However, acting on the deshe to abuse only reinforces the ties, even if actual 
abuse to another does not occur. McFadyen wiites: “Tlu'ough mastuibation, the 
experience of aiousal by childien may be reinforced in a way which desensitises 
potential abusers to feelings of guilt or shame which might act as impediments to 
active willing, so more deeply embedding the will in this orientation”.^  ^ Once abuse 
has occuiTed, the physiological effects on abusers of their behaviour aie likely to be 
reinforcing and habit-forming. The force of habit, which may be reinforced through 
imagination whilst masturbating, is likely to be accompanied by a displacement of 
active willing, hi other words, a psychological dependence can be created which will 
increase the sense that the sexual behaviour is unwilled.
hi short, it is cleai" from McFadyen’s analysis that the will of the abuser 
becomes entiapped in the dynamic of abuse, and fuitheimore, was not ‘free’ prior to 
abusing. This is especially cleai' in the incidence of abusers who do have a 
background of abuse, which as we have already seen, significantly affects willing and 
identity fonning processes.
4.Ü Willing the Holocaust
McFadyen identifies a similar' operative dynamic in the holocaust, hi Nazi 
Gei-many, the elimination of the Jews by mass minder was actively willed. However, 
“the willing of genocide was itself shaped and formed thiough the process of planning 
and implementing solutions to the ‘Jewish problem’”.^  ^ The will was not foimed 
independently from the social context (i.e., in a ‘neutral’ sphere), rather, it was 
immersed in and inseparable from concrete reality.
**^5T5,pll5.
Again I note that the will of the child is also incorporated into the patliological dynamic (BTS, 
ppl21-125).
’^ 5ra,pll6.
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In short, it was not that genocide happened without Hitler’s and other’s will, 
or even against them, but that the willingness to conceive and implement the Final 
Solution was bom out of a prior commitment to address the Jewish problem thiough 
less diastic actions?^ Additionally, the possibility of the willing of genocide belongs 
to the instmmentalisation of anti-Jewish measures. With each successive measure, 
the will was further conditioned to accept the next. In McFadyen’s words, “with each 
incremental commitment, it was all the hai'der to separate the will from the giadually 
unfolding logic of genocide as the Final Solution”.^  ^ Or again: “[the] incrementation 
in planning and action helped cloud what it was that one was willing and the point at 
which one willed it”."*®
Willing was further incorporated into the process through the bureaucratic 
means previously outlined. The shift to means-centred action meant that action was 
assessed according to intra-systemic criteria of technical-instrumental rationality 
concerned only with the means, not the ends. Willing ceased to be active in relation 
to the ends of action, attending only to the efficient execution of the means -  the will 
was redirected. A similar dynamic is also evident in the killing units and the 
victims."**
hi both the situations of child abuse and the holocaust, the will is caught up 
and incorporated into the pathological dynamic. Although my summary of 
McFadyen’s account of the will is sketchy, the following key points can be identified 
as common to both:
"®5ra,pll6.^"5ra,pll7.^°5ra,pii7.
5ra,ppll9-121; 125-126.
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1. McFadyen has effectively demonstrated the descriptive inadequacy o f any 
simplistic notion o f willing as the exercise o f completely free decision and of the 
underlying notion of the will as a neutral organ of arbiti aiy choice.
2. Willing is bound up with the situation, and the situation permeates the will 
to such an extent that it is descriptively inadequate to name personal pathology 
without also naming the overarching pathological dynamic in which the person is 
caught up through his/her own willing.
3. Willing is inseparable from the processes and accidents o f person- 
formation. Distortions in willing evidence distortions at the core of personal identity 
in the basic pattern of intentionality.
4. Willing may become pathologically habituated by incorporation into 
concrete, social, and material processes of action and by the trajectoiy of past action. 
It is not merely a personal dynamic, but arises out of being incorporated into 
pathological dynamics which are inter-, ti*ans-, and supra-personal.
5. Willing may become confused, disorientated, and redirected through 
dynamics that are not merely personal, which may also lead to further confusion about 
the construal of reality.
To return briefly to the issues raised at the beginning of this section, a moral 
language (secular discourse), especially with its indebtedness to modernity’s priority 
of freedom in ascertaining responsibility, is descriptively inadequate to the complex 
reality of willing in the two concrete pathological situations (that the will is ‘bound’ -  
to sin). There are important aspects of willing that have come to the fore in this 
discussion which fall beyond the boiuidaries of moral language, that is, the boundaiy 
between the subjective and objective, the personal and impersonal. As McFadyen has 
shown, the phenomenon of willing does not deal with a passively received pathogen,
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but an active contiibution of the self that escapes the criteria of moral evaluation 
because of the complexity of the pathological dynamic which draws in the self in its 
entirety as well as non-personal structures.
At the risk of repetition, let me try to put this more clearly. According to the 
criteria and standards of judgement afforded by moral frames of reference, we only 
sin personally where we have sufficient freedom for self-determination in action -  
where freedom means a freedom from the determining influences of internal and 
external pressiues. It is only when I enjoy this freedom, when I live and act in my 
own power (autonomously), i.e., when my will is free, that I am responsible and 
culpable for my actions. When impersonal forces are so gi'eat that I no longer act 
voluntarily (e.g. addiction, social factors, hunger, etc.), I am no longer culpable. In 
other words, even whilst recognising the complexity of the factors in play, there is a 
stark choice:
Either internal, personal dynamics are potent relative to otlier forces and dynamics, 
or I am oveipowered by them. Either I have personal power, exercise will and am therefore 
culpable, or I am the innocent victim of my situation, iiTesistible diives or the superior, 
coercive force of otliers.'*^
McFadyen has argued that the descriptive and explanatory power of such a 
fr amework is inadequate for understanding. There is a more complex interrelation 
between internal and external factors than is allowed for in this dichotomy. In these 
concrete pathologies, the will is not overpowered, nor is it disembedded fr om action, 
and action does not occur against the will. Rather, personal and extra-personal 
dynamics co-operate, and so will remains embodied in personal action.
BTS, pl32. (Italics m original). Botli Dis. Michael Partridge and David Cook have pointed out to 
me on separate occasions that McFadyen is constructing a ‘straw-man’ argiunent here. There is a far 
broader and more complex range of secular accounts of tlie will tlian McFadyen acknowledges. 
Additionally, many secular accounts of the will are vh tually indistinguishable from Christian accounts. 
Compare for instance. Book VII (and Ill.i) o f Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (London: Penguin, 
1976), with Chapters 6 and 7 of St Paul’s Letter to the Romans. Marx, Freud, or many contemporary 
philosophers might also serve as examples. This will be picked up again in tlie critique in the body of 
the text.
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The traditional doctrine of original sin recognises the dialectic between the 
active contribution of the person and what is received as a consequence of 
situatedness. And so, we can identify the first positive contribution of what is still at 
this stage a loosely theological account to secular discourse: the doctrines o f original 
sin and the bound will offer greater explanatory and descriptive power to the 
complexities o f these pathologies than a non-theological framework allows.
However, thus fai*, it is not inconceivable that such an account of the will 
could be offered by secular discourse (if modem assumptions about the nature of 
freedom were abandoned), albeit in different language. What remains to be seen is 
the specifically theological content and context of the hypothesis, and consequently, 
the explanatoiy power of theological frames of reference in relation to the mode of 
personal participation in the pathologies.
5. An Unlikely Alliance
McFadyen finds support for the complex interplay between person and 
situation in both feminist theology and Augustine. So that we don’t lose sight of the 
big picture, that is, McFadyen’s conversation between theological and secular 
discoiu'se, we will focus on the ‘bare bones’ of the relevant chapters in his book. In 
doing this, particularly with Augustine, we will see the distinctive contribution of 
theology to these pathologies more cleaily.
5./ Feminist Theologies o f Sin
Much feminist theology, with its concem for issues relating to identity, 
integrity, power, autonomy and relationality has tended to focus on the theological
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tradition’s insistence on pride as the paradigmatic sin?^ Pride is generally understood 
as the idolisation of the self, or, the worship of the self?"* Insofar as pride is the 
attempt to be like God, the theological tradition rightly inteiprets it as both refusal to 
be a creatui'e and to acknowledge God as God."*^
To view sin as having a paiadigmatic form is implicitly to invoke a nonnative 
standard of reference for the good, over-and-against which pathological deviations 
may be discerned. And so, if the paiadigmatic form of sin is pride -  self-assertion to 
the point of idolisation -  then the good which it opposes is self-abasement to the point 
of self-abnegation. If this is accepted, then according to the standard feminist critique 
women aie innocent. For many women, their sense of self is submerged in 
relationships to others whose identities, desires, and needs displace their own to the 
extent that there is a dissipation of the self -  a collapse of the self into relationships."*  ^
This phenomenon has been refened to in much literatuie as a Toss of self ."*^
Most feminist theologians agiee that pride does name the stereotypically 
‘male’ sin, and consequently, the corollaiy of ‘male’ pride is the ‘female’ virtue of 
submissiveness or self-surrender."** They also agree about the appropriateness of 
naming pride as sin and they do not dispute the tradition’s characterisation of pride.
As we shall see in Chapter 5, Karl Barth makes tliis mistake although not to the extent tliat is often 
suggested (see Katliryn Greene-McCreight, ‘Gender, Sin and Grace: Feminist Theologies Meet Karl 
Barth’s Hamartiology’, SJT, 50/4, 1997, pp415-432). Examples of otlier modem theologians who do 
the same are: Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, London: SCM Press, 1978; Reinhold Niebuhr, The 
Nature and Destiny o f  Man, I, London: Nisbet, 1941; Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt: A Christian 
Anthropology, Pliiladelphia: Westminster, 1939; and Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, II, 
Edinburgh: T&T Clarl  ^ 1994 (all referenced in BTS, pl35n -  see also for references to feminist 
tlieology on pride; also McFadyen, ‘Sins o f Praise’, p37n).
On this see esp. BTS, pp216-219; McFadyen, ‘Sins of Praise’, pp36f.; also McFadyen, ‘Sin’.
As such, McFadyen rightly identifies idolatry as the root and paradigmatic fonn of sin, o f which 
pride is an instance. (McFadyen, ‘Sins of Praise’, p36).
575, pp 136-137.
However, it is to be emphasised that ‘loss of se lf  and ‘slotli’ is not tlie experience of all women as 
shown in Susan B. Tliistlethwaite, Sex, Race and God: Christian Feminism in Black and White, New 
York: Crossroad, 1989, cited in Greene-McCreight, ‘Gender, Sin and Grace’.
It is argued tliat in practice this has meant women are instmcted not to resist abuse and oppression as 
tliis would result in pride.
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What is in dispute is the emphasis which pride has received in the theological 
tradition.
In response to the tradition’s emphasis on pride, feminist theologians have 
identified the Toss of self as sloth. Traditionally, sloth refers to acts of omission 
arising out of wilful indolence or indifference."*  ^ As such, it has often been construed 
as a fonn of ‘overblown selfliood’, that is, a self which is so turned in on and satisfied 
by itself that it cannot and will not stir itself to action.^ ** Sloth is, therefore, a less 
active way of idolising the self and is consequently a form of pride. Consequently, it 
“denotes a mode of personal agency”.^ * The significance of feminist theologies of sin 
for McFadyen’s aim now becomes clear:
Feminist reinteipretation of sloth represents... an attempt to reclaim a personal and 
active dimension in tlie description of women’s experience, without denying the sense in 
which they are victims o f  oppression^
The key in feminist interpretations of sloth is a shift from an understanding of 
sloth as passive to an active form of personal agency. Put differently, sloth names a 
mode of personal participation in oppression exercised by victims in relation to two 
different objects: selfhood and patriarchy. Verb-usage by feminists testifies to this 
shift: a) failing, hiding, refusing, abdicating, abnegating, denying, fleeing; b) 
participating, being complicit, acquiescing in, accepting, consenting to, complying, 
and cooperating with.^^ Analogous to the discussion of willing in the previous 
section, the intention in using these verbs is to indicate both the experienced reality of
It is not insignificant tliat the original list from wliich the ‘seven deadly sins’ were taken contained 
eight. ‘Sloth’, in the list o f seven, was taken to include both acedia, apathy or boredom, and tiistitia, 
melancholy and dejection, which occmxed in the list o f eight. This obviously casts a different light on 
the “tradition’s” inteipretation of slotli. For a more extensive discussion see Donald Capps, The 
Depleted Self: Sin in a Narcissistic Age, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993, Chapter 3, esp. pp41-48.
Cf. Luther’s characterisation of sin as incurvatus in se. Martin Luther, Luther’s Works: Lectures on 
Romans, Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1971, esp. pp291f.; 313; 345. See also Karl Barth, 
Church Dogmatics IV/2: The Doctrine o f  Reconciliation, (eds.) Geoffrey W. Bromiley, and Thomas F. 
Tonance, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000, pp403f., esp. p407.
BTS, pl40.
BTS, pl41 (italics in original).
See BTS, ppl41-142n for refs.
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oppression, and that the victims aie personally active as subjects. In other words, the 
condition and mode of subjectivity is affected, and there is a coiTespondence and 
conformity of subjective intentionality with the external realities of oppression. In 
short, women participate personally in their own oppression as subjects (insofai' as 
intentionality and will are actively (dis)orientated under patriarchy).
So, what have feminist theologies of sin actually contributed to the doctrine of 
sin? The problem feminist theologians found with the theological tradition’s 
overemphasis on pride as the paiadigmatic sin was that it neglected the experiences of 
many w o m e n . T h e  key response by feminist theologians was to name the 
coiTesponding dissipation of self as sin. This is a highly significant move. In naming 
a complement to what is tiaditionally claimed to be universally extensive, feminist 
theology achieves a shift in the way sin is being understood. Naming sloth as sin 
fundamentally alters the normative fr ame of reference that underpins the identification 
of pride as what sin essentially is. This happens in two ways.
First, it alters the tiadition’s understanding of pride because, if self-loss is sin, 
then not all fonns of pride are sinftil. Pride therefore undergoes a reinteipretation in 
the light of an understanding of sloth, the boundaries of which are redefined more 
naiTowly than traditionally has been the case. The key change is that victims are
To this extent, feminist theologies of sin use empirical analysis (secular discourse) to criticise 
tiaditional doctrines of sin. One excellent example o f tliis on a related matter is Brock’s and 
Thistlethwaite’s study of prostitution, which confirms McFadyen’s analysis o f feminist doctrines of sin 
except in one important respect. Like McFadyen’s account, Brock’s and Thistlethwaite’s doctrine of 
sin is rooted in emphical experience of concrete pathologies. However they conclude: “Sin is not a 
concept adequate to explaining the condition of women and childien who are exploited sexually” 
(Casting Stones, p236). They fuid die traditional language of sin to be inadequate and too limited to 
describe the pathological dynamics of prostitution preferring instead to draw from the Korean term 
"hail’ which better captures the depths of human suffering. Han refers to “ die abysmal experience of 
pain”, and contains both active and inactive aspects. In short: “Lacking an idea like han and having 
only the doctrine of sin into which all the pains and ills o f die world must be placed, Cluistian theology 
has conftised sin and han and has profoundly distorted oin ability to understand die complexities of the 
human condition” (Casting Stones, p238). Like many feminist accounts, Brock’s and Thistlethwaite’s 
do not refer sin to a transcendent God, and although rightly critical of the tradition in many respects 
(e.g. original sin and pride pp247; 251), fail to see the possibilities for a more multifaceted doctrine of 
sin such as that offered by McFadyen. Chapters 8 and 9 of Casting Stones could serve as a useful point 
of comparison for BTS.
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empowered to act against oppression, abuse, etc., because failing to assert or protect 
oneself might prove sinful.
Second, as pride can no longer be interpreted as any assertion of self that 
rebels against self-abnegation, the nonnative standard of reference undeipinning the 
discernment of sin undergoes a shift. The goods of which pride deprives one are no 
longer complementary virtues, but complementary aspects of the same pathology. 
What feminist theologies of sin do, and this is the key, is relate pride and sloth to a 
more comprehensive standard of reference, that is, “an understanding of the proper 
economy of the self in relation”.^ ^
hi feminist theology, it is a vision of ‘right relation’ that stands as the 
normative reference against which patriarchy, pride, sloth, and sin are judged.^^ 
Consequently:
Sin is that which constricts and restricts human beings from tire abimdance and 
plenitude of being-in-relation wliich is proper to them: tliat which dissipates, blocks, disorients 
or counters tlie dynamics of genuine and full mutuality. *^'
hi other words, any power, force, or dynamic (e.g. patriarchy) that sets up a 
counter dynamic to life in abundance and full mutuality is pathological because it 
restricts, constricts, and disorients. As feminist analysis shows, disorientation is 
internalised in a way which binds people to it from within in their deepest 
intentionalities and is transmitted through internalised structures and processes of 
interaction. This means that participation in sin remains personal, because personal 
energy is centrally organised and directed, but also that life-intentionality is subject to 
an internalised disorientation away from the genuinely good. Sin is therefore to be
BTS, pl56.
This will not be developed here, in part because of tlie similarities witli tlie next section. See BTS, 
ppl56-162.
” 575, p i62.
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constl'ued in tenns of a co-operation between disorientated personal and supra- 
personal dynamics.
Feminist theologies of sin have further added to the case against the 
descriptive adequacy of moral frames of reference mid given more specifiable content 
to the hypothesis of the bound will. They move the discussion forwai'd from the 
previous section in one highly significant respect. It moves beyond the minimum 
requirements of descriptive adequacy in relation to concrete situations by envisioning 
the good and articulating a normative standard of reference which sets before us a 
fuller and richer conception of the potentialities of human life, rather than simply 
reversing the pathology.^*
However, although cast in theological language (in a general sense), ‘God’ is 
noticeably absent from the picture.^^ It has therefore made little positive contribution 
to testing the descriptive power of specifically theological language (in a narrow 
sense). The account offered could again be developed without explicitly theological 
reference, although it is notable that the Chiistian tradition does help bring the notion 
of willing to expression. But this is why McFadyen turns to Augustine.
For a succinct example of the key moves that McFadyen identifies in feminist doctrines of sin, see 
Maiy Grey, ‘Falling into Freedom: Searching for New Interpretations of Sin in a Secular Society’, in 
SJT, 47/2, 1994, pp223-243.
This is typical o f many feminist dieologies due to die problematic nature o f speaking of an almighty, 
transcendent, sovereign God for human relations in the fear of becoming hierarchical and enslaving. In 
other words, “die language of sin is retained, but without its basic grammatical rule of reference to 
God” (McFadyen, ‘Sins of Praise’, p38). There are also some important mediodological questions diat 
are raised by doing ‘theology’ in this way. See esp. McFadyen, ‘Sins o f Praise’, pp37-41; also BTS, 
ppl62-165.
I l l
5.## Augustine on the Will
McFadyen engages Augustine in the task of concrete testing because 
Augustine counters a position that has some marked similarities with modem 
assumptions. Following McFadyen, we will first consider veiy briefly Pelagius’ 
position and then Augustine’s in more detail.^®
Pelagius believed that freedom in willing and choosing is an inalienable 
characteristic of the human creature. Will is therefore a pure and neutral organ of fr ee 
choice. The will’s freedom consists in its power to motivate itself out of mutual 
indifference towaids one of a number of different possibilities of action. 
Consequently, human beings are always in a position of possibility.
In situations of coercion, that is, being forced to do something against one’s 
will, Pelagius still maintained that the freedom of the will is a pure organ of choice 
insofar as it may still wish for alternative possibilities, albeit without sufficient 
freedom and power in action to exercise them, hi other words, the will retains its 
inalienable freedom as a foimal capacity, even if the person cannot act otheiwise. 
Coercion represents a removal of will from action rather than an act against one’s 
will.
As the will is a piue, neutral organ of fr'ee choice we are culpable for failing to 
stand against the pressure of sinftil action. Sin is therefore to be conceived in purely 
axiological terms. The will cannot be sinful since it is a fomial and neutial capacity 
to orient oneself in action through free choice. Only acts of the will may be sinful. 
This means that it is always possible (though often difficult) to avoid sinning, and as
Tills section is highly indebted to BTS, ppl67-188.
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we are inherently capable of willing and doing the good we are culpable for failure to 
do so.
In the light of the discussions of the concrete pathologies above, it should be 
immediately obvious that Pelagius’ account of the will is inadequate. The will is not a 
free and neutral organ of pm*e choice, nor can willing be reduced to the making of 
action-guiding, atomised decisions, but is incorporated into the pathological dynamics 
of the situation. Consequently, Augustine’s theological response to Pelagius falls at 
the heart of our concerns.
The key difference between Augustine’s and Pelagius’ accounts is that 
Augustine explicitly places his understanding of sin within the context of grace. 
Pelagius understood the fr eedom of the will in teims of its capacity to motivate itself 
to do otheiwise, making faith an act of the will. Augustine recognised that this 
position makes faith a human act and achievement which he believed was contraiy to 
the view of the human situation implied by the Christian understanding of salvation. 
In contrast to Pelagius, Augustine maintained that grace acts on the human condition 
from without and results in a radical distortion in our being. Perfection requires 
something more than self-modification.
For Augustine, the will is re-orientated internally and is therefore motivated 
and attracted to pursue the good which is a consequence of the gift of faith enacted by 
the Holy Spirit. The will is made good, not by its own power, but by the action of the 
Holy Spirit: it is first made good by the Spirit, and then receives a new orientation 
towards God and the good. At the same time, Augustine maintains that the good 
which results from the Spirit’s action is also the will’s own goodness. The action of 
the Spirit empowers and reorients the will so that subsequent willing and action do not
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happen without the will’s own power and active engagement. In other words, 
Augustine holds necessity and freedom together by arguing that the will is free when 
it accords with the motivation and desire to pursue the good. Put simply, Augustine 
maintains both sides: that faith as an act of the will is a personal act under the exercise 
of personal power and that the experience of being under grace compels the will.
Augustine’s ability to maintain both the necessity and freedom of the will 
rests, in large pait, upon a crucial distinction that he makes between ‘compulsion’ and 
‘force’. The term ‘force’ is reseiwed specifically for describing the interplay of forces 
between physical objects. Consequently, the compulsion of grace is not something 
analogous to an iiTesistible, physical force meeting a moveable object. When an 
action is forced in tins sense, it ceases to be a personal action as the person has 
become simply a physical object: “Forced action, by this definition, is action without 
wiir.^^ In a situation of force, will is simply inoperative.
By way of contrast, any action where the person is not reduced to physical 
objects of interaction is voluntaiy. Actions that we do unwillingly are also voluntary, 
by means of willing. This predicament is known as the ‘divided will’. Unwilling 
does not denote absence of will but division of will. Consequently, in a situation of 
compulsion, there are constraints placed upon the possible courses of action, but 
insofar as we exercise the will, willing is active and effective albeit constrained. 
Compulsion does not overcome the will but engages, directs, constrains, and utilises 
the will. One can find oneself voluntarily compelled to do something willingly, that 
one would (willingly) have avoided, and therefore, do it imwillingly. Put differently, 
one’s will can be caught up in an orientation (pathological dynamic) which one would 
not choose, but to which one is compelled to add one’s personal energies of willing.
BTS, pl81. (Italics in original).
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Pelagius’ understanding of freedom (to make choices in a neutial sphere apai't 
from God’s grace) is, for Augustine, not freedom but the will’s bondage to sin. 
Pelagius maintains that the basis of the will’s consent is its own independent decision 
and judgement, independent that is, from God and transcendent criteria. In other 
words, the standards and criteria of judgement in the position of neutrality can only 
come fr om itself. This position can also be called pride -  a sin which goes hand-in- 
hand with optimism that sin has not effected a radical distortion on one’s capacities 
for discerning and judging the good. By way of contrast:
In Augustine’s view, the will’s freedom consists, not in making autonomous choices 
(even when they may happen to coincide witli tlie good), but in being so related to the source 
of goodness that one is motivated permanently, unavoidably and indivisibly in active devotion 
to it. Thus, he is able to proclaim it a great freedom, indeed, to be able to sin, yet an even 
greater one to be unable to sin {non posse peccare')^'
Put differently, Pelagius’ concern to secure the will’s freedom from any form 
of constraint including the good resulted in binding the will to sin by requiring it to 
act with an inadequate representation of the good. For Augustine, a discernment of 
goodness cannot be derived independently from God. Pelagius’ will is freed from the 
good and therefore freed for sin.
For Augustine, sin is a disorder and disorientation in active intentionality. All 
sins are therefore acts of the will (although not coterminous with acts or will). With 
Augustine’s understanding of compulsion, he can assert that all active sinning is a 
necessity under the conditions of inherited original sin, and yet volmitary. The 
criterion for sin is not an act of the will but opposition to God. At this point, we 
realise why McFadyen chose to engage with Augustine. Because Augustine shows 
that compelled action involves willing, the dynamics of sin can be seen to have real 
explanatory and descriptive power, notably, because of an explicitly theological 
account.
“ 5ra ,pl85 .
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The relevance of Augustine for the concrete pathologies is that he has 
demonstrated that, even where sinM action originates from elsewhere (e.g. unwilling 
sinful action), it compels the will to participate, and draws on its own internal power. 
The power of sin is therefore internalised in such a way that it distorts the internal 
dynamics which stmcture a person’s intentionality. Consequently, the person is not 
only culpable for sinful acts that originate from within, but can become bound 
internally to the dynamics of sin.
Augustine’s understanding of the divided will has shed fui'ther light on the 
dynamics of the will in the concrete pathologies above. In conjunction with feminist 
theologies of sin, Augustine has added further weight to McFadyen’s hypothesis 
about the natui'e of the boiuid will in pathological situations. Even though the 
compulsion to act is external, the act remains personal and willed because the will is 
incorporated into the pathological dynamic.
Augustine’s account of the will differs from feminist accounts in two 
important respects. First, Augustine broadens the concept of the voluntary more 
explicitly than feminist accounts so that all situations in which there is willing are 
included, even under the conditions of coercion. In other words, there aie few, if any, 
situations which do not involve active and personal engagement. The theological 
contribution here is that under the conditions of sin, the will is necessarily misdirected 
away from God and the good and so the very capacity for ‘free’ choice is already 
disorientated. As the will is already bound to this disorientation, all willing further 
embeds the self in it.
Second, since the will is already bound to the pathological dynamics of the 
situation, it does not have sufficient clarity or potency to free the self from it.
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Additionally, the veiy concept of the good is itself clouded by sin. Sin, for Augustine, 
is a comprehensive tmning away from God and the good which results in the 
disorientation of life-trajectories and confusion about reality. Healing from sin may 
therefore, only come from outside the situation. The question is not whether we enjoy 
fomial freedom, but whether we are in bondage to sin or orientated towards the one 
tme source of our freedom. As McFadyen puts it:
the opposite o f sin for Augustine is not tlie good act predicated on die potent freedom 
of tlie free (neutral) will, but faith (which issues, not in legal obedience, but a concrete spirit 
of love). Faith is, by contrast, predicated on the potency of the grace of God in instilling tlie 
spirit of faith. Yet faith remains for Augustine voluntaiy, since it requires the contribution of 
personal power tluoiigh consensual willing.*’^
In summary, many of the core assumptions that are made in secular accounts 
of pathologies such as the nature of freedom are descriptively inadequate to the 
concrete pathologies mentioned above. People do not stand outside the situations 
exercising free choices in a neutral sphere, rather, the pathological dynamics of the 
situation exercise a disorienting influence on willing, hi other words, and this is 
pailicularly clear in Augustine’s account, a theological concept of sin offers a more 
adequate imderstanding of concrete pathologies because sin is not understood in terms 
of an act of human willing derived fr'om voluntaiistic actions. Sin cannot be thought 
of as individual acts of an atomistic agent who exercises ‘free’ choice in a neutial 
sphere.
Up to this point, the key theological contributions to secular accounts of the 
pathologies aie: 1) the doctrines of original sin, the bound will, feminist and 
Augustine’s theologies of sin, offer greater explanatory and descriptive power to the 
complexities of concrete pathologies than a non-theological framework allows; 2) 
feminist theology articulates a noimative standard of reference as a fuller and richer 
conception of the potentialities of human life, rather than a simple reversal of the
BTS,p\91.
117
pathology, or returning to the original conditions; 3) Augustine offers an explicitly 
theological account that locates the discussion of the will in tenus of (distorted) 
relation to God.
6. Normative Standards
Talking about any pathology implies a nonuative standard of reference or 
criterion from which the pathology is discerned. That is, we operate with a standard 
of what should be against which disorder, denial, or disease may be identified. 
Therefore, eveiy pathology carries with it an implicit characterisation of the good.
When questions of standards are posed -  ‘what is abuse seen as abuse of?’; 
‘what conception of normal, right, and true humanity is functioning in identifying the 
holocaust as inhumane?’ -  secular discourses tend to be surprisingly weak. 
McFadyen writes: “Many of the seculai* discussions of concrete pathology -  and, 
indeed, many discussions of sin -  in fact operate with a fairly restricted notion of the 
good as their normative standard of reference, often reducible to maintenance of 
noimal physiological, emotional or social functioning”.M c F a d y e n  identifies two 
significant problems with this.^  ^ First, secular discoui'ses fail to convey the full 
depths and significance of the denial and distortion of human flourishing, because 
they do not have a rich conception of hmnan flouiishing. Second, because of this 
underdeveloped understanding, they give those caught up in the pathological 
dynamics a restricted sense of what they might hope for. In many cases, this 
restriction of the good, reinforces the damage caused by the pathological dynamics.
BTS, p200.
BTS, pp200-201.
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This is where the most significant contribution that theology can make to 
secular" discourse comes to the fore. McFadyen’s aim is to offer “a specifically 
theological conception of the good, which affords a rich comprehension of the nature 
of pathology and holds out an enriching apprehension of the good to people caught up 
in it”.^  ^ Thus far, McFadyen has built up a cumulative case in favour* of the 
explanatory and descriptive power of the hypothesis that the will is bound to 
pathologies in which it is situated. At the end of the previous section, we noted that 
feminist theology articulates a normative standard of reference as a fuller and richer 
conception of the potentialities of human life, and that Augustine offers an explicitly 
theological account that locates the discussion of the will in terms of (distorted) 
relation to God. Additionally, and perhaps more significantly, ‘right relation’ for 
Augustine can only be interpreted in terms of relation to God. McFadyen now intends 
to bring both of these dimensions together by giving an explicitly theological account 
of a rich notion of human flourishing, and testing whether this can fiu ther emich the 
understanding of the pathological dynamics discussed thus far.
The foundation for McFadyen’s understanding of human flourishing is the 
doctrine of the Trinity. Because of the similarities between his account of the 
docti'ine here and in The Call to Personhood, it will not be repeated.H ow ever, the 
cross and the resunection of Jesus operate as an additional focal point for McFadyen 
and indicate the abundant goodness and plenitude of God. Together they are the 
source of joy in God, and the standard of nonnative reference for talking about sin.^  ^
Consequently, sin is that which counters the dynamics of God in creation and 
salvation. Sin is only known in the context of God’s active countering of it, that is.
®®5ra,p201.
BTS, pp206-212. See Chapter 2 above.
68 McFadyen does not discuss die power of the cross and resurrection in overcoming sin and death.
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working thi'ough the damage and brokenness caused by sin in order to reorient the 
world towards more abundant possibilities that were available hitherto. Sin can only 
be known in the context of the presence and action of God in the world (cf. Barth).
On the basis of the trinitarian dynamic, the cross and resunection, McFadyen 
identifies joy, faith, and worship as the noimative standards fi*om which sin is to be 
judged.Consequently, we will unpack what McFadyen means by them, and then 
see whether they work as normative standards for the concrete pathologies described 
above.
Joy is particularising and intensifies particularity.^® Our joys chaiacterise our 
personhood and life-intentionality. Joy invigorates and directs our concrete living. It 
goes beyond what is stiictly necessary for our physiological and psychological well­
being. Joy is excessive, and indicates the finding of abundance beyond what is 
strictly necessaiy; it incorporates orientation to oneself and another; it cuts across the 
usual ways of construing dependence and autonomy, and establishes integrity and 
uniqueness. Joy is a mode of relationship, both expressive of, and constitutive for, 
personal identity and integrity. However, ‘joy’ that is worthy of God has had to go 
thi'ough the cross. Joy does not pretend that there are no crosses, rather, it 
acknowledges that the crosses of the world are to stand but are to be worked thi'ough. 
The pathological dynamics are reoriented to the abundance and fullness of God. 
Redemption is emphatically not a return to the original conditions, but forward 
looking.^ ^
^^5ra,pp212-216.
At this point McFadyen’s tlieology is heavily indebted to David Ford’s. See David F. Ford, The 
Shape o f  Living, London: HarperCollins, 1997; and David F. Ford, Self and Salvation: Being 
Transformed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Elsewhere McFadyen illustrates the contrast between a Christian view and a secular view by pointing 
out that in the original Superman film, after Lois Lane has been killed, she is not resurrected (i.e. re­
orientating die person’s life-intentionality by working tinough the chaos of sin and death), rather, 
Superman flies rormd the world coimter-clockwise to turn back time so she can live again (retiuning to 
the original conditions). See McFadyen and Inge, 'Art in a Cadredral’.
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Faith involves an expansion and deepening of the dynamic integiity proper to 
the person. The dynamic being of God is orientated towards filling and fulfilling 
human beings with their own proper integrity in abundance. The dynamics of human 
integrity are founded on their ‘right relation’ to the dynamics of God. Joy in God 
stretches one to respond to new, fuller, and richer ways of being even more oneself in 
relation.
If faith is the energising spirit, then worship is the active form in which human 
beings direct all their energies towards the God whose dynamic order is directed 
towards them and the world. Worship is that active, attentive response to the dynamic 
order of God. hr worship, our own dynamic order or relatedness is blessed, 
continually opened to, and incorporated into the dynamic order of God.^  ^ hr the joy 
of faith and worship, abundance is properly fomided within the ecology and economy 
of God’s transforming presence and action. It is not a diminution of human selfliood 
and fr eedom, but their proper foundation.
As the normative standards of the good, joy, faith and worship show sin to be 
a disruption of genuine worship; idolatry. Sin appears in terms that re-echo the above 
consideration of willing -  a disorientation of the will from within coimtering the 
orientation to the spirit of faith -  that is, a spiritual disorientation of the whole person 
at the most fundamental level of life-intentionality and desire. Human lives are 
involved in a disorientation away from the reality of God, others, and the true 
fulfilment of their being. The situational and relational dynamics within which the 
person is caught, distort or block the mediation of the dynamics of God. This means 
that the situational dynamic both asserts itself as an independent power and rmiversal 
frame of reference, and undermines the conditions for genuine worship of God by
See McFadyen, and Ford, ‘Praise’; and McFadyen and Inge, ‘Art in a Cathedral’.
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fostering an active misperception of the nature of God’s being and identity, hi short, 
wrong worship either has the wrong object or the wrong dynamic.^^
McFadyen has now given specifically theological content to the dynamics of 
the bound will.^ "* His concern is then to test directly the explanatory and descriptive 
power of this explicitly theological identification in relation to the concrete 
pathologies outlined above.
To worship is to order one’s life around a reality as primary to and constitutive 
of meaning, worth, truth, and value. One’s personal energy is oriented towards this 
reality as the ground and criterion for active life-intentionality. The object of worship 
is absolute, and unconditional. It demands exclusive loyalty, hr the light of this, 
McFadyen seeks to discern first, whether the concrete pathologies can be analysed in 
terms of worship, and second to discover whether such worship is genuine or 
idolatrous.
1. Concrete dynamics o f worship. Both the account of the sexual abuse of 
childr en and the holocaust offered above represent for McFadyen, “a clear, concrete 
manifestation of the dynamics pertaining to worship: the direction of all energies 
towards demands which do not only overiide, but exclude, all other loyalties and 
which are lived as foundational to identity, relation, meaning, worth and tnith”.^  ^ In 
relation to child abuse for example, there is no tr anscendent locus of commitment or 
frame of reference for evaluation. The child is enclosed in a comprehensive 
fr amework of meaning, tr*uth, value, and action offered by and through the abusive
BTS,p22\.
He does this, in large part, by further consideration of Augustine, pride, and slotli, although tliese are
not mentioned in my summary. 
BTS, p229.
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relationship. Consequently, the abusive dynamics raise themselves to being of 
primary significance as foundational to personal integrity, identity, and life- 
intentionality, as well as incorporating themselves into the internal stnictures of 
identity and communication.
A similar dynamic is evident in the account of the holocaust. The material and 
social practices of the Nazi state shaped life-intentionality and orientation to the 
extent that these dynamics secured the practical commitment of others without 
obviously intruding into their consciously held beliefs. Nazism became the horizon 
for all commitments, action and intentionality, to which most of public and often 
private life was directed. Through institutions and the processes of public life the 
Party used various means to secure commitment and devotion. Additionally, Nazi 
policy was presented as a quest for a just, right and true order, and the ‘emergency’ 
situation that emerged became a self-legitimating criterion in public policy and 
practice, eliminating competing claims of any transcendent frame of reference.
The key point in both pathologies is the cumulative blocking of transcendence. 
Life-internationalities are enclosed in, energised by, and orientated to the pathological 
dynamic. In short, both of the concrete pathologies correspond to the dynamics of 
worship.
2. True or false worship? As already seen, genuine worship is characterised 
by joy, and therefore, to ask whether the concrete pathologies constitute genuine or 
idolatrous worship is also to ask whether they nourish or block joy. The blocking or 
disorienting of the dynamics of joy is the fundamental characteristic of idolatry.
Joy which participates in and mediates the dynamics of God perfects and 
develops the dynamic order of persons-in-communion. There is an intensification of
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personal particularity in the dynamic ecology of joyful relation. In the case of child 
abuse, the intentionality of abuse reduces the child to a particular', perverse 
frrnctionality for the abuser. The child is not intended as having integrity in life- 
intentionality and identity apart from the abusive relationship. The abuser does not 
intend the child to have genuine joy. Abuse is abuse of the child’s own capacity for, 
and orientation to joy. It is abuse of the child’s capacity to worship, that is, orient her 
energies towards the fullness of others, herself, and God.
Abusive relationships are not personal. The abuser does not seek to engage or 
be engaged by, intensify and develop the dynamic order of his, or the child’s own 
particularity. But at the same time, there is a sense in which abuse over-particularises 
in its over-determination of life-intentionality and identity. Identity is bound to one 
particular relation and dynamic which energises, orients, directs and defines identity 
and life-intentionality into the future. Consequently, access to transcendent sources of 
meaning, energy and truth are effectively blocked, and additionally, the possibilities 
of self-transformation. There can be no real fr eedom or openness in relations with 
others as other, nor can there be openness towards oneself as potentially other than 
what one is and has become through abuse. This is, put simply, joylessness. What is 
blocked is the dynamics of the trirme God and the possibilities of non-distorted 
worship -  idolatry.
By way of contrast Nazi ideology appealed in many ways explicitly to joy -  in 
blood, race, nation, soil, culture, etc.. hi the ecology of God’s movement to creation, 
there is a proper place for joy in these particularities. The question is about the mode 
of orientation to them, that is, whether they replace the dynamics of the trirme God.
In Nazi Germany, the objects of joy were absolutised and became the prime 
determinants of the value and truth of everything else whilst making claims to
124
objectivity. The primacy of loyalty owed by Germans to their race reflected the belief 
that their race was actually superior to other races. This, in other words, is idolatry -  
joy in blood, race, nation, and soil is removed from the joy in these particulars as 
directed by the dynamics of joyful orientation to God. The dynamics of God are 
orientated towards all of humanity and creation, and although this does not undermine 
local horizons of commitment, it does make them penultimate to loyalty to God. 
Thus, all the particularities of concrete situatedness are relativised. Joy in these 
particularities which participates in and mediates the dynamics of God is orientated 
towards perfecting and developing the dynamic order of all human particularities in 
relation to one another. There is a transcendent horizon of loyalty which defines 
coimnitted responsibility at these levels.
There are a niunber of other ways in which this dynamic is evident in the 
holocaust some of which I list for brevity’s sake: 1) Nazi ideology and policy reduced 
and denied Jewish particularity and integrity as a locus of joy; 2) The energies of 
genuine joy in being German and joy in other races (and in God) are dissipated 
precisely tlrrough their separation, and the genuine richness of German identity 
undermined along with the possibilities of true worship; 3) At the personal level, Nazi 
policy depersonalised and departicularised identity tlrrough relativising the particular 
to the group, bureaucratic administration and mass extermination; 4) Death camps 
were deliberately designed to constrict and constr ain by reducing people to the needs 
of their own physiological survival.
Although this list is by no means exhaustive, it is clear that for both Jews and 
Germans, the holocaust entailed a highly energised distortion away from the 
abundance of God. The holocaust can be seen as an abuse of the capacity for joyful 
praise of God and joyful orientation of self and others.
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Idolatry, therefore, holds descriptive and explanatory power in relation to the 
sexual abuse of children and the holocaust. The dynamics evident in the concrete 
pathologies can be re-expressed in tenns of idolatry. This does more than simply give 
the same description offered by secular discourse in different terms. The meaning 
given to idolatry is not containable within the frames of reference offered by secular 
discourse, and so, using the language of idolatry gives a specifically theological 
meaning to the pathologies. Within the context of the book, sin can be seen to offer 
gieater descriptive and explanatory power of the concrete pathologies as it better 
encapsulates the dynamics of the situations and the way in which the will, and the 
whole person, is incorporated into the situation.
7. Secular Discourse in McFadyen's Doctrine of Sin
In this section I will review the method in McFadyen’s argument, identify 
briefly the main developments in his method from his earlier work, consider the role 
of secular discouise in his doctrine of sin, focus more directly and critically on his 
method, and finally, consider some possible weaknesses in McFadyen’s content.
Z.f A Basic Outline o f Method in Bound to Sin
Because of the detail that it has been necessary to enter into with regard to the 
content, I will briefly recap the key methodological stages in Bound to Sin.
The docti'ine of sin can function as a test of our ability to speak of God in 
relation to the world. Therefore, McFadyen argues, the doctrine of sin holds
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explanatoiy and descriptive power in relation to concrete pathologies. His aim is to 
put this to the test by engaging in an explicit conversation with secular discouise.
McFadyen began by offering a seculai' reading of two concrete pathologies 
without any explicit reference to theological discourse. These readings then 
functioned as test cases for a theological account of the pathologies. The intention 
was not so much to pit them against each other as mutually exclusive frames of 
reference, but by engaging them in conversation, i.e., a theological accoimt informed 
by the secular reading, show that theological discourse can offer a more adequate 
explanation and description of the concrete pathologies than seculai* discoui se can.
McFadyen identified the bound will as the context for testing. Using an 
alliance between feminist theology and Augustine, McFadyen showed that a secular 
framework with its assumption of a modem notion of fr eedom as choice and a neutral 
will making atomistic decisions, was simply inadequate for describing and explaining 
the complexities of the pathological dynamics. A theological account of sin can make 
two significant contributions. First, it holds greater descriptive and explanatoiy 
power of the pathologies because theological discourse can offer a dynamic account 
of sin that shows how the whole person, both willingly and unwillingly, becomes 
incorporated into the pathological dynamic. Second, it can offer a normative standard 
of reference forjudging the pathologies which derives from explicit reference to God. 
This shows both why the pathologies actually aie pathological, and at the same time, 
offers a fr amework of hope for the smvivors that may enable and empower them to 
come to terms with their experiences.
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7./# Earlier and Later Methodology
Thi'ee main concerns were identified in McFadyen’s earlier work as significant 
for his method. First, McFadyen understood the task of theology as engaging with 
both ‘the tradition’, and ‘culture’. This was to be guided by two Rules: the primacy of 
God in theological method and critical engagement with the determinate situation. 
Second, his work was both rooted in and intended to shape praxis. Third, his work 
was structured such that theological discouise enters into a dialectical dialogue with 
secular discourse. All tliree of these concerns meant that McFadyen necessarily had 
to engage with secular discourse.
All three of these concerns are clearly evident in McFadyen’s later work in a 
more pronounced way. The second concern comes through more clearly in his later 
work, especially in his work with child abuse.^® The first and third concerns come to 
definitive expression in his method of ‘testing’. He does far more than enter into a 
dialectical dialogue with theological and seculai* discoinse, but places them into a 
situation where the methodological assumptions of both are at stake. Both forms of 
discouise can still leam fiom and be criticised by the other, but if theology cannot 
contribute any further descriptive of explanatory power to the analyses of the concrete 
pathologies offered by secular discomse, the very purpose of theology is called into 
question. In short, if theology cannot make a contribution to the understanding of 
pathologies that cannot be made with secular discourse, reference to God does not 
make any difference to the affairs of the woiid.^^
McFadyen, Hanks, and Adams, ‘Ritual Abuse’; McFadyen, and Ford, ‘Praise’; McFadyen, ‘Crime 
and Violence’; McFadyen, ‘The Abuse of the Family’; McFadyen, ‘Healing the Damaged’; McFadyen, 
‘Cliristians in Public Life’.
See Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘Tmth as Mission: The Christian Claim to Universal Truth in a Pluralist 
Public World’, inSJT, 46,1993, pp437-456.
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As stated above, a cmcial difference can be seen in a shift from a concern to 
maintain the distinctness of theological and seculai* discourse, and for each to inform 
and be criticised by the other, to the distinctness of each discourse being maintained 
by informing and criticising the other. This comes to expression in the sixth 
methodological thesis; in order to be intelligible and true to itself theology must 
necessarily engage in dialogue with secular foims of public explanation, 
understanding and truth which both confront and permeate the situation of a living 
theological tradition. In short, engagement with secular discourse is a necessary 
condition for theology to be ‘true to itself. The uniqueness and distinctness of 
theology is maintained precisely in, through, and by, conversing with secular 
discourse.
Another important development can be seen in McFadyen’s use of secular 
discourse. Recall that in Chapter 2 above, McFadyen was criticised for not taking 
sufficient account of the breadth of seculai* discouise. hi essence, McFadyen’s 
account of secular discourse rested upon a monological reading that was almost 
entirely dependent upon Rom Harré. In his later work, McFadyen does take into 
consideration a fai* broader range of thinkers although it remains notable that his 
secular evaluation of the holocaust was highly dependent upon Zygmunt Bauman. 
Whilst it is always possible for an author to engage with a gieater range of material, 
some of which will be mentioned shortly, one does not get the sense that McFadyen 
was somehow ti*ying to fit ‘secular discourse’ into a theological framework which was 
a danger in his earlier work.^^ In short, in his later work, McFadyen seems to have 
taken secular discourse more seriously on its own terms.
Again this is why I place him between Types 3 and 4 in Chapter 1 above, and not in Type 4 which 
would characterise Bartli’s approach.
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However, McFadyen still does not offer an adequate account of ‘secular 
discourse’. In fact, a strong case can be made that McFadyen is putting forward a 
‘sti aw-man’ argument. McFadyen’s description of secular accounts of the will which 
are enmeshed in a secular account of ‘freedom’ is simply inadequate for two main 
reasons. First, McFadyen is taking ‘secular’ accounts of the will to be synonymous 
with libertarian freedom. In fact, the core of his critique of secular accounts is that he 
argues the will cannot occupy a ‘neutral’ position from which to survey a range of 
‘free’ (‘imcaused’) choices. Whilst there are undoubtedly a number of philosophers 
who do fall into this position -  especially amongst philosophers of religion -  this is by 
no means always the case, and even when it is, McFadyen’s critique does not always 
apply. For instance, the position which McFadyen attacks demands a heavy dose of 
libertarian free will combined with a hard-line incompatiblism, such as that which 
undergirds Alvin Plantinga’s ‘Free Will Defence’. I n  tliis strong fonn of libertarian 
freedom and incompatiblism, McFadyen’s critique may hold some force. However, 
even amongst philosophers who hold a similar position, there are options which evade 
the full force of McFadyen’s critique. One such position is that offered by Peter van 
Inwagen who maintains incompatiblism with a foim of libertarianism which allows 
for causal factors -  ‘contra-causal libertarianism’.^ ® McFadyen’s critique is evaded 
further still by compatiblists (such as J. L. Mackie) and of couise hard-line 
determinists. This latter category of thinkers are well represented amongst both social 
and natural scientists as well as philosophers. Similarly, the accounts of the will 
found in the work of Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Foucault and others do not fit 
neatly into McFadyen’s ‘either/or’ description. To put the first point bluntly, 
McFadyen’s critique of secular accoimts of the will is a straw-man argument because
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature o f Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974, Alvin Plantinga, God, 
Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974.
Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
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a significant number of thinkers fiom a variety of disciplines do not adhere to the 
position McFadyen puts forward as a ‘seculai*’ account of the will.
Second, even though McFadyen may have captured a populai* imderstanding 
of the will such as that fi*equently offered in the mass media (for example in the so- 
called ‘natme/ nurture debate’), the account of the will offered by many philosophers 
and social scientists is in some cases virtually indistinguishable from Christian 
accounts. This is by no means a recent phenomenon either. The obvious example is 
Ai'istotle’s Nichomachean Ethics in which he offers a highly intricate account of the 
will and its relation to freedom. The account of the will put forward by Aristotle is 
so close to that offered by Paul in Romans 6 and 7 that it is not an easy task 
identifying the differences. In other words, not only does McFadyen fail to recognise 
the vast range of possible positions on the freedom of the will (most of which do not 
fall under his critique), McFadyen does not recognise that some ‘secular’ accounts 
come vei*y close to ‘Christian’ accounts which calls into question the dichotomy upon 
which his critique rests.
Given that one of McFadyen’s concerns is to engage in a mutually 
illuminating dialogue with secular discourse, it would be reasonable to assume that a 
reliable grasp of secular discourse is a sine qua non for the task. If we were to push 
this point further, it would follow that the ability of his theology to engage with 
regnant secular assumptions is seriously impaired. However, the point need not be 
put as strongly as this, nor does this excluded his work for being informative for our 
purposes. A simple way out of the conundrum would be to limit the term secular 
discourse with the qualifier ‘some forms of...’ . Similarly, insofar as McFadyen’s 
engagement with seculæ* discourse is accurate, his argument is a highly significant
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, esp. Books III and VII.
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one for both theology and secular discourse (and remains so even if he has overstated 
the case). As already mentioned, his characterisation of seculai* discourse does, I 
believe, captme some dominant secular assumptions at a popular level albeit not at a 
more highly theorised level.
One consequence of this point is to emphasise the importance of recognising 
and engaging with the diversity of secular discom ses, and, insofar as possible, to treat 
them as dialogue partners in their own right. McFadyen’s approach seeks to show 
how theology can engage in a mutually informative dialogue with seculai* discouise, 
which even if he has not done it as thoroughly as he might have done, his method 
does not cease to be insti*uctive. Indeed, it is the aigument of this thesis that his 
fundamental method is essentially the coirect way of approaching this kind of 
dialogue. The only way he could have avoided some generalisations of this sort is to 
focus on ad hoc dialogues between particulars. This, I will suggest below, is perhaps 
the best way to approach this kind of dialogue, but cannot have the wider appeal or 
applicability for which McFadyen was aiming. McFadyen’s project, even if it could 
have been done more comprehensively (and it is already fairly exhaustive), is of 
profound importance for Christian theology. ‘Straw-man’ arguments 
notwithstanding, McFadyen does highlight both the significance of theology engaging 
with seculai* discourse and the importance of recognising the multifaceted nature of
secular discourse. i
I
Related to this, we still lack a sufficient account of the complexity of secular ■
discourse(s), and perhaps more importantly, a suggestion of criteria for evaluating, 
distinguisliing and attributing weight to different forms of secular discourse(s) -  not 
all seculai* discourses function according to the same assumptions. Fui*theimore, as 
stated in Chapter 1, not all seculai* discourses aie amenable to a conversation with
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theology -  the methodological assumptions of some are formed in explicit antagonism 
to theology. This said, some distinct benefits are evident from a dialogue between 
theological and secular discourse, some of which we will now consider.
7.Hi Secular Discourse in McFadyen^s Doctrine of Sin
The central concern of McFadyen’s book, even before his thesis that the 
doctrine of sin can frmction as a test of our ability to speak of God in relation to the 
world, is a conversation between theological and secular* discourse. In fact, the 
process of ‘testing’ relies in large part upon this conversation. As stated in the 
previous chapter, a conversation goes both ways, so let us consider briefly some of the 
benefits gained for both sides by the conversation. In contrast to his earlier work, 
McFadyen in his later writing is stronger on the contribution that theology can make 
to secular discourse. Let us start with the opposite movement — secular discourse to 
theology.
1. Secular discourse shows and reminds theology o f its own inner truth. If 
theology cannot bring to adequate expression a theological dimension which secular* 
frameworks are incapable of bringing to expression, it has failed. The uniqueness and 
distinctness of theology is maintained precisely by conversing with secular discourse. 
Engagement with secular discourse is a necessary condition for theology to be ‘true to 
itself, hr short, secular discourse can serve to remind theology of its central tasks and 
that it can and should contribute to public discourse.^^
See McFadyen, ‘Truth as Mission’.
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2. Secular discourse has brought the doctrine o f sin into engagement with the 
realities o f concrete pathologies which has enriched the understanding o f sin. 
Engagement with secular discourse has helped bring aspects of the theological task to 
further light that have hitherto received insufficient attention: an explicit relation of 
the doctrine of sin to the doctrine of the Trinity as well as to joy, faith and worship, a 
renewed understanding of original sin, the inadequacies of the tradition’s emphasis on 
pride as the root sin, the drawing out and highlighting the significance of Augustine’s 
understanding of the will, an emphasis on the dynamic, comprehensive, energised and 
relational dimensions of sin.
The pressure of interpretation is stronger in the other direction -  the 
contribution theology can make to secular discourse. The key benefits can be 
summarised as follows:
1. Part o f the theological task is to discern and show secular discourse its 
own inner truth. If the concrete pathologies operating in the sexual abuse of children 
and the holocaust cannot be adequately understood except with reference to the denial 
of and opposition to God, then a secular imderstanding of the world camiot properly 
exclude God on its own terms. If secular discourses fail to incorporate adequately 
into themselves reference to the activity of the triune God this is a failure, not 
according to theological discourse, but according to secular disciplines’ own truth. 
McFadyen’s theological description and explanation of the concrete pathologies poses 
this challenge to seculai* discourse.
2. The doctrines o f original sin, the bound will, feminist and Augustine’s 
theologies o f sin, offer greater explanatory and descriptive power to the complexities 
o f concrete pathologies than a non-theological framework allows. A secular (moral)
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framework does not account adequately for the complexities of the pathological 
dynamic, in part, because of some of its core assumptions (‘straw-man’ arguments 
notwithstanding). The theological account offered highlights both the inadequacy of 
this kind of a framework and identifies aspects of the pathological dynamics that can 
only be expressed in a theological fr amework.
3. Both feminist and Augustinian doctrines o f sin articulate a normative 
standard o f reference as a fuller and richer conception o f the potentialities o f human 
life which Augustine locates in a specifically theological context. McFadyen 
identifies two significant problems with the analyses of secular discourses: 1) secular 
discoui'ses fail to convey the full depths and significance of the denial and distortion 
of human flourishing because they lack a rich conception of normative standards; 2) 
because of an inadequate understanding of human flourishing, Üiey give those caught 
up in the pathological dynamics a restiicted sense of what they might hope for. 
Taking joy, faith and worship to be noimative standards of reference reveals both the 
depths of the pathologies (by constming them as idolatry), and indicates the 
possibilities for a new future.
The danger of setting out the strengths of the conversation in this fashion is 
that it implies that theological and secular discourses are in conflict. Wliat the whole 
of McFadyen’s work testifies to is that both are dependent upon the other. His later 
work paiticularly shows that both theological and secular discourses need the other in 
order to be true to themselves accordmg to then own criteria. Additionally, the 
theological approach McFadyen offers is highly indebted to, indeed dependent upon, 
the analyses offered by secular discomse. Although he argues that the doctrine of sin, 
and consequently an understanding of the world in relation to God, holds greater
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descriptive and explanatory power than the secular analyses, the theological analysis 
builds upon the seculai' analysis. The point is that theological discomse can captme 
aspects of the pathologies that are excluded a priori by seculai' discomse because of 
its refusal to interpret the world with reference to God. This is clear in the fifth 
methodological thesis: to engage in a conversation in which the theological and 
secular inteipretation of the pathological dynamics are both tested by each other’s 
understanding, and by the empirical realities of the situation.
7./V Further Consideration o f Method
McFadyen’s concern for ‘testing’ is a bold and original move, but it is worth 
pausing to consider the methodological underpinnings of the ‘testing’ more fully. 
One reviewer of Bound to Sin comments: “while the pictme of sin that emerges from 
McFadyen’s reflections is often compelling, it is uncleai* whether the process of 
testing he employs is genuinely open-ended, or whether the framework within which 
the study is conducted prejudices the issue in favom of the tiadition”.^  ^ Does 
McFadyen, in other words, test the tiadition against seculai' and empirical frames of 
reference, or is the process of testing set up in advance to favom the tradition?
What is clear is that McFadyen has highlighted some of the weaknesses of 
(some forms of) secular discomses with respect to concrete pathologies on the basis 
of a theological account. What is less clear is whether this could have occuned 
without theological interaction. On the basis of the assumptions held by the secular 
discomses that McFadyen engages with, the complexities of the pathologies cannot be 
accounted for adequately. However, not all foi*ms of secular discomse share these
Ian A. McFarland, ‘Review: Bound to Sin’, in International Journal o f Systematic Theology, Vol. 3, 
No. 3 ,2001’,p332.
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assiunptions. The main contributions that the theological account offered were 
gi'eater explanatory and descriptive power, and normative standards. Both of these 
could be offered without explicit reference to God as we have seen in McFadyen’s 
account of feminist doctrines of sin. This means it is plausible that other secular 
discourses could overcome the weaknesses which McFadyen’s theological account 
highlights without reference to a theological account. From the perspective of secular' 
discourses, the significant factor was not that a more adequate account was offered 
that was theological, but that (some forms of) secular discourse had been cr'iticised. 
This raises the question of whether McFadyen offered a theological critique of secular 
discourse rather than entering into genuine ‘testing’.
McFadyen is still keen to retain the ‘Barthian priority of God’ in theological 
method,^"  ^but also recognises the value of a broadly correlationalist tradition (hence 
he stands between Types 3 and 4 in Chapter 1 above). His emphasis on dialogue/ 
conversation and a flexible understanding of tradition implies that the process of 
testing should be recast in the light of the empirical and secular analyses of the 
pathologies whilst maintaining the orthodoxy of ‘the tradition’. However, 
McFadyen’s account of Augustine particularly, although perhaps given a slightly 
different emphasis, is largely unreconstructed and is recognisably a recapitulation of 
Augustinian orthodoxy to the extent that one reviewer questions whether he is “losing 
sight of the method alluded to at an earlier stage”.^  ^ Given that the theological 
account remains largely imchanged although indebted to secular analyses, it appears 
that McFadyen has not remained sufficiently trire to his intended method/conelation. 
Emphasising the ‘priority of God’ at the expense of a conelation is also evident in a
On occasions, McFadyen does offer a critique of otlier people’s work which gives too much to 
secular discourse at the expense of theology, e.g. Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘Review: Sin, Guilt, and 
Forgiveness: The Hidden Dimensions o f a Pastoral Process, Mary A. Coate, London: SPCK, 1994’, in 
Expository Times, 106, 1995, p349.
Graham, Review, p259.
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more recent work on forgiveness when McFadyen writes: “‘Natural reason’, 
‘common sense’ and the truth claims of secular disciplines or culture may be made 
use of, but only in an ad hoc fashion, to help extrapolate the account of forgiveness to 
be found within the distinctive integrity of the Christian faith”.^  ^ hr short, McFadyen 
appears to have mormted a theological critique of (some forms oj  ^ secular discourse 
rather than a genuine ‘testing’ of the doctrine of sin.
7,v Further Consideration o f Content
The focus of this chapter is on McFadyen’s method not content, but there are 
some issues which are worth raising briefly which have a bearing on method. 
McFadyen brings together discussion of the sexual abuse of children and the 
holocaust. These two pathologies were used as fields of testing for the doctrine of sin. 
One of the main developments that came from this testing was taking joy, faith and 
worship as normative standards of the good firom which these pathologies should be 
judged. Given this, some lines of thought are conspicuously absent, hr the light of 
these pathologies, there is no attempt to touch on questions of theodicy. Similarly 
absent, and this is especially surprising given McFadyen’s concern for praxis, he 
made little effort to show what the western theological tradition might have to say to 
the extremities of the human condition. And perhaps most importantly, in a 
theological account of sin and normative standar ds, the significance and possibilities 
of the cross, resruTection, forgiveness, redemption and reconciliation are rar*ely 
touched upon. It might be asking too much of an author to incorporate this into an 
already broad ranging, and at the same time highly specific (in its aims) book, but
McFadyen, and Sarot, Forgiveness and Truth, pp2-3.
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given McFadyen’s concerns, it is siuprising not to find fui'tlier discussion of these
issues in other places.^^
It is not insignificant that the only other theological book that brings together
the sexual abuse of children and the holocaust is not even mentioned in Bound to Sin.
This book is David Blumenthal’s Facing the Abusing God}^ What is more significant
is that this book is a theology of protest -  and a protest which is pairiculaiiy difficult
reading for a Christian theologian. Blumenthal, a Jew, poses in an especially acute
manner the problem of speaking of a God who in the light of cries of pain does not
appear to respond to human suffering. In addition to the strong voices of protest
against ‘the abusing God’, what comes through especially clearly in Blumenthal’s
work is dissonance -  to the extent that it is built into the very structure of the book.
Blumenthal writes:
in the aftermath o f the holocaust, one cannot simply speak; tliat discourse has been 
shattered by the irruption of die holocaust into modem consciousness; that language has been 
ruptured by the in-breaking of the holocaust into common speech. ... Caesura, brokenness, 
fragmentation are all we have to express the disjunctm e of normal discourse with the reality of 
tire holocaust. ... Thought itself must be broken, shattered, fragmented -  like a nightmare; for 
writing theology after tlie holocaust is living in a nightmare with its sudden turns, its 
flashbacks. To do theology is to remember, in pieces, in horrible pieces. ..,
Caesma. Fragmentedness. Lruption.^^
Blumenthal adds a disruptive, ‘nightmare-flashback’ to the end of each 
chapter in the first part of the book. These ‘irruptions’ certainly shock the reader out 
of any settled, systematic mode of thinking (which is followed through in the later 
exegesis). Even if, joining with another reviewer of McFadyen’s work, “I was 
disappointed at McFadyen’s lack of engagement with such themes as the
To some extent, some of these issues are addressed in McFadyen, ‘Healing the Damaged’; Ford, and 
McFadyen, ‘Praise’.
David R. Blumenthal, Facing the Abusing God: A Theology o f Protest, Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1993. It is important to note that when McFadyen was approached for material he found 
especially useful for Bound to Sin, one o f tire first books that he mentioned (and spoke highly of) was 
Blumenthal’s. Additionally, given McFadyen’s specific corrcem for ‘testing’, it is difficult to 
incorporate Blumentlral’s work into tire analysis. This is also a point mentioned in Graham, ‘Review’, 
p260; and one of very few good (or accurate) points made in Hannah Holtschneider, ‘Review; Bound 
to Sin’, found at http://www.cicr.cam.ac.rrk/resources/reviews/reviews/01004.html [February, 2002].
Blrrmenthal, Facing the Abusing God, pp8-9.
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impossibility of speaking of God after Auschwitz, or the considerable pastoral and 
theological issues generated by survivors of abuse searching for images of God that 
heal, rather than sanction, their betrayals”,^ ® the main weakness seems to be that he 
ends his book with an account of the good, rooted in the goodness of God, without 
having addressed the dissonance, the theology of protest, that is evident in 
Blumenthal’s work. The problem is not with the validity of his argumentation -  that 
every pathology carries with it an implicit characterisation of the good -  but that 
McFadyen does not seem to have taken the horror implicit in his own content into 
account for the later stages of the book. Put in more general terms, content impacts 
method not only in terms of the arrangement of material, but in terms of what the 
material becomes. Perhaps more than any other area of theology the doctrine of sin 
should affect the way that theology is done. This will be discussed fmther in Chapter 
5 on Barth’s hamartiology.
8, Conclusion
The central aim of this chapter was to highlight some significant developments 
in the form and content of Alistair McFadyen’s later theology, hi regard to form, the 
main difference is that the distinctness of theological and secular* discourse is 
maintained by informing and criticising the other. This is perhaps clearest in the sixth 
methodological thesis: in order to be intelligible and true to itself, theology must 
necessarily engage in dialogue with secular forms of public explanation, 
imderstanding and truth which both confront and permeate the situation of a living 
theological tradition. McFadyen has tried to extend the conversation between 
theological and secular* discourses into a form of concrete testing. The adequacies of
^ Graham, ‘Review’, p260. (Italics in original).
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both secular and theological accounts of concrete pathologies were put to the test and 
placed into concrete conversation. There is, however, more theological mileage to be 
gained from engaging with an empirical frame of reference and it was also suggested 
that McFadyen offered a theological critique of secular discour se rather than a fonn of 
concrete ‘testing’.
hr regard to content, there is a clear* shift from theological anthropology to the 
doctrine of sin (although the continuities between the two are evident). McFadyen 
demonstrated the possibility of theology having something to contribute to both 
secular discourse and also concrete pathologies. By highlighting the role of the 
(boimd) will in relation to pathological situations, McFadyen has offered a more 
adequate account of the complexities of the situation than many secular theorists ar e 
able to do. Overall, McFadyen offered a comprehensive doctrine of sin in such a way 
that the relevance to concrete situations was evident. Some question was raised about 
the conspicuous absence of discussions of dissonance, theodicy and some pastoral 
issues. Neither was it clear the extent to which the doctrine of sin (content) affected 
theological method.
The following two chapters considers aspects of Karl Bar*th’s thought which 
will be used to shed further light on the interaction between theological and secular 
discourse. Chapter 6 will then bring McFadyen’s thought into explicit dialogue with 
Bar*th’s.
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CHAPTER 4 
Method in Karl Barth’s Theological Anthropology
1. Introduction
The previous two chapters of the thesis explored the methodological dynamics 
of Alistair McFadyen’s thought which can be located somewhere between the Types 3 
and 4 explored in Chapter 1 above. The aim of this chapter and Chapter 5 is to 
explore further Type 4 (Karl Barlh) with respect to theological anthropology and the 
doctrine of sin.
hi Chapter 1 it was suggested that it is a necessary aspect of the two-fold task 
of theology to maintain both the priority of God in theological method and engage 
with the determinate situation. It was also suggested that the most appropriate way of 
doing this, following McFadyen, is to approach theology from between Type 3 and 4. 
Because of the difficulty of staying on the tight-rope between Types 3 and 4, it was 
ar gued that if we are to fall off, it is important to veer towards Type 4 rather than 
Type 3 as this does better justice to the uniqueness of the Christian message which 
should have ultimate priority, hr this respect, a dialogue with Type 4 functions as a 
useful check for the tight-rope walk as well as helping to give ultimate priority to the 
trinitarian self-revelation of God. Therefore, the focus of this chapter and the 
subsequent chapter is with Karl Barth’s thought (Type 4), rather than a Type 3 thinker 
(such as Paul Tillich) whose thought might also have a significant contribution to 
make to the relation between theological and secular discourse. Additionally, most
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approaches to these sorts of areas of dogmatics (such as the ‘theology of culture’) tend 
to have been through Type 3 rather than Type 4 approaches/
The central concern of this chapter is to identify the method operative in Karl 
Barth’s theological anthropology which is dealt with most comprehensively in Church 
Dogmatics III/2. Because of the nature of Barfir’s theology, it does not serve our task 
to ask directly about the interaction between theological and secular discourse, but by 
focusing first on his method. Only in doing this will the question of the relationship 
between theological and secular* discourse be highlighted. Tliis question is peripheral 
to Barth’s concerns (and may not be the most appropriate distinction for approaching 
his thought), which is not to say that his thought is not infor*mative, rather that it can 
only be addr essed in the light of broader methodological considerations.
The structure of this chapter can be set out as follows, hiitially, some key 
aspects of Barth’s ‘theo-logic’ will be set out. It is helpful to identify some key loci 
which are evident in his theology more generally which are also operative in his 
theological anthropology. Attention will then be turned specifically to Barth’s 
anthr opology as it appears in Church Dogmatics III/2, Because of the inseparability 
of for*m and content in Barth’s thought, Barth’s method will only become clear by 
considering the content, and so both form and content will be developed in 
conjimction. However, the impor*tant methodological considerations will be 
identified. Following the exposition of Barth’s content, the interaction between 
theological and secular discour se will be addr essed more explicitly and critically.
' This is particularly evident in ‘theology and film’ (Chapter 7 below), examples of which include 
Clive Marsh, and Gaye Ortiz (eds.), Explorations in Theology and Film: Movies and Meaning, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1997, esp. Part 1; and to a lesser extent Robert K. Johnston, Reel Spirituality: Theology and 
Film in Dialogue, Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2000.
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2. Method in Kari Barth
To attempt to offer even an outline of Barth’s methodology in the space of a 
few pages would be absurd and this has been done at greater length elsewhere/ 
However, it is helpful to have some idea of what to look for in advance for the task of 
identifying Barth’s method in his anthropology (even if this is in explicit contrast to 
Barth’s method^). Consequently, three key loci or emphases will be mentioned. It is 
to be stressed that these loci are by no means exhaustive, nor is this treatment of 
Barth’s method intended to be remotely comprehensive.'^ The purpose is solely to 
highlight thr'ee significant aspects of Barth’s method to aid the analysis of his 
anthropology below.
 ^ For instance; Stephen W. Sykes (ed.), Kat'l Barth: Studies of his Theological Method, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979; Alan J. Torrance, Persons in Communion: An Essay on Trinitarian Description 
and Human Participation with Special Reference to Volume One o f Karl Bath‘s Church Dogmatics, 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996, esp. Parts 1 and 2; David F. Ford, Barth and God's Story: Biblical 
Narrative and the Theological Method o f  Karl Bai'th in the Church Dogmatics, New York: Peter Lang: 
1985; Thomas F. Torrance, Kai'l Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910-1931, London: 
SCM Press Ltd., 1962; Bmce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: 
Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995; Robert G. Crawford, 
‘The Theological Method of Karl Barth’, in SJT, 25, 1972, pp320-336; Gordon Watson, ‘A Study in St 
Anselm’s Soteriology and Karl Barth’s Theological Method’, in SJT, 42/4, 1984, pp493-512; George
S. Hendry, ‘The Transcendental Method m the Theology of Karl Barth’, in SJT, 37/2, 1984, pp213- 
227.
 ^ However, analysis o f Baifh’s method is on the basis o f having first read BaiHi, and is therefore a 
posteriori. It is also worth noting that Barth himself does tliis in tire opening pages o f his dogmatics 
proper. See Karl BarÜi, Church Dogmatics I/l: The Doctrine o f the Word o f  God, (eds.) Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, and Thomas F. Torrance, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995, pp25f..
 ^Many higlily significant aspects o f Barth’s metliod (and content) are not being mentioned here. Other 
important considerations include Barth’s use of scripture (David F. Ford, ‘Barth’s Interpretation of the 
Bible’, in Sykes, Karl Barth, pp55-87; Ford, Barth and God’s Stojy); the Holy Spirit (John Thompson, 
The Holy Spirit in the Theology o f  Karl Barth, Pennsylvania: Pickwick Publications, 1991; Philip J. 
Rosato, S. J., The Spirit as Lord: The Pneumatology o f Karl Bai'th, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981); the 
role of grace (Gerrit. C. Berkouwer, The Triumph o f Grace in the Theology o f Karl Barth, London: 
Paternoster, 1956); Barth’s biography (Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life fi'om Letters and 
Autobiographical Texts, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1976, McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic 
Dialectical Theology, Torrance, Karl Barth)', and time (Richard H. Roberts, ‘Barth’s Doctrine of Time: 
Its Nature and Implications’, in Sykes, Karl Barth, pp88-146). In fact, tliere are very few aspects of 
Barth’s content diat cannot be seen to have significant methodological implications.
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1. The task of theology for Barth is a derivative one. That is, theology takes 
the form of a Nachdenken.^ In his Gottingen Dogmatics Barth writes; “All reflection 
on how God can reveal himself is in truth only a ‘thinking after’ of the fact that God 
has revealed himself.”  ^ What this means for Christian theology is that eveiy aspect of 
method, content, and doctrine is to be determined a posteriori to the revelation event.^ 
The significance of this is twofold. First, the object of theology (God, as subject, who 
becomes ‘object-for-us’) determines both the form and content of theology (hence the 
inseparability of fonn and content in Baith^). The method and the results of the 
enquiry are detennined by the object^, and so the ‘pressure of interpretation’ is 
irreducibly from God to us. This approach contributes to Baith’s understanding of 
theology as a science.
Second, corresponding to the order of knowing is a shift in the approach to 
theology. Much theology has proceeded by means of asking ‘how’ questions, which 
tend to assume a prior soteriology, anthiopology, mid epistemology -  ‘How do we
 ^Nachdenken also has connotations of ‘under-standing’, that is, literally standing under tiie auüiority of 
the object of enquhy.
 ^Karl Barth, The Gottingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, Volume /, (ed.) Geoffrey 
W. Bromiley, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990, pl51; cited in Torrance, Persons in Communion, p74.
 ^See esp. Torrance, Persons in Communion, ppl5f., 25-28, 49-53, 71-74, 89f; also Stephen W. Sykes, 
‘Barth on the Centie of Theology’, in Sykes, Karl Barth, pp29f.; Ford, ‘Barth’s Interpretation of the 
Bible’, pp55-87; R. D Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’, in Sykes, Karl Barth, ppl48f.; Thompson, 
The Holy Spirit in the Theology o f Karl Barth, p2; Daniel J. Price, Karl Barth’s Anthropology in Light 
o f Modern Thought, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002, ppl8-20, 49-50, 102f.; Eberhard Jüngel, God’s 
Being is in Becoming: The Tîinitarian Being o f  God in the Theology o f Karl Barth. A Paraphrase'. 
(trans.) John Webster, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001, esp. pp9f.. There is, however, some question 
about whether Barth consistently avoids adopting an a priori approach. See esp. Tonance, Persons in 
Communion, p p ll6 -l 19, and Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’.
® Tonance, Persons in Communion, ppl5-22; Gary W. Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology o f  Relations: 
Trinitarian, Christological, and Human: Towards an Ethic o f the Family, New York: Peter Lang, 1999, 
p44n.
 ^See Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum -  Anselm’s Proof o f the Existence o f God in the 
Context o f his Theological Scheme, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1960, Chapter 1. Barth writes: 
“‘rational’ knowledge of tire object of faith is derived from the object of faith and not vice versa. That 
means to say that the object of faith and its knowledge are ultimately derived from the Truth, drat is, 
from God and from his will.” (p52). Also, Karl Bartli, ‘On Systematic Theology’, in SJT, 14, 1961, 
pp225-228.
Barth, CD I/l, pp31 If., Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1: The Doctrine o f God, (eds.) Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, and Thomas F. Tonance, Edinbmgh; T&T Clark, 2000, Chapter V; and esp. Thomas F. 
Torrance, Theological Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
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know God?’; ‘Does God exist?’; ‘What is God?’; and so on. In contrast to these 
approaches, Barth’s primary concern is with ‘who’ questions -  ‘Wlio is Yahweh?’; 
Who is Jesus C h r i s t ? I n  developing and clarifying Barth’s thought, this is the point 
which Dietrich Bonhoeffer had in mind when he opened his 1933 lectures in 
Christology by stating that: “Teaching about Chiist begins in silence”, a n d  went on 
to argue emphatically for the methodological priority of the ‘who’ question. The 
silence to which Bonhoeffer was refening is a methodological or presuppositional 
silence which allows the Counter-Logos to determine the natuie of human logoi. In 
short, by maintaining the primacy of the ‘who’ question, Barth’s theology takes the 
form of a Nachdenken.
2. Revelation is the revelation of God as the triime God. '^^  Who God is is the 
trinitarian God, and God as Trinity determines the form and content of theology to the 
extent that Jüngel refers to Barth’s placing of the doctrine of the Trinity at the 
begimiing of his dogmatics as “a hermeneutical decision of the greatest relevance”. 
Of particulai' significance is Barth’s opening of his dogmatics proper with the doctrine 
of the Trinity which stands in radical contrast to much modern theology where the 
docti'ine of the Trinity often appears as an ‘add-on’ in the final sections of the book.^® 
Bai'th writes:
" See Thomas F. Tonance, Theology in RecoTistmction, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1965, ppll7-127; 
Torrance, Persons in Communion, ppll-12, 22n, 49n, 71-74.
Dietrich Bonlioeffer, Christ the Center, (tians.) Edwin H. Robertson, San Francisco: Harper Collins, 
1978, p27. See also Translator’s Preface, esp. pl5; Tonance, Persons in Communion, pp 22n, 49n, 
Alan J. Torrance, ‘Introductory Essay’, in Eberhard Jüngel, Christ, Justice, and Peace: Towards a 
Theology o f  the State in Dialogue with the Barmen Declaration, D. Bruce Hamill, and Alan J. Tonance 
(trans.), T & T  Clark, 1992, ppxiif..
Because this revelation is centred on Jesus Christ it excludes all forms of natural theology.
CD I/l, Chapters I and II.
Eberhard Jüngel, The Doctrine o f the Trinity: God’s Being is in Becoming, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1976, p4.
CD I /l, p300.
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God reveals liimself. He reveals Himself through Himself. He reveals Himself If we 
really want to understand revelation in terms o f its subject, i.e., God, then the first thing we have 
to realise is tliat this subject, God, the Revealer, is identical with His act in revelation and also 
identical with its effect. It is from tliis fact... that we learn we must begin the doctrine of 
revelation with the doctr ine of the triune God.^^
The Trinity, therefore, holds fbimal and material primacy in Barth’s thought 
and can be seen to inform every aspect of Bai'th’s content.
3. Revelation is centied in and is identical with Jesus Christ. For Barth tliis 
means that all aspects of Christian doctrine are to be thought through from the 
perspective of Jesus Christ. In the opening of his book on Baith’s Christology, John 
Thompson writes:
In his [Barfh’s] theology there is no Christology as such; on tire otlier hand, it is all 
Cluistology. ... [Tjhere is no such tiling as a section on Christology in the whole o f Karl Bartii’s 
writings. Yet it is Christological through and through. This is due to the fact tliat Barth’s 
theology as a whole and in every part is detennined by its relation to Jesus Cluist, his being and 
action, so that one cannot detach any aspect from it. ... Because Jesus Christ has this priority, 
centrality and normative position for faith and theology, all theology has this Cluistological 
basis and perspective.^”
The methodological significance of this is that for Barth theology has its 
stai'ting point in Cluistology. Consequently, to cite Thompson again, “all aspects of 
theology and dogmatics must be dynamically related to this living and concrete centre 
and be determined tluoughout by it”.^  ^ Barth’s theology is therefore thoroughly 
Cluistocentiic.^^ McCormack explains that Christocentrism for Barth, “refers to the 
attempt to understand eveiy doctrine from a centre in God’s Self-revelation in Jesus
CD FI, p296. (Italics in original).
The metirodological implications o f God as Trinity in Barth’s thought are considered in: Jüngel, The 
Docti'ine o f the Trinity, Torrance, Persons in Communion, esp. Parts 1 and 2; Williams, ‘Bartii on the 
Triime God’; Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology o f Karl Barth; Colin E. Gunton, Becoming 
and Being: The Doctrine o f God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1978, Part II.
See Sykes, ‘Barth on the Centre of Theology’,
John Thompson, Christ in Perspective: Christological Perspectives in the Theology o f Karl Barth, 
Edinbmgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1978, ppl-2.
Thompson, Christ in Perspective, p2.
^  But not Christomonist. Eberhard Jüngel rightly states: “Christology is the carefully considered 
fomidation of anthropology in Barth’s characteristically Cluistological tiiought. There can be no 
question of a ‘ Christomonism’, precisely because this Christological concentration is not a principle 
from which a system can be deduced.” (Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, Paul G. E. (trans.)', 
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986, pl28).
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Christ”/^ This is absolutely key for Bai'th. Every doctrine, including anthropology as 
we shall see shortly, is to be approached by adopting Christology as the starting
point.^ '^
In sum, Bai'th’s theological method takes the form of Nachdenken, and is 
grounded in an understanding of God as Trinity. The pressure of interpretation is 
irreducible from God to humanity, and so the starting point for all theological enquiry 
is Chiistology. This is evident time and time again throughout the Dogmatics:
The place from which the way of dogmatic knowledge is to be seen and understood can 
be neither a prior anthropological possibility nor a subsequent ecclesiastical reality, but only the 
present moment of the speaking and hearing o f Jesus Christ Himself/^
The very possibility of addressing theological anthropology is itself 
determined by Chiistology: “Man is made an object of theological knowledge by the 
fact that his relationship to God is revealed to us in the Word of God”.^  ^ With these 
methodological emphases in mind, we now consider Barth’s method specifically in 
his theological anthropology.
McCormack, Karl Barth‘s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, p454.
This was not always the case for Barth. McCormack rightly recognises that Chiistology only 
functions as a ‘methodological rule’ for all doctrines in his mature thought, that is, from approximately 
Volume II onwards. In his work up to this point, Cluistology is the theoretical ground of Barth’s 
theology, but Barth’s “basic orientation (his existential focus, if you will) was towards the revelation- 
event which occurs in the here and now on the basis of God’s Self-revelation in Jesus Clirist” (Karl 
Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, p328). What this means is that in his earlier work, 
Barth did not attempt to understand all doctrine from tJie starting point of Christology, and that 
although the ground of his theology was Christological, his theology was pneumatocentric.
CD FI, p41. Or again: “A church dogmatics must, o f course, be Christologically determined as a 
whole and in all its parts, as surely as the revealed Word of God, attested by Holy Scripture and 
proclaimed by tire Church, is its one and only criterion, and as surely as tliis revealed Word is identical 
with Jesus Cluist. If dogmatics cannot regard itself and cause itself to be regarded as fundamentally 
Christology, it has assuredly succumbed to some alien sway and is already on tlie verge of losing its 
character as church dogmatics.” (CD 1/2, p i23).
Karl BaiUi, Chw’ch Dogmatics III/2: The Docti'ine o f Creation, (eds.) Geoffrey W. Bromiley, and 
Thomas F. Torrance, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998, pl9.
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3. Barth's Anthropology in Church Dogmatics 111/2
To be rightly understood, Barth’s anthropology needs to be located within the 
whole, and this is to be done in two ways. First, Bai'th’s theological anthropology 
needs to be positioned in terms of what Gary Deddo calls Barth’s ‘theology of 
relations’.D e d d o  identifies ‘seven spheres of being-in-relation’ in Barth’s thought:
1) Intra-Trinitarian Life: Son to Father in the Spirit; 2) Jesus to the Father in the 
Spirit; 3) Humankind to God through Jesus; 4) Jesus to other humans; 5) 
Humankind: One to Another; 6) Body to Soul; 7) Eternity to Time.^® Many of these 
‘spheres’ fall beyond the scope of this chapter. Nevertheless it is important to note 
that there is an analogia relationis at the heart of Barth’s thought.^^ The trinitarian 
relations provide an ontological and ethical grounding for understanding our 
relationship to God and to each other. There is, in other words, a correspondence 
between human relations, and God’s relation to us in Jesus Christ and the Triune 
relations. The conespondence functions in an irreversible direction, viz., God to 
humanity. Thus, Barth roots his special ethics in his anthropology, and so Volume 
11174 (Chapter Xn) parallels Volume m/2 (Chapter X) in terms of its sti*ucture.^ ® So 
too, Barth’s anthropology is grounded in Chiistology and ultimately his doctrine of 
God. Although it is in Volume m/2 that Barth expounds his theology of relations in 
the most detail, the groundwork is laid as early as Volume FI on the Word of God 
and the Trinity, and Volume H/1 in the action of God (being and act are hreducibly 
connected in Barth). The point is this. Ontologically, Barth’s theology of relations
Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology o f  Relations, passim.
Deddo, Karl Barth‘s Theology o f  Relations, p41.
^ Barth does not use this term until he considers the Christological grounding for antliropology in CD 
III/2. This is because the analogy only makes sense once the second tenn of comparison has been 
introduced, viz., humanity.
^ Deddo, Karl Barth's Theology o f Relations, p5.
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starts with the intra-hinitarian relations, moves to God’s covenant relation to creation, 
and then to human relations. This framework provides the foundation for his special 
ethics. We aie therefore jumping into the middle of his ontological framework.
Second, Barth locates his anthropology in the second volume of his doctrine of 
creation. The first volume deals with the act of creation and the relation to covenant, 
and so the second focuses on the creature. In accordance with Barth’s method, 
Christology is the starting point for Barth’s theology of relations. Barth opens in/2 
by making this clear:
Because man... is the creature whose relation to God is revealed to us in the Word of 
God; he is the central object o f the theological doctrine of creation. As the man Jesus is Himself 
the revealing Word o f God, He is the source o f  our knowledge o f  the nature o f man as created 
by God?^
Barth structures the volume accordingly. There aie foui* main sections in the 
volume conesponding to humanity’s relation to God, humanity’s relation to others, 
humanity as soul and body, and humanity’s relation to time. Each of the four sections 
opens with a subsection starting with Jesus: ‘Jesus, Man for God’; ‘Jesus, Man for 
Other Men’; ‘Jesus, Whole Man’; and ‘Jesus, Lord of Time’. Both in teims of form 
and content, Bai'th’s starting point is Chiistology.
At this point it is worth making a point of clarification about three phrases that 
Barth uses: ‘real man’; ‘humanity’; and ‘whole man’. ‘Real man’ refers to the God- 
man relationship which Barth expounds in §44, ‘humanity’ refers to the man-man 
relationship in §45, and ‘whole man’ to the unity of soul and body in the individual 
person in §46.^  ^ We will focus on the first two areas of his anthropology: humanity’s 
relation to God (real man), and then to others (humanity), hi many ways, these two
CD IIF2, p3. (My italics).
Stuart McLean, Humanity in the Thought o f Karl Barth, Edinbui'gh; T&T Clark, 1981, p25; Deddo, 
Karl Barth's Theology o f  Relations, p88.
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areas form the heart of Barth’s anthropology, and furtheimore, cleaiiy reveal Barth’s 
method and how he envisages the relation between theological and secular discourses.
3.Î (Real) Man as the Creature o f God
§44 is comprised of three subsections: ‘Jesus, Man for God’; ‘Phenomena of 
the Human’; and ‘Real Man’. In the first section, Barth develops six criteria fi'om the 
history of Jesus which are flirther developed in the second and third subsections, hi 
other words, this section is concerned with ascertaining the nature of ‘real man’ 
derived from a Christological basis. We will therefore begin by looking at the 
Christological basis for Barth’s criteria and then examine how he applies them in his 
third subsection. The phenomena of the human, in which Barth’s engagement with 
secular discouise is stated most clearly, will be picked up at a later stage.
Barth begins by locating the humanity of Jesus in the continuity of his 
history.^^ In his histoiy, Jesus appears as the bearer of an office acting in a specific 
and concrete direction. In locating Jesus in his work and the office he holds, Jesus is 
real man. Jesus is real man and has a real history. The real man is the working Jesus. 
The exclusiveness of Jesus is not that he has a history, but that he is his history. Jesus 
is his history because Jesus’ exclusiveness rests in the fact that the work of Jesus is 
uniquely his because he is this history as Saviour. "^  ^ Neither can the person and 
histoiy of Jesus be separated, nor the work of Jesus and the work of God because God 
acts as Jesus acts. Jesus acts in the name of God and is therefore doing God’s work. 
Jesus is known only in his work and history, and as such, his being as man is in his
CD III/2, pp56f. 
CD IIF2, p60.
151
work and in this work he has a human nature. Jesus does not have a human nature 
fust which functions as a presupposition to explain and validate the nature of Jesus, 
rather, it is in his being as a man that he reveals and explains human nature. He is a 
person as we are, not in the sense of sharing in our humanity, but in being the one in 
whose humanity we must share.
Two important aspects of Barth’s method have already become cleai*. First, 
the pressuie of interpretation is iireducibly from Jesus to human n a t u r e . T h i s  is 
perhaps the most radical and significant aspect of Barth’s anthropology in conti'ast to 
most other theological anthropologies. Barth has radically reversed the pressure of 
interpretation, suggesting that we cannot learn about the nature of true humanity 
without it being revealed in some sense, nor without reference to God. Both ontically 
and noetically, Jesus functions as the methodological foundation for ascertaining the 
nature of true humanity. Put differently, Barth does not operate with a prior concept 
of what it is to be human, that is, fitting Jesus’ humanity into prior (immanent) 
categories, rather, who and what Jesus is determines what it is to be human. We share 
in his humanity rather than he in ours.^^
Secondly, Bai'th’s Chiistology provides the ontological foundation for his 
anthropology. Gai-y Deddo summarises five points which Bai'th makes to establish 
this foundation/^ 1) In the person of Jesus there is the co-incidence of act and being;
2) This Jesus, m the unity of being and act, is a human person; 3) The history, action, 
and work of the person of Jesus has no other reason for being except the salvation of 
humankind; 4) The life and work of this man are identical with the life and work of
The situation is not quite as straightforward as this. Clearly we, and Barth, do operate with a prior 
concept of human nature into which Jesus is born. However, the point is that what we mean by human 
nature is redefined by the life of Jesus, and from this perspective we can see what true human nature is.
Again I emphasise that this is not to say tliat we do not have knowledge o f humanity apart from 
Jesus, rather that our understanding of humanity is redefined by Jesus’ humanity, which is true 
himianity.
Deddo, Karl Barth's Theology o f Relations, pp45-51; corresponding to CD HI/2, pp55-68.
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God, yet in such a way that the real humanity of Jesus is confirmed and not 
subsumed; 5) The unity and continuing distinction between the man Jesus and God is 
ultimately grounded in the intra-triune relations of Father, Son, and Spirit. Thus, 
Barth affinns a correspondence among “a) the intra-trinitarian relations, b) the 
relation of the man Jesus and God, c) humankind’s relationship to God, d) the 
relationship of the man Jesus with other human beings and e) the personal relations 
among human beings”.^  ^ It is on the basis of this ontology that Bai'th identifies six 
criteria which turn up time and time again throughout the volume and it is to these 
that we now tum.^^
These six criteria emerge in the first instance from a summaiy of the 
Chiistology just outlined.'^® At this point Barth’s emphasis is on humankind’s 
relationship to God in the humanity of Jesus. He then considers the implications of 
this for humanity in general which is where we shall focus.'^  ^ In short, Barth is 
attempting “to define more precisely the criteria which must be used in any attempt to 
determine the nature of man”.'^  ^ Again we note that Barth is attempting to determine 
the nature of humanity according to criteria that are Christologically rooted, hi each 
case the criterion opens by positing a relation between Jesus’ humanity and ours. We 
cite Barth at length:
1. If it is the case in relation to the man Jesus that in His humanity we are confronted 
immediately and directly with the being of God,
then necessarily, assuming that there is similarity between Him and us in spite of all 
dissimilarity, eveiy man is to be understood, at least mediately and indirectly, to the extent that 
he is conditioned by the priority of this man, in his relationship with God, i.e., in the light of the 
fact diat he comes from  God, and above all that God moves to him.
2. If it is the case... then... evety man is a being which is conditioned by the fact that 
this deliverance is for him, that eveiy man as such must exist and have his being in a histoiy
Deddo, Karl Barth's Theology o f  Relations, p51.
CD IIF2, pp68-71, 73-74, 132-133, 162-163, 214-221.
40 CD IIF2, pp68-71.
These criteria appear in their most succinct form in CD IIF2, pp 132-133 (without enumeration). See 
Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology o f  Relations, pp52f.
CD mil, p73.
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which stands in a clear and recognisable relationship to the divine deliverance enacted in the 
man Jesus.
3. If it is the case... then... the being o f every man, in so far as this liistoiy essentially 
concerns it, is not an end in itself but has its true determination in the gloiy o f  God....
4. If it is the case... then... it must be said o f every man that it is essential to him that 
as he exists, God is over him as his Lord, and he himself stands under the lordship o f God the 
Lord.
5. If it is the case... then... the being o f every man must consist in this histoiy. Not 
only his actions but his being will consist in his participation in what God does and means for  
him. ... The proper action of real man can then be understood only in the light of the fact tliat it 
may correspond to the divine action in his favour, doing justice to the grace addressed to him.
6. If... then... the being o f  no other man can be understood apart from the fact that his 
existence too, as an active participation in what God does and means for him, is an event in 
which he renders God sei'vice, in which he for his part is for God, because God first willed to 
bind Himself to man, and in so doing has bound man to Himself.'*^
These criteria can be summarised thus: “man belongs to God, exists only in 
relation to God’s act, exists for the glory of God, under His Lordship, according to his 
purpose, and in His service”.'^ '^  Wliat is unambiguously clear from these criteria, is 
that for Barth, feal man’ can only be understood in explicit relation to God. hr 
anticipation of Chapter 6, one difference between Barth’s and McFadyen’s 
anthropology is that Barth is not appealing primarily to a doctrine of the Trinity, and 
on the basis of the intra-trinitarian relations postulating about the nature of humanity. 
For Barih, humanity is ontically constituted by being-in-relation to God (not by 
identifying a correspondence between human and intra-trinitarian relations). The 
methodological implication is that Jesus, as fully human and fully God, is the person 
fr om whom the natur e of the relationship between God and hmnanity and what this 
means for human being is revealed. Although McFadyen does also root his 
anthropology in Christology, the emphasis that this method receives in Barth is far- 
greater. Whereas in McFadyen, there is a possibility of identifying the key aspects of
CD IIF2, pp73-74. I am closely following McLean’s layout {Humanity in the Thought o f Karl Barth, 
pp26-27).
Deddo, Karl Barth's Theology o f Relations, p57.
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his anthropology without explicit reference to theology (for instance Rom Harré), this 
is not a possibility for Barth.
Having identified six operative criteria from Christology Barth quickly adds 
that these criteria are “the minimal requirements” by which all conceptions of human 
nature must be measured.'^^ Barth is under no illusion that he has arrived at a 
theological concept of humanity, rather that these criteria are the measure for all 
conceptions of humanity whatever their source.^^ This clearly has important 
implications for the relation between theological and secular discourse which will be 
unpacked at length below. At this point we note that theological criteria, both 
ultimately and operatively, have primacy over non-theological approaches to the self. 
Barth goes on:
No définition o f human nature can meet our present need if  it is merely an assertion 
and description of immediately accessible and knowable characteristics of the nature which man 
thinks he can regard as tliat o f his fellows and therefore of man in general. From the standpoint 
o f all our criteria, human self-knowledge on this basis must be regarded as a vicious circle in 
which we can never attain to real manN
Again it is clear that ‘real man’ is an explicitly theological concept that cannot 
be identified in non-theological terms. Barth is not arguing that we cannot say 
anything about humanity without reference to theology, but that an adequate account 
of human nature can only be offered with recourse to an explicitly theological
CD IIF2, p73.
See CD IIF2, pp19-54, 75-132.
CD IIF2, p75 (my italics). It is worth noting the similarities to Lutlier’s characterisation of sin as 
incwvatus in se. See Martin Luther, Luther’s Works: Lectures on Romans, Saint Louis: Concordia 
Publishhig House, 1971, esp. pp291f.; 313; 345. The methodological implications o f inwardness are 
explored in Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self: The Making o f the Modern Identity, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989, Part 2; Alan J. Torrance, ‘The Self-Relation, Narcissism and the 
Gospel of Grace’, SJT, 40, 1987, pp481-510; John Macquanie, In Search o f Humanity: A Theological 
and Philosophical Approach, Chippenham: Xpress Reprints, 1993, Chapter 4; Gilbert Ryle, The 
Concept o f Mind, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1949, Chapter 6; and Soren Kierkegaard, Philosophical 
Fragments, (ed. and trans.) Howard V. Hong, and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, 1985. 
Barth himself also refers to sin in terms of “man turned in upon himself’ (e.g. Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics IV/2: The Doctrine o f  Reconciliation, (eds.) Geoffrey W. Bromiley, and Thomas F. 
Torrance, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000, p407).
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discourse. Descriptions of humankind without reference to God give us “knives 
without edges, or handles without pots, or predicates without subjects”."^^
Stuart McLean recognises that these six criteria reveal a “dialectical-dialogical 
relationship between God and man in Jesus Christ”.'^ ® More specifically, points one 
and four refer to presence and Lordship (revelation), points two and five to 
deliverance (reconciliation), and three and six to glory ( r e d e m p t i o n ) . P u t  
differently, the first set of pairs refers to the relationship between God and human, the 
second to the action within the relationship, and the third to fulfilled or completed 
action. Thus, at the heart of Barth’s anthropology is the premise that God exists and 
is in relation to human beings. Therefore, any definition of humanity without this 
dimension would be radically deficient. Again we emphasise that Barth does not 
deny that the social sciences (secular discourse) can discover anything about 
humanity, rather, the main criterion for judging all anthropologies is that humanity is 
iiTeducibly related to God. In this context we note that one of the main aims of Stuart 
McLean’s essay is “to introduce social scientists to Kail Barth”.^  ^ hi terms of 
method, Barth’s anthropology is determined by the object of enquiry (the humanity of 
Jesus Christ) and the pressme of inteipretation is from the locus of theology, the 
Word/ God-man/ Jesus, to human nature in general. It is humankind’s relationship to 
God that is essential to an understanding of humankind, hi lai'ge pait, this is due to a 
key aspect of Barth’s thought -  that knowledge of humanity as grounded in Jesus 
Christ is also the ontological determination o f humanity’s existence'/^
CD IIF2, p76.
McLqzlm, Humanity/ in the Thought o f  Karl Barth, p27.
McLean, Humanity in the Thought o f Karl Barth, p27.
McLean, Humanity in the Thought o f Karl Barth, pvi. Cf. Daniel Price’s aim: “I also hope that, in 
the light of this study, social and psychological scientists might find Baitli’s antliropology mcreasingly 
interesting, especially at the point where psychologists o f a Cluistian persuasion seek botli to integrate 
and differentiate Christian belief and scientific practice” (Karl Barth‘s Anthropology, p7).
‘Determination’ (Bestimmung) is a difficult word in Barth. It can be translated ‘determination’, 
‘destination’, ‘destiny’, ‘statement’, or ‘definition’. The word incorporates notions of purpose,
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The ontological determination of humanity is grounded in the fact tliat one man among 
all others is the man Jesus. So long as we select any other starting point for our study, we shall 
reach only tlie phenomena o f the himian.^^
It is with these words that Barth opens the subsection on ‘real man’ and in the 
following paragraph gives his most succinct summary of the six criteria. This means 
that we are now at the point where BaiHi is to develop a constructive approach to a 
definition of humanity on the basis of these criteria and the recognition of Jesus as the 
ontological determination of humanity.
At the heai't of Barth’s explication of the definition of humankind is that the 
being of the human is in ‘being-with-God’. As we have seen, humankind is both 
revealed in Jesus and has its ontological determination in Jesus, hi other words, the 
ontological status of humankind is determined in and with the being-in-relationship of 
the man Jesus to God. Barth’s six criteria were initially developed by looking at 
Jesus’ relationship to God and then humanity in general’s relationship to God. Thus, 
to be human is to be essentially in relationship to God. Because Jesus is with God in 
a unique way, viz., that he is the presence of God himself, all other persons are 
thereby brought into relationship with God. In short:
The ontological detemimation o f all men is that Jesus is present among them as their 
divine Other, their Neighbour, Companion, and Brother. ... to be man is to be witli God.^ *^
Humanity’s being with God is the “basic determination” of our being and is 
the heart of what Barth means by ‘real man’.^  ^ It is because being-with-God is the
meaning, destiny, definition, and design, and is therefore an ‘onto-relational’ term. It approximately 
conresponds with the English ‘designation’. See Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology o f  Relations, p37n.
CD m il ,  pl32.
CD IIF2, pl35.
This is why “Godlessness is not, therefore, a possibility but an ontological impossibility for man. ... 
To be in sin, in godlessness, is a mode of being contiary to our humanity. For the man who is witli 
Jesus -  and this is man’s ontological determination -  is with God. If he denies God, he denies 
himself.” {CD IIF2, pl36). Tliis also explains a shift in Barth’s understanding of the imago Dei. In 
liis earlier thought, even up to and including Volume I of tlie Church Dogmatics, Barth thought that 
alüiough God created hunmnity hi his image, the Fall meant that the image was totally destroyed. The 
grace of God restores the likeness of God to us. However, in Volume III as we have just seen, Barth 
understands humanity in a necessary relationship to God (‘Godlessness is... an ontological 
impossibility for man’), and so, the image does not consist in a quality of humanity which could be 
destroyed or lost (that is, a prior anthropological category), rather, the image is a ‘structured
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‘basic determination’ of human being that secular discourses cannot adequately 
describe human nature according to their own resources. The definition of ‘real man’ 
is what occupies Barth for the rest of the section which he approaches from the 
perspective of God’s action towards humanity.
To recap, in terms of method, Barth has moved consistently towards an 
understanding of the nature of ‘real man’ starting from a Christological base. The 
pressure of interpretation is iiTeducibly a movement from Jesus’ humanity to our- 
humanity. Barth does not start with a prior conception of humanity into which Jesus 
fits, but considers the nature of Jesus’ humanity which is oiu' true humanity (i.e. as we 
were created to be), and from tins develops six criteria which are to guide enquiry into 
the nature of humanity (and so his theology takes the form of Nachdenken). With 
reference to secular discourse, it is not that Barth denies the value or insights that are 
gained from secular discourse, rather that they are only concerned with the 
‘phenomena of the human’ Engagement with secular discourse is to be guided by 
the six criteria that are developed from Christology which will be explored further 
below.
In terms of content, Barth started by locating the humanity of Jesus in the 
continuity of his history and consequently his work in the office he holds. On the 
basis of this Christological ontology, Barth develops six criteria that are to guide his 
analysis. These criteria are to frmction as a measure for all conceptions of humanity
relatiomhip’. The image of God is present in humankind by virtue of being created. See Thompson, 
The Holy Spirit in the Theology o f Karl Barth, ppl64f.; David Cairns, The Image o f  God in Man, 
London; SCM Press Ltd., 1953, ppl64f.; Price, Kai'l Barth’s Anthropology, pp 117-119; Gerrit C. 
Berkouwer, Man: The Image o f God, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964, pp93f..
"Definitions of man as man interprets himself, however, are not necessarily wrong. Ancient and 
modem natural science, or rather tlie respective philosophies of nature, teach us that man must be 
understood as a definitely peculiar and remarkable factor within the cosmo-teiTestrial, the physical- 
chemical, and tlie organic biotic processes of universal existence”. (Karl Barth, ‘The New Humanism 
and the Hmnanisni of God’, in Theology Today, 8, 1951-1952, pl61.
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whether or not they are derived from a theological or non-theological source. 
Because humankind is both revealed in, and has its ontological detemiination in Jesus, 
the ontological status of humankind is detennined in and with the being-in- 
relationship of the man Jesus to God. In short, to be human is to be essentially in 
relationship to God. Therefore secular discourse cannot account fully for the nature 
of hiunan being according to Barth’s position. The ‘basic deteimination’ of human 
being is in being-with God and this is what is meant by ‘real man’.
Up to this point, Barth has been concerned primarily with the vertical relations 
between God and humankind. In doing this his emphasis has been on theological 
antliropology -  human being in covenant-partnership with God. In considering the 
vertical relations, it is unambiguously cleai' for Barth that being-in-relationship to God 
is essential for oui" humanity. This was detennined first by the nature of Christ’s 
humanity and then secondaiily in our being with Jesus in election, history, gratitude 
and responsibility.^^ There aie some strong similarities here with McFadyen’s 
anthropology as we shall see in Chapter 6, but it is worth recalling that it is in the next 
stage, the horizontal relations, that for McFadyen a theological approach did not seem 
to be stiictly necessaiy for understanding humanity (although this was of course not 
his intention). And so we now consider how Barth addresses the horizontal relations.
It is important to note tliat this relationship is only part of Barth’s theology of relations. Knowledge 
of self is irreducibly tied to knowledge of God as tlie God-human relation is dependent upon the intra- 
trinitarian relations as Father, Son, and Spirit. See Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology o f Relations, pp81- 
85 noting especially the six-fold determination of humankind as being-in-relationship with God. Cf. 
also John Calvin who entitles tire opening sub-section of his Institutes with the words: “The knowledge 
of God and that of ourselves are connected” (John Calvin, Institutes o f The Christian Religion, (ed.) 
John T. McNeill, (trans.) Ford L. Battles, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1960, p35). See also 
Thomas F. Torrance, Calvin’s Doctrine o f Man, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957, ppl3-22.
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3.U Man in his Determination as the Covenant-Partner of God
In §45, Barth shifts his attention from ‘real man’ (the vertical relation) to 
‘humanity’ (the horizontal relation). One of his main tasks in his theological 
anthropology is to show how ‘real man’ is related to ‘humanity’. I n  accordance 
with his method, Barth’s starting point is again Jesus, the ‘man for other men’. 
Consequently, we begin with Barth’s Christological foundation for understanding 
humanity and then move on to consider the natiue and shape of humanity.
Jesus is true man and true God and is therefore (real) man for God. As true 
man, Jesus has the true creaturely form of man and thus a true humanity. Barth states 
his argument eaily on:
If the divinity o f tlie man Jesus is to be described comprehensively in the statement that 
He is man for God, His humanity can and must be described no less succinctly in the 
proposition tliat He is man for man, for otlier men. His fellows.^”
In other words, Jesus is both man for God and man for man. Only Jesus is 
uniquely and radically to, with, and for others. This has five implications. First, that 
Jesus is a man means that he is not without his fellow-men. Second, Jesus is sent and 
ordained by God to be humanity’s deliverer and saviour. Third, Jesus’ humanity is 
determined by his divinity and so his person is identified with his mission. Thus, 
Jesus’ humanity is “to do with something ontological”.^  ^ Fourth, the solidarity with 
which Jesus is bound to his fellows is wholly real. He is “immediately and directly 
affected by the existence of his fellows”.^  ^ Fifth, Jesus’ being is prescribed, dictated,
Humankind “exists originally and properly in an imier connexion and correspondence between his 
divine determination and his creaturely form, between his being as the covenant-partner of God and his 
being as man”. (CD IIF2, p205).
CD IIF2, p208.
CD IIF2, p210.
CD IIF2, p211. See also the footnote on p211.
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and detennined by others and their needs. Barth develops this last point by 
considering six implications of Jesus’ humanity which can be summaiised thus/^
1) Jesus is from  humankind in that his humanity is determined by the nature 
of fallen humanity, and not a humanity that is untouched by sin; 2) Jesus is to 
humankind in that his hmnanity is exclusively, uniquely, and radically for the benefit, 
deliverance, and salvation of humankind, and Jesus gives himself entirely to 
humankind in service; 3) Jesus is with hmnankind in that he is always with others, 
even those who have not yet heard his name as Master, Messiah, King, and Lord -  
His hmnanity is determined by them and for them; 4) Jesus is for  humankind in that 
his humanity is from, to, with, and for hmnankind which is in conespondence with his 
being from, to, with, and for God in obedience to God and seiwice to His fellows; 5) 
Jesus serves hmnankind because He is for God who is for humankind in serving the 
will of God; 6) hi Jesus’ humanity there is freedom because the being of Jesus, and 
therefore humankind, arises out of the inner stnicture of the Triune life. Humanity 
has been taken into the inner life of God ontologically in the Son which is reflected in 
the being of Jesus ad extra.
As the repetition and reflection of God, as divine and hmnan, Jesus is the 
imago Dei. Given that the humanity of Jesus is the image of God, this means the 
image is only indirectly and not directly identical with God. It presents God in the 
reality distinct from Himself. Amongst the inner relations of the Trinity, there is unity 
of essence between the Father and the Son, but not between God and humankind. 
Thus, there is a distinction or disparity between God and humankind. But for all the 
disparity, there is also conespondence and similarity between the two relationships.
CD m il,  pp214-219.
^ Many theological anthropologies do not account sufficiently for this disparity as discussed in 
Chapter 2 above.
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In other words, there is no analogia entis^ but rather an analogia relationis.^^ Bai'th 
writes:
The humanity of Jesus, His fellow-humanity, His being for man as the direct 
correlative of His being for God, indicates, attests and reveals this correspondence and 
similarity.®^
Barth correlates the intia-trinitarian relations with Jesus’ relations with God 
and others, and our relations with God and others by the analogia relationis. We 
stated at the outset that Barth’s anthropology needs to be located within a theology of 
relations and this is the ciaix of it. The analogia relationis does not seiwe as a prior {a 
priori) methodological tool which Baith uses to construct his theology, rather it 
functions more as a conclusion {a posterioril Nachdenken), or at least a summary of 
the volume thus far (and possibly from CD I/l onwai'ds). Barth rejects an anaolgia 
entis because it does not recognise the dispaiity between God and humankind, and 
because it would be to misrepresent the relational nature of God’s and our existence. 
Relations constitute being. There is no being without being in relation in either the 
divine or creatmely life. The being of God in Himself is externalised in Jesus Christ 
so that humanity might be brought into the sphere of and participate in the intra- 
trinitarian re la t ions .This  means that the analogy only works in one direction, and 
through it Barth brings together the similaiities of the intra-trinitarian relations, the 
Jesus-God relation, Jesus-others relation, and person to person. It is in this way that 
Christology can function as a foundation for anthropology.
Emil Brunner disputes this. See Emil Brunner, ‘The New Barth: Observations on Karl Barth’s 
Doctrine of Man’, in SJT, 4, 1951, p i27. For a detailed discussion of Barth’s concept of analogy see 
Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology o f Relations, ppl30-141 (with extensive bibliographical footnotes); and 
Tonance, Persons in Communion, Part 3, esp. ppl48-168.
CD III/2, p220.
®® Deddo, Karl Barth‘s Theology o f Relations, p95.
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Barth turns from the man Jesus to humanity in general: “Chiistology is not 
antliropology”.^  ^ There are both differences and similarities between Jesus’ humanity 
and our humanity. On the one hand, humanity in general cannot be a Deliverer, 
Saviour, or be for others from the beginning. We observe real humanity from the 
perspective of sin and alienation, and therefore in contradiction. But on the other 
hand:
If the humanity of Jesus consists in the fact that He is for other men, this means that for 
all the disparity between Him and us He affirms tliese others as beings which are not merely 
unlike Him in His creaturely existence and therefore His humanity, but also like him in some 
basic form . Where one being is for others, there is necessarily a common sphere or form of 
existence m wliich the ‘for’ can be possible and effective.®®
hi short, for all the disparity between Jesus’ humanity and ours, there is a basic 
creaturely form of humanity that is given by God. This is especially clear when 
considering covenant-partnership with God. There is no natural capacity to enter into 
covenant-partnership which humanity has to actualise, rather, humanity is a covenant- 
partner to the extent that humanity is called and summoned to be so, in and through 
Jesus’ covenant-partnership. In other words, there is a basic form of humanity 
between the humanity of Jesus and humanity in general that is common to both.
Even in considering the common foim of basic humanity, Barth remains 
thoroughly Christological:
Our criterion in answering this question [What is the basic form o f humanity?] is the 
humanity of the man Jesus. ... in theological antliropology what man is, is decided by the 
primary text, i.e., by tlie humanity of the man Jesus. And die application of the criterion means 
that a whole sphere of supposed hiunanity is ruled out as non-human from the very first, and 
cannot be considered.®^
Barth identifies the common foim of basic humanity as being in relation to, 
with, and for others. We can only see our humanity in relation to others. Only sinful 
man denies fellow-humanity, although even sinfril man stands in the light of Jesus. In
®’ CD III/2, p222.
®® CD III/2, p223 (my italics).
69 CD HI/2, p226.
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short, isolated humanity equals inhumanity The basic form of humanity as revealed 
in the humanity of Jesus is that humanity is essentially a co-humanity. We aie who 
we are only in relationship to others. This is again Christologically rooted:
The humanity of Jesus consists in His being for man. From the fact that this example 
is binding in humanity generally there follows the broad definition that humanity absolutely, the 
humanity of each and every man, consists in die determination of man’s being as a being with 
others, or rather with the other man. It is... in fellowship, that he is genuinely human, that he 
achieves true humanity, that he corresponds to his determination to be God’s covenant-paitner, 
that he is the being for which the man Jesus is, and dierefore real man.^ *
To sum Up, humanity is a) a determination of human being (created by God 
for covenant-partnership); b) a being with others (primarily in Jesus, and secondarily 
in our humanity); c) a being of one man with the other (never in isolat ion).Thus,  
the recognition of our humanity is dependent upon the recognition of the humanity of 
the other and it is this that Barth develops in some detail.^^
Barth reflects on what it means to say T am’, which he locates in Jesus’ T am’ 
sayings in the Fomth Gospel. '^  ^ Three steps can be identified. First: “The mere fact 
that I say T’ means that I describe and distinguish the object to which I say it as 
something like myself; in other words, that with my T’ I also address him as 
‘Thou’”.^  ^ Put differently, I am in distinction and connexion to the other and I am 
therefore as I am in relation. Second: “I am in encounter with the other who is the 
same way as I am”.^  ^ Or again, “at the very root of my being and from the very first I 
am in encounter with the being of the Thou, under his claim and with my own being 
constituting a claim upon him”.^  ^ This means that in the T-Thou’ relation, there is a 
mutual reflection of persons in one another as distinct from each other which takes the
Barth looks to Nietzsche as an example o f man without fellow humanity, and thus as sinfiil man. See 
CD III/2, pp231-242.
CD III/2, p243.
CD m il, p243.
At this point there are some strong similarities between Barth’s and McFadyen’s anüiropologies.
CD III/2, p244. Tliis is in distinction fiom the T am’ when considered in isolation like Nietzsche’s 
(CD III/2, pp231-242).
CD mJl, p244.
CD III/2, p246.
^  CD m/2, p247.
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form of a kind of confrontation between the I and the Thou and the Thou and the I. 
‘Encounter’ means, and this is the third step, “I am as Thou art”7  ^ Humankind is 
essentially a being-in-relationship of a personal nature and this occms in a history. 
“To say man is to say histoiy, and this is to speak of the encounter between the I and 
theThou”.^ ^
Stuail McLean is overstating the case when he writes refening to this section:
The nuanced discussion of dialogical-dialectical relationships between persons, while 
building on Martin Buber’s discussion, goes beyond it and forms the most perceptive and 
profound discussion o f the meaning of humanity tliat I have seen in Western literature, 
theological or non-theological.®°
However, McLean does point us in an important direction. This is one point 
in Barth’s theological anthropology where he builds explicitly on some non- 
theological approaches, in this case, Ferdinand Ebner and Martin B u b e r . I n  fact, for 
all the indebtedness to non-theological approaches, some of Barth’s critics have failed 
to see the Christological basis for Barth’s explication of the T and Thou’!^  ^ This is, in 
other words, a key point for considering the relation between theological and secular 
discourse.
We have seen from the outset that Barth has rooted his anthropology in 
Christology which is the ontological determination of humanity. In doing this, Barth 
has not adopted a prior conception of humanity about which he theologises, rather, the 
notion of humanity is itself detemiined theologically, crucially a posteriori. The heart
CD m/2, p248. 
CD IIF2, p248.
80 McLean, Humanity in the Thought o f Karl Barth, p40.
Martin Buber’s drought is o f course theological. As mentioned in Chapter 1 above, tire main 
distinction o f this diesis between theological and secular (non-theological) discourse does not always 
capture Barth’s thought well. It is in a strict sense, i.e., the understanding of theology drat we find in 
Barth, drat I refer to Buber’s thought as non-theological.
According to Deddo, K aii Barth’s Theology o f Relations, pl03n. Deddo does not give any 
examples. Although he is not entirely clear about Bardi on this issue, one example may be Wolfliart 
Pamienberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, (trans.) Matthew J. O’Connell, Edinburgh; T&T 
Clark, 1985, pp 183-184. Similarly, Ray S. Anderson, in his highly informative book largely based on 
Barth’s andrropology, does not mention the Christological basis at this point {On Being Human: Essays 
in Theological Anthropology, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982, pp45-46).
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of Barth’s argument is that non-theological accounts cannot account adequately for 
the nature of humanity because at least one major aspect is discounted a priori (the 
vertical relation -  ‘real man’). In other words, it is because being-with-God is the 
‘basic determination’ of human being that secular discourses camiot adequately 
describe human natuie. However, it has also been pointed out that Barth is not 
opposed to seculai' discouise per se. On the contiaiy, insofar as it goes, and the 
relation between the ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ is the case in point, secular discourse can be 
highly infoimative. It is worth repeating that in this section Barth is so dependent 
upon seculai* approaches that some critics have not recognised the Chiistological 
grounding. Barth’s ai*gmnent is not that secular discourses are worthless (although 
they are not concerned with true humanity), rather, that they are only concerned with 
the ‘phenomena of man’, a point to which we shall retui*n later. The point at this 
juncture is this. Here, as in all of Bai'th’s theological anthropology, the ultimate 
criterion for the adequacy and validity of his anthropology is Jesus Chiist. Later 
Bai'th wi'ites in this regard:
tlieological anthropology has the advantage over this better knowledge of tire natural 
man [viz. non-theological approaches] that it possesses a criterion -  its knowledge of divine 
grace and the man Jesus -  which allows and commands it from the very outset and with final 
resoluteness and clarity to turn its back on that worse knowledge and ignorance, and from tire 
very first and necessarily aird therefore with final consistency to move in the direction of the 
conception of himrairity and therefore of human nature according to which man as such arrd 
radically is irot wiürout but witlr the fellow-man, and his humanity at its deepest and highest 
level consists in the freedom of his heart for the otlrer.®®
Following from this, we can also recognise the parallel between the fourfold 
characterisation of being-in-encounter and the last three Christological characteristics 
of Jesus’ being for God by his gratefully recognising God’s Lordship, being obedient 
and responsible, and his being a servant of God gladly in freely serving others. "^^  In
CD m /2, pp277-278n.
For this point I am indebted to Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology o f Relations, p i 06.
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other words, the Clnistological ground is also evident in Barth’s stnicture.^^ We can 
now recognise a conespondence between the vertical and horizontal relationships of 
humanity. As humankind participates in relationship with God in gratitude, 
responsibility, and freedom, humankind also participates in relationships with others 
in gratitude, responsibility, and freedom. In service of God, hiunankind is lead to 
service of others, and thus participates in the gift of humanity.
Barth goes on to consider in greater depth the nature of fellow-humanity 
especially in terms of sexual differentiation.^^ As this section does not add much to 
the discussion of his method this will not be considered here. Volume DI/2 contains 
two other sections which are concerned with humankind’s relationship to itself, or 
whole man (Man as Soul and Body), and humankind’s relationship to time (Man in 
his Time).^^ Although important for Barth’s anthropology as a whole these sections 
do not add greatly to the stnictme or methodology that has been outlined and so will 
not be considered here either. However, it is worth emphasising again that in these 
two sections, like the two preceding sections, Barth discusses his themes by opening 
with a subsection on Jesus,
To recap, in relation to content, Barth’s concern shifts from ‘real man’ (the 
vertical relation) to ‘humanity’ (the horizontal relation). Again, Barth’s anthropology
Contra J. G. Gibbs, ‘A Secondary Point o f Reference in Barth’s Anthropology’, SJT, 16, 1963, 
ppl32-135.
®® CD UÎ/2, pp285-324. Barth’s discussion of male/female relationships goes against contemporary 
sensibilities and has consequently received much criticism for it. For an attempt to interpret Barth’s 
male/female differentiation witliin his tlieology o f relations as a whole see Deddo, Karl Barth’s 
Theology o f  Relations, ppl 19-130. Additionally, many commentators have not recognised the full 
range of Barth’s theology o f relations wliich is often assumed to end with the male/ female relations. 
In fact, the parent/ child relation occupies approximately one thhd of Barth’s entire anthropology. 
Again Deddo brings this out well (esp. ppl87-260).
On humankind as soul and body see Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology o f  Karl Barth, 
ppl61f. (which is one o f the main sections in Barth where the agency of the Holy Sphit is clearly 
evident). On relation to time see F. W. Camfield, ‘Man in His Time’, in SJT, 3, 1950, ppl27-148; 
Klaas Runia, ‘Karl Barth on Man in His Time’, in Reformed Theological Review, 17, 1958, ppl-11.
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is rooted in Christology. Jesus is true man and tme God and is therefore real man for 
God. As such Jesus has the true creaturely form of man and is both man for God and 
man for man. Jesus is, therefore, from, to, with, and for humankind. Although there 
is a distinction and disparity between God and humankind, there is also a 
correspondence which receives its fiillest expression in Jesus who is the image of 
God. There is, in other words, an analogia relationis between God and humanity 
which moves in an irreversible direction.
The continuity between Jesus’ humanity and our humanity is that the 
humanity of Jesus consists in the fact that he is for other men, and so our humanity is 
like his in a ‘basic form’. The basic form of humanity is in being in relation to, with, 
and for others. Our humanity is only evident in relation to others, the negation of 
which is inhumanity or sinful humanity. Humanity is therefore essentially co­
humanity. Barth develops the relationship between the self and the other in some 
detail for which he is highly indebted to secular thought.
In relation to foim, the same method that was cleai* regarding ‘real man’ is 
also operative -  deriving anthropology from Christology. However, there are a few 
differences here. First, Barth identifies both the continuity and discontinuity between 
Jesus’ humanity and our humanity which means that we only correspond to him in 
certain ways, i.e., in the basic form of humanity as co-humanity. We cannot be 
Saviour or Deliverer. However, in the basic form of humanity, there is a 
correspondence with Jesus humanity, as well as with the intra-trinitarian relations, and 
so the continuity can be seen in the structure of relations.^^
Hence Barüi’s doctrine of the original, first, and second imago Dei', that is, the original intra- 
tihiitarian relation of Father, Son, and Sphit (the original image), the corresponding relationship of 
humanity to God and to each other in Jesus (the first image), and humanity’s becoming of the image in 
human existence through human to human relationships (the second image). See esp. a transcription of 
Barth in John D. Godsey, Karl Barth‘s Table Talk, London & Edmburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962, p57.
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Second, in expounding the analogia relationis, the underlying trinitaiian 
ontology receives greater significance. The orders of knowing and being are 
constantly intertwined in Bai'th, and in the exposition of the sections of his 
anthropology, CMstology has received far gieater attention. Jesus Christ is both the 
noetic soui'ce and ontological detennination of humanity. However, although the 
Trinity does not appear to be operatively constitutive of humanity, God as Trinity is 
the ultimate grounding for humanity and theological method (hence Barth opens his 
Dogmatics with the doctrine of the Trinity).
And finally, Barth’s consideration of humanity is in some ways more 
revealing. In the section on the phenomena of man, Barth criticised vai'ious non- 
theological approaches on the basis of the six Christological criteria he developed. In 
developing his section on the basic foim of humanity as co-humanity, Bai'th made 
extensive use of secular discourses to the extent that some critics missed the 
Christological grounding for the section. The point is that Barth does recognise the 
multifaceted nature of human existence. However, theological anthropology for Bai'th 
is shaped by the way he understands the biblical witness to human natuie. The 
deteiminative factor is Jesus Christ and so all other factors are relative to Christ. 
Consequently, all knowledge (including both theological and non-theological 
discoui'ses) about any aspect of human existence will be seen in its true sense only 
when comprehended in teims of this deteiminative factor.^®
cited in Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology o f  Relations, p96. See also CD III/2, pp219-220; and Cairns, 
The Image o f  God in Man, ppl67f..
The trinitarian grounding for Barth’s antlnopology is explicit in CD III/2 although he does not 
develop it. Deddo is particularly strong on highlighting both the Christological and trmitarian 
foundations for anthropology {Karl Barth’s Theology o f Relations, Parts 1 and 2, passim., e.g. pp54f). 
See also Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology o f Karl Barth; Rosato, The Spirit as Lord, pp87f; 
Torrance, Persons in Communion; Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’.
Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology o f  Relations, p i In.
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Having considered some of the main facets of Barth’s anthropology, it is now 
possible to consider in more detail the relation between theological and secular 
discourses in Barth’s thought.
4. Secular Discourse in Barthes Anthropology
In this section I will briefly review the key loci of Barth’s theological method 
as evident in his anthropology, consider more specifically the relation between 
theological and secular' discourse in four sections of his anthropology, and finally, cast 
a more critical eye towards Barth’s approach.
4A Method in Barth’s Theological Anthropology
The methodological loci that were identified in the whole of Barth’s thought 
were also apparent in his theological anthropology. First, Barth’s anthropology was 
clearly grounded in his Christology. Bar*th did not operate with a prior concept of 
humankind, rather, an imderstanding of ‘tr'ue humanity’ was developed by first 
looking at Jesus’ humanity.®  ^ Jesus Christ functions as the noetic source and 
ontological determination of Barth’s anthropology. Second, Barth’s anthropology is 
not only grounded in Christology but also the doctrine of the Trinity, hr Barth’s
“[In founding antlnopology on Christology,] we leave the traditional way, which was to try first to 
establish generally what human nature is, and on tliis basis to interpret the human nature of Jesus Christ 
in particular [e.g. Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective; and the structure of Jürgen 
Moltmann, Man: Christian Anthropology in the Conflicts o f the Present, (trans.) Jolm Sturdy, London: 
SPCK, 1974]. Our whole approach to die relation between human sin and human nature has led us 
inesistibly in die opposite direction. Human sin excludes us firom understanding human natuie except 
by a new disclosure through the perception of divine grace addressed to man and revealing and 
affirming true humanity in the midst of human sin, i.e., a disclosure which is genuinely new, involving 
faith in die divine revelation. But if  we ask where we may find an authentic revelation in this respect, 
we are not led to man in general but to the man in particular, and in supreme particularity to the one 
man Jesus. Thus, contrary to the usual procedure, we must first enquire concerning this one man, and 
then on this basis concerning man in general.” (CD III/2, p44n).
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thought, the Trinity cannot be considered in isolation from the incarnate Jesus, nor the 
incarnate Jesus in isolation from the triune being of God. Although the tiinitaiian 
grounding for Barth’s anthropology was not stressed here -  other than perhaps 
through the analogia relationis -  Barth’s anthropology is rooted in an understanding 
of God as Trinity.^^ And finally, given Barth’s grounding of his anthropology in 
Christology and trinitarian theology, his anthropology takes the form of Nachdenken, 
It is important to emphasise again that Barth’s method is derived in response to the 
nature of the Word of God and does not function as a prior structur e for his content.^^ 
The pressiue of interpretation is irreducibly from God to humankind.
4.1# Secular Discourse In Barth’s  Theological Anthropology
Having identified some of the key methodological loci operative in Barth’s 
theological anthropology, we can now consider more specifically the relation between 
theological and secular* discourse in Barth’s anthropology. There are four main 
sections that are especially informative in III/2. The first section addresses some 
general methodological considerations about the relation between theological and 
secular discoruse and the second focuses on the specific role of non-theological 
antliropologies in theological anthropology. Because of the methodological 
significance of these two sections they will be treated at greater lengtli. The third 
section is essentially a negative critique of secular discourse on the basis of 
theological criteria (the phenomena of man), and the final section in a more positive 
assessment of the relationship (the I-Thou relationship). These will be taken in turn.
The trmitarian grounding for Bartli’s anthropology is set out in Price, Karl Barth‘s Anthropology, 
ppl 8-20, 57-58, 109-111, 132-138, 144, 23 If.; and esp. Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology o f Relations, 
ppl5-35, 39-40, 54-56, 72-75 ,159f., 174, 177, etc..
See CD 1/2, p861.
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1. General methodological considerations. Barth opens his volume on 
anthropology by asserting that anthropology is concerned with hiunanity as placed in 
the cosmos. As such, anthropology for Barth has a cosmic character, but emphatically 
does not outline a cosmology or worldview. Barth writes:
dogmatics has neither tlie occasion nor the duty to become a technical cosmology or a 
Ciiristian world-view. Were it to do so, it would be losing its way in a sphere essentially foreign 
to it. Its true object is the revealed, written and declared Word of God. Those who have 
claimed to have a world-view... have always derived it from otlier sources than the Word of 
God. Here at tire outset we part company with the exponents of all world-views, '^*
The primacy of the Word of God in Barth’s theological method is again clear. 
The point is that the relationship between theological and secular discourse in Bai'th’s 
thought is a direct result of his theological method. Barth explores tliis further in 
setting out five points about the relation between theologies -  that are derived fiom its 
object — and cosmologies (secular discourse). In summai'y fonn these are:
a) [Fjaith which grasps the Word of God... has never yet engendered its own 
distinctive world-view, but in this respect has always made more or less critical use of alien 
world-views.
b) [Fjaith m the Word of God can never find its theme in the totality of the created
world.
c) From the fact that faith, committed to its own special tlieme, can give only incidental 
attention to creation as a whole, it follows that its relation to the cosmological presuppositions 
and consequences o f its witness and confession could and can only be supremely non­
committal. ... It can pass from one world-view to anotlier without being untrue to itself, i.e., to 
its object.
d) Even where... we think we detect an absolute union of faith with this or that world­
view, we are not really dealing witii faitli at all, but with a partial deviation from faith such as is 
always possible in the life of the Church and of individuals.
e) In so far as faith itself is true to itself, i.e., to its object, and in so far as its confession 
is pure, its association with this or that world-view will always bear the marks of the 
contradiction between the underlying confession and the principles of the system with which it 
is conjoined.^®
We are now in a position to see what is meant by what McFadyen calls ‘the 
Bai*thian priority of God in theological method’. The ultimate criterion for faith that 
is ti'ue to its object in theological method is the Word of God. However, faith may
CD IIÏ/2, p6.
In a footnote Barth goes on: “In this respect we might go so far as to say that faith is radically 
disloyal to tliem [world-views]” (p9n).
®^ CD III/2, pp7-10.
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also function with operative criteria that are derived from elsewhere (secular 
discourse). The point is that the operative criteria are governed by the ultimate 
criterion, and so the object of theology which detennines both the form and content of 
theology has ultimate priority even though it may not have operative priority at a 
given moment. Because of this framework, faith can even be ‘disloyal’ to world­
views, that is, use secular discourse to expound aspects of faith without adopting the 
framework of that discom*se. At the same time, faith does not offer a world-view, or 
what we would now call a ‘meta-narrative’, rather, it moves from the paiticular to the 
universal. For Bmrth, this does not mean offering (an a priori) universal framework 
for interpreting theology and cultme, rather, on the basis of {a posteriori) par ticulars 
of faith (especially the incarnate Christ), considers what this means for the current 
context. It is also notable within the context of this thesis -  that is, a dialogue 
between theological and secular* discourse -  that for Barth, a union of faith with 
another world-view is a deviation from faith. However, to use secular discourse to 
expound aspects of faith where the primary or ultimate loyalty rests with the form and 
content being determined by the object of faith, is part of Christian tradition. To use 
John Thompson’s words, “all thought schemes or philosophies may be used as 
servants but not as masters, not as forms which bring an outside frame of reference or 
criterion to bear on the biblical testimony to divine revelation”.^ ^
The general consideration of the relation between theological and secular 
discom'se in Barth is further illuminated with regard to exact science. Barth first 
makes the point that theology is in this sense in basic opposition to philosophy, but is 
closer methodologically to the inductive sciences which are based on observation and 
inference. He then makes three points which again I quote in summary form.
Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology o f  Karl Barth, plO.
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Genuine science has the following points in common with genuine theological 
scholarship/®
a) It does not carry with it any world-view. It is content to observe, classify, 
investigate, understand and describe phenomena. It does not unfold any ontology of the 
cosmos. To the extent diat it does so it becomes an interpretation, and ceases to be an exact 
science. ... There is no scientific world view.®®
b) Exact science also agrees with the theology of creation in the fact that it too 
investigates and describes the cosmos only as the cosmos of man, that for it too tlie cosmos 
exists only anthropocentiically: not of course from tlie standpoint of tlie Christian faith in God’s 
Word and therefore not theanthropocentiically; but from the standpoint of human observation 
and inference, of wliich it clearly recognises the limits.
c) It recognises two fundamentally distinct spheres. ... It does not call diem heaven and 
earth, but no less than tiieology it recognises die distinction between heaven and earth.*®®
Barth has often been charged with not engaging sufficiently with the natural 
sciences -  a point which T. F. Torrance tried to a d d r e s s -  but this quotation 
indicates the basis of Barth’s approach. It is worth further drawing out the 
methodological significance of these three p o i n t s . F i r s t ,  neither theology nor the 
natural sciences functions with a priori assumptions about a specific world-view. 
Both disciplines let the object determine the method of enquiry and therefore the 
content, hi this way, both let the particular determine the universal and are 
functionally a posteriori. Second, both theological and exact sciences operate 
antliropocentrically. hr this context, ‘anthropocentric’ is a positive term for Bai’th as 
the Word of God focuses on both God and human beings. Both theology and exact 
science are the result of particular activity of human beings and are in this respect 
anthropocentric. It is also worth noting the opposite implication, that is, the limit 
imposed on anthropocentric enquiry. For exact science this means that it cannot make 
statements that go beyond the boundaries of the cosmos, whereas theology, in being
®® In this context, ‘genuine’ means having the metliod of enquiry determined by the object.
®® Altlrough Bartli does have a point in his distinction between die world-views of philosophy and exact 
sciences, even the most exact sciences do have a world view. This has been explored in Jean-François 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, (trans.) Geoff Bennington and Brian 
Massumi, Guildford and King’s Lynn: Manchester University Press, 1992, esp. Chapter 7.
*®® CD m/2, ppl2-13n.
*®* Torrance, Karl Barth; Tonance, Theological Science; Thomas F. Torrance (ed.), Belief in Science 
and in Christian Life, Edinburgh: Handsel, 1980; Thomas F. Torrance, Reality and Scientific Theology, 
Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1985.
*®^ See Price, Kard Barth’s Anthropology, pp l02-111.
*®® Again I note that Barth is not entirely consistent here. See Tonance, Persons in Communion, esp. 
ppl 16-119, and Williams, ‘Barth on the Triune God’, ppl57f..
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‘theanthropocentric’, refers to the fact that human being is to be miderstood as a 
creature in relation to God. And finally, in recognising two distinct spheres, both 
theological and exact science both have clear boundaries within which they operate. 
For exact sciences this means that they ar e to be concerned with the physical universe 
(whether or not they recognise the heavenly sphere). For theological science this 
means that creation is to be considered in teims of its relation to God.^ ®"^  This general 
theological framework can be seen to function more specifically in relation to 
theological and non-theological antluopologies.
2. Theological and non-theological anthropologies. The ‘problem of man’ is 
a problem not just for theology, but for much of human thinking. Therefore Barth 
considers briefly some of the methodological underpinnings of two main types of 
non-theological anthropology. These will be taken in turn.
The first type of non-theological anthropology is the ‘speculative theory of 
man’. Regardless of its foundations (whether in exact science or self-intuition), 
speculative anthropologies belong “to the context of a world-view”. They go 
beyond the hypotheses of exact science treating them as axiomatic principles which 
provide a framework for imderstanding the whole. Barth locates speculative 
anthropology somewhere between ‘myth’ and ‘philosophy’. Barth expounds the 
underlying method:
man supposes that he can begin absolutely witli himself, i.e., his own judgement, and 
then legitimately and necessarily push forward until he finally reaches an absolute synthesis, a 
system of truth exhaustive of reality as a whole. On this assumption he also and primarily 
thinks tliat he can know and analyse himself. ... He thinks that in some way he can know 
himself. Anthropology on tliis basis is the doctrine of man in which man is confident tiiat he 
can be both teacher and die pupil o f the truth. ... The essential point, however, is not its attitude 
to this idea [of reference to God], but the fact that this teaching has its origin in that arid comer;
104 (cphe Word of God has a cosmological border. It illuminates tlie world. It makes it know -  heaven 
and earth -  as tlie sphere in winch God’s glory dwells and in which He concerns Himself with man. It 
understands and explains it as one great parable of this happening. ...” (CD, III/2, p i 1).
CD III/2, p22.
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that here at the start of human self-knowledge stands man himself in his unlimited self- 
confidence either witli or without the drought o f God, or with this thought or drat.*®®
Barth does not consider it his place to engage with speculative anthropologies 
as they are rooted in a methodology that is close to the essence of sin -  it originates in 
human self-confidence, is dependent upon cor incurvatum in se (Luther), and does not 
identify the essence and nature of humanity (which cannot be found apart fiom 
reference to the Word of God). As such, Barth considers speculative antluopologies 
to be an ‘enemy’ to Ciiristian confession.
Barth is more positive towards the second type of non-theological 
anthi'opology, the ‘exact science of man’: “Man, too, is an object -  one among many, 
but nevertheless the nearest object -  of the physiological and biological, 
psychological and sociological sciences”. A s  an exact science, the second type of 
non-theological anthropology maintains a sense of relativity, that is, it refrains fiom 
“consolidating its formulae and hypotheses as axioms and therefore treating them as 
revealed dogmas”. T h e  concern of exact science will always be with the 
appearance rather than being of humanity, that is, the outer not the imier, and will 
emphatically not address the totality of humanity, rather, partial phenomena. Barth 
writes:
Strictly speaking, what physiology and biology, psychology and sociology can offer, 
will not be statements to the effect that man in his physical, psychological and sociological 
existence is or is not this or that, but statements to the effect that man as a phenomenon is to be 
seen and understood by man according to this or tiiat standpoint and in this or that aspect of his 
constitution and development, as deterrnined by current knowledge of these facts accessible to 
human enquhy. Scientific anthropology gives us precise information and relevant data which 
can be of service in the wider investigation of tlie nature of man, and can help build to build up a 
teclinique for dealing with tliese questions. Since it is itself a human activity, it presupposes that 
man is, and what he is, and on this basis shows him as to how he is, in what limits and under 
what conditions he can exist as the being he is. It is not concerned with his reality, let alone 
witli it philosopliical foundation and explanation.*®®
*®® CD III/2. p22. This citation includes a clear reference to Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments. 
See ft. 48 for further references.
*®^ CD III/2, p23.
*®® CD III/2, p23.
*®® CD m/2, p24.
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Insofar as the second type of anthropology remains within the limits of its 
enquiiy, i.e., does not strive to offer a world-view or become axiomatic, dogmatic, 
and speculative, it “cannot be the enemy of the Christian confession”. I n  other 
words, this kind of non-theological anthropology can play an important role in 
theological anthropology as long as it is concerned with hiunankind in relation to the 
natural order and not God or ultimate real i ty.^Within the context of theological 
anthi’opology, so long as the ultimate criteria are derived from the Word of God, the 
exact science of humankind has a place.
The main difference between theological and non-theological anthropologies is 
that theological anthropology considers humanity in relation to God. There aie two 
main methodological implications of this for Barth. First, “even the fact that man is 
the creation of God, standing as such in special relation to God, is a fact not accessible 
to human thought and perception otheiwise through the Word of God”.^ ^^  This 
means, as we have seen at length above, that humankind can only be properly 
understood within the context of Christian revelation which means being determined 
by Christology. Second:
the revelation of God does not show us man as we wish to see him, in the wholeness of 
his created being, but in its perversion and corruption. The trutli o f man’s being as revealed in 
the Word of God and attested generally by Holy Scripture shows us man as a betrayer of liimself 
and a sinner against his creatur ely existence. ... his real situation in the sight o f God is that he is 
the one who contradicts the purpose of God and therefore himself, distorting and corrupting his 
own being.**®
A further reason for grounding theological anthropology in Christology is that 
under the conditions of sin, not only are we incapable of seeing our true hiunanity, but 
we are also incapable of recognising ouiselves as sinners. The revelation of
**® CD m/2, p24.
*** It may even be “relevant, interesting, important and legitimate” (CD III/2, p79).
**^  CD m/2, p25.
*‘® CD III/2, p26.
**“* “Only when we know Jesus Cluist do we really know that man is tire man of sin, and what sin is. 
And what it means for man” (CD, IV/1, p389).
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humanity in sin is itself a product of revelation and cannot be determined apart form 
revelation. This will be examined at length in the next chapter, but the important 
point here is that apart foim the Word of God there is no possibility of offering an 
account of tme humanity.
Before considering more briefly how Bai'th actually does integiate theological 
and seculai' discourse, it is worth summarizing the main points thus far.*^  ^ First, 
theological anthropology begins with dogmatics not an a priori philosophy, 
cosmology, or speculative world-view. Barth’s theology begins with God’s self­
revelation, and as we have seen at length, his view of humankind derives from this as 
revealed in the incai*nate Christ. In this way, Barth’s anthi'opology stands in stark 
contrast to most other theological anthropologies which tend to move in the opposite 
direction. As we have now seen, this has significant implications for the 
relationship between theological and secular discouise which perhaps culminates in 
theology maintaining the ultimate criteria, but being somewhat flexible with operative 
criteria.
Second, theological anthropology respects the boundaries between itself and 
secular discourse, hi each case the boundary is detemiined by the object of enquiry. 
There are points of similaiity between theology and the natural sciences (less so for 
philosophy and speculative anthropology for Barth) which opens the possibility for a 
dialogue. However, there are also points where theological and non-theological 
discourses aie simply incompatible. Theology must begin with its own premises 
which from the perspective of a position outside that of faith may well be 
imacceptable. hi theological anthi’opology, a core assumption is that humankind is 
fallen and that although sin may be used as a model for understanding the human
For these points I am indebted to Price, Karl Barth‘s Anthropology, ppl 16-117. 
**® One example o f this is Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective.
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situation, the extent of human depravity and the recognition of it is a revealed tmth. 
To some extent McFadyen’s aim was to verify empirically the descriptive and 
explanatory power of the doctrine of sin, but for him, and even more so for Barth, 
knowledge of sin (and ourselves) derives from knowledge of God/^^ Put differently, 
the doctrine of sin may have empirically verifiable descriptive and explanatoiy power, 
but the doctrine itself cannot be derived apart from special revelation (although it may 
be criticised and challenged by secular discourse).
Third, knowledge of ‘real man’ or ‘tme humanity’ can only come from the 
Word of God. Only the Word of God reveals the reality of human sin and corruption 
as we shall see at length in the next chapter. This means that non-theological 
approaches can only be concerned with the phenomena or symptoms of humanity 
without capturing ‘tme humanity’. However, there is one respect in which Barth may 
not be quite right, that is, with regard to his view of ‘speculative’ anthropologies. He 
may be right about the dogmatic and axiomatic claims of speculative anthi'opologies, 
but they can accurately describe the symptoms or phenomena of humanity as can be 
seen in most art forms. Having identified some of the key methodological points of 
Baith’s engagement with non-theological anthropologies, let us now turn more briefly 
to two instances of actual engagement with them in 111/2.
**’ The use of sin as an empirical model is not new in McFadyen, not even with reference to Barth. See 
Fred Berthold Jr., ‘Theology and Self-Understanding: The Christian Model of Man as a Sinner’, in 
Peter Homans (ed.), The Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology: Essays in Divinity, Volume III, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, ppl 1-32. Price also uses secular discoruse (psychology) 
to criticise Barth’s theological anthropology {Karl Barth’s Anthropology, passim). Unfortunately, 
Price focuses mainly on the points of similarity between tlieological and non-theological approaches 
which means that he fails to see the significance of what a distinctly theological anthropology can offer 
the dialogue (he focuses almost entirely on die ‘human-human’ relations and not tlie ‘God-hiunan’ 
relation which is primary in Barth). This is where McFadyen’s approach exceeds most other 
approaches.
'*® As in Berthold, ‘Theology and Self-Understanding’.
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3. The phenomena o f man. In Chapter 2 on McFadyen’s anthi'opology, it was 
suggested that McFadyen did not engage sufficiently with enough forms of secular 
discourse being largely dependent upon Rom Harré’s thought. It was also suggested 
that ironically Barth takes the breadth and content of secular discourse more seriously 
than McFadyen. McFadyen is more dialogically orientated than Barth, and yet it is 
Barth who in the final analysis does more justice to secular discourse in laige part by 
recognising and maintaining clear boundaries between the forms of discourse. In fact, 
in one place in HI/2 alone Barth devotes over fifty pages specifically to this task to the 
extent that one commentator wi'ites: “Barth [is] obviously enjoying himself here”. 
This is the section in which Barth deals with the ‘phenomena of man’.
From the exposition of Bai'th above, it is cleai* that Barth addresses the 
‘phenomena of man’ immediately after developing six criteria for theological enquii'y 
that are derived fiom Christology. In his analysis, Barth first addresses the secular 
approaches on theh own tei*ms and then criticises them according to the theological 
criteria previously outlined. In doing so, Barth evaluates other anthropologies on the 
basis of the theological method that he has developed. For instance, Barth begins by 
looking to Polanus with whom he illustrates that anthropology based on self­
observation cannot lead to real man and culminates in a vicious circle. In Chapter 1 
it was mentioned that the distinction between theological and secular discourse is not 
always the most appropriate for Barth. His concern is more with the extent to which 
all tliinking is determined by the Word of God, hence he does not distinguish between 
theological and secular discourse. Consequently, some approaches which are 
theological may be dealt with here under ‘secular discourse’ because they share the 
same basic methodological approach (for example Emil Brumier).
**® W. A. Wliitehouse, ‘The Nature of Man’, in ‘The Christian View of Man: An Examination of Karl 
Barth’s Doctrine’, SJT, 2,1949, p62, referrmg to CD HI/2, pp76-132.
*2® CD IIF2, PP76-77.
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The breadth of Barth’s engagement with other anthropologies becomes clear 
when he examines four main anthropological approaches of the modem period: 
naturalism (Zockler, Otto, Titius, and Portmann); idealism (Fichte); existentialism 
(Jaspers); and theistic anthi'opology (Bmnner)/^^ Naturalism, Barth ai'gues, is unable 
to establish humanity’s distinctiveness in relation to other creatuies, pointing at best 
to human phenomena. Ideahsm operates within the field of self-knowledge and so it 
is unable to stand the test of the six criteria. Barth finds the transcendent point of 
reference in existentialism more promising, but identifies it as ultimately resting in 
hiunankind itself. And finally, although not ‘secular’, Barth finds that theistic 
anthropology to meet many of his criteria, but it fails on thiee counts: it does not
need the God of self-revelation as the transcendent other; it finds the reality of 
humanity in fieedom of choice, not obedience; and it offers only potentiality, not 
actuality.
There is much to be gained fiom an in depth analysis of Barth’s engagement 
with these schools of thought, but his method is clear foim this overview. What has 
not been brought out here is where Barth is more positive towards these schools of 
thought, hi each of them he finds much that he likes, usually msofar as they are 
describing the ‘phenomena of man’, but he finds them all to be flawed according to 
his criteria. Of course his criteria could be rejected and the starting point could be 
placed elsewhere, but for Barth as we have now seen at length, anthi'opology can only 
derive from Chiistology. Therefore, Barth’s analysis of these secular discourses tends
CD III/2, pp78-132. It is worth noting that Barth’s critique of secular discourse is not restricted to 
this section. Indeed some of Ins most significant criticisms appear elsewhere in the volume, such as his 
well-known critique of Nietzsche (pp231-242).
122 «Yhe god in whom Fichtean man believes is himself, his own mind, the spirit of the protesting voice 
in which he puts his confidence and in the power of wliich he knows himself to be free. ... Fichte’s god 
is Fichte’s man, and Fichte’s man is Fichte’s god.” (CD III/2, ppl08-109n).
Adapted from Bromiley’s summary (Geoffr ey W. Bromiley, Inti'oduction to the Theology o f  Karl 
Barth, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996, pl26).
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to be negative. A more positive approach can be seen clearly in his analysis of the I- 
Thou relationship.
4. The I-Thou Relationship. This aspect of Baith’s thought has already been 
explored above. Two important factors became clear. First, where secular discourse 
was in accordance with his six criteria, Bai'th was more than happy to incorporate it at 
length into his theology. At the very least this shows that Bai'th is far from opposed to 
secular discourse per se. Second, there are aspects of anthropology and human nature 
that are common to both theological and non-theological a p p r o a c he s . W e  have just 
seen how secular discouise can describe the phenomena or symptoms of humanity, 
but there are other aspects of human nature that are common to both theological and 
non-theological approaches such as the recognition of agape and eros.^^^
Before considering briefly some possible weaknesses in Barth’s anthropology 
and seeing how they are related to the relationsliip between theological and seculai' 
discourse, it is worth clai'ifying further a number of points arising from this sub­
section. First, having seen in some detail how Barth’s approach interacts with a 
number of forms of secular discourse -  philosophy, the inductive sciences, the social 
sciences, and vai'ious approaches to anthropology -  it is important to clarify fui'ther 
some possible differences between them. Barth states quite clearly that theology can 
be understood as being in basic opposition to philosophy. This is not because Barth is 
opposed to the use of philosophy in theology, it should be evident by now that this is 
emphatically not the case, rather his point is that theology is closer methodologically
Not surprisingly, Emil Brunner asks whether Barth’s view that there is a quality of humanity tiiat 
can be apprehended by non-Christians amounts to a ‘pohit of contact’? See Brunner, ‘The New Barth’, 
ppl30-132.
CD IIF2, pp274-285n.
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to the inductive sciences which are based on observation and inference. Philosophy 
can be used as a theological tool in a number of respects -  by offering analytical tools, 
logic, insight into the human condition, world-views, and so on -  but, unlike the 
inductive sciences, Barth argues that it is not content to ‘observe, classify, investigate, 
understand and describe phenomena’. The core problem that Barth finds with 
philosophy is that it carries with it an inherent world-view and offers an 
‘interpretation’ of phenomena rather than a ‘description’.
In this regard, Barth has more time for the social sciences. With the exception 
of ‘speculative anthropologies’ which Barth dismisses, the social sciences can be seen 
as closer to the inductive sciences in that they ‘observe, classify, investigate, 
understand and describe [the] phenomena [of the human]’. Consequently, in his 
anthropology, Barth used insights derived from the social sciences (and some 
philosophy) in order to describe aspects of the phenomena of the human -  especially 
the natur e of relations. Put bluntly, philosophy tends to have more significance for 
Barth in terms of wider theological concerns, whereas the social sciences help in the 
specific task of describing the phenomena of the human and, to a lesser extent, 
expounding the doctrine of sin as we shall see shortly.
It is also worth noting that Barth’s shift in emphasis from his engagement with 
philosophy in his earlier thought to consider a far wider range of secular discoiuses, 
represents more than simply a change in dialogue partner (although it is undoubtedly 
this -  and the choice of dialogue partner is itself determined in large part by the 
theological doctrine being expounded), rather this shift can be interpreted as a 
development of his thought. On the one hand, given the methodological purity of his 
approach, Barth does not need to distinguish between different types of secular 
discouise because his concern is with the extent to which all thought foims conform
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to the Word of God. On the other hand, however, there is a difference in the use of 
secular discourse by theology. So for example, philosophy is not used by Barth to 
expound aspects of the phenomena of the human unlike the social sciences and the 
social sciences are not used to offer categories or language for thinking through key 
doctrines. Even thougli Barth does not develop this, there are a vaiiety of ways in 
which secular discourse can be useful for theology, but for Baith, they are always the 
servant not the master. The point is that Barth increasingly uses more diverse foims 
of secular discourse in his thinking (which are governed by his theology), but does not 
offer extensive resources for evaluating the significance of this diversity.
Second, having offered further clarification of the relationship between 
theology and pai'ticulai* foims of secular discoiuse in Bailh’s anthropology, it is now 
important to restate how Barth conceives of the relation between theology and seculai* 
discouise more broadly. The key point with regaid to all forms of secular discourse 
for Barth is that secular discourse cannot offer a frill account of anthropology, sin, or 
any broadly theological theme, because it misses a crucial element -  that creation 
stands before God and is in relation to God. For anthropology this means that the 
social sciences, for instance, can only describe the phenomena of the human as we 
have now seen in considerable length throughout this chapter. To restate the basic 
elements of Barth’s method with regard to secular discourse, the ultimate criterion for 
all theological enquiry is that it is true to its object -  the Word of God, but it may 
function with operative criteria that are derived from elsewhere (secular discourse). 
Jolm Thompson is worth quoting again, “all thought schemes or philosophies may be 
used as servants but not as masters, not as foims which bring an outside frame of 
reference or criterion to beai* on the biblical testimony to divine revelation”.
Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology o f Karl Barth, plO.
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And finally, a brief word on apologetics. It should be clear by now that Barth 
emphatically rejects any form of apologetics insofar as apologetics can be understood 
as offering some kind of a defence of the Chiistian faith according to the canons of 
secular rationality. For Barth, as for McFadyen, the core task of theology vis-à-vis 
secular discourse, is to borrow selectively fiom the secular in order to expound 
aspects of theology, hi doing this, theology may well offer distinctive illumination to 
aspects of ‘seculai* discourse’, as indeed was the case in McFadyen’s approach. 
Insofar as this can be understood as apologetics, both Barth and McFadyen would 
welcome this particular task. However, it should be emphasised that Barth (and to a 
lesser extent McFadyen) has no desire to, and in fact finds it theologically abhoirent, 
to try to demonstiate consistency with, or somehow validate the content of theology 
according to secular insights. Neither Barth’s nor McFadyen’s approaches to secular 
discourse are diiven by apologetic concerns although their approaches may indeed 
have some significance for apologetics.
4.m Possible Weaknesses?
The relationship between theological and secular discourse in Barth’s 
anthropology should, I hope, be clear by now. Barth’s thought, including his 
antlnopology, has received extensive criticism elsewhere which does not bear 
repeating here. However, it is worth raising some possible weaknesses that may well 
stem from his theological method as this serves to further illuminate the relationship 
between theological and secular discomse in Barth’s thought. Tlnee questions will be 
posed.
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1. Given Barth j  Christological orientation, and the theological ontology that 
goes with it, is his anthropology adequate? Two main issues aiise. First, Barth is 
cleai'ly highly dependent upon Christology at almost every point of his theology. 
However, there is a question about how much we actually know about the person of 
Christ on the basis of the biblical texts, or at least, the extent to which Barth may or 
may not move beyond these texts. Christology may be a good starting point for 
anthi'opology, but it is not clear that it should hold the methodological significance 
that Bai'th attributes to it without other major (operative) points of r e f e r e n c e . F o r  
instance, in his insistence on grounding anthropology on Christology, Barth does not 
always seem to have done justice to aspects of the New Testament’s anthropology, 
or even the nature of Christ’s humanity within these t ex t s . Fu r t he r mo re ,  his 
Christology, and certainly the six criteria deriving from it, tend to be fairly abstract. 
For example, as Jesus assumes fallen humanity, it is not clear at what point he 
provides criteria for true humanity? However, the main issue I wish to raise lies 
elsewhere.
The key issue here is not about Christology, but about the doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit. Barth has often been criticised for having an insufficient doctrine of the Spirit, 
which, in this case has some truth to it. Barth consistently maintains that there can be
Barth’s Christology is essentially a highly developed and theologised post-Chalcedonian one.
It is notable tliat most contemporary theologians who are indebted to Barth derive tlieir 
andrropology prhnarily from the doctrine of the Trinity and not Christology. Examples include, 
Alistair I. McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theoiy o f the Individual in Social 
Relationships, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Colin E. Gunton, The Promise o f  
Trinitarian Tlieology, Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1991, esp. Chapter 5; Colin E. Gunton, The One, The 
Three, and The Many: God, Creation and the Culture o f  Modernity. The 1992 Bampton Lectures, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; Anüiony C. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the 
Postmodern Self: On Meaning, Manipulation and Promise, Edinburgh; T&T Clark, 1995; Stanely J. 
Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology o f the Imago Dei, Westminster: 
Jolm Knox Press, 2001.
See Sykes, ‘Barth on the Centre of Theology’, pp47f..
*®° Such as the account given in Udo Schnelle, The Human Condition: Anthropology in the Teachings 
o f Jesus, Paid, and John, (trans. O. C. Dean Jr.), Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996.
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no direct equation of Christology with anthropology/^^ and flu'theimore that a direct 
equation of Christology with anthiopology is impossible because of sin/^^ However, 
Barth’s anthiopology rests upon the identification of a conespondence between Jesus’ 
humanity and our own, i.e., that there is something that humanity has in common with 
Jesus/^^ This leads Gibbs to ai'gue that although Christology is Barth’s primary point 
of reference, he also has a secondary point of reference in his anthropology. Gibbs 
writes:
The problem posed by the procedure of founding anthropology on Clnistology is 
primarily how to distinguish the uniqueness of tlie Man Jesus from tliat which all men have in 
common with Him. This problem is worked out as Barth has recourse, subordinate to the 
primary Cluistological point of reference, to a second point of reference -  what ‘can obviously 
be said o f every other man’, or what can be said m a ‘general sense’ o f all odier creatures, or 
what is ‘immediately apparent’, or the phenomenon as it presents itself to us.'^^
While Gibbs may overstate the case, especially in his identification of the 
second point of reference in all four main sections of Barth’s anthropology, he is right 
to identify both that there are other implicit criteria functioning within Barth’s 
anthiopology that aie not stated. Gibbs may also be right about the significance of a 
phenomenological account of humanity in Barth, but the key that Barth does not 
develop at this point is the role of the Holy Spirit in anthropology. In short, does 
the Holy Spirit not function as the ‘secondary point of reference’? Put differently, is
CD III/2, pp47-54; 71; 222; 512.
Brunner (‘The New Barth’, ppl29f.) suggests that there may be a possible tension here in Barth’s 
thought, because of his view that sin is an ontological impossibility.
Cf. Caims, The Image o f  God in Man, ppl69f.. The relationship between Jesus’ humanity and ours, 
albeit not witii reference to Bartli, is set out extremely well in Stephen W. Sykes, ‘The Theology of the 
Himianity o f Christ’, in Stephen W. Sykes, and John P. Clayton, Christ, Faith and History: Cambridge 
Studies in Christology, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1972. See also John Thompson, ‘The 
Humanity of God in die Theology of Karl Bardi’, in SJT, 29, 1976, pp249-269; Thomas G. Weinandy, 
In the Likeness o f  Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity o f  Christ, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993; and 
Trevor A. Hart, ‘Sinlessness and Moral Responsibility: A Problem in Clnistology’, in SJT, 48/1, 1995, 
pp37-54.
Gibbs, ‘A Secondary Pomt of Reference in Barth’s Antlnopology’, ppl32-135.
Gibbs, ‘A Secondary Point of Reference in Barth’s Anthropology’, pl33. References for the 
citations from Bartli have been left out from die quotation.
The Holy Sphit is important for Barth in his section ‘Man as Soul and Body’, and mcreasingly so in 
Volume IV (esp. §62, §63, §67, §68, §72 and §73) in which he identifies die Sphit as die agent of 
holiness in sinful hiunanity amongst other things. However, the Holy Sphit plays a noticeably small 
role in the core of his anthropology. See Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology o f Karl Barth, 
Chapters 8 and 9.
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it not the agency of the Spirit that grounds the correspondence between Jesus’ 
humanity and ours? Perhaps the most important question to raise here is whether or 
not it is the Spirit’s role to transform us into the likeness of Christ in a way that 
enhances our particularity and not Christ’s/^^ It might well be that the problem Gibbs 
raises may not have been an issue had Barth a more developed pneumatology at this 
point. But to retmn to the main question of this subsection, Barth does offer an 
adequate anthiopology on the basis of Christology and the resulting ontology, but this 
could be further enhanced with a stionger pneumatology.
2. Does Barth underestimate the values o f non-theological anthropologies? 
John Thompson rightly identifies perhaps the most significant aspect of Barth’s 
anthiopology:
BaiHi has radically reversed traditional dogmatics which began with the phenomenon 
o f the human, with our human being, and then went on to speak of the humanity of Jesus Christ. 
Barth reverses the order wliich is consistent witli his basic Christological emphasis. In this way 
the doctrine of humanity is not deduced from but related to and interpreted in the light of tire 
man Jesus Christ. 138
Barth h^s, in other words, a very specific orientation which has major 
methodological implications. There are, therefore, two main options that Barth sees 
regarding theology’s relation to secular discourse. On the one hand, there is the 
position (which Barth himself holds) which seeks to learn as much as possible as 
Christians orientated towards God through Chiist fi’om disciplines which are not 
overtly theological. On the other hand, it is possible to try and stand outside the 
Christian faith to explore other insights and then see where Christian theology 
matches. There is simply no third way for Barth.
See Jurgen Moltmann, The Spirit o f Life: A Universal Affirmation, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1994; and Alisdair I. C. Heron, The Holy Spirit: The Holy Spirit in the Bible in the Histoiy o f Christian 
Thought and in Recent Theology, London: Marshall Morgan & Scott, 1983, ppl37f..
Thompson, The Holy Spirit in the Theology o f  Karl Barth, p i 68.
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Given Barth’s Chiistological orientation, he gives the trinitarian self-revelation 
of God methodological primacy over secular discourse although he is open to learning 
as much as possible horn secular- discourse, but from within a theological frame of 
reference -  secular* discourse may function as a servant but not as a master. Stuart 
McLean puts it this way:
While he [Bartli] rejects the findings of social science, used as the source of norms of 
human nature, he accepts social science when it functions within its limits and when the norm of 
anthropology is theology.
hr short, Barth takes secular discourses very seriously and consequently learns 
a great deal from them. There may have been scope in his work for greater 
engagement with them, as T. F. TorTance shows with regard to the natural sciences, 
but this does not mean that Barth underestimates the value of secular discourse. He 
does, however, give the trinitarian self-revelation of God methodological primacy at 
every point.
3. Is Barth s conception o f ‘real man ‘ too limited? Recall that for Barth, ‘real 
man’ is Jesus Christ and only secondarily and in an indfrect sense is it humanity in 
general which participates in Jesus Clirist, There does seem to be a tension here. On 
the one hand, real man is defined as one fully and consciously engaged with God in 
Jesus. On the other hand, humanity in general is defined as linked with God whether 
or not this is conscious. Emil Brumier puts a different slant on the matter: “I cannot 
rid myself of the suspicion that ‘real man’ which is the leading idea of the Barthian 
antlnopology may mean something that is irreconcilable with the Christian doctrine of 
sin”.^ "^  ^ He rightly notices that Barth’s use of the word ‘real’ seems to be what is 
noiinally expressed by the word ‘true’. In other words, Jesus is true man. But
McLean, Humanity in the Thought o f  Kat'l Barth, p34.
McLean, Humanity in the Thought o f Karl Barth, p33.
Brunner, ‘The New Barth’, pl26.
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according to this usage, the sinner is not real man as Bai*th tells us in a number of 
places. But Barth also writes of real man in terms of the creature whom God is for. 
Presumably it is the human creature or humanity in general that is meant here. To use 
Bnmner’s words in summary:
At one moment real man is man who flilfils the purpose of God in creation. At another 
moment real man is man as he in fact exists, i.e. sinftil man who as such does indeed not answer 
yes to God’s determination.
I do not intend to resolve this difficulty here other than to point out two 
methodological weaknesses that may feed into it on the basis of the relationship 
between theological and secular discourse. First, given the consistency of Barth’s 
Christological concentiation it may be that he has not fully taken on board at this 
stage of his dogmatics, either the implications of sin for human being (not theological 
m e t h o d ) , n o r  the contribution that non-theological accounts can offer regarding the 
phenomena or symptoms of humanity. And second, this tension may again result 
fiom an insufficient theology of the Holy Spirit. ‘Real’ himianity seems to be largely 
a static notion, whereas humanity formed by the Spirit shaped over time in tlie whole 
life, death, and resurrection of the incarnate Son and now foimed in us is a radically 
dynamic notion.
5. Conclusion
The cential concern of this chapter was to identify the method operative in 
Karl Barth’s theological anthropology as it appears in Church Dogmatics III/2 with a
Brunner, ‘The New Barth’, pl26. Later he writes: “Eidier ‘real man’ means man whom Jesus Chiist 
delivers, man tliat is who is not doing the will o f God, or else this ‘real man’ is not the man we in fact 
are” (pi 30).
For instance, Williams notes tiiat Barth lacks “any sense of human bondage” ( ‘Barth on the Triune 
God’, p 173).
This said, Daniel Price shows Barth’s antlnopology to be a of a dynamic nature, but tliis is regarding 
relations rather than a state {Karl Barth’s Anthropology, passim).
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view to discovering how Barth relates theological and secular discourse. Because of 
the nature of Barth’s theology, the relation between theological and secular discourse 
only became cleai* by first identifying some key points of his theological method.
The chapter began by identifying three key emphases of Barth’s method as a 
whole -  theology as Nachdenken, and a grounding in Chiistology and trinitarian 
theology -  which were also seen to be operative in his anthropology, even though 
Christology perhaps received greater emphasis. It was suggested that Bai*th’s most 
significant contribution to theological anthiopology was in his radical reversal of 
traditional dogmatics which began with the phenomenon of the human and went on to 
speak of the humanity of Jesus Christ. Instead, Baith reversed the order in accordance 
with his basic Christological emphasis.
Once Barth’s method was clear, the relationship between theological and 
secular discourse also became cleai*. Although Bai*th definitely maintained ‘the 
priority of God’ in theological method, he engaged at length with secular discourse 
albeit mainly through a filter derived fiom Christological criteria. As a result, he was 
deeply critical of some non-theological anthropologies, but where he thought secular 
approaches expounded an anthropology orientated by the Word of God, he embraced 
them openly.
Three main points could be identified fi‘om Barth’s engagement with secular 
discourse. First, regarding the priority of God in theological method, theological 
anthropology begins with dogmatics, not an a priori philosophy, cosmology, or 
speculative world-view. Second, theological anthropology respects the boundaries 
between itself and secular discourse as a result of both the form and content being 
determined by the object. And finally, knowledge of ‘real man’ or ‘true humanity’ 
can only come from the Word of God. Of course, this theological approach is
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unlikely to be convincing for secular discourse, but then to try to offer gi'ounds 
external to the Word of God would be to miss Barth’s point. Furthermore, science, 
much like theology, also has its givens which cannot be established from outside its 
framework. A dialogue between theology and secular- discomse must, for Barth, 
maintain the bomidaries between the different frameworks insofar as the discourse is 
deter-mined by its object of enquiry. However, as long as the distinctness is 
maintained, dialogue can occur. It now remains to explore further Barth’s method in 
regard to the doctrine of sin. This appears in his most mature work in Church 
Dogmatics Volume IV and will be explored in the following chapter.
192
CHAPTER 5 
Method in Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Sin
1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to identify the method operative in Karl Baith’s 
hamartiology. Analogous to his anthropology, Barth does not explicitly address the 
relationship between theological and secular discourse and so this can only become 
clear* in the light of his overall method. As in the previous chapter, Barth’s method 
can only be identified by means of his content. Consequently, the approach adopted 
will be to engage with the content of Barth’s doctrine of sin and identify the key 
methodological considerations. Only then will the relationship between theological 
and secular* discourse become clear.
The core of Barth’s doctrine of sin appears in two main places in his Church 
Dogmatics} First, Barth considers evil or ‘das Nichtige' (tr. nothingness), which is 
located in his doctrine of providence in Church Dogmatics 111/3} Although this
 ^ There are numerous oilier places where sin is treated explicitly in one form of another, but not in the 
same lengüi or depth. Two examples include Barth’s discussion of demons in Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics IIT/3: The Doctiine o f Creation, (eds.) Geoffrey W. Bromiley, and Thomas F. Tonance, 
Edinburgh; T&T Clark, 1996, pp519-531; and ‘the Lordless Powers’ in paragraph 78, Karl Barth, The 
Christian Life, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981. John C. McDowell emphasises that Barth only comes to 
a ‘provisional definition’ of das Nichtige in his discussion in CD IIF3, and that this needs to be 
complemented particularly by the section on ‘die Lordless Powers’ (“‘Nothing will come of Nothing”: 
Karl Barth on das Nichtige', found at http://www.geocities.coinyiolinnvmcdowell/Barth Evil.htm 
[18/4/02]). Similarly, R. Scott Rodin, in his comprehensive book on Barth’s doctrine of evil argues 
diat “[a] close examination of the work as a whole [Church Dogmatics'] will show that in no less than 
28 of its 73 sections evil, sin and death are given major treatment” (R. Scott Rodin, Evil and Theodicy 
in the Theology o f  Karl Barth: Issues in Systematic Theology, New York: Peter Lang, 1997, p5). These 
he lists as sections 14, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 39, 41, 42, 47, 48, 50, 51, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 64, 
65, 69, 70, 72, 73, and 78 (p5n). Furthermore, Rodin emphasises that: “This section [on das Nichtige], 
witii its very narrow and defined pmpose, has mistakenly been tieated as the best and final word from 
Barth on evil. It is instead simply a further exposition on a topic which has been an integral part of Ins 
theology from the beginning... ” (p i81).
 ^Barth, CD III/3, pp289-368.
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section is not explicitly a doctrine of ‘sin’ (sin is the concrete foim of das Nichtige), 
Barth’s method is clearly evident here, and perhaps more importantly is highly 
informative for the relationship between theological and secular discourse. Baith 
develops an explicit doctrine of sin in his doctrine of reconciliation in Church 
Dogmatics Volume IV.  ^ What is immediately obvious is that Barth’s approach stands 
in direct contrast to much of the western theological tradition, including the 
Reformers to whom Barth was heavily indebted, in locating his doctrine here rather 
than between creation and reconciliation/ redemption.'^ The key, for Barth, is that 
knowledge of sin is only possible in the light of the knowledge of the revelation of 
God and hiunanity in Jesus Chiist.
The structure of this chapter will correspond to Barth’s treatment of sin. I will 
begin therefore by identifying Barth’s method as operative in his discussion of evil in 
m/3 which proves to be particularly illuminating for the relation between theological 
and secular discourse. Then, I will consider Barth’s doctrine of sin in its threefold 
form of pride, sloth, and falsehood (IV/1-3). This will be located in the wider context 
of Volume IV and particular notice will be taken of his methodology. Although 
Barth’s method is perhaps at its most developed here, it is only informative for the 
relation between theological and secular* discourse by the total absence of secular 
discourse which is not insignificant for our pmposes. Finally, attention will be 
directed specifically and critically to the relationship between theological and secular 
discourse in Bar th’s doctrine of sin.
 ^ Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/1: The Doctrine o f Reconciliation, (eds.) Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 
and Thomas F. Torrance, Bdinbmgh: T&T Clark, 1997; Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2: The 
Doctrine o f Reconciliation, (eds.) Geoffrey W. Bromiley, and Thomas F. Torrance, Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 2000; Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3A: The Doctiine o f Reconciliation, (eds.) Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, and Thomas F. Torrance, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999.
For the Reformers, knowledge of sin was necessary for and prior to understanding the grace of God. 
The difference between the Reformer’s approach and Barth’s is set out well in Allen Jorgenson, ‘Karl 
Barth’s Christological Treatment of Sin’, in SJT, 54/4, 2001, pp439-462.
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2. Das Nichtige
Barth’s discussion of das Nichtige^ is particularly informative for considering 
the relation between theological and secular discourse, mainly because Barth includes 
a lengthy footnote (37 pages!) in which he directs attention specifically to secular 
discourse/ Baith’s discussion of das Nichtige can be divided into two main sections 
coiTesponding to the noetic and the ontic dimensions. As our concerns are mainly 
with method, particular attention will be paid to the noetic at the expense of the ontic.^ 
Barth opens the section on das Nichtige as follows:
There is opposition and resistance to God’s world-dominion. There is in world- 
occnrrence an element, indeed an entire sinister system of elements, which is not 
comprehended by God’s providence... nor ruled by die almighty action o f God like creaturely 
occmience. ... There is amongst the objects of God’s providence an alien factor. ... This 
opposition and resistance, this stubborn element and alien factor, may be provisionally defined 
as notliingness.^
Das Nichtige, the ‘impossible possibility’, is evil. Evil is nothingness. 
However, evil is not defined as nothingness, rather, evil is identified as nothingness.^ 
Nothingness is characterised by its menacing of both God and the creature, and evil is 
the actualisation of this m e n a c e . T h e  concrete form in which das Nichtige is active 
and revealed is sin.^^
 ^ To highlight the difficulties o f translating das Nichtige, I cite the editor’s note: “Many terms have 
been considered for das Nichtige, including the Latin nihil which has sometimes been favoured. 
Preferring a native term, and finding constructions like ‘die null’ too artificial and ‘the negative’ or 
‘non-existent’ not quite exact, we have finally made do with ‘nothingness’. It must be clearly grasped, 
however, that it is not used in its more common and abstract way, but in the secondary sense, to be 
filled out from Barth’s own definitions and delimitations, o f ‘that which is not’.” (CD III/3, p289).
® CD III/3, pp312-349.
’ The somewhat problematic account of the ontic dimensions of das Nichtige are addressed in Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, ‘Bardi on Evil’, in Faith and Philosophy, 13/4, 1996, pp584-608. Scott Rodin also 
higlilights a niunber of problematic elements (Rodin, Evil and Theodicy, pp200-205). See also John 
Webster, Barth's Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth’s Thought, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998, 
ppVOf..
' CD III/3, p289.
® Wolterstorff, ‘Barth on Evil’, p585.
“Nodiingness is the past, the ancient menace, danger and destmction, die ancient non-being which 
obscured and defaced the divine creation of God but which is consigned to the past in Jesus Christ, in 
whose death it has received its deserts, being destroyed widi this consummation of the positive will of 
God which is as such the end o f his non-willing” (CD III/3, p363).
" CD III/3, p305.
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Das Nichtige poses a number of problems for theology/^ First, nothingness 
cannot be explained from the side of the Creator, nor the creature, and yet God is Lord 
over it and does not permit it. Nothingness is Üierefore a ‘third factor’ that neither 
originates in God nor the creature/^ Second, in light of the tension of God’s disposal 
of nothingness and letting it run its course, there is a danger of either overestimating 
or underestimating its power. Both, Baith suggests, have to be avoided. And third, 
Barth argues that “theology as a human activity, and imder the presuppositions of the 
present dispensation, knows its object solely under the shadow of this break [between 
the Creator and the crea ture ]Therefore ,  theological thought and reflection must 
always be broken and can never be integrated into a complete system.Theology’s 
“aim must simply be to make the right report”. This last point is significant because 
as we saw with McFadyen, the form of theology is in laige part determined by its 
content which means that all theology is conducted under the conditions of sin and is 
therefore of a provisional nature. Although Barth acknowledges this, neither he nor 
McFadyen seem to allow for the brokenness of theology in practice. Additionally, as 
we shall see a number of times tliroughout Bai th’s hamartiology, he asserts that evil 
and sin can only be described and never explained. This is in part an attempt to allow 
for the brokenness of theology, and yet Barth offers a ‘description’ of evil and sin to
These problems are addressed more directly in the ontic dimensions of das Nichtige which I do not 
go into (CD IIF3, pp349f.).
In his comprehensive analysis o f Barth’s doctrine o f evil, Scott Rodin comes to two startling (but 
accurate) conclusions. First, because evil emerges as the eternally rejected ‘not-God’ from which God 
has differentiated Hhnself, its ontology deriving from the non-willed side of God’s positive will results 
in evil being a ‘necessary antithesis’ in Barth’s theology (Evil and Theodicy, ppll-14, passim). 
Secondly, there is a sense in which the origin o f evil is in God as it is a necessary result o f God’s 
choice to create (p77). In tlris respect Barth is close to Jürgen Moltmann’s discussion of zimzum and 
consequently shares some of the same challenges (God in Creation: An Ecological Doctiine o f  
Creation, Margret Kohl (trans.), London: SCM Press Ltd, 1985, Chapter IV).
CD IIF3, p294.
Bartli continues: “This does not mean, of course, tliat we ought not to proceed here and everywhere 
with the greatest intellectual probity and with rigorous logic and objectivity” (CD IIF3, p295).
CD IIF3, p295. David Ford rightly emphasises this pomt in Barth and God’s Stoiy: Biblical 
Narrative and the Theological Method o f  Karl Barth in the Church Dogmatics, New York: Peter Lang, 
1985, pl02.
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the extent that Nicholas Wolterstorff is forced to comment: “in spite of his clahn that 
evil is ‘incomprehensible and inexplicable’, there is much about evil that Barth 
professes to comprehend and explain -  more than he should”/^
In addition to raising these problems, Barth also addiesses a misconception. 
This misconception is the equation of nothingness with the ‘negative’ or ‘shadow’ 
side of creation. The negative side of creation reminds us of the threat and 
conaiption of nothingness, but is emphatically not to be equated with it. To equate the 
negative side of creation with nothingness is a slander on creation.'^ There is a 
conti'ast and antithesis in creation, and even the negative side praises God even though 
it is near to nothingness.
The shadow side of creation is one of the most ambiguous and problematic 
aspects of Barth’s theology.^® However, as Jeremy Begbie recognises, “it [is] 
probable that he is thinking of finitude and all its effects (including death), the quality 
of having been created out of nothing and therefore always being on the verge of 
collapsing back into non-existence”.^  ^ As an illustration of this, Barth offers what 
amoimts to an ode to his beloved W. A. Mozart which Begbie reads as confirmation 
of authentic praise of a finite, limited creation.^^ It is worth noting here, whether or 
not Barth is right about Mozart, or Begbie about Barth, ‘secular* discourse’ is being
Wolterstorff, ‘Barth on Evil’, p598.
Bartii writes: “creation is as it were on the frontier of nothingness and orientated towards it. Creation 
is continually confronted by tins menace. It is continually reminded that as God’s creation it has not 
only a positive but also a negative side. Yet this negative is not to be identified with nothingness, nor 
must it be postulated that the latter belongs to the essence of creaturely nature and may somehow be 
understood and interpreted as a mark of its character and perfection.” (CD III/3, p296).
Wolterstorff identifies two problems that arise from Bardi’s account here. See ‘Barth on Evil’, 
pp592-594.
° See Rodiir, Evil and Theodicy, p p l87-195.
Jeremy S. Begbie, Theology, Music and Time, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p95.
“I make tlris interposition here, before turning to chaos, because in the music of Mozart... we have 
clear and convincing proof that it is a slander on creation to charge it with a share in chaos because it 
includes a Yes and a No, as tlrough oriented to God on one side and nothingness on the other. Mozart 
causes us to hear tliat even on the latter side, and tlierefore in its totality, creation praises its Master and 
is therefore perfect. Here on the threshold of our problem -  and it is no small achievement -  Mozart 
has created order for those who have ears to hear, and he has done it better than any scientific 
deduction could.” (CD IÏI/3, p299n).
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used by Barth to illustrate a theological point. The methodological priority here is 
undoubtedly theology, but at this point, secular discoiuse is used as an illustration for 
theology (and not more than this).
If the negative side of creation and nothingness are equated, this is a tiiumph 
of nothingness because nothingness would be concealed in the negative and not 
recognised as nothingness. In this case, “nothingness suddenly becomes something 
which is ultimately innocuous, and even salutaiy”.^  ^ Real nothingness, sin, evil, death 
and the devil would be no less active, just less recognisably so and may even appear 
to be in positive relation to God. So, how is nothingness known?
To answer this question we must revert to the source of all Cluistian laiowledge, 
namely, to the knowledge o f Jesus Christ... . For in Him there is revealed not only the 
goodness o f God’s creation in its twofold form [positive and negative], but also the true 
nothingness which is utterly distinct from both Creator and creation, the adversary with whom 
no compromise is possible, die negative which is more than the mere complement of an 
antithetical positive...
In Other words, as with the rest of Barth’s theology, nothingness is known 
through Jesus Chr is t .Nothingness  is the enemy that Jesus has defeated and 
overcome. However, for us nothingness remains the antithesis which we can neither 
conquer, comprehend, envisage, master, nor control. And again: “We know all this 
clearly, directly and certainly from the source of all Christian knowledge, the 
knowledge of Jesus Clirist”.^  ^ It is only in Jesus Christ that we can see what 
nothingness is in its true nature and reality.^^ In Jesus Christ, we see it as an antithesis
CD ni/3, p300.
CD III/3, p302.
It is wortli emphasising again that the Jesus Chiist o f Barth’s Christological method appears to be 
largely a heavily tiieologised post-Chalcedonian Jesus.
CD III/3, p303.
Because o f Barth’s methodological insistence on describing evil and sin fr om the perspective of its 
overcoming in Clnist, Bartli, in contrast to McFadyen, offers comparatively little discussion of original 
sin. Tliis is in large part because Barth is not hugely concerned with the origin o f sin. See Jorgenson, 
‘Karl Bartli’s Christological Treatment of Sin', passim; Rodin, Evil and Theodicy, pp74f., and Webster, 
Barth's Moral Theology, p67. In contrast Gary A. Anderson mistakenly writes: “Karl Barth, devoted 
considerable energy toward recovering what Cluistian tliought meant by the doctrine of original sin” 
fNecessarium Adae Peccatum: The Problem of Original Sin’, in Carl E, Braaten, and Robert W. 
Jenson (eds.), Sin, Death and the Devil, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000, p38).
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not only to God’s whole creation but also to the Creator. And so, what is nothingness 
when seen from this perspective?
Nothingness is the ‘reality’ on whose account (i.e. against wliich) God Himself 
willed to become a creature... yielding and subjecting Himself to it in Jesus Christ in order to 
overcome it. Nothingness is tlius tlie ‘reality’ which opposes and resists God, which is itself 
subjected to and overcome by His opposition and resistance, and wliich in this twofold 
determination as the reality that negates and is negated by Him, is totally distinct from Him. 
The tme nothingness is that which brought Jesus Christ to the cross, and that wliich He 
defeated there.
Nothingness is the source, manifestation, and consequence of sin and sin is the 
concrete foim of nothingness.^^ However, we cannot come to knowledge of 
nothingness through knowledge of sin.^° Knowledge of sin and nothingness has its 
basis in God and God’s Word and work, and therefore in Jesus Christ. Just as 
knowledge of humanity camiot come fiom knowledge of self for Barth, knowledge of 
sin cannot derive fiom humanity’s self-communion as it would not be knowledge of 
real sin or nothingness.^^ In Jesus Christ we learn that nothingness is not exhausted in 
sin but exceeds it. Knowledge of nothingness and sin can only be revealed by God 
and in God’s opposition to it. Barth emphasises the significance of this point time and 
time again:
We must be clear tliat all om* knowledge... of sin can be genuine and related to our 
own real sin, to true nothingness, only when it is clearly apprehended tliat sin and nothingness 
are primarily and properly known in Jesus Christ and acknowledged by Him... . Unless Jesus 
Christ is their objective basis, our knowledge and acknowledgement will bear no real relation 
to tlie alien and adversary here involved... P
CD HI/3, p305. Wolterstorff comments on Barth’s method here: “The fundamental point which 
Barth wishes to make here is that the negativity which constitutes evil in all its forms can be identified 
only if  God is brought into the picture. Unless we bring God in, we’ll miss its nature. There is at work 
in reality a power, a dynamic, toward tlie negating of God’s purposes and desires, which in tmn God 
negates. Evil is that.” (Wolterstorff, ‘Barth on Evil’, p595).
“We have called sin die concrete form of nodiingness because in sin it becomes man’s own act, 
acliievement and guilt. Yet nothingness is not exhausted in sin.” (CD III/3, p310).
“We must be careful not to relinquish the position that the objective ground of our knowledge of 
nothingness is really Jesus Clnist Himself. We must be careful not to transfer diis ground to the 
consciousness of our own existence and sin as thought this were out direct consciousness of 
nothingness.” (CD III/3, p306).
In diis context ‘real’ means for Bardi “in opposition to the totality of God’s creation” (CD III/3, 
p310).
CD III/3, p307.
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In terms of method, Barth has remained consistent to his Christological 
orientation. Knowledge of das Nichtige can only come from knowledge of its 
overcoming in Jesus Chiist. Analogous to his anthropology, Bar th does not start with 
a prior concept of evil but derives his understanding of evil from that which God 
opposes in Jesus Christ. So what place is there for secular discourse in Barth’s 
imderstanding of das Nichtigel
Before focusing on Barth’s engagement with secular* discourse in the footnote 
mentioned above, it is worth emphasising again a point that was made in the previous 
chapter and one that will be made again in following chapters. ‘Secular* discourse’ is 
not a term that can be applied easily to Barth. Whereas in McFadyen’s thought the 
distinction between theological and non-theological thought was relatively easy to 
discern, this is not so for Barth. This is because Barth’s engagement with secular 
discourse is usually intertwined with other* theological approaches. However, his 
engagement with other theological approaches and secular discourse are generally 
used as further resources for development of Barth’s point, either* in terms of an 
example of how not to do something, or where he is in agreement by incorporating it 
into his theology. Put simply, we might be better* off examining Barth’s thought not 
in the light of a distinction between theological and secular discour se, but in terms of 
whether* or* not human thinking derives from an understanding of the Word of God in 
Christ. For Barth, the distinction is between the human logoi informed by the divine 
Logos, and all other human thought whether or not it is ‘theological’. This point will 
be developed frnther in Chapter 6 below.
For the purposes of this thesis it is important to maintain the distinction 
between theological and secular discourse, and so, as in the following analysis, some 
‘theological’ approaches are referred to in general terms as ‘secular’, which in a sense
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they are for Baith. At root, these other theological approaches stand in contrast to 
Barth’s approach -  deriving all theology from Christology -  and so they are simply 
imable to identify and describe true nothingness, true sin, and true humanity.
There is, however, another side to the coin. In Barth’s thought, ‘theology’ 
only exists because o f  the disorder caused by sin. Whereas most secular disciplines 
could exist in a world that is not fallen, there would be no need for theology in a 
world that is not fallen. In the opening pages of his Church Dogmatics Baith writes: 
“To set itself in a systematic relationship to other sciences, theology would have to 
regard its own separate existence as necessary in principle. But this is the very thing 
it cannot do. It cannot think of itself as a link in an ordered cosmos, but only as a 
stop-gap in a disordered cosmos”.^  ^ In other words, the very existence of theology 
itself places it in a necessary relationship with secular discourse. Theology itself is an 
inteiTuption and therefore adopts a prophetic role in relation to seculai* discourse. We 
turn now to Barth’s engagement with secular* discourse.
The first point to mention is that in this section Barth’s engagement with 
secular discourse is in a footnote. Although some of Baith’s most interesting and 
provoking thought often appeals in his footnotes, this suggests at the outset that his 
engagement with secular discourse is tangential to his theological approach to das 
Nichtige. In other words, Barth is being consistent with his approach to secular 
discourse insofar as it is generally used in one of two ways, either as an illustration of 
how not to approach a subject, or to incorporate the benefits into his theological 
framework. In this case it is largely the former but is nonetheless revealing for his 
imderstanding of the relation between theological and secular* discourse, that is, 
Barth’s theology remains substantially unchanged by engaging with secular discourse.
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I/l: The Doctiine o f  the Word o f God, (eds.) Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 
and Thomas F. Torrance, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995 plO.
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It is also worth noting that Barth’s discussion of secular discourse in this footnote is a 
serious, perceptive, and critical engagement with these thinkers. On this basis alone -  
rigorous engagement with a wide range of secular thinkers -  it can be argued that 
there is a sense in which Barth takes secular discourse more seriously than McFadyen.
Barth considers five main thinkers in this footnote: the theologians Julius 
Müller and F. D. E. Schleiermacher, and the philosophers G. W. Leibniz, Martin 
Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Our purposes will be served best, not by offering a 
detailed exposition of Barth’s analysis, but by identifying the dominant characteristics 
that form the basis of Barth’s interaction with each respective thinker. In the light of 
such an analysis, the basis of Barth’s engagement with secular discour se will become 
clear. We will begin with the theologians. '^^
Baith’s main focus up to this point has been with the objective ground of 
knowledge of nothingness which he locates in Jesus Christ. Julius Müller adopts the 
opposite approach to Barth,^^ which is summarised by Barth: “His apparent rule is 
that, if we consider human existence in its psychological, sociological and historical 
reality, a little serious reflection will necessarily lead us to the conclusion that man is 
a sinner”.^  ^ Although Müller’s approach is not in accordance with Barth’s method, 
Barth is far from unappreciative of Müller’s contribution and writes of Müller:
He was deficient neither in deep and comprehensive msight into human reality nor in 
scrupulous consideration o f earlier tliought and ophiion. ... [T]he outstanding and enduring 
significance of his work is that he confronts this dark stain on the psychological, sociological 
and liistorical picture of man with greater thoughtfulness, perplexity and alarm, that he 
investigates and explores this sphere with greater thoroughness, and that he weighs and 
evaluates the dialectics and limitations of the various ancient and modem theories with greater 
exactitude, not only tlian his contemporaries, but also than most o f the representatives of tlie 
earlier tradition.^’
This is not the order that Bartli adopts. He considers Leibniz before Schleiermacher.
BaiÜi’s concern is with Miiller’s two volume Die Christliche Lehre von der Siinde, 1838-44 (E.T. 
The Christian Doctrine o f Sin, 1885).
'"CDIIF3,p313n.
CD IIF3, p313n.
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Baith’s problem with Müller is that he does not raise the question of whether 
this ‘dark stain’ can be directly perceived, identified and assessed as though it were 
one phenomenon among others, or whether knowledge of this phenomenon is a 
question of faith and therefore (‘in the strict sense’) a theological question. Müller, 
Barth suggests, assumes the existence of sin as a matter of common knowledge, and 
therefore, a comprehensive investigation of humanity will reveal a knowledge of the 
nature of sin and nothingness. Barth finds this approach to be prefigured in Kant’s 
Religion within the Limits o f Pure Reason and praises the accuracy of both Müller’s 
and Kant’s thinking on this subject. However, Barth continues: “The remarkable 
accuracy of their [Müller’s and Kant’s] main thesis invites the conjecture that perhaps 
their only failure is not to see that they actually accept the Christian insight and look 
from the heart of the Gospel”.^  ^ As a result, there aie ‘serious gaps’ in their 
investigations, thiee of which Barth h igh l igh ts .A t  this point it is important to note 
that Barth is highly appreciative of both Müller’s and Kant’s thought (although 
mainly Müller’s in this instance), only that insofar as they accurately describe sin and 
evil, it is not on the empirical basis that they suggest, but is in fact derived from the 
Gospel albeit without their being aware of it. Because of their attempted method, 
there are theological deficiencies in their accounts.
Barth’s discussion of Schleiermacher is the longest and most comprehensive 
analysis of all five of the thinkers, which perhaps indicates something of Barth’s 
indebtedness to him.'^ ® Rather than entering into the detail here, the gist of Barth’s
CD IH/3, p314n.
CD IH/3, pp314-316n.
40 It is not insignificant tiiat Bartli’s last ever colloquium in the summer of 1968 was a consideration of 
nineteenth century theology by means o f Schleiermacher’s On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured 
Despisers, Eberhard Busch highlights Üie significance of this: “During the summer [of 1968], in a 
‘postscript’ to an anthology of Schleiermacher texts, Barth then gave a survey o f tlie chequered history 
of his relationship with die great theologian, whom he had first welcomed so enthusiastically and then 
criticised so vehemently, without being able to get away fi:om liim and without solving tlie questions he
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engagement can be obtained by identifying the pattern of his engagement. Recall that 
with Müller, Bai1h, first offered an exposition of his thought, drew out some of the 
sti'engths, and then pinpointed some of the weaknesses, so with Schleiermacher, Baifh 
first offers an incisive exposition of Schleiermacher. However, rather than simply 
drawing out the strengths (and there are many for Bai'th'^ )^ of Schleiermacher’s 
approach, Barth defends him against many of his critics and then adds some of his 
own criticisms.'^^ What we find in Barth’s analysis of Schleieimacher is a deep (albeit 
critical) appreciation of his work. However, our main concern here is with Barth’s 
engagement with secular discourse, and although Müller’s and Sclileieimacher’s 
approaches deviate fiom Barth’s, om* main interest lies with the philosophers. The 
theologians are after all deeply imbedded in Chiistian tradition and, even if their 
approaches are in opposition to Barth’s, we would expect to find much that Barth 
agrees with because of their being infoiined by Christian ti adition. Is this so with the 
philosophers, at least one of whom is explicitly atheist'^^?
Barth’s account of Leibniz again begins with an exposition of his thought 
which is followed by an appreciation and a critique. Leibniz’ account of evil was 
lai'gely fiom the perspective of the problem of theodicy, hence Barth appreciates the 
universal scope through which Leibniz interprets sin, evil and nothingness. However, 
“this is its only praiseworthy characteristic”.'^ '^  The problem that Barth has with 
Leibniz is, in short, that he subsumes the negative into the positive and lacks a 
principle for evaluation. As a result, Leibniz domesticates nothingness, and therefore
posed” {Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1976, 
pp493-493),
Barth identifies two in particular: that God in Iris omnipotent grace has negated evil, and that evil 
exists only in relation to God’s grace {CD IH/3, pp326-328n).
“The fallacy of Schleiermacher was to absolutise the historico-psychological actuality o f the 
Christian religious consciousness, and therefore to regard tlie sin apprehended within its limits as real 
(CDHI/3,p333n)”.
However, Bartli argues that in many ways neitlier Heidegger nor Sartre are aüieists {CD IH/3, 
p343n).
CD IH/3, p317n.
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does not offer an account of real nothingness. Heidegger and Sartre, whom Barth 
takes together, are more promising. In the opening paragraph on Heidegger and 
Sartre Barth writes:
In tlieology, at least, we must be more far-sighted tlian to attempt a deliberate co­
ordination witli temporarily predominant philosophical trends in which we may be caught up, 
or to allow them to dictate or correct our conceptions. On the other hand, there is every 
reason why we should consider and as far as possible learn from the typical pliilosophical 
thinking of the day.'*^
In other words, in the opening stages of Barth’s engagement with two major 
secular thinkers, Barth affinns first the methodological priority of theology, and 
second, the importance of engaging with contemporary secular thought. The key 
appears to be, and this is reading into Barth, identifying which aspects of secular 
thought (and by extension ‘culture’) are not merely passing tiends or consonant with 
the framework of the Gospel and are therefore worthy dialogue partners. 
Unfortunately we are not offered any criteria through which to judge contemporary 
movements and for two very good reasons. First, to offer criteria for such a task 
would involve an a priori evaluation of the object which is contrary to every bone in 
Barth’s body. Notably, Baith is not even prepared to offer an a priori repudiation of 
natural theology as this would involve succumbing to the very fr*amework against 
which he is standing. And second, it is often not possible to discern which trends aie 
passing and which have deeper significance until the phenomenon has passed, or at 
least has existed for some time.
Barth adopts a similai* approach for both Heidegger and Sartre -  offering a 
reading of their work, praising aspects of it, and criticising others. Again, we are not 
concerned with the detail of Barth’s exposition so much as to as the key question 
about the extent to which Heidegger and Sartre (and Müller, Leibniz, Schleiermacher 
-  secular discourse) have described ‘true’ nothingness, or whether they are merely
CD IIF3, p334n.
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concerned with the phenomena. The answer is not quite as simple as it would seem. 
On the one hand, “though Heidegger and Sartre aie both in different ways concerned 
with nothing, they are concerned with something very different from the nothingness 
which we have here considered as nothingness before God”.'^  ^ And on the other hand, 
“[tjheir thought is deteimined in and by real encounter with nothingness”.'^ ^
Herein lies the problem, and it is one which raises oui* question in a 
pai'ticularly acute manner. Both Heidegger’s and Sartre’s “thought and expression aie 
detei*mined in and by the considerable upheaval of Western thought and expression 
occasioned by two world wars”.'^  ^ Both have abandoned the optimism and pessimism, 
quietism and activism, speculation and positivism of the preceding two centuries. 
Why? Because both Heidegger and Saitre have faced tiue nothingness and are 
foimed by this encounter. Hence Barth warns:
Whoever is ignorant of the shock experienced and attested by Heidegger and Sartre is 
surely incapable of thinking and speaking as a modern man and unable to make himself 
understood by his contemporaries
Heidegger and Sartre have both been confronted by true nothingness and are 
formed by it. Clearly they have captured ‘something’ of its character albeit without 
reference to God. To recall Barth’s anthropology briefly, secular discourse was able 
to describe the ‘phenomena of man’ in some detail, but always fell short of describing 
‘true humanity’. Are Heidegger and Sartre only concerned with the phenomena of 
nothingness or with true nothingness? Barth states his opinion very clearly.
[W]e camiot agree that, with their doctrine of nothing, our existentialists have even 
entered the dimension in wliich nothingness is to be seen and described as true nothingness by 
Christian insights. Tliis is naturally of a piece with their ignorance of God, in consequence of 
which tliey cannot adopt the standpoint from which one must see and tliink and speak in this 
matter. They see and tlnnk and speak as true, alert and honest cliildren of our time who have
CD IH/3, p344n. 
CD HI/3, p345n. 
CD HI/3, p345n. 
CD IH/3, p345n.
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experienced themselves the shock sustained by modem man. Yet tliey still resemble Leibniz 
and Schleiermacher in the fact that they do so from an arbitrary human standpoint...
Heidegger and Sartre are therefore faced with and try to describe true 
nothingness. Only, because of their adoption of a human standpoint, they are not able 
to describe true nothingness even though they do capture something of its reality, or 
rather, the phenomenon of nothingness. Secular discourse can therefore be used as a 
useful resource for describing the phenomena of nothingness, but to describe true 
nothingness, a theological approach which sees nothingness from the perspective of 
its overcoming in Jesus Christ is a necessary requirement.
Barth has clearly gained a lot from his engagement with secular discourse, but 
in this case he stops short of a ‘mutually illuminating dialogue’. Secular discourse is 
unlikely to benefit hugely from Barth’s analysis,^^ and on account of Barth’s 
engagement with secular discourse being in a footnote, his theological approach 
remains unchanged (although possibly complemented) by his engagement with 
secular discomse.
In summary, seculai" discomse can describe accmately the phenomena of 
nothingness, but falls short of describing true nothingness. This is because secular 
discomse cannot adopt the Christological standpoint from which true nothingness is 
revealed. Barth does not argue this out of some kind of attachment to his method, but 
because he genuinely believes secular accounts to fall short of describing true 
nothingness. True nothingness -  evil and sin -  is an explicitly theological reality that 
can only be described in theological categories. Tme nothingness is that which
CD IH/3, p345n. Or again: “It is futile to deny that what tlie existentialists encounter and objectively 
perceive is real nothingness. Yet it must be stated most emphatically that seeing they do not really see. 
What they see, describe and proclaim is not real notliingness, just as tlie God, denying or not denying, 
they ignore and replace by surrogates is not the real God.” (CD IH/3, p346n).
The aim of Wolterstorff s article ‘Bardi on Evil’ is, in part, to challenge philosophers to take heed of 
Barth’s approach.
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menaces God and God’s creation and therefore cannot be properly described in 
categories which exclude God/^ All foims of secular discourse fail to describe true 
nothingness because they view it from a human perspective.
Further evaluation of the relation between theological and secular discourse in 
Barth’s discussion of das Nichtige continues in Section 4 below. In the meantime we 
will consider Bai th’s doctrine of sin, that is, the concrete foim of das Nichtige.
3. Barth's Doctrine of Sin
The aim of this section is to address specifically Barth’s doctiine of sin as it 
appeal's in Church Dogmatics Volume IV. Although this will not be treated with 
much reference to the wider material in which it is situated, the methodological 
significance of this material will become clear in an overview. Consequently, the first 
sub-section will consider Barth’s placement of the doctrine within the context of 
Volume IV, whilst the subsequent sub-sections will follow Barth’s treatment of sin in 
its thi'eefold form of pride, sloth, and falsehood.
With regard to the relation between theological and secular discomse, it is 
worth noting at the outset that Barth’s account of sin in its threefold form is through- 
and-thi'ough a theological account without so much as a passing reference to secular 
discomse (not even a footnote!). To a large extent this is to be expected. Whereas 
many forms of seculai* discomse offer accounts of evil, sin has generally remained a
Bartli goes on to describe the ontic reality of das Nichtige in some lengtli (pp349-368), and altliough 
important, would only lead away from our primary concerns. Again I refer readers to Wolterstorff s 
article ‘Barth on Evil’ for evaluation o f this aspect of Barth’s discussion, and again I note that 
Moltmann shares many of die same problems as Barth here. Moltmann also highlights the ambiguity 
inherent within ‘nothingness’ (Moltmann, God in Creation, pp72-86). ‘Nothingness’ is also considered 
wifb wider reference well beyond Bartli in George S. Hendry, ‘Notiiing’, in Theology Today, 39, 1982- 
3, pp274-289.
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theological category and so has not been addressed by seculai' discourse/^ This does 
not mean, however, that Barth’s account ceases to be informative for the relation 
between theological and secular discomse. Wliat it does mean is that it is not 
necessary to enter into the detail of Barth’s hamartiology in the way in which this was 
necessary in his anthropology and, to a lesser extent, his discussion of das Nichtige. 
The heart of his method will become clear by focusmg on relevant aspects of his 
doctrine of sin. We begin by highlighting the doctiine’s systematic location.
3.1 Sin In Volume IV
Two main factors helps us to locate Barth’s doctiine of sin in the wider 
context of Volume IV, both of which have methodological significance: Barth’s 
location of the doctrine of sin within the doctrine of reconciliation, and the 
architectonic of Volume IV. These will be taken in their respective order.
1. hi contrast to many theological approaches to the doctrine of sin Barth 
states that, “there can be no place in dogmatics for an autonomous section De 
peccator consti*ucted in a vacuum between the doctrine of creation and that of 
reconciliation”.^ '* Instead, Barth locates the core of his doctrine of sin within the 
doctrine of reconciliation.^^ Geoffrey Bromiley lists three reasons for this:
(1) Theology deals primarily with God and obviously one camiot describe tlie fall as 
God’s work. (2) He has laid tlie groundwork for the fall in II/2 on election, [and] particularly 
ill the section on nothingness in IH/3 [as we have already seen]. (3) He believes that the fall
In this regard Alistan McFadyen has rightly argued that even though sin language may appear to be 
theological, it is in fact ‘pragmatically atheism’ for many contemporary theologians. Additionally, use 
of the word ‘sin’ is especially popular with tlie press at the moment, but in this case it is neither used as 
a theological category, nor has it received the explanations which are attributed to ‘evil’. ‘Sin’, in tlie 
popular imagmation, usually refers to ‘something a bit naughty’, like eating the extra slice of chocolate 
cake. Rarely does it carry with it the condemnation that it does (should?) in Cliristian usage, nor that 
which evil carries in both Christian and secular use.
CD IV/1, pl41.
It is worth noting that the German Versohnung, translates both as ‘reconciliation’ and ‘atonement’.
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can be properly understood and presented only in the light of the divine work of 
reconciliation/"^
The most significant of Bromiley’s reasons is the third. In anticipation of later 
discussion, for Barth knowledge of sin is derived from that which it opposes in Jesus 
Christ: sin as pride is in opposition to the humiliation of God in Jesus Chiist (Very 
God); sin as sloth is in opposition to the exaltation of humanity in Jesus Christ (Very 
Man); and sin as falsehood is in opposition to the true witness in Jesus Chiist (God- 
Man). A similar methodology that was operative in his anthiopology is evident here. 
Put negatively,
sin cannot be recognised and understood and defined and judged as sin in accordance 
with any general idea of man, or any law which is different from the grace of God and its 
commandment, tire law of the covenant.^^
In Other words, sin is not to be defined from pre-theological reflection on 
human nature and history, rather it is to be defined exclusively out of the event of its 
overcoming in and through God’s act in Jesus Christ. Put positively:
It is in the knowledge of Jesus Chiist as the revelation o f the grace of God that we 
shall necessarily perceive step by step both the fact that man is a transgressor, and tire nature 
of tire transgression hr which he contradicts the grace of God and for the sake of which he is 
decisively contradicted by that grace.^ ®
The two crucial points here are 1) knowledge of sin cannot be derived from 
any source other than its overcoming in the grace of God (which includes secular 
discourse), and 2) Christology is again to be the starting point. Both these points will 
become more evident in an overview of Volume IV as seen from the architectonic to 
which we now turn.
2. The tight structure of Volume IV helps place Baith’s doctiine of sin into its 
wider context of the doctrine of reconciliation and consequently is infomiative for the
Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Inti'oduction to the Theology o f Karl Barth, Edhrbrugh: T&T Clark, 1996, 
pl75.
”  CD IV/1, pl40.
CD IV/1, pl42.
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content of the doctrine of sin. The section headings of the relevant three pai*t volumes 
can be foimulated in a table as follows:
KARL BARTH’S CHURCH DOGMATICS VOLUME IV
IV/1
Very-God/ Divinity o f Christ/ 
Priesthood
Jesus Christ. The Lord as Servant
59. The Obedience of the Son of 
God
60. The Pride and Fail of Man
61. The Justification of Man
62. The Holy Spirit and the 
Gathering of the Christian 
Community
63. The Holy Spirit and the 
Christian Faith
IV/2
Very-M an/ Humanity o f Christ/ 
Kingship
Jesus Christ. The Servant as Lord
64. The Exaltation of the Son of 
Man
65. The Sloth and the Misery of 
Man
66. The Sanctification of Man
67. The Holy Spirit and the 
Upbuilding of the Christian 
Community68. The Holy Spirit and Christian 
Love
IV/3
God-M an/M ediator (God~man)/ 
Prophet
Jesus Christ. The True Witness
69. The Glory of the Mediator
70. The Falsehood and 
Condemnation of Man
71. The Vocation of Man
72. The Holy Spirit and the 
Sending of the Christian 
Community
73. The Holy Spirit and Christian 
Hope___________________________
From this table it can be seen that Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation can be 
approached either vertically or horizontally. In reading the respective volumes cover 
to cover, the vertical approach would be adopted. In this case it is evident from the 
outset that Barth’s discussion of sin (sections 60, 65, and 70) is rooted in a 
Chiistological account which is expounded at length in the preceding section. 
Similarly, the subsequent section corresponds to the resulting form of salvation, hi 
other words, moving in the vertical direction takes the following shape:
1. The work of Jesus Christ
2. The foim of sin
3. The form of salvation
4. The Holy Spirit and the Christian community
5. Three modes of hope
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However, if read in the horizontal direction it is evident that Barth makes use 
of the traditional ‘offices’ of Christ (albeit in a different order^^) as Priest, King, and 
Prophet, the tiaditional ‘states’ of Christ (humiliation, exaltation, and manifestation), 
as well as the Chalcedonian formulation of the God-human unity.^® In each case 
Barth’s reworking of the offices and states of Christ, and the Chalcedonian formula, 
form the starting point for each successive section which are explicitly developed in 
the light of the respective Christological orientation. Consequently, in considering 
Bai'th’s doctrine of sin, we will move horizontally so that the focus can be specific, 
but at the same time we will bear in mind the broader picture witliin which Barth’s 
doctrine is situated. Of particular note is the Chiistological orientation with which 
each section of the part volumes opens.
The section headings for Baith’s doctrine of sin are also informative for 
method, and can be fonnulated in a table thus:
THE DOCTRINE OF SIN IN CHURCH DOGMAT/CS VOLUME IV
IV/1 IV/2 IV/3
The Pride and Fall of Man The Sloth and MIserv of Man The Falsehood and Condemnation of Man
1. The Man of Sin In the Light of 1. The Man of Sin in the Light of 1. The True Witnessthe Obedience of the Son the Lordship of the Son
2. The Pride of Man 2. The Sloth of Man 2. The Falsehood of Man
3. The Fall of Man 3. The Misery of Man 3. The Condemnation of Man
Barüi explains this as follows: “For me the priestly and kingly offices in the narrower sense are the 
doings of Christ, The humiliation of God in becoming man and the exaltation of man up to God are 
respectively Christ’s priestly and Christ’s kingly work. Christ the prophet is Christ revealing Himself 
as King and Priest. To make clear what happens when He reveals Himself, I  have to know what He is 
and does... Christ’s priestly and kingly offices are the subject-matter, die content of His prophetic 
office, because He reveals Himself.” (John D. Godsey, Karl Barth's Table Talk, London & Edinburgh: 
Oliver and Boyd, 1962, p l7, cited in Rodin, Evil and Theodicy, pp207-208).
See Colin E, Gunton, ‘Salvation’, in John Webster (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, ppl46ff.
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Analogous to the previous table, Barth’s doctrine of sin can be read vertically 
and horizontally. If read vertically, as we shall, the following foimulation occurs:
1. Jesus Christ in his respective office and state
2. The antithesis in sin in its threefold foim
3. Three conesponding states
hi other words, even within the doctrine of sin itself, Barth’s Chiistological 
orientation determines his understanding of sin. This will be unpacked at length 
below. We now turn to Barth’s doctrine of sin in its tlueefbld form of pride, sloth, 
and falsehood again focusing particularly on his method.
3.Ü Pride
Barth begins his section on pride by noting that his thinking up to this point 
has assumed the disraption of sin: the previous section in IV/1 dealt with ‘the way of 
the Son of God into the far coimtry’, ni/3 contained an extensive discussion of das 
Nichtige as we have seen, and the dismptive effects of sin were evident in the doctrine 
of revelation as far back as I/l . In other words, Barth is aware of the presence, natui e, 
and significance of sin fiom the outset, but only attempts to clarify the doctrine now. 
Additionally, most of the Christian tradition including the Refoimers tended to 
explicate sin after the doctrine of creation and before the doctiine of atonement/ 
reconciliation.^^ Implicit in this approach is the view that knowledge of sin is 
necessary in order to know what salvation redeems. The key here is that knowledge 
of sin is a prior condition of salvation. Knowledge of sin precedes that of Jesus
Again see Jorgenson, ‘Karl Barth’s Christological Treatment of Sin’.
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Chiist.^^ So why does Bai*th go against the tradition to which he is so indebted? 
Because,
in the knowledge of sin we have to do... with a specific variation o f the knowledge 
of God, of God as He has mediated Himself to man, and tlierefore of the knowledge of 
revelation and faitli. ... That man is evil, that he is at odds with God and his neighbour, and 
therefore with himself, is something which he camiot know of himself, by communing with 
himself, or by conversation with his fellow-men, any more that he can know in this way that 
he is justified and comforted by God.®^
Barth is rigorously applying the same approach that we have already seen in 
his anthropology. In relation to his anthropology John Webster poses the two 
alternatives for Barth:
is Cluistian theology to begin its definition of the limnan agent fiom pre-theological 
reflection on human nature and history, subsequently applying or correlating (perhaps 
critically) the fruit of such reflections witli Christian antlnopological and ethical symbols? Or 
is it to define the human agent exclusively out of the event in which God commands and 
humanity is called to obedient action?^ '^
The issue is one of the relation between the general and the par ticular. Should 
we start with a general notion of humanity about which we theologise, or should we 
derive our' understanding of humanity from the Word of God? hr relation to sin, 
should we start by considering a general notion of evil in the world, or is sin an 
explicitly theological concept that cannot be known from a general idea of humanity? 
For Barth, the issue is a simple ‘either/or’, and in both cases he takes the latter 
option.Knowledge of self cannot lead to knowledge of sin unless instructed by the 
Word of God. Barth writes: “Access to the knowledge that he [humanity] is a sinner 
is lacking in man because he is a sinner”.^ ® Or again: “Crooked even in the
In practical terms, i.e., preaching, the matter may not be quite as clear cut as this would suggest. See 
Donald G. Bloesch, Jesiis is Victor! Karl Barth’s Doctiine o f Salvation, Nashville: Abingdon, 1976, 
ppl28f„
CD IV/1, pp359-360.
Jolin Webster, Barth’s Ethics o f  Reconciliation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p69.
Barth’s method, antliropology, and doctrine of sin can, on occasions, be seen to intersect. For 
example: “The term ‘mankind’ is one which we have to call a Christian term because it is only in the 
light of the Gospel that we can make serious use of it -  to describe the sum of all men to whom the 
mercy of God is shown because tliey are all sinfiil and guilty before Him” (CD IV/1, pp504-505).
^  CD IV/1, pp360-361.
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knowledge of liis crookedness, he can only oppose the Word of God which enlightens 
and instructs him concerning his crookedness”.^ ^
Barth spends some time considering whether or not it is possible for there to 
be an autonomous knowledge of sin apart from and preceding the knowledge of Jesus 
Christ, and although he concludes that some knowledge is possible (as in Calvin and 
Luther’s use of the Law), it is ultimately insufficient.^^ The danger of deriving 
loiowledge of sin apaii fr om Jesus Christ, and this would be true for secular accounts 
as well as theological accounts, Bar th suggests, “[is] that the knowledge of human sin 
against the background of this arbitrary construction will finally prove to be only a 
dramatised form of the self-knowledge of man left to himself, and that in this 
confrontation there can be no knowledge of the real sin by which man is accused by 
God and of which he is guilty before Him”.^  ^ hr contrast to most of the Christian 
tradition, Barfh maintains this ‘simple thesis’ which falls at the very heart of Barfii’s 
methodology: “only when we Imow Jesus Christ do we really know that man is the 
man o f sin, and what sin is, and what it means for man^\^^
This loiowledge is a matter of the divine loiowledge of revelation and faith. 
Knowledge of human sin is enclosed in this knowledge and is acquired through this 
knowledge. There is no other starting point for knowledge of sin and to seek to do so, 
even in the form of a normative concept by which to measure sin, is itself a form of 
sin!^  ^ To try to measure sm or develop a doctrine of sin from the basis of our own 
resom ces apart from the grace of God is itself to sin.^  ^ Why is this?
®’ CDIV/l,p361.
According to Barth, both Calvin and Luther have shown that some knowledge is possible from the 
law apart from Jesus Christ, however, he identifies six main drawbacks in this position (CD IV/1, 
pp362-387).
® CD IV/1, p387. There are obviously strong links here to Barth’s discussion o f das Nichtige.
™ CD IV/1, p389 (my italics).
^ 'C D IV /l,ppl41,389.
“And is not this necessarily to sin again -  theologically!”. (CD IV/1, pl41).
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Not because we can find and produce another and better method, the Christological, 
but because Jesus Clirist Himself is present, living and speaking and attesting and convincing;
... because the man of sin and his existence and nature, his why and whence and whither, are 
all set before us in Jesus Clnist, are all spoken to us directly and clearly and incontrovertibly/^
Knowledge of sin takes place in the knowledge of Jesus Christ. With regard 
to sin as pride, the obedience of the Son of God functions as a mirror in which we can 
see the ‘man of sin’ because in Jesus Christ “we have to do with human sin in its 
absolutely pure and developed and unequivocal form”.^ "^ Jesus Christ reveals the 
reality of human sin in his suffering whilst at the same time being the judge who 
discloses its sinfulness, hr disclosing the sinfulness of sin in its actuality, it is 
revealed as the truth of all human being and activity. Therefore: “The knowledge of 
Jesus Christ is finally the knowledge of the significance and extent of sin”.^ ^
hr the light of Jesus Christ, Barth ai'gues, it is clear that there is no human 
capacity or possibility for overcoming sin, nor the freedom to change from the old to 
the new. Redemption can only come by the grace of God.
The form of sin that is specifically brought to light by the obedient 
condescension of the Son is pride. Sin as pride holds something of an overarching 
character in Barth:
Sin in its unity and totality is always pride. ,.. Why pride? [Because] [t]lie pride of 
man is a concrete form of what a more general definition rightly calls the disobedience of man 
and Christianity rightly and more precisely calls the unbelief o f man.’®
hr accordance with the tradition Barth sees pride as the prior of the three forms 
of sin, however, he breaks from the tradition insofar as he understands pride as a 
‘concrete form’ of the disobedience and unbelief of h u m a n i ty . I t  is crucial to note 
that sin in its threefold form of pride, sloth, and falsehood is first an act of
CD IV/1, pp389-390.
’'^CDIV/l,p397.
CD IV/1, p407.
CD IV/1, pp413-414.
”  In this respect, Bartli avoids the full impact of tlie feminist critique of tlie tradition’s insistence on 
pride as the root of all sin which was explored in Chapter 3 below.
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disobedience,^^ which is ultimately rooted in unbelief/^ It is unbelief, therefore, and 
not pride which is the original foim and source of all sins. Unbelief, not pride, is the 
sin which produces and embraces all other sins.
Pride corr esponds to and contradicts the divine action in Jesus Christ in which 
God in his love and freedom becomes a serwant. Put differently, pride is the antithesis 
of its positive counterpart -  justification through God’s self-humiliation. Barth 
considers four different standpoints of the human disorder which is the antithesis of 
the divine order of gr ace. Before identifying these standpoints, it is important to note 
that in each case the sin or ‘absurd act’ which we commit is inexplicable. Sin can and 
is to be described. It cannot, however, be explained -  it is absurd and irrational. This 
important point will be seen to recur throughout all of Barth’s discussion of sin, and 
as we shall see below, has significant implications for engaging with secular 
discomse.
1. “The Word became flesh... [but] we want to be as God is, we want to be 
God”.^  ^ As God humbles himself, humanity in sin wants to exalt itself.
2. hr Jesus Christ “the Lord became a servant... [b]ut the man for whom God 
is God in this way... is the very opposite -  the serwant who wants to be lord”.^  ^ As 
God the Lord becomes servant, humanity in sin wants to become lord.
3. hr Jesus Christ God becanre “the divine Judge and fulfilled the divine 
judgement... [b]ut the man whom God meets in this way in Jesus Clnist... is the very 
opposite of all this... wanting to be his own judge instead of allowing that God is in
“In sin, man does that which God does not will, wliicli, seeing Üiat God is over him and he is the 
creature and covenant-partner of God, he ought not to do. Sin is the act o f man in which he ignores and 
offends die divine majesty. Sin is, therefore, disobedience.” {CD IV/1, p414).
“Disobedience springs up necessarily and irresistibly from the bitter root of unbelief. It is true 
enough that unbelief is the sin, the original form and sour ce of all sins, and in tire last analysis die only 
sin, because it is the sin which produces and embraces all other sins.” (CD IV/1, p414).
CD IV/1, p418.
Barth’s description here goes far beyond what I have described, focusing in each case on how sin in 
its form as pride is empty and futile, but is also powerful, dangerous, and concealed.
“ CD IV/1, p432.
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the right against him”.^  ^ As God the divine judge fulfils the divine judgement, 
humanity in sin wants to play the judge.
4. Jesus Chiist “gave Himself to the depth of the most utter helplessness... 
[b]ut tlie man whose place and kind God made His own in Jesus Clirist is... the man 
who has always thought and still thinks that he can help himself and that in this self- 
help he has a claim to the help of God”.^ "^  As God became helpless for our sake, 
helpless humanity in sin believes that he/she can help him/lierself and in doing so can 
claim God’s help.
Now that Barth has considered the antithesis to the humiliation of the Son in 
the form of sin as pride, Barth examines the fall that results from human pride. In 
other words, his attention shifts from what the sin of human being is to who and what 
the human being is who commits this sin.
Barth emphasises that here too, theological enquiry begins with Christology 
which is nonnative for all aspects of the doctrine of sin. In the light of Jesus Christ, it 
can be seen that the man of sin is fallen man. The fall of man comes with the pride of 
man.^  ^ Where the Son of God came down and was raised up, the man of sin tiied to 
exalt him/herself and fell down. Baith makes two prehmmaiy points. First,
we cannot and must not deviate at any cost from the revelation of the Word of God. 
Just as we cannot see and understand and recognise and confess for ourselves that we have 
sinned and continue to sin in pride, so we cannot see and understand for ourselves that in so 
doing we have fallen and that we have to exist incontrovertibly and krevocably in the deptiis 
as servants and slaves and captives.®®
And second,
however we may describe tire fallen being of man, we cannot say tliat man is fallen 
completely away from God, in the sense that he is lost to Him or that he has perished.®’
CD IV/1, p445.
CD IV/1, p458.
And so the well known proverb ‘pride goes before a fall’, Bartli argues, is true.
®® CD IV/1, pp478-479.
®’ CD IV/1, p480.
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In other words, Barth is affirming first the priority of God in theological 
method, at this point with respect to the doctiine of sin, and second that however great 
the abyss which separates God and humanity, humanity is still in the sphere of God’s 
action. Barth has already argued that sin can only be described and not explained. In 
accordance with this principle, he stresses that in speaking of the doctrine of sin we 
must be careful not to say too little, that is, abandoning the Christological referent 
from which all theology derives, nor say too much, in which case we would be 
trespassing in the domain of explanation.^^
hi considering the appearance of humanity which is revealed by the miiTor of 
the obedient humiliation of the Son of God, it is clear first that “only the divine 
forgiveness is an adequate payment and restitution of the debt of man”,®^ and second, 
“The fact that Jesus Christ died totally... means decisively that this corruption [of 
humanity] is both radical and total”.^ ° Even though this corruption is total, this does 
not mean the loss of humanity, nor the loss of the ‘good nature’, the divine likeness, 
nor does it memi that ‘any relic or core of goodness’ remains.^^ What it does mean is 
that humanity is “corrupt and guilty, [and] the enemy of God”.^  ^ Consequently: “The 
only relic that we can speak of is that of God’s good and gracious will operative to 
man and over him -  the being of man before God, as the object of His grace even in 
the form of judgement”.^ ^
®® There is some question about wheûier or not Baiûi does trespass into the domain o f explanation as 
Wolterstorff points out in relation to das Nichtige (‘Barth on EviT, p598).
CD IV/1, p484. “To sin is to do tliat which only God can put right, only God as He acts and reveals 
Himself as the gr acious God (CD IV/1, p491)”.
CD IV/1, p492. Baifh continues: “That is to say, it means that the sinful reversal takes place at tlie 
basis and centre o f the being of man, in Iris heart; and tliat the consequent sinful perversion tlien 
extends to the whole of his being without exception” (CD IV/1, p492).
See ft. 57 in chapter 4 below.
“  CD IV/1, p494.
CD IV/1, p494.
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In summary, Barth began by explicating the manner in which we become 
aware of sin through Jesus Chiist who judges all human sinfulness as the tiuth of all 
human being and activity, and then moved on to consider what sin is as seen from this 
place in its form as pride. Finally Barth considered the fall that results from human 
pride, that is, who and what the human being is who commits this sin. In terms of 
method, in each case Barth’s starting point was Christology and each aspect of sin 
was deteimined in its antithesis in God’s redemptive action in Jesus Christ, In direct 
contrast to McFadyen, it is notable that Barth has not even made a passing reference 
to secular discourse at this point. His doctrine of sin is explicitly theological without 
direct reference to pre- or extra-theological discourse. As Barth’s method is now 
clear in his doctrine of sin and it remains consistent for the next two foims of sin, 
these can be dealt with more briefly. We continue with the second fonn of sin.
3.m Sloth
Barth opens the section on sin in its form as sloth by summaiising two key 
methodological considerations that were laid out in IV/1 : that the light fr om which sin 
is to be seen is that of its overcoming in Jesus Christ; and that humanity is corrupt 
even in its self-understanding and in the knowledge of this comiption. Consequently, 
fr om the outset Bai*th remains faithful to his view that genuine knowledge of sin is an 
element of the knowledge of God, revelation, and faith and proceeds accordingly. 
That is, Barth consistently maintains yet again the priority of God in theological 
method.
Barth places the human predicament in contrast with the exaltation of the Son 
of Man and finds that the human situation is one of immobility and inertia. As a
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background to the explication of sin as sloth, Bai'th finds that in the light of the 
existence of the man Jesus and the direction of the Holy Spirit, the shaming of all 
humanity occurs. Shame functions as a criterion of our knowledge of Jesus. Jesus is 
the one who shames us, and we are those who aie shamed by Jesus. Shame arises 
from compaiing ourselves with God. In relation to Jesus in whom we aie confronted 
by a man like ourselves, we are compared to the Holy God against whom our failure 
is exposed. This is oui' actual shaming whether or not we see it. If we are ashamed of 
oui'selves, this means that we are aware of the way in which we are shamed by the 
man Jesus and are forced to see and know ourselves in our loathsomeness.
Sin as seen fr om the standpoint of the new man in Jesus Christ is sloth. Sloth 
means for Barth “sluggishness, indolence, slowness, or inertia”.^ "^  Sloth is the ‘evil 
inaction’ which is the antithesis to both the upward movement of the Son of Man, and 
the foim of evil action in pride. There is therefore a contiast between the heroic, 
Promethean form of sin -  pride -  and its antithesis in the “quite unheroic and trivial 
form of sloth”. B a r t h  continues:
The sin of man is not merely desperate but also despairing. It is also... ordinaiy, 
mediocre and trivial. The sinner is not merely Prometheus of Lucifer. He is also... a lazy­
bones, a sluggard, a good-for-notliing, a slow coach and a loafer. He does not exist only in an 
exalted world o f evil; he also exists in a very mean and petty world of evil (and there is a 
remarkable unity and reciprocity between the two in spite o f their apparent antithesis).^®
Sloth, like pride, is a foim of general disobedience, unbelief, and ingratitude. 
Even in its foim as inaction, the idler or loafer does something. That is, the loafer 
does not do that which God wills and consequently does that which God does not will.
CD IV/2, p403.
CD IV/2, p403.
CD IV/2, p404n.
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As such, sloth is plainly disobedience and a fonn of u n b e l ie f .S in  in the fonn of 
sloth crystallises in the rejection of the man Jesus, and in resisting God, the slothful 
man is “turned in upon himself’ and finds “his satisfaction and comfort in his own 
ego”.^  ^ The paradox of sin m this form is that in refusing Jesus, the man of sloth not 
only refuses this man, but also refuses to be himself (“and thus becoming his own 
pitiful shadow”^^ ). Sloth is sin because it is primaiily a refusal of God’s grace. 
MiiToring his stinctuie for his anthropology (CD in/2) and the doctrine of the 
command of God the Creator (CD 111/4), sin in the form of sloth represents 
humanity’s refusal 1) in its relationship with God, 2) with others, 3) in relation to self, 
and 4) with time. Each section begins with a brief compaiison to the man Jesus, but 
om* main concern at this point is with the human side.^ ®®
1. In relation to God, sin as sloth involves a refusal of God’s gift in our folly 
and stupidity. For Barth, stupidity refers to “that which the Bible describes and 
condenms as human folly”. Therefore, Barth finds that sin in its fonn as sloth is an 
evil (in)act(ion) of the whole person, and consequently, the slothful person is 
responsible and culpable for the refusal to act.
2. In relation to others, sin as sloth involves an inactivity and inhumanity. 
Recalling from Barth’s anthropology that inhumanity means to be without one’s 
fellows, this again can be understood as a denial of God.
“He [Üie idler or loafer] turns liis back on God, rolling himself into a ball like a hedgehog with 
prickly spikes. At every point, as we shall see, tins is the strange inactive action o f the slothful man.” 
{CD IV/2, p405). See also CD IV/2, p412.
CD IV/2, p407. See ft. 49 in Chapter 4 below.
CD IV/2, p408. There is a strong point of connection with Barth’s anthropology.
In each case Bartli shows how each form o f sloth that is explored here applies to all four of the
relations -  God, otliers, self, and time -  and highlights how its is both dangerous and powerful as well
as how sloth in these forms is concealed.
CD IV/2, p411.
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3. hi relation to self, sin as sloth involves a life of dissipation}^^ In its 
inactivity, the slothful person is active in willing the disorder, discord, and 
degeneration of his/her natuie.
4. In relation to time, sin as sloth means futile but factual care or anxiety: 
“man is always one who is anxious in some way”.^ ^^  This is rooted the insecurity 
which derives from being a practical atheist, inhuman, and a vagabond, and occupies 
both active (fr antic activity) and passive (contemplative passivity) forms.
Now that Bai'th has considered the antithesis of the exaltation of the Son in the 
form of sin as sloth, Barth examines the misery that results fr om sloth.
In the light of Jesus it is clear, Barth suggests, that humanity’s inauthentic 
existence as those who are ‘stupid, inhuman, dissipated, and discontented’, is the 
“misery of man in the sense of his exile as the sum of human woe”.^ ^^  The human 
situation is revealed in the light of Jesus to be one of human misery which is “the evil 
fruit of the evil sloth of man”.^ ^^  However, humanity in its slothful action and misery 
remains the covenant-pai'tner of God and consequently remains within the sphere of 
God’s action in divine grace. Barth makes three points about the miseiy which is the 
consequence of sloth.
1. Since sin as sloth can only be cured by Christ’s death, it is itself incurable. 
Therefore: “Our first proposition is... [that sin as sloth] is a mortal sickness, i.e., that 
if we ourselves had to bear it... it could end only with our death and destruction.”^
“Dissipation involves waste or neglect, and a resultant disorder, discord and degeneration (CD IV/2, 
p453)”.
CD IV/2, p470.
104 ig the dissatisfied man who necessarily becomes his own slave, and lives in tlie bondage of his 
need of security(CD IV/2, pp470-471)”.
CD IV/2, p483.
CD IV/2, p483.
CD IV/2, p486.
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Humanity’s misery is a radical perversion, and although not yet death, is plunging to 
death.
2. Since Jesus, a new man, has taken our place, the misery of humanity 
belongs to the old humanity. Therefore: “We are freed from our miseiy to the extent 
that in Him [Jesus the new man] we too are new men and therefore the subjects of 
new acts.” °^^  The misery of man as seen in the light of his liberation is a history in 
the sense that it has a life of its own in which it continually confirms and renews itself 
in an endless circle. That is, Barth affirms both that what man does he is, and what he 
is he does.
3. Since Jesus in royal freedom has set us free from misery, and this is the 
third proposition: “Our misery... is the determination of our will as servum 
a r b i t r i u n C The human will is in bondage. The bondage of the will describes the 
perversion of the human situation which results fr om the sloth of humanity in his/her 
relationship with God, and significantly, can only be established Christologically and 
not on the basis of any a priori reflections or empirical findings. Freedom of the will 
is not an empty or formal concept, and so picking up some of McFadyen’s 
terminology, it is not a neutral or abstract decision that is to be made between good 
and evil. Rather the free man is the man who can be genuinely man in fellowship 
with God.^ ^® That is, freedom to sin is not freedom, rather the only true freedom is in 
not being able to sin {non potestpeccare). Or again: “Non potest non peccare is what 
we have to say of the sinful, slothful man. His sin excludes his fr eedom, just as his
CD IV/2, p490.
CD IV/2, pp493-494.
See Colin E. Gunton, ‘The Triune God and the Freedom of the Creature’, in Stephen W. Sykes, Karl 
Barth: Centenaiy Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; and Webster, Barth's Moral 
Theology, Chapter 6.
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freedom excludes his sin. There is no middle position.”^ F r e e d o m  can only be 
found in the new man in Christ. Insofar as the old and the new are present:
Freedom and bondage clash in one and the same man: his freedom as a new man in 
Jesus Clirist and in tlie Holy Spirit; and his bondage as an old man, outside Jesus... ; and both 
of them total; no tertium, no bridge, no mediation or synthesis between them, but only the 
antithesis of that conflict, life in sanctification, the militia Christif^
In sum, Barth began by placing the human situation in contrast with the 
exaltation of the Son of Man and found that the human situation to be one of 
immobility and inertia. The universality of this form of sin was revealed through 
shame which forms the background for sin as sloth. Then Barth considered 
specifically sin in its form as sloth as evil inaction and found that it distorts 
humanity’s relation with God, others, self, and time. In each case sloth was 
manifested as stupidity, inhumanity, dissipation, and discontent. Finally, Barth 
considered the miseiy of human being that is the consequence of sloth.
In terms of method, in each case Barth’s starting point remains consistently 
Christological as each form of sin was determined by its antithesis in God’s 
redemptive action in Jesus Christ. As the Son of Man was exalted, so the man of sin 
is understood in terms of sloth. Again in direct contiast to McFadyen, Barth has not 
explicitly referred to secular discourse, and indeed, insofar as he considers theological 
method here, states that knowledge of sin cannot be derived fr om empirical findings 
or a priori reflections. As was particularly clear in the brief section on the bondage of 
the will, this knowledge can only be established Christologically. We turn now more 
briefly to the third and final foim of sin,*^ ^
CD IV/2, p495.
CD IV/2, p497. Cf. Barth’s discussion of human being as simul totus iustus et totus peccator (CD 
IV/l, pp517; 596; 602) which is explored in Trevor A. Hart, Regarding Karl Barth: Towards a Reading 
o f His Theology, Downers Grove: IVP, 1999, Chapter 3, and also Chapter 7 below.
I treat this section more briefly not only because Barth’s metliod is already clear and so it would be 
of limited value to engage in a lengthy exposition here, but also because I echo Colin Gmiton’s 
sentiment that Volume IV/3 “cannot be said to add much to Barth’s understanding of salvation [or sin]” 
(Gunton, ‘ Salvation’, p 151 ).
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3.iv Falsehood
Barth reiterates again that knowledge of sin “derives subsequently and 
retrospectively from a knowledge of the existence and work of Jesus Christ as the 
Mediator of the covenant of gi'ace”.^ "^^  In being unreservedly faithful to his method, 
Barth finds the contrast to Christ as the tme witness in sin in its form as falsehood or 
untmth. Falsehood is the opposition of humanity’s own word to God’s Word and is 
thus an evasion and obstruction to the reality of God. Falsehood therefore adds a third 
dimension to sin in its forms of pride and sloth.
Although pride does hold an overarching character for Barth, a number of 
commentators have missed the significance of falsehood.Falsehood is something 
of a common denominator for pride and sloth because humanity stands in a false 
relation to the truth in pride and sloth. But falsehood is also distinct from the first two 
forms of sin in that pride and sloth can be understood as the works of sin, and 
falsehood as the word of sinful humanity. Even though the truth is revealed to 
humanity in Jesus Chiist, it is rejected and untruth is asserted against it. Man is 
therefore shown to be a liar.
What, then, is truth? Truth is not an idea, principle, system, or even correct 
doctr ine .Rather ,  “the truth of God is grounded in the fact that this is identical with 
the tme Witness Jesus Christ as the revelation of God’s will and work for man 
enacted in Him”.^ ^^  Barth outlines three ways in which Jesus is the tme witness.
CD IV/3.i, p369.
One example of this can be seen in an otherwise highly informative paper: Kathryn Greene- 
McCreight, ‘Gender, Sin and Grace: Feminist Theologies Meet Karl Barth’s Hamartiology’, SJT, 50/4, 
1997, pp415-432.
“Even at best, doctrine as the work of man is always a dubious and equivocal phenomenon (CD 
IV/3.i, p376)”.
CD IV/3.i, p377. It is worth noting that Barth emphasises both the historicity of Jesus and his 
empowerment by the Holy Spirit.
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First, Jesus exists in relationship to God in a unique way which distinguishes 
him from the rest of humanity, and yet stands on equal footing with humanity. 
Because of Jesus’ twofold deteimination -  the vertical and horizontal relations, true 
God and tme man -  Jesus is the one who is the tme witness. Second, Jesus is the tme 
witness as the suffering Jesus. The prophetic work of Jesus takes the form of passion. 
It is through the victoiy in his sufferings that Jesus pursues his prophetic task and 
witnesses to the tmth of God’s suffering with us in him. Third, as the tme witness, 
Jesus is a speaking person in whom the tmth is present and speaks by itself. He 
speaks from the place that God alone has the power to speak, and speaks of the 
reconciliation of the world to God effected in his death and passion.^
Barth turns from the tmth to which testimony is borne in Jesus Christ to its 
opposite in sin as falsehood in the man of sin. Falsehood, is primarily a spiritual (not 
moral) phenomenon and consists in a movement of evasion. Evasion refers to the 
attempt to find a place where tmth can no longer reach or affect humanity. One way 
in which this is done is in appaient espousal of the tmth, whereas in fact humanity 
espouses u n t m t h . I t  is clear therefore that differentiation is needed between tmth 
and untmth and, for Barth, Jesus Christ functions as the criterion for this 
differentiation. Barth identifies foui* main points where falsehood is revealed. First, 
the man of untmth avoids identifying Jesus Christ with the tmth. Second, the man of 
untmth further fails to recognise the tmth in the death and passion of Jesus Chiist.
Significantly, God’s Word is not dependent upon its being heard. There is no natural human 
capacity for tlie hearing of God’s Word (no ‘point of contact’), and so, if  it is heard it is on account of 
the agency of tlie Holy Spirit.
With characteristic wit, Barth offers a number of examples: “He sets up a tlieoretical and practical 
system of truth. He establishes fronts on behalf of truth. He founds schools and academies of truth. 
He celebrates days and even whole weeks of truth. He organises formal campaigns for truth. He is so 
active in the cause of trutli that when compared with him Jesus Clirist tlie true Witness seems to be only 
a waif and a bungler who must surely be glad that He has found a patron and advocate to support Him 
so skilfully and powerfully.” {CD IV/3 A, p436).
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Third, the man of untruth avoids God’s Word of grace and pardon which is spoken in 
the power of the Holy Spirit which demands obedience and gratitude. Fourth, the 
man of untruth avoids God’s free Word that endows him with the true fr eedom of a 
free cleaving to the free God.
Falsehood is not simply identical with the unti uth active in all forms of human 
unbelief, superstition and error. Although these phenomena are manifestations of the 
falsehood of the man of sin, this judgement is only possible in the light of the witness 
of Jesus Christ and therefore stand in his light.
Sin in its fonn as falsehood caiTies with it the threat of condemnation because 
of the threat of the sinner being nailed to his/her lie. Humanity refuses the Word of 
truth, tlie pardon that comes with it, and attempts to change the tmth into untmth. In 
treating the tmth as untmth, the man of sin stands under the threat and danger of being 
damned. The prospect of condenmation is his/her futuie, and although there is still 
time to repent, this does not mean that damnation will not happen.
In summary, Baifh’s discussion of sin in its form as falsehood, although only 
outlined briefly here, can be seen to echo closely the structure of sin in its previous 
two foims. That is, Bai'th began by focusing on Jesus the tme witness in the light of 
whom his antithesis -  the man of sin in its form as falsehood -  became clear. Again 
at every point, Jesus fimctions as the criterion for identifying, understanding, and 
describing sm (notably not explaining it). As in the previous thi'ee forms, sin in its 
fonn of falsehood can be seen to carry with it the thi'eat of condemnation.
With regal'd to oui' concern with the relation between theological and secular 
discourse, Barth’s hamartiology proper is conspicuously silent. He has not made use
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of secular discourse at any point of his discussion, even in his footnotes. However, 
we can discern Barth’s attitude towards secular discourse in relation to sin by 
extension from his method as we will see in the next section.
4. Secular Discourse in Barth's Doctrine of Sin
In this section I will review briefly Barth’s theological method as evident in 
both his understanding of das Nichtige and his doctrine of sin. Then I will consider 
more specifically the relation between theological and secular discourse in both of 
these main sections, and finally, evaluate Barth’s approach more critically.
4.Î Method in Barth's Hamartiology
hi the opening section of the previous chapter three methodological loci were 
identified as operative in the whole of Barth’s thought: theology as Nachdenken, a 
grounding in God as Trinity, and a starting point in Christology. All three of these 
loci were clearly evident in Barth’s anthropology. With regard to Barth’s 
hamartiology, the trinitarian grounding is not obvious (although it is implicit 
especially in relation to his Christology) and it is evident in Volumes IB and IV as a 
who l e . Ho we ve r ,  Barth’s hamartiology was clearly grounded in his Christology at 
every point. Analogous to his anthropology, Barih did not operate with a prior or 
general concept of evil from which an understanding of sin was derived, rather his 
doctrines of das Nichtige and sin were explicitly developed in the light of their being
This is clear from tiie account of Volume III offered in KaÜnyn Tanner, ‘Creation and Providence’, 
in Jolm Webster (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000; and Volume IV offered in Gunton, ‘Salvation’.
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overcome in Jesus Christ. And so, the stalling point for Baifh’s hamartiology as well 
as his anthropology is undoubtedly Christology.
Again in unison with his anthropology, Bai'th’s hamartiology takes the form of 
Nachdenken, It has been highlighted in both Barth’s anthropology and hamartiology 
that theological method can be simplified to an ‘either/or’. That is, theology proceeds 
either by operating with prior concepts of hmnanity and sin, or derives these doctrines 
from an understanding of who God is in Christ. The whole of Bai'th’s thought, 
including his anthropology and hamartiology, takes the latter option. Theology is an 
a posteriori activity. In relation to das Nichtige and sin, both can only be known in 
the light of their overcoming in Jesus Clirist and cannot be derived fr om any other 
source including secular discourse. The pressure of interpretation moves from 
loiowledge of Christ’s redemptive work to sin and emphatically not the reverse. 
Knowledge of sin is, in other words, a variation of knowledge of God.
4.U Secular Discourse In Barth’s  Hamartiology
In many ways Barth’s doctrines of das Nichtige and sin are not as informative 
for considering the relation between theological and secular' discourse as his 
anthropology was. However, this is not to say that there is nothing to be gained from 
it. Barth’s discussion of das Nichtige, in which he engages explicitly with secular 
discourse in a lengthy footnote, is highly informative. Consequently, we will begin 
by focusing on Barth’s interaction with secular discourse in this section, and then 
consider his lack of engagement with it in relation to his doctrine of sin. Although 
there is no explicit engagement with secular discourse in his doctrine of sin, his 
method is possibly at its most developed here and so is insti'uctive for theological
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method, and furthermore, offers a wealth of material for a theological concept of sin. 
In both cases the key question to be asked is the extent to which secular discoiu'se can 
describe ‘tme’ nothingness and sin, or whether they are only concerned with the 
phenomena.
1. Secular discourse in das Nichtige. Barth offers a theological account of 
das Nichtige which demonstrates a strong awareness of secular accounts of 
nothingness, but is not informed by them. In other words, Barth’s account is an 
explicitly theological account that derives from theological criteria and a theological 
method -  describing das Nichtige in the light of its overcoming in Jesus Chiist. To 
this extent, secular discourse does not adopt an informative role in Barth’s account. 
However, in a lengthy footnote Barth engages explicitly with secular accounts (by 
which I include Müller and Schleiermacher at this point) of evil, all of which adopt a 
starting point from a human or non-theological perspective. In each case Barth finds 
much that is to be praised as well as much that he criticises. In short, secular- 
discourse can describe the phenomena of nothingness but not tme nothingness.
Barth’s engagement with secular discourse does appear to be more than a 
passing interest and he does show considerable vigour in his reading of the particular 
figures. As a result, Barth certainly takes secular discourse seriously, arguably more 
so than McFadyen, but he does not enter into dialogue with it at this point (which 
McFadyen does). Barth’s theology neither informs secular discourse, nor is it 
infomied by secular discourse. The fact that Barth’s engagement with secular 
discourse occurs in a footnote shows both that he takes it seriously, and also that it is 
tangential to his overall argument. However, one is not left with the view that it is 
merely tangential, rather that if it warranted incorporating explicitly into his ar gument
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he would have done so. The key, for Barth, lies in giving theology ultimate 
methodological primacy and if need be allowing secular discourse operative primacy.
A strong case can be made for secular discourse not entering his argument 
proper because of his reluctance to enter too deeply into describing the phenomena of 
nothingness. In this regard Barth comments: “The pathology of the man of sin is not 
part of the true subject-matter of dogmatics”. There is no doubt in my mind that if 
Barth was concerned to describe the phenomena of das Nichtige, much like he 
described the phenomena of man in his anthropology, he would draw heavily from 
secular* discourse particularly Müller, Heidegger, and Sartr*e. However, the more 
interesting question to be asked at this point is about the potential of Barth’s 
discussion of das Nichtige for the relation between theology and secular discourse 
now.
Nicholas Wolterstorff s article on Barth and das Nichtige highlights two 
significant points for our* discussion. Wolterstorff, writing as a philosopher albeit a 
Christian one, uses Barth’s doctrine to challenge some contemporary philosophical 
approaches to evil, and at the same time identifies some problematic elements in 
Barth’s account of the ontic dimensions of das Nichtige. hr other words, we find in 
Wolterstorff an attempt to bring Barth’s discussion of das Nichtige into dialogue with 
secular thought in such a way that the dialogue is mutually illuminating for both 
partners. In particular, Wolterstorff finds a number of aspects of Barth’s account of 
das Nichtige parficularly fruitful for challenging contemporary philosophical 
approaches. These can be summarised thus: insisting that evil is a power, finding 
negative aspects in creation that are not evil, arguing that evil cannot be identified by 
reference to the negative aspects, and perhaps most importantly recognising that God
CD IV/3.Î, p469.
Wolterstoiff, ‘Barth on Evil’. McDowell’s article ‘Notliing will come of Nothing’ might also serve 
as an example of an approach which bridges the gap between theology and secular discourse.
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is wounded by much that transpires in creation. On the other hand, aspects of Barth’s 
argument, especially regarding the ontic dimension of das Nichtige, are shown to be 
problematic for the contemporary philosophical mind. This might suggest that had 
Barth engaged more explicitly with some philosophical approaches to theodicy, he 
might have revised some of the tensions in his account of the ontology of das 
Nichtige. This, however, is to enter into speculation.
2. Secular discourse in Barth’s doctrine o f sin. Barth did not attempt to 
engage explicitly with secular discomse at any point of his doctrine of sin. As first 
glance tliis does not bode well for our concerns. However, on a number of occasions 
Barth does state that sin cannot be recognised, understood, defined, and judged as sin 
in accordance with any general (or a priori) principle or notion of humanity apart 
from the grace of God. hi other words, there are no resources whether theological or 
secular that can identify sin as sin that are not derived explicitly from the Word of 
God. As we have aheady seen in Barth’s discussion of das Nichtige, he is not 
opposed to engaging with secular* discoiuse per se or even incoi*porating secular* 
discourse into his theological approach, rather, Barth believes that secular discourse 
cannot describe true sin because it attempts to view sin by excluding reference to 
God. This point is clear* in the Har*nack/ Barth correspondence of 1923 :
Harnack. Sin may be defined as a lack of respect and love.
Barth. Sin is rather more serious than mere lack of respect and love. In is enmity 
with God and estrangement from God. It is our being lost in an alienated and superficial 
likeness to God. It is a condition which can only end in our annihilation........
John Webster captures Barth’s position well when he writes: “Barth’s 
Christological determination of sin is not so much an attempt to dislocate
Point 12 of the Hamaclc/ Barth Correspondence: ‘On sin in relation to tlie from and content of 
preacliing’ cited in George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology o f Karl Barth, Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000, p329.
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‘theological’ from ‘empirical’ reality, as an argument bom of a sense that human 
persons are characteristically self-deceived”.W e b s t e r  has recognised that Barth’s 
concern is not to distinguish between theological and secular discourse, as all forms of 
human thinking and activity are inherently flawed (which for theology means that 
reflection must always be broken and can never be integrated into a complete system). 
Rather, Barth’s concern is with the extent to which all human thinking is conformed 
to the Word of God. It is for this reason that the distinction between theological and 
secular* discourse is not always appropriate for Bar*th. There is also reason to believe 
that although Bar*th does not discuss secular discourse in his doctrine of sin, he thinks 
that some knowledge is possible. In part this can be argued by comparison with his 
discussion of Heidegger and Sartre in his section on das Nichtige, but there is also 
evidence for this in his doctrine of sin.
Although this was not discussed at length, it was noted that Barth spends some 
time considering whether or not it is possible for there to be an autonomous 
knowledge of sin apart from and preceding the knowledge of Jesus Christ. In 
particular, Barth was concer*ned with Calvin and Luther’s use of the Law. He 
concluded that some knowledge is possible but that it is ultimately insufficient. By 
extension, it can be suggested that secular* discourse might offer some knowledge of 
sin, especially the phenomena of sin, but that this too is insufficient. Why is it 
insufficient? Because sin is an ineducibly theological concept and reality which is at 
root a form of disobedience and unbelief.
hr terms of method we again find that there are only two possible approaches 
to knowledge of sin. On the one hand, knowledge of sin can be derived from a 
general concept of humanity, evil, or even empirical method, on the other hand
Webster, Barth's Moral Theology, p69.
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loiowledge of sin can only be derived from the Word of God.^^  ^ The methodological 
choice is a simple ‘either/or’. Echoing his anthropology and his discussion of das 
Nichtige, Barth finds all theories to be ultimately deficient that aie not derived 
explicitly from the Word of God. Why? Because they aie only concerned with the 
phenomena of humanity or sin, not tine humanity or tine sin.
Another approach to the relation between theological and secular discourse in 
Barth’s doctiine of sin can be found in Barth’s insistence that sin can only be 
described and not explained. Even whilst bearing in mind Wolterstorff s comment 
that Bai'th does not maintain this distinction consistently, a case can be made that 
insofar as secular discourse addresses sin, it tends to try and explain sin (perhaps 
Norman Bates in Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho represents the case in point). This is 
especially clear in the social sciences where complex pathological histories are often 
seen to explain almost in a causal sense why a person commits a specific evil act.^^  ^
By way of contrast, for Barth, sin is an ‘absurd act’, the ‘impossible possibility’ which 
we cannot ultimately explain. Sin can only be described -  it is irrational.
Further ramifications of Barth’s hamartiology for the relation between 
theological and secular discoiuse will be discussed in the following chapter where 
Barth’s thought will be dr*awn into explicit dialogue with McFadyen’s. It will be 
argued that although Bardh’s basic theological method is corr ect with regard to sin, he
Wolfhart Pannenberg adopts the first approach and on this basis criticises Barth’s doctrine of sin. 
See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, (trans.) Matüiew J. O’Connell, 
Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1985, Chapter 3, and pp91-92 for his critique of Barth.
This can be seen time and time again in contemporary films, many of which tend to be about sin in 
one form or another. One recent example can be seen in tlie film From Hell which is about Jack the 
Ripper. Before seeing the frhn I was curious about how Hollywood would deal with the fact that these 
particularly gruesome and apparently random (and therefore inexplicable) murders were left unsolved 
(in ‘real life’). The answer is by constructing an ‘X-Files’ type plot which reaches to the highest levels 
of society. In other words. Jack tlie Ripper’s evil is, from within a certain framework, made to appear 
perfectly logical (cf. Seven). The message is clear. Evil is not so bad if  it is clearly explicable and has 
been rationalised. For fihn this means making us imcomfortable enough for us to sit up hi our seats, 
but not so uncomfortable tliat we cannot revel in tlie gore knowing tliat it will ultimately be resolved. I 
suggest tliat film hi tliis instance illustrates a popular approach to evil within secular discourse 
particularly in the social sciences. See also Reinhold Zwick, ‘The Problem of Evil in Contemporary 
Film’, in John R. May (ed.). New Image o f Religious Film, Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1997.
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applies it too rigidly with reference to secular discour se. In the meantime we consider 
some further ramifications of Bar th’s doctrine of sin.
4JÜ Further Consideration o f Barth’s  Doctrine o f Sin
In the previous chapter three possible weaknesses in Barth’s anthropology 
were considered which helped clarify his understanding of the relation between 
theological and secular discourse. However, a similar approach to Barth’s 
hamartiology would not be of gr eat benefit here, not because there are no weaknesses, 
but because Barth does not engage with secular* discourse in his hamartiology to the 
extent that he did in his anthropology. Therefore a different approach will be adopted.
Barth’s method in botli his doctrines of das Nichtige and sin are now clear*. It 
has been argued that Barth takes secular discourse more seriously than McFadyen but 
that he does not enter into dialogue with it. This was particularly clear in Bar*th’s 
discussion of das Nichtige. Barth’s doctr*ine of sin was less useful in large part 
because secular* discourse does not tend to address sin since ‘sin’ is a theological term 
with limited value for* secular* approaches. However, there are non-theological 
equivalents to sin which capture in essence what theologians call sin (Nietzsche, 
Marx, and Freud might serve as examples). Again it is not Barth’s concern to attempt 
this task either, but we might ask whether Barth’s thought can be brought into 
dialogue with such an approach and indeed this has been done in an aptly titled book. 
The Dialogue between Theology and Psychology. O n e  essay in particular is of 
relevance here which we will consider briefly.
Peter Homans (ed.), The Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology: Essays in Divinity, Volume 
III, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.
Fred Berthold Jr., ‘Theology and Self-Understanding: The Clnistian Model of Man as a Shuier’, in 
Homans, The Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology, Chapter 1, ppl 1-32.
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In his essay ‘Theology and Self-understanding: The Christian Model of Man 
as a Sinner’, Fred Berthold Jr. considers whether or not analysis of human experience 
yields theological insight, or whether theological insight yields an understanding of 
experience. To do this he adopts two models of human sin which he places into 
dialogue, the first being Barth’s doctrine of sin,^^  ^the second being a psychoanalytic 
approach to narcissism. Berthold’s aim is close to McFadyen’s: “to inquire whether 
the Christian theological model of ‘man as sinner’ is adequate to, or in conformity 
with, the facts of human experience”. In other words, Berthold attempts to see 
whether Baith’s account of sin holds ‘explanatory and descriptive power’ (McFadyen) 
for human experience. Because of the similaiities here with McFadyen’s 
(considerably better) approach to sin and the inadequacies of Berthold’s, the detail is 
not important. Rather Berthold represents the admirable aim of placing Barth’s 
thought into a situation of ‘testing’ whereby theology is brought into dialogue with 
secular discourse. In the light of this dialogue, Berthold suggests that “the data as 
imderstood psychoanalytically should lead us both to expand and to revise the 
theological model”. T h i s  is not surprising given Berthold’s ‘straw-man’ Barth, but 
he does alert us to a way in which theology can engage with secular discourse. For 
both Berthold and McFadyen, the dialogue between theology and secular discourse 
should be mutually illuminating, and both ultimately adopt the ‘priority of God in
Although Berthold’s essay is useful, his treatment of Barth’s doctrine of sin is grossly inadequate. 
As a result he comes to some false conclusions. Two examples will suffice. First, Berthold conceives 
of Barth’s doctrine o f sin solely in terms of pride at the expense of sloth, falsehood, disobedience, and 
evil. Second, even though Berthold does make passing reference to the link between pride and 
unbelief, he uses Barth as a representative of die western tradition in terms of pride being the root sin. 
Both of these factors mean that Berthold fails to recognise the depth and nuances in Barth’s doctrine of 
sin, and ultimately describes a ‘straw-man’ version of Barth, One false conclusion that Berthold is led 
to is that the psychoanalytic approach criticises the Protestant doctrine of sin along the same lines as 
the feminist critique that was highlighted in McFadyen’s work in Chapter 3 below. As we saw, this 
critique has a limited impact on Barth because he aheady offers an account that incorporates most of 
tlie criticisms -  sin as unbelief, disobedience, and sloth. I suspect that there may be similar problems in 
his account o f psychoanalysis but I am not in a position to liighlight them.
Berthold, ‘Theology and Self-Understanding’, pl5.
Berthold, ‘Theology and Self-Understanding’, p29.
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theological method’ which we have now seen extensively in Barth’s thought. 
Additionally, Berthold identifies an important way in which Barth’s account of sin 
can both inform and be informed by secular discourse even if seculai* approaches do 
not recognise this as sin.
Berthold also alerts us to a danger with entering theology into dialogue with 
secular discourse -  a danger which we have also seen in McFadyen albeit to a lesser 
extent. The danger lies in being unfair to either the theological side or the non- 
theological side. Berthold’s treatment of Barth’s (and Calvin’s and Luther’s) doctrine 
of sin was simply not fair to them. Whereas McFadyen’s account of seculai' 
discourse, less so in his later work, does not account sufficiently for the range of 
secular discourse, hi other words, there is a crucial lesson to be leai*ned here: i f  this 
kind o f dialogical approach to theology is to be attempted, it is important that secular 
discourse and theology should be taken seriously by attempting to understand the 
other's position on its own term, and treating the material fairly. Even though Barth 
is not concerned to enter into a dialogue with secular discoiuse, his theology is highly 
instructive at this point. Whether or not he agiees with a particular thinker, he always 
treats them seriously and fairly, as well as acknowledging explicitly the range of 
positions.
5. Conclusion
The central concern of this chapter was to identify the method operative in 
Karl Barth’s hamartiology as it appears in Church Dogmatics III/3 and IV/1-3 with a 
view to discovering how Barth understands the relationship between theological and 
secular discourse. As in the previous chapter, Barth’s understanding of the relation 
between theological and secular discourse only became clear by first identifying his
238
theological method. In this case, the analysis of Barth was perhaps less fruitful than 
his anthropology for shedding light on the relation between theological and secular 
discourse although it was by no means worthless.
The key, for Bai1h, is that knowledge of sin and evil is only possible in the 
light of the knowledge of the revelation of God and humanity in Jesus Christ. 
Possibly the greatest achievement of Barth’s hamartiology lies in his theological 
approach to knowledge of sin and evil in the light of its overcoming, hr this way 
Barth stands in contrast to much of the Western tradition including the Reformers 
who typically located the doctrine of sin between creation and redemption rather than 
within the doctrine of reconciliation. The consequence of Barth’s shift was that there 
is only a very limited possibility of knowledge of sin from a perspective other than its 
overcoming in Jesus Christ, Barth’s approach here fits well with his basic 
Christological orientation and approach to theology as Nachdenken.
In the light of Barth’s basic method, his rmderstanding of the relationship 
between theological and secular discourse also became clear. With regard to das 
Nichtige Barth engaged explicitly with secular discourse in such a way that he took it 
seriously, possible more so than McFadyen, but did not enter into a dialogue with it. 
As a result, Barth maintained the priority of God in theological method and engaged 
with secular discourse. Even though Barth did enter into dialogue with secular* 
discourse in his anthropology and did not here, it was suggested that he would have 
been prepared to give secular* discourse operative control had it be required by his 
theology. Furthermore, it was argued that the reason Barth did not need to dialogue 
with secular discourse here was that he was not concer*ned to describe the phenomena 
of sinful humanity in much depth.
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With regard to his doctrine of sin, Barth did not explicitly engage with secular 
discourse at all and so there was a more limited sense in which his doctrine of sin was 
informative. Again it is worth emphasising that a major reason for this is that ‘sin’ is 
not a secular term, and therefore we should expect limited engagement with it. 
However, it was argued that if Barth was concerned to describe the phenomena of sin 
he might well have entered into dialogue with secular discourse, and more 
importantly, that secular discourse could not accurately describe tr ue sin. The reason 
for this was twofold. First, secular discourse could not recognise sin as sin because 
reference to God was excluded. And second, because secular discourse was itself 
corrupted by sin it is trapped in its own circle.
The previous chapter concluded by identifying three main points from Barth’s 
engagement with secular discourse. First, theological anthropology consistently 
maintained the ultimate priority of God in theological method and does not begin with 
an a priori philosophy, cosmology, or speculative world-view. Second, theological 
anthropology respects the boimdaries between itself and secular discour se as a result 
of both the form and content being determined by the object. And finally, knowledge 
of ‘real man’ or ‘true hiunanity’ can only come from the Word of God. With regard 
to Barth’s hamartiology the first and third points are again confirmed, hr his limited 
engagement with secular discourse, theology consistently maintains ultimate priority. 
Similarly, knowledge of tnie sin and evil can only come from knowledge of the Word 
of God. The second point is not so much of an issue for Barth’s hamartiology, in part 
because the distinction between theology and secular discourse may not be the most 
appropriate one for Barth especially at this point -  an issue which will be explored 
further in the following chapter. A better one might be to distinguish between human 
thought that is determined by the Word of God and human thought that is not.
240
However, because there is sufficient overlap between the two, investigating Barth in 
light of the distinction between theology and secular discourse is still worthwhile and 
will be explored at greater length in the following chapter.
Having explored in some detail Barth’s understanding of the relation between 
theology and secular discourse in his anthropology and hamartiology, it now remains 
to bring Barth into explicit dialogue with McFadyen. This is the focus of the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 6 
Learning From McFadyen and Barth
1. Introduction
The central question lying at the heart of the thesis is ‘how ought theology to 
be done?’. In response it has been argued that theological enquiry (‘straight 
dogmatics’) has two mam aspects which are to be understood as pari of a single task. 
The first aspect is to reflect critically on the trinitarian self-revelation of God as 
testified to in the Christian scriptmes, doctrine, tradition and history. The second 
aspect is to engage critically with the social, cultural, and intellectual world in which 
we ar e living. From this understanding of theology it follows that it is crircial for 
theology to engage with secular discourse. The specific concern of the thesis has 
been to identify how theology should engage with secular discomse.
In Chapter 1 above. Types 3 and 4 of Hans Frei’s typology were set out as the 
polar positions of the thesis. Type 3 gives equal weight to Christian self-description 
and philosophical frameworks. It proceeds by way of a ‘correlation’ between the 
Christian faith and other disciplines with the aim of developing a ‘dialogue’. By way 
of contrast Type 4 gives priority to Christian self-description. The pressure of 
interpretation moves from theology to other disciplines. It recognises that other 
disciplines can make important and significant contributions to the Christian faith, but 
that theology retains ultimate priority. David Ford and John Webster’s approaches 
were used as representatives of Types 3 and 4 in Chapter 1. It was then suggested that 
Alistair McFadyen’s approach falls between Types 3 and 4, and further, that this is
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how theology should engage with secular discourse. Karl Barth, whose thought falls 
in Type 4, was used as a conversation partner. A dialogue with a Type 4 thinker was 
considered more valuable than with a Type 3 thinker because of the necessity of 
giving God’s self-revelation ultimate priority over secular discourse. In this respect 
Karl Barth’s thought serves as a useful check.
Having explored McFadyen’s and Barth’s thought at length in Chapters 2-5 
above, it now remains to bring their approaches together in ‘dialogue’ and draw some 
conclusions about how to structure the relation between theology and secular 
discourse. In particular, it will be argued that McFadyen’s thought lies in direct 
continuity with Barth’s, but that he takes Barth’s basic premises fuither in terms of 
dialogue with secular discourse. However, although McFadyen enters into a more 
open dialogue with secular discourse and gives it greater weight in shaping his 
theology than Barth, Bai*th takes seculai* discoiuse more seriously than McFadyen.
Three main tasks remain which correspond to the sti*uctm*e of this chapter. 
First, McFadyen’s and Baith’s thought will be brought into explicit conversation in 
order to compare their respective methods more directly and clarify the differences 
between their approaches. Second, the conclusions about how theology should 
engage with secular discourse need to be stated and set out clearly. This will be done 
in the form of nine theses. And finally, we will return to the Webster/ Ford debate 
which was used in the opening chapter to set out the teims of the thesis.
2. A Comparison of Method in McFadyen and Barth
In this section McFadyen’s and Barth’s methods will be compared, first with 
respect to theological anthiopology, and second with respect to the doctrine of sin. In
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each case two main aspects of their approaches will be considered: the grounding for 
their theology; and the natur e of the relation between theology and secular discourse.
2./ Theological Anthropology
This subsection will focus on two key loci functioning in Karl Barth’s and 
Alistair McFadyen’s method in their theological anthiopology.
1. Both Barth and McFadyen gi'ound their theological anthiopology in a 
doctrine of the Trinity and Chiistology. However, the priority accorded to each 
differs. Chapter 4 highlighted the Cliristological grounding of Barth’s theological 
anthropology which functioned as the starting point for understanding both the 
vertical and horizontal relations. With regard to the foimer, Jesus’ humanity is the 
ontological determination of our humanity and so the pressui e of interpretation moved 
irreducibly from Jesus to the rest of humanity. The point here is that Jesus is the only 
‘real man’. This is not to say that there is not a prior conception of humanity 
functioning which Jesus adopts, rather that in adopting this humanity and 
transfoiming it, Jesus reveals the nature of ‘real man’. Why? Because humankind is 
both revealed in and has its ontological determination in Jesus. The ontological status 
of humankind is detennined in and with the being-in-relationsliip of the man Jesus to 
God. The basic determination of human being is therefore in being-with-God.
With regard to the horizontal relations, Jesus has the true creaturely foim of 
man and is both man for God and man for man. The continuity between Jesus’ 
humanity and our humanity is that the humanity of Jesus consists in the fact that he is 
for other men, and so, our humanity is like his in a ‘basic form’. The basic form of 
humanity is in being in relation to, with, and for others. Our hiunanity is only evident
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in relation to others, the negation of which is inhumanity or sinful hiunanity. 
Humanity is therefore essentially co-humanity.
The key point in Barth’s method is his claim that theological antlnopology, in 
both its vertical and horizontal relations, is derived primarily from Chiistology (both 
ultimately and operatively). The humanity of Jesus deteimines how true humanity is 
to be understood. Baith’s primaiy concern is not with describing the ‘phenomena of 
man’, that is ‘knives without edges, or handles without pots’ as non-theological 
approaches do, rather Barth describes humanity understood as a creature before God. 
The main emphasis is that human beings are created relational beings in both the 
vertical and horizontal senses (the horizontal relations are not restricted to human 
relations). This is also true for McFadyen, and in this sense he, and most other 
contemporary relational anthropologists, is heavily indebted to Bai*th. But, whereas 
Barth’s understanding of humanity derives from being grounded primarily in 
Chiistology, McFadyen’s is rooted primarily in a doctrine of the Trinity. This is not 
to say that Trinity is not operative in Barth, or Chiistology in McFadyen, but that the 
overriding emphasis, the ‘pressure of interpretation’, is from these loci.
McFadyen therefore opens his anthropology by developing a doctrine of the 
Trinity and like Barth considers both the vertical and horizontal relations. In focusing 
on the vertical and horizontal relations, McFadyen operates with a concept of the 
imago Dei which is fruther expounded with regard to the horizontal relations with 
recoiu'se to the ‘call of Christ’. However, his ultimate starting point or theological 
ontology rests primarily on an understanding of God as triune. In other words, 
because human beings are understood first to be relational beings, the imago Dei is 
explored in both its vertical and horizontal dimensions. The grounding for 
understanding human beings as relational does not rest primarily in Christology as
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with Barth, but with the Trinity. In doing this McFadyen is in good company (which 
may suggest a current dissatisfaction with Barth’s Christological approach to 
anthropology) and he avoids a trap that many contemporary theological 
anthropologists fall into -  moving immediately from relational concepts of the Trinity 
to human personhood.* However, his approach still rests upon this correspondence.
McFadyen develops an understmiding of the immanent Trinity which by way 
of shorthand we might refer to as a ‘social model’. By this I mean that the being and 
life of the Persons of the Trinity are inherently relational and perichoretic. Although 
not applied ‘immediately’ to human relations, there remains a close correspondence 
between divine and human personhood as can be seen in the following statement: 
“Just as the Persons of the Trinity receive and maintain their identities through 
relation, and relations of a certain quality, then so would human persons only receive 
and maintain their identities through relation with others and would stand fully in 
God’s image whenever these identities and relations achieved a certain quality”.^  
This quotation testifies to a basic difference in orientation between Barth’s and 
McFadyen’s anthropologies. They both describe human beings as relational, but 
Barth’s grounding for this is an understanding of Jesus’ humanity, whereas 
McFadyen’s is an understanding of the immanent Trinity. At the risk of 
oversimplifying, McFadyen believes the Persons of the Trinity to be constituted by 
their relations and so human beings too are constituted by relations. The difference 
lies in the point of comparison for the analogy.
Two aspects of McFadyen’s theology are understated at this point. The first is 
the significance of the economic Trinity for human personhood which tends to be
' Alistair I. McFadyen, ‘The Trinity and Human Individuality: The Conditions for Relevance’, in 
Theology, 95,1992, pplO-18.
 ^This thesis draws heavily from Alistair I. McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian Theory of 
the Individual in Social Relationships, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p31.
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translated almost entirely into Christological terms. As a result there is an 
underdeveloped role for the agency of the Holy Spirit in human being and identity 
(which is also largely true for Barth). Secondly, McFadyen’s Chiistology centres on 
the ‘call of Christ’. This has the benefit of emphasising both the personal dimensions 
of the call as well as the necessity of the transformation of the human situation from a 
point outside it. However, McFadyen’s Christology is also deficient. The main way 
in which this is evident is perhaps the absence of the priesthood of Christ, that is, the 
mediatorial significance of Jesus’ life for human personhood. This means that the 
methodological grounding of McFadyen’s theological anthropology effectively 
functions in two main ways. The first is a comparison of divine and human relations 
in both the vertical and horizontal dimensions, the second is the dialogical nature of 
human relations on the basis of the call of Christ. To this extent, we aie essentially 
left with a God-human/ human-God relation (which is extended to human-human/ 
human-world relations), and a Christ figuie as exemplar -  exemplar, that is, of 
conducting imdistorted dialogical relations.
Because Barth’s anthiopology derives from Christology, the God-human/ 
human-God relations aie mediated through the person of Christ thus becoming God- 
Christ-human/ human-Christ-God relations. To this extent, Barth is not dependent 
upon maintaining a direct continuity between divine and human personhood and in 
fact maintains a radical discontinuity (‘an infinite qualitative distinction’ even^), 
between divine and human personhood. Similarly, in emphasising the priesthood of 
Christ, Jesus is not only mediator, nor an exemplar of undistorted relations, but of true
 ^ Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, Sixth Edition, (trans.) Edwyn C. Hoskyns, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993, plO.
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humanity, i.e., humanity as it was created to be."^  The main difference here is that for 
Barth, humanity is ontically constituted by being-in-relation to God not by identifying 
a coiTespondence between human and intra-trinitarian relations.
Barth’s and McFadyen’s approaches to theological anthropology represent two 
different but not mutually exclusive ways of approaching the subject. In short, 
Baifh’s primary locus is Clnistology and McFadyen’s the Trinity. However, the 
doctrine of the Trinity is also operative in Barth and Christology in McFadyen as we 
have seen in the above chapters. What is interesting is that most contemporary 
approaches to theological anthr opology many of which ar e heavily indebted to Barth 
-  not least in the current re-invigoration of trinitarian theology -  tend to approach 
anthropology primarily through the doctrine of the Trinity and not Christology. 
Additionally, much of the content of contemporary anthropologies is not dissimilar 
from Barth’s. The ramifications of this observation are not to be drawn here other 
than recognising that McFadyen, along with many contemporary theologians, is both 
in direct continuity and discontinuity with Baith’s approach. Let us now consider the 
differences in their relation to secular discourse.
2. The relation between tlieology and secular discourse in McFadyen’s and 
Barth’s theological anthiopology has been explored at length in Chapters 2 and 4 
above, but it is worth clarifying aspects of the relation. Let us begin with Barth.
The distinction between theological and secular* discourse is not always one 
that applies easily to Barth. This is mainly because Barth’s primaiy concern is with 
the extent to which all thinking is determined by the Word of God. However, the 
distinction still works on account of a basic difference in method. For Barth,
It is wortii noting that Barth has been criticised by T. F. Torrance for having an inadequate 
understanding of the priesthood of Christ. The point I make here is relative to McFadyen, not a 
comment on Barth’s theology more widely.
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theological anthropology begins with dogmatics, not an a priori philosophy, 
cosmology, or world-view. Consequently, Barth’s thought falls into Type 4 of Hans 
Frei’s typology. By way of contiast, most other theological and non-theological 
anthropologies operate with a prior worldview or general concept of humankind from 
which the anthropology develops. In this respect Barth definitely maintains the 
‘priority of God in theological method’ by giving theology ultimate priority.
Barth’s concern is not to offer a description of humankind in the way many 
other anthropologies do, especially in the social sciences, rather his concern is with 
‘tine’ humanity. As a result, his theology is necessarily theological (as tine humanity 
can only be understood in relation to God) and secular discourse does not have a 
major role to play in his anthropology. Insofar as Barth does describe the 
‘phenomena of man’ he draws heavily from secular discouise. In this regard he 
writes: “Definitions of man as man interprets himself, however, are not necessarily 
wrong. Ancient and modem natuial science, or rather the respective philosophies of 
nature, teach us that man must be understood as a definitely peculiai* and remarkable 
factor within the cosmo-terrestrial, the physical-chemical, and the organic biotic 
processes of universal existence”.^  Put differently, secular discourses have their place 
and can be used as valuable recourses for describing aspects of human being. They 
cannot, however, be afforded ultimate priority. Hence, Barth’s engagement with 
secular discourse fits within a broadly theological framework and is used to describe 
further aspects of human being that theology is unable to do. Therefore secular 
discourse is afforded operative priority insofar as it is governed by theology which 
has ultimate priority.
 ^ Karl Barth, ‘The New Humanism and the Humanism of God’, in Theology Today, 8, 1951-1952, 
pl61.
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Although engagement with seculai* discourse is not a priority for Baith, nor is 
it understood to be necessai*y for the theological task, his tieatment of secular 
discouise is always rigorous and attempt is made to take it seriously on its own terms 
(i.e. within its own framework of understanding), Barth’s use of seculai* discourse 
falls within a theological framework (i.e. how he employs secular discourse within his 
theology), but his reading of secular discourse attempts to understand it fi*om within 
its own frames of reference (i.e. putting his theological framework aside for the 
duration of his reading). On account of this point, and that he engages with a broader 
range of seculai* discourses than McFadyen, it was argued above that Barth takes 
secular discourse more seriously. Additionally, Barth’s approach to theological 
anthropology respects the boundaries between itself and secular discourse. This is a 
direct result of his understanding of theological science -  having both the foim and 
content being determined by the object of enquii*y. The pressure of interpretation is 
from the object to the human enquirer and not the reverse. To this extent Baith’s 
approach is open to illumination and criticism from other disciplines which similarly 
seek to let the object determine the method of enquiry.
Barth’s approach enables a fruitful dialogue between theology and secular 
discomse precisely because it respects the boundaries between the various disciplines. 
The uniqueness and distinctness of the disciplines are maintained by engaging with 
the other on its own terms (i.e. within its own framework of rmderstanding), because 
each discipline recognises the givens which cannot be established from outside its 
own fr ame of reference. This is an important point for theological engagement with 
secular discourse. One example of this can be seen in film. A frhn can only ‘work’ if 
it is allowed its own voice and, consequently, the viewer enters into the framework of 
the film for at least the duration of the film. In this respect, film can have operative
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priority -  especially during its duration, but second order reflection on film gives 
theology (or the viewer’s perspective) ultimate priority. Only in this way is it 
possible to allow the other to be other without doing it violence.
Barth therefore does have a place for engagement with secular discourse, but it 
is very much in keeping with Type 4 of Frei’s typology. He does, however, lay down 
the foundations for a more open dialogue with secular discourse whilst maintaining 
the ultimate priority of God. The scope for development is immediately evident in 
McFadyen’s description of his aims:
What I intend, therefore, is not simply a new recourse to traditional Christian 
apologetics, and much less is it a simple recourse to a Barthian foim of Dogmatic theology. I 
am more willing to take the risks of a meaningful and open dialogue with non-Christian 
thought than die latter would allow. As regards the former, I am not seeking to justify to non- 
Christians conclusions reached within the circle of faitii tiirough independent theological 
reflection by dressing them up in die language of secular thought.®
Chapter 2 above developed an understanding of McFadyen’s method at length, 
hi particular, the significance of two ‘Rules’ was stressed: maintaining the Barthian 
priority of God in theological method and critical engagement with the determinate 
situation. McFadyen set up his approach in such a way that a dialogue with secular 
discourse was a necessary aspect of his theology as well as his understanding of the 
task of theology. This gave McFadyen at least one distinct advantage over most other 
theological anthropologies -  he was able to engage with the actual (structure of) 
relations by wliich persons are constituted. As a result, McFadyen’s thought falls 
between Types 3 and 4. He is keen to maintain, and for the most part successfully 
manages to maintain, both the dialogue/correlation with secular discourse of Type 3 
and the priority of God of Type 4. To this extent, McFadyen’s thought can be 
understood as a basic development of Barth’s towards Type 3. The fundamental
crF,ppll-12.
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premises for McFadyen’s approach aie evident in Baith’s thought, but McFadyen is 
more willing to develop them than Barth.
Like Barth, McFadyen definitely gives the trinitarian self-revelation of God 
ultimate priority, and like Barth, is prepared to allow secular discourse operative 
priority. The main difference between Bar th and McFadyen here lies in the emphasis 
that is given to secular discourse. McFadyen allows secular discourse far greater 
operative priority in his theology than Barth does. McFadyen’s account of secular 
discourse notwithstanding, it is allowed operative priority in his theology to the extent 
that it informs explicitly both the form and content of his theology. However, because 
of the extent of McFadyen’s engagement with secular discourse, it can be argued that 
his account could have been offered without recourse to theology and remain 
substantially unchanged (albeit not by McFadyen). As a result, it was not always 
entirely clear what the distinctive contribution that could be made by theology for an 
understanding of personhood.
At this point we can draw two conclusions. First, McFadyen is extending 
Barth’s general orientation towards Type 3, but is remaining consistent to Barth’s 
premises and fundamental outlook. Second, McFadyen is more open to dialogue with 
secular discourse and allowing secular discourse to determine the form and content of 
theology than Barth, but Barth takes it more seriously than McFadyen. We now turn 
to their respective doctrines of sin.
2.ÎÎ The Doctrine o f Sin
Analogous to the previous subsection, attention will centre around two main 
loci in Barth’s and McFadyen’s doctrines of sin: the theological grounding for their 
theology and the nature of the relation between theology and secular discomse.
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1. Many of the same methodological dynamics that were evident in Barth’s 
and McFadyen’s theological anthropology are also evident in their respective 
doctrines of sin. We will begin again with Barth.
The core of Barth’s approach to theological method regarding the doctrines of 
evil and sin is that evil and sin can only be understood (described not explained) in the 
light of its overcoming in Jesus Christ. In other words, the pressure of interpretation 
is irreducibly from knowledge of Jesus’ redemptive activity to knowledge of evil and 
sin. Knowledge of evil and sin is not only not a requirement for knowledge of Jesus’ 
redemptive activity, it cannot lead to knowledge of this activity. In this respect, 
knowledge of sin and evil are to be understood as an aspect of the doctrine of 
revelation, that is, a consequence of the knowledge of God. It is important to note 
that sin and evil do not originate in God, only that knowledge of sin and evil come 
tlu'ough knowledge of God. Sin and evil are ultimately inexplicable and are to be 
understood as a ‘third factor’ in creation -  originating neither with God, nor creation.
The key point is again that knowledge of evil and sin can only come through 
knowledge of its overcoming in Jesus Christ, hr terms of method this means that 
Barih does not begin with a prior, general, conception of evil and sin from which 
theological reflection derives, rather the conception of evil and sin is the result of his 
Christological orientation. Analogous to his anthropology, the issue is not quite as 
black and white as this. To use the words ‘evil’ and ‘sin’ necessarily requires a prior 
conception of their meaning and what this might entail. Barth does not deny this, and 
to this extent does operate with a prior conception of sin and evil. However, the point 
is that our understanding of sin and evil is reconfigured in the light of Jesus Clirist. 
We can only understand ‘true’ or ‘real’ sin and evil from this perspective. The
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pressur e of interpretation is irreducibly and emphatically from knowledge of Jesus to 
knowledge of sin. Apart from knowledge of Christ, not only is it not possible to 
describe true sin and evil, it is not even possible to recognise true sin and evil.
In the light of Christ, nothingness (evil) can be seen as “the ‘reality’ which 
opposes and resists God, which is itself subjected to and overcome by His opposition 
and resistance”.^  Nothingness is characterised by its menacing of both God and the 
creature and evil is the actualisation of this menace. The concrete form of 
nothingness is sin. However, knowledge of nothingness cannot be derived through 
knowledge of sin. Rather, knowledge of sin and nothingness has its basis in God’s 
work in Jesus Christ. Consequently Barth’s knowledge of sin derives from that wliich 
it opposes in Jesus Christ: sin as pride is in opposition to the humiliation of God in 
Jesus Christ, sin as sloth is in opposition to the exaltation of humanity in Jesus Christ, 
and sin as falsehood is in opposition to the true witness in Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ 
therefore functions as the hermeneutical key thr ough whom knowledge of sin and evil 
derives. As with his anthropology, Barth’s hamartiology is irreducibly Christological 
and derives from a Christological base. This is perhaps the key difference between 
Barth’s and McFadyen’s approach.
There is a sense in which McFadyen’s Bound to Sin does not develop a 
doctrine of sin, rather it uses the doctrine of sin for various purposes. To this extent, it 
is not easy to identify what McFadyen’s doctrine actually is, other than that he affirms 
strongly an orthodox, western approach to sin giving particular* weight to the doctrine 
of original sin. In this respect, McFadyen’s hamartiology is in strong continuity with 
Barth’s. An entrance to McFadyen’s doctrine can be found in the latter* stages of his 
book where sin is developed as idolatr*y.
’ Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics III/3: The Doctrine o f Creation, (eds.) Geoffrey W. Bromiley, and 
Thomas F. Torrance, Edmbmgh: T&T Clark, 1996, p305.
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Sin and idolatry can be understood as that which counters the dynamics of 
God in creation and salvation. The contrast to sin in this sense is joy, faith, and 
worship of the trinitarian God which is characterised by an abundant and flourishing 
life. This highlights the core methodological difference between McFadyen and 
Barth. Barth’s hamartiology is rooted primarily in Christology, whereas McFadyen’s 
is again rooted primarily in the doctrine of the Trinity. Both McFadyen and Barth 
affirm strongly that knowledge of sin can only come from its overcoming. Similarly, 
Barth’s hamartiology is somewhat dependent upon the doctrine of the Trinity, and 
McFadyen’s on Christology, but their emphases are different -  corresponding to their 
respective emphases in their anthropologies. The central difference in theological 
method between Barth and McFadyen derives from the weight they respectively 
attribute to Christology and the doctrine of the Trinity.
The main benefit McFadyen gains from giving methodological priority to the 
doctrine of the Trinity over and above Christology is that it offers the opportunity to 
have a more dynamic conception of sin than is perhaps the case in Barih. 
McFadyen’s emphasis on the dynamics of relation, both in terms of sin itself and in 
terms of standing before God, allows him to consider the structural dimensions of evil 
and sin in a way that is often underdeveloped in many hamartiologies. Consequently, 
McFadyen unpacks at length the pathological dynamics of two concrete pathologies 
and demonstrates effectively both how the individual is incorporated into the 
pathological dynamic (unwillingly), and at the same time how the individual is 
personally responsible for his/her (willing) role in the dynamic. To this extent, 
McFadyen’s doctrine of sin has benefited hugely both from grounding his doctrine 
primarily in the dynamics of worship of the triune God and by engaging with secular 
discourse.
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However, a few weaknesses were also identified in McFadyen’s doctrine of 
sin. Perhaps the most important was paying insufficient attention to the significance 
of ‘brokenness’ resulting fiom sin for both method and content. Barth recognised the 
implications of sin for his theology although did not incorporate it into his theology 
sufficiently, whereas McFadyen does not seem to pay attention to this aspect of the, 
doctrine at all. In temrs of method, McFadyen’s most constnictive theological 
contribution occur s at the end of the book and does so without much reconstruction in 
the light of either the contributions fi*om secular discourse (hence it was suggested 
that McFadyen offers a theological critique of some forms of secular discom se rather 
than a genuine form of ‘testing’), or in the light of the significance of the material that 
he is dealing with. Therefore, in relation to content, McFadyen’s account of the 
dynamics of worship which are characterised by abundant and joyous living seems a 
bit weak at the end of a book focusing on child abuse and the holocaust, hi short, 
McFadyen does not appear* to take suffering and redemption seriously enough in his 
theological account of the doctrine of sin (which may suggest an inadequate theology 
of the cross). Barth’s Christological orientation precludes this potential problem as 
the hicamation and atonement is precisely this story. As a result, Barth’s doctrine of 
sin proper occms as chapters within a three part volume on the doctrine of 
reconciliation. However, the most significant differences between Barth and 
McFadyen come through in how they conceive the relation between theology and 
secular* discourse to which we now turn.
2. The relationship between theology and secular* discourse in both Barth’s 
and McFadyen’s doctrines of sin remains substantially the same as was the case in 
their respective anthropologies. For Barth, theology again retained ultimate priority
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and secular discourse was afforded some operative priority -  albeit less so than in his 
anthropology. By way of contiast, McFadyen’s relation to secular discourse was 
heavily indebted to the approach adopted in his anthropology but was further 
developed for his doctrine of sin. However, this is not to suggest that either Barth’s or 
McFadyen’s approaches were uninformative for understanding the relation between 
theological and secular discourse. We will again begin with Baith.
With regal'd to hamartiology, Barth’s main engagement with secular discourse 
occuned in his section on das Nichtige. It was suggested that this was largely because 
secular discouises rarely discuss a notion of ‘sin’ which is an explicitly theological 
teim, whereas seculai’ discourses do discuss notions of ‘evil’. However, the same 
basic method which was evident in Barth’s anthropology was again evident in his 
hamartiology. Insofar as there is a difference between his approach to anthropology 
and sin with regal’d to seculai’ discomse it is one of emphasis. This emphasis is not so 
much new in his hamartiology as more evident.
From the outset Barth’s theology has been characterised as a Nachdenken -  of 
the Word of God. Theology is necessai’ily an a posteriori activity which proceeds 
primarily from an understanding of who Jesus Christ was and is. Every area of 
Christian doctrine is developed from a stairing point in Jesus Chiist. This was seen to 
be the case in both Barth’s anthropology and hamartiology. However, in his 
hamaitiology the ‘methodological purity’ of Bai*th’s approach becomes particularly 
evident. In his section on das Nichtige in which Barth engages with secular discomse, 
we find that Barth engages with various theological approaches alongside Leibniz, 
Heidegger and Sai’tre. One implication of this that has been emphasised throughout 
the thesis is that ‘secular discomse’ may not always be the most appropriate categoiy 
to use to analyse Barth’s thought. However, from Baith’s perspective there is a sense
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in which it is an extremely appropriate category. Barth was not concerned so much 
with whether or not thinking was explicitly theological, but the extent to which all 
foims of thought aie conformed to the Word of God. Consequently, many 
‘theological’ approaches are considered alongside ‘secular’ approaches. Given the 
absolute methodological purity and consistency of Barth’s approach, there is no 
distinction to be made between ‘theological’ and ‘non-theological’ thought -  all 
thinking that is not conformed to the Word of God is secular, and this may well 
include some prominent ‘theologians’. For instance, in his theological anthropology 
Barth engages with four main anthiopological approaches of the modem period: 
natmalism (Zdckler, Otto, Titius, and Fortmann), idealism (Fichte), existentialism 
(Jaspers) and theistic anthropology (Bmimer). Emil Brunner, whom many consider to 
be one of the foremost theologians of the twentieth century, is dealt with alongside 
secular approaches, the implication being that his thought is ‘seculai*’.^
With regard to Barth’s hamartiology, we find Julius Müller and F. E. D. 
Schleiermacher being considered alongside the philosophers G. W. Leibniz, Martin 
Heidegger and Jean-Paul Saifre. The main difference here with his theological 
anthropology arises fiom die way in which content informs method. For Baith, sin is 
essentially a theological concept which is at root a fomi of disobedience and unbelief. 
From this it follows that thinking that is not conformed to the Word of God -  secular 
discourse (whether or not it is ‘theological’) -  is, in a mamier of speaking, ‘sin’. 
‘Secular discourse’ -  thinking which is not conformed to the Word of God -  
coiTesponds to sin insofar as it is not orientated to the Word of God. Thus, many 
‘theological’ approaches ai*e, according to Barth’s method, both seculai* and sinful.
 ^As a result, Barth dismisses Bninner very easily on occasions. For example: “Brunner’s contribution 
to this matter [the virgin bhür] in his more recent book, Man in Revolt, is so bad that my only possible 
attitude to it is silence” (Karl Bai1h, Church Dogmatics 1/2: The Doctiine o f the Word o f  God, (eds.) 
Geoffrey W. Bromiley, and Thomas F, Tonance, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000, p i84).
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Two fiu'ther points are worth mentioning here. First, in the light of the current 
Zeitgeist, Barth’s method may appear to be astonishingly arrogant and indeed there is 
a strong sense in wliich this is the case. But this point is worth qualifying in two 
respects. First, Barth himself did not make any claim that his own thought 
coiTcsponded to the Word of God in this way. In fact, he was exceptionally open 
about his own fallibility. And second, to assess Barth’s method from outside it is, to 
some extent, to miss his point. Making the claim of arrogance involves standing 
outside his framework in order to make a value-judgement that there is a better 
starting point than Jesus Christ for doing theology, i.e. adopting a general fr amework 
for understanding from which Barth’s is judged. The claim that Barth’s approach is 
aiTogant rests upon his methodological purity and the absolute consistency of his 
approach. Whether or not he was right to insist on his method in the way that he did, 
the rigour and consistency with which it was applied cannot fail to impress. It is 
precisely because of this that Barth is able to maintain the ultimate priority of God in 
theological method at every point. However, it might well be asked whether Baith’s 
theological method is applied too rigidly with reference to secular discourse. The 
‘théologie’ of his method certainly demands that ‘secular discourse’ (in both the 
senses used here) should be governed by theology at eveiy point, but seculai* 
discourses afford greater insight into the human situation than Barth seems to allow.
The problem here is that to ask after the validity of secular approaches to 
antlu'opology and sin again runs the risk of missing Barth’s main point -  that 
knowledge of self and sin is a variation of knowledge of God and therefore can only 
be known in the light of Jesus Christ. By way of contrast, McFadyen manages to 
maintain the priority of God in theological method and also recognises the 
significance of secular contiibutions for a Christian understanding of sin and evil.
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Consequently, McFadyen is not only open to theology being criticised (and 
reconstructed) by secular discourse to a fai* greater extent than Barth would allow, but 
fui'theimore, that conversation with secular discourse actually helps reveal the nature 
of Christian truth. As a result, McFadyen’s doctrine of sin benefits from engagement 
with secular discourse in helping biing aspects of the doctrine to frnther light that 
have hitherto received insufficient attention. As stated in Chapter 3 above, examples 
include an explicit relation of the doctrine of sin to the doctrine of the Trinity, as well 
as to joy, faith and worship, a renewed understanding of original sin, the inadequacies 
of the tiadition’s emphasis on pride as the root sin, the drawing out and highlighting 
the significance of Augustine’s understanding of the will, and an emphasis on the 
dynamic, comprehensive, energised and relational dimensions of sin.
It is clear from McFadyen’s anthropology and hamartiology both that theology 
has benefited gi'eatly by engaging with secular discourse, and that secular discourse -  
if it was prepared to listen to theology -  might also benefit from the dialogue (not 
least by letting theology help reveal its own imier-tmth). However, in a thesis 
pushing for ‘dialogue’, it must be asked whether ‘dialogue’ is always appropriate at 
eveiy point. On occasions, McFadyen is in danger of overestimating the value of a 
dialogue between theology and secular discouise. For instance, the sixth 
methodological thesis (Chapter 3 above) states that “in order to be intelligible and true 
to itself, theology must necessarily engage in dialogue with secular foims of public 
explanation, understanding, and truth...”. In other words, for McFadyen, it is a 
necessary condition for theology to be true to itself that it engages with secular 
discouise. To make dialogue with secular discouise a necessaiy condition for 
theology to be true to itself excludes the possibility that theologies of Type 5, and 
possibly Type 4, are capable of producing intelligible theologies that aie ‘true to
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themselves’. This is simply not the case, and I have no doubt that McFadyen would 
want to affiim that John Webster, for instance, is indeed producing intelligible 
theology that is ‘tme to itself. Dialogue with secular discourse cannot and must not 
be a necessaiy condition for theology however valuable the benefits which derive 
from such a dialogue.
There are a number of conclusions specific to the relation between Barth and 
McFadyen that can be diawn at this point before considering some more general 
conclusions about the relation between theology and secular discourse. In the light of 
their respective antliropologies it is clear that McFadyen is indeed extending Barth’s 
basic orientation towards Type 3, but is also remaining consistent to Baith’s premises 
and fimdamental outlook. Additionally, McFadyen is more open to dialogue with 
secular discourse and allowing secular discourse to deteimine the foim and content of 
theology than Barth, but Baith takes it more seriously than McFadyen. Both of these 
conclusions are confirmed again m their respective hamartiologies albeit with further 
qualification. With respect to the first conclusion, Baith is right to affirm that 
knowledge of self and knowledge of sin can be derived primaiily from knowledge of 
God, but underestimates the scope of paiticularly the human sciences for infoiming 
these areas of dogmatics -  a point which McFadyen addressed. With respect to the 
second conclusion, McFadyen takes secular discourse far more seriously than he does 
in his earlier work, and similarly gives it greater operative contiol in his theology -  
much more so than Barth would allow. Two further conclusions are also evident.
First, it has been suggested throughout the thesis that the distinction between 
theology and secular discourse is not always the most appropriate for Barth. In many 
ways this remains the case. However there is a sense in which it is an extiemely
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appropriate distinction for Barth in that, if anything, the boundaries between theology 
and secular discourse are drawn more rigidly and naiTOwly. Any thought form 
(including many ‘theologies’) that does not confoim to the Word of God is ‘secular’, 
and therefore sinful (insofar as it is a form of disobedience and unbelief). If this is the 
case, and in the light of McFadyen’s work it appears to be something of an 
overstatement, there remains a great deal of work to be done in spelling out the 
implications of this position for, say, the natural sciences, or mathematics. What does 
it mean for human biology to be done in conformity to the Word of God?^
Second, the significance and difficulty of walking the tight-rope between 
Types 3 and 4 is particularly clear. McFadyen is often in danger of falling off one 
side or the other, and as a result, tends to overestimate the place of dialogue with 
secular* discourse in theology -  to the extent that it is made a necessary condition. 
Bearing this in mind, Karl Barth was cei*tainly right to affirm the importance of doing 
theology “as though nothing had happened” (Chapter 1 above). His theology, 
particularly his Christological orientation, has indeed served as a crucial check for 
how to approach theology by maintaining the priority of God in theological method. 
It now remains to present the conclusions to the thesis in a more general way.
3. Learning from McFadyen and Barth: Nine Theses
The central concern of the thesis was to investigate the role of secular 
discourse in theological anthropology and the doctrine of sin. In more general terms, 
the purpose was to explore the question ‘how ought theology to be done with
® Stanley Hauerwas has done some work in this area although he has yet to publish on it. However, 
one of his former doctoral students has published a book which gives some insight into Hauerwas’ 
response to tlie question. See Joel J. Shuman, The Body o f Compassion: Ethics, Medicme, and the 
Church, Boulder: Westview Press, 1999. One way of accessing the issue here is whether or not we 
choose our dentist because he or she is a Christian, or because they have a good record of not causing 
any pain with their patients.
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particular respect to secular discourse?’. In other words, the thesis would fall short if 
the lessons to be learned from McFadyen and Barth were not expressed in a less 
specific way in order to be more applicable to theology in general. This section sets 
out nine theses without argument, but with brief explanation. In doing this two 
purposes are served. First, the nine theses fimction as a conclusion to the thesis as a 
whole -  hence they will be set out without additional justification. And second, they 
shift the debate from the specific concerns and parameters of theological 
anthropology and the doctrine of sin to theology in general. The following section 
will return to the Webster/ Ford debate from the opening chapter.
Thesis 1: In order to be ‘true to itself, it is crucial for theology to understand and 
reflect critically upon the trinitarian self-revelation o f God as testified to in Christian 
Scripture, doctrine, tradition and history, and the social, cultural and intellectual 
world in which we are living
Thesis 1 does not suggest that engagement with secular discourse is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for theology to be theology. Theology is 
theology whether or not notice has been taken of other disciplines -  I am not 
suggesting that theologies of Type 5 in Frei’s typology are not theology. Approaches 
that only engage with the trinitarian self-revelation of God as testified to in CMstian 
scripture, doctrine, tradition and history are theology. Similarly, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1 above, it is not a necessary condition for theology to engage with secular 
discourse all of the time. There is definitely an important role for ‘str aight dogmatics’ 
in the Webster sense (especially in helping maintain the ultimate priority of God in
“Cf. C7P,pplO -ll.
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theological method). Neither does Thesis 1 suggest that it is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for theology to reflect on both poles in order to be time to itself. 
Again, theologies of Type 5 can certainly be true to themselves and engaged with the 
contemporary situation. However, not only is this more likely to happen by 
engaging with secular discourse, it is facilitated by engaging with secular discourse.
This is the (overstated) point of the sixth methodological thesis in McFadyen’s 
doctrine of sin (Chapter 3 above): ‘in order to be intelligible and time to itself, 
theology must necessaiily engage in dialogue with secular forms of public 
explanation, understanding, and truth, which both confront and permeate the situation 
of a living theological tiadition’. Although it is not a ‘necessary’ condition for 
theology to be ‘intelligible and true to itself, theology is certainly reminded of its 
own inner truth by engaging with secular discourse and enabled ‘to do its job 
better’.^  ^ The uniqueness and distinctness of theology is maintained in, through, and 
by, conversing with secular discourse, not in spite of it. The reasons for this are 
twofold.
First, the great stiength of McFadyen’s approach to the doctrine of sin is that 
he seeks to show that a theological approach to two concrete pathologies could have 
greater descriptive and explanatory power than secular* approaches. Although his 
argument is weakened by giving an insufficient account of secular approaches, his 
argument remains highly instructive in terms of method. What McFadyen shows 
successfully is that if theology has nothing to offer that cannot be stated sufficiently in 
secular* frames of reference, theology as a discipline has failed. If reference to God 
does not make any actual difference as to how pathologies are understood, then this
However, we might well ask if  it is possible for theology to avoid secular discourse completely. In 
this case we would do well to distinguish between the deliberate employment of secular discourse and 
a broader conception of the influence of secular discourse. It might be possible, in theoiy at least, to 
avoid the former but not tlie latter.
Jeremy S. Begbie, Theology, Music and Time, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p271.
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suggests first that secular accounts of pathologies are sufficient for understanding sin, 
and second, that the best theology can offer is a re-interpretation of secular accounts 
in theological language, hi other words, it is by engaging with secular discourse that 
the distinctive contribution that theology can make is made clear. Secular discouise 
gives licence for theology to be theology, and furthermore reminds theology of its 
own inner-timth.
Following from this, it was also clear in McFadyen’s doctrine of sin that 
secular discourse helped bring out aspects of a theological account of sin that have 
hitherto received insufficient emphasis in recent yeai's. In particular, McFadyen 
related the doctiine of sin to the doctrine of the Trinity, and to joy, faith, and worship. 
Engagement with secular discouise also leads to a renewed understanding of original 
sin and the nature of the bondage of the will, highlighting the inadequacies of the 
tradition’s emphasis on pride as the root sin, and emphasising the dynamic and 
relational dimensions of sin.
Second, the task of theology that has been developed in this thesis entails a 
single task with two aspects (engagement with ‘the tradition’, and ‘culture’). On this 
understanding it can be said that it is a necessary (but insufficient) condition of 
theology to be true to itself that it engages with its cultural context. One of the main 
ways in which this is done is by engaging with secular discourse. Dialogue with 
secular discourse itself is not a necessary condition because engagement with the 
cultural context might occur through other means. However, it remains that dialogue 
with secular discourse is an extremely good way of engaging with the cultural context 
which in tur n helps shapes the form and content of theology.
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Thesis 2: Given that it is crucial for theology to engage with both poles, this is best 
approached from between Types 3 and 4 o f Hans Frei ’s typology.
Theologies of Type 4 tend to recognise the significance of engaging with 
secular discourse as we have seen at length by looking at Barth’s theology. However, 
theologies of this type do not allow secular discourse sufficient operative control 
within the theological framework. This was McFadyen’s main objection to Barth’s 
approach. Barth’s theology gives a place to secular discoinse and takes such 
discourses very seriously. However, Barth stops short of an ‘open dialogue’ with 
them. Secular* discoru se may be used to develop aspects of theology, but is operative 
only in this limited sense. Consequently McFadyen was ‘more willing to take the 
risks of a meaningful and open dialogue with non-Christian thought than... [Barth] 
would allow’. It is in this sense that McFadyen remains in direct continuity with 
Barth’s approach, but develops the position fur*ther towards Type 3.
Type 3 approaches, such as those offered by Paul Tillich or David Ford,^  ^tend 
to give too much weight to the cultur al context, sometimes at the expense of theology. 
Tillich’s ‘method of correlation’, for instance, allows ‘culture’ to pose the questions to 
which theology gives an answer. Although this approach is highly appealing given 
the imderstanding of theology being developed in this thesis, it falls short in two main 
ways. First, the resulting theology is highly existential in character* which means that 
core aspects of the Christian faith are ultimately interpreted from within an existential 
fr amework, rather than the reverse. And second, ‘culture’ may not be asking the right 
questions. A theological engagement with culture should not be characterised by
Again I emphasise tliat Ford’s work is placed in Type 3 for very different reasons than Tillich’s. 
There are strong dissimilarities between Üieir approaches. See Chapter 1 above.
Determining what the ‘right’ questions are does o f course presuppose a specific teleology, as whether 
or not a question is ‘right’ is determined directly be the specific end in view. With Tillich’s concern
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giving a theological response to questions posed by the ‘determinate situation’ (to use 
Tillich’s phrase) because a) culture and not theology would be determining the form 
and ultimately the content of theology, and b) the questions that should be asked 
about culture from a theological perspective may not be the same as those evident in 
the determinate situation. Theology must be engaged with the cultur al context, but 
must ultimately be constructed on the basis of the ‘priority of God’. Theologies of 
Type 3 simply do not give sufficient weight to Christian self-description. 
Consequently, it has been argued that engagement with secular discourse should occur 
somewhere between Types 3 and 4.
Approaching theology fr om between Type 3 and 4 is a difficult exercise which 
in Chapter 1 above was likened to trying to balance on a tight-rope. Because of this, 
McFadyen’s theology tends towards one side or other on different occasions. It was 
argued that if falling off the tight-rope is to occur, it is better to fall off towards Type 
4 as this does better justice to Christian self-description, hence Karl Barth was the 
dialogue par tner in this thesis. Thesis 3 helps structure this approach.
Before turning to Thesis 3, an obvious question which has arisen which 
requires some attention. I have been arguing for a position ‘somewhere between 
Types 3 and 4’ and have highlighted the difficulty of maintaining tliis position 
consistently. One must ask, therefore, is this a new position being identified -  say 
Type 3.5 -  or is it simply a variation of Type 4? Furthermore, if it is a distinct type, 
why have not other commentators identified it before? In responding to these 
questions we must be reminded of two points.
for apologetics, ‘culture’ may well be asking the ‘right’ questions insofar as they are possible points of 
departure. My point is that the form and content o f tlieology should be determined by tlie priority of 
God in theological method, which means that the ultimate primacy in the asking of theological 
questions must come from theology not culture.
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First, in favour* of Type 3.5, we might argue that this is in fact McFadyen’s 
position. There is certainly some discontinuity between his position and Type 4, and 
he is prepared to give secular discourse far greater operative control in his theology 
than can be accommodated in Type 4. Additionally, it has also been suggested that 
maintaining this distinct type is like balancing on a tight-rope, and consequently, 
McFadyen (and possibly other potential exponents of Type 3.5) are in danger of 
falling off on one side or another. Put differently, there may well be occasions when 
an exponent of Type 3.5 may be closer to Type 3 than Type 4. Given this, a strong 
case can be made for* affirming the existence of a distinct type -  Type 3.5.
On the other hand, throughout the thesis, I have tried to argue that if an 
exponent of Type 3.5 is to fall off the tight-rope, it is better to veer towards Type 4 
because this does better justice to the unique subject-matter of Clrristian theology. It 
follows from this that, for the most part, we might actually be dealing with a Type 
3.75. An additional argument throughout the thesis has been that McFadyen’s 
approach stands in fimdamental continuity with Bar*th’s and can be understood as a 
development of Barth’s approach towards Type 3. This would strongly suggest that 
we are in fact dealing with a variation of Type 4 and not a distinct type.
To retur*n to the original question, are we dealing with a Type 3.5 or a 
variation of Type 4? The answer* depends on the weight attributed to the points just 
outlined. In my view, it is quite possible to affirm either*. The major* advantage of 
affirming a Type 3.5 is that is highlights both the continuity and discontinuity 
between itself and Types 3 and 4 (although this could of course be qualified within 
the scope of the narrative). Indeed Frei himself is reputed to have said that “he would 
probably place himself between Types 3 and 4 -  but that ‘aesthetically he found
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himself paiticipating in all five”.^  ^ However, my inclination would be to affirm a 
variant reading of Type 4 because of the importance of affirming the ultimate priority 
of the subject-matter of theology, hr the light of this, we might be better to say that 
the position we ar e dealing with rests on the boimdary (albeit just inside) of Type 4 
which distinguishes it from Type 3. This position can only be maintained if we are 
prepared to have a fairly broad imderstanding of the scope of the types. If a more- 
narrow approach was to be offered, we would have to affirm a Type 3.5. This 
question will be picked up again in the next main section.
Thesis 3: It is necessary for theology to maintain the ‘priority o f God’ in its method, 
and this can be facilitated by recognising a distinction between ultimate and operative 
criteria.
The meaning of ‘the priority of God’ has been left fairly open in the thesis. It 
will be given a bit more content in Thesis 4 below. Following McFadyen, it has 
referred to the general point that the pressme of interpretation moves from theology 
(or more accurately the subject-matter of theology) to secular discourse. It might be 
given a more specific reference, referring for instance to the priority of grace, of 
theological language, of the doctrine of God, Christology and so on, but these would 
be specific ways of maintaining the priority of God in theological method. The aim in 
this thesis has been to argue that dogmatics in the Webster sense (Type 4/5), Christian 
self-description, doctrine, tradition, history, and so on, must be the primary 
determinative factor. However, engaging with the determinate situation is also a
David F. Ford, 'On Being Theologically Hospitable to Jesus Christ: Hans Frei's Achievement',
Journal o f  Theological Studies 46.2, October, 1995, pp538, 544.
David Ford argues strongly that the Types must be read in this way (Ford, 'On Being Theologically 
Hospitable to Jesus Christ: Hans Frei's Achievement', pp536f.).
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necessary aspect of the theological task. Maintaining the priority of God and the 
approach to theology through dialogue is facilitated by an important distinction 
between ultimate and operative priority.
The distinction between ultimate and operative priority has been unpacked and 
illustrated at length in all of the chapters above. It refers to the difference between a 
tacit framework which ultimately stmctures enquiry and a fr amework which might be 
used at any given moment. In short, the theological pole has ultimate priority and 
seculai' discourse may have operative priority at any given time. Making this 
distinction recognises both the varying significance of different kinds of frameworks 
of understanding and offers a structure through which the relation between theology 
and secular discourse can be thought through.
The danger of distinguishing between ultimate and operative priority is that a 
static approach might be implied. The distinction applies primarily to the starting 
point from which the ‘pressure of interpretation’ derives. However, although this 
point stands, it is be better to think in more dynamic terms such as a ‘field of force’. 
The starting point and the pressure of interpretation are fixed, but theology need not 
necessarily refer to the starting point or pressure of interpretation. It can operate 
within this dynamic and remain true to it without referring to it at every point. A 
good example of theology done in this way is Jeremy Begbie’s recent book Theology, 
Music and Time. Begbie’s conviction is that “music can serve to enrich and advance 
theology, extending our wisdom about God, God’s relation to us and to the world at 
large”.C onsequently , Begbie approaches theology ‘through music’, and does so to 
the extent that he fears that some readers may consider his approach to be avocation 
of some forms of ‘natural theology’. For Begbie, this leads to a concluding chapter
Begbie, Theology, p3.
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on theological method where it is made miambiguously clear where his ultimate 
priorities lie, and that the preceding discussion was conducted in the light of these 
priorities. In short, Begbie gives ultimate priority to God in theological method, but 
conducts his discussion in the field of force deriving fiom this priority (the force of 
trinitarian self-revelation) without being rigidly constrained by it. His approach 
balances integrity to his theological framework as well as integrity to the musical 
academy.
A question remains about the correct methodological attitude in theology to 
the principle of non-contradiction. At its root, the principle affirms that for any 
statement p, p  and ^p cannot both be true at the same time (e.g. x  is black/ % is white). 
Taken as a Taw’ of logic, the principle of non-contradiction is something that should 
be talcen for granted in much theological enquiry. Theology is, after all, largely 
subject to the canons of rationality shared in the various departments in the university. 
Additionally, it is general thought that it is good for theology (or any discipline) to 
steer clear of Tnationality’. And yet there are instances where the principle of non­
contradiction can pose serious problems for theology. One obvious example of this is 
when in conflict with the Roman Catholic Church Copernicus, and later Galileo, 
rejected the Ptolemaic system of the universe and argued tliat the sun was the centre 
of the solar system. Essentially they were putting forward the claims of empirical 
science as a way of discovering tnith. On many instances, such as this one, there is 
only an apparent contradiction. Consider the following two statements made at the 
same time by the same person: “The sim is shining. It is raining.”. There need not be 
a contradiction between these two statements. Although it is tr*ue that on most 
occasions when it is raining, the sun is not shining, this is not always the case. There 
is no logical contradiction between tire sim shining and having rain at the same time.
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With regard to Copernicus and Galileo, there was not a necessary conflict 
between their position and theology. The Roman Church at the time was enmeshed in 
a particular world-view which prevented them from ‘an open or mutually informative 
dialogue’ about this issue. In this case, this does not mean that the object of theology 
or even ‘theological tinth’ is called into question by the findings of empirical science. 
Rather, a particular world-view (which at the time was linked closely with theology) 
was called into question by the empirical realities of the situation (cf. Thesis 6 .below). 
The problem arose on account of confusing this world-view with theological truth. If 
this were the case, there would be a contradiction. Instead, this example highlights 
one way in which secular discourse can challenge and help refonnulate theology 
without theology losing its distinctive subject-matter.
However, just because this example in which the principle of non- 
contiadiction was only in apparent conflict, this does not have to hold for all cases. 
There are possible circumstances under which secular ‘truth’ is in conflict with 
theological ‘tiuth’. One need only mention the resmrection to see a whole host of 
problems arising here. On the one hand, secular truth claims that people do not rise 
from the dead. On the other hand, theological truth claims that Jesus rose from the 
dead. On the face of it there is a contradiction -  either secular discourse has made a 
mistake, or Jesus did not rise from the dead. One way out of this particular dilemma 
would be to point to the form of argument under-girding the secular claim -  the 
problem of induction. Another way would be to do some theological juggling such 
that God can on occasions break the laws of nature. Nevertheless, this only evades 
the issue. There may well be actual situations where there is a contradiction between 
theological and secular discoui'se which no amount of juggling can evade. What does 
the theologian do when faced with this problem?
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Given the argument made in this thesis -  that theological discourse should 
maintain ultimate priority -  one solution would be simply to ignore it (as the Roman 
Church tided to do with Copernicus and Galileo) and risk the charge of being 
‘invincibly arrogant’. Within the context of this thesis, Karl Barth’s approach niight 
be argued to be the closest to this response given his theological method. So how 
would Barth deal with it? The first point to be raised is that Barth is not only open to 
finding truth in the secular as we have seen, but goes so far as to talk of ‘secular 
parables of the truth’. T h e  main point here is that Barth emphasises that tiuth is 
often found outside the Church. However, with respect to the principle of non­
contradiction this is only of passing interest. More importantly for Barth, secular 
words are only true insofar as they are in accordance with the Word of God. In other 
words, where truth is found in secular discourse, it is because it corresponds to the 
Word of God. hi its harshest form, Baith evades the problem of the principle of non­
contradiction by ai'guing that insofar as any discipline is true, it is because it is in 
accordance with the object of theology (note that theology itself does not have a 
monopoly on the truth). This means that if there is a contradiction, there is a problem 
either with the theological or secular formulation of truth. To quote George 
Hunsinger on Barth: “The inconceivability of the divine mystery does not mean that it 
is absurd or that it is to be explained as an absurdity. The Word of God is 
inconceivable, not self-contradictory”.^  ^ When there are contradictions, the problem 
lies in our formulations of the truth (or possibly the inconceivability of the divine
Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3J: The Doctrine o f  Reconciliation, (eds.) Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 
and Thomas F. Torrance, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999, esp. ppl 18-135. This has been unpacked at 
some lengtli by George Hunsinger in his essay ‘Epilogue: Secular Parables of the Trutli’ (George 
Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape o f his Theology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991).
Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, p i97.
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mysteiy).^^ The point is that it is impossible for there to be an actual contradiction 
between theological and secular* truth (otherwise it would not be ‘true’ to the Word of 
God), only apparent contradictions. Theology cæi, therefore, be corrected by secular 
discourse.
Thesis 4: Two main loci help maintain the priority o f God in theological method: the 
doctrine o f the Trinity, and Christology,
Perhaps the greatest strength of Barlh’s theology is his absolute consistency in 
deriving all theology from his understanding of God’s self-revelation in Christ 
through the Spirit. For Barth this means that every aspect of theology derives from 
Christology. Whether or not Christology should be accepted as the starting point for 
all theology is open to question, but the consequence of this in his thought is that 
every aspect of theology, and indeed all his interaction with secular discourse, is 
governed by God’s self-revelation in Christ. The ‘methodological purity’ of Barth’s 
approach not only allows the priority of God in theological method to be a possibility, 
but it makes it a necessity. All his thinking follows from this stai*ting point, that is, to 
restate an earlier point, theology takes the form of a Nachdenken,
In McFadyen’s theology, the role afforded to Christology in Barth’s theology 
was largely adopted by the Trinity. As mentioned above, the relationship between the 
person of Chr ist and the trinitarian persons is obviously closely intercomiected, but in 
terms of theological method, Christology and the Trinity function slightly differently 
(which was explored in the previous section). However, McFadyen’s basis in 
trinitarian theology also necessitates the priority of God in his theology.
For frudier discussion of tliis see Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, ppl95-198, and 264-269 (with 
discussion o f Bardi’s four-fold criteria for discerning the tmth).
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The dialogue between Barth and McFadyen shows that it is not necessary for 
the starting point of theology to be Christology or the Trinity, rather that both 
Christology and the Trinity function as necessary loci in the theological framework. 
Any Christian theology which adopts a framework where Christology and the Trinity 
are not afforded ultimate priority is deficient. To repeat a point made imder Thesis 3, 
this does not mean that all theology has to derive explicitly from Christology and the 
Trinity at every point, rather it has to fimction with integrity to that theological 
framework. Again to repeat an example, Jeremy Begbie writes at the end of his book: 
“my intention throughout has been to allow the ultimate ‘pressure of interpretation’ to 
come not from musical practice considered in and of itself (as some kind of 
autonomous, normative arbiter), but fr om a focus on the activity of the trirme God, 
definitively disclosed in Jesus Christ, whose purpose is the participation of the world 
-  including music -  in his own trirme life”.^ ^
Thesis 5: Where theology and secular discourse are not incommensurable, the
relation between theology and secular discourse should be mutually illuminating 
insofar as possible.
In approaching theology by means of the kind of dialogue outlined in this 
thesis, it is important to recognise that there may well be forms of secular* discourse 
with which dialogue is not possible. Some forms of secular discourse may be 
constrncted in explicit antagonism to theology and so the notion of a ‘mutually 
illuminating dialogue’ simply does not apply. However, this does not mean that
Begbie, Theology, p278.
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theology cannot benefit from this relationship, only that dialogue cannot occur?^ To 
some extent, Barth’s engagement with secular discourse in his discussion of das 
Nichtige might be an example of this. Barth considered secular discourse ‘on its own 
terms’, and found much that he could draw on -  paiticularly in Heidegger and Sartre -  
but the pressure of interpretation did not appear to be mutual. Bailh (theology) was 
open to illumination and critique from secular* discourse, but there is no apparent 
reason why the reverse would be true. In a fr amework in which God is excluded {a 
priori), there is no reason why secular discoirrse should listen to theology, unless of 
course theology can demonstrate the validity of its own distinctive contribution by, 
for instance, showing greater explanator*y and descriptive power of a pathology 
(Thesis 1).
However, most forms of secular discoruse are open to some form of dialogue, 
especially if the distinctive contribution that theology can make is clear. In this case 
the dialogue can be mutually illuminating to the extent that each discipline is open to 
learning from the other. Chapters 2, 3, and 5 particularly illustrated some of the ways 
in which this kind of a dialogue might occru as well as highlighting some of the 
possibilities for further development.^^
McFadyen’s Bound to Sin is a good example of how theology and secular 
discoruse might begin to illuminate each other. His basic method could be extended 
to incorporate a number* of other areas. For instance, a theological account of guilt, 
shame, and possibly original sin might have much to offer a sociological or 
psychological account of narcissism (and vice versa).^ "^  Similarly, a theological 
accormt of what it is to be a creature before God might have significant scope for 
contributing to ecological issues. It is an essential aspect of the theological task to
It is also worth noting tliat this situation is not particularly common.
Again Begbie’s Theology, Music and Time might also serve as an example.
Cf. Donald Capps, The Depleted Self: Sin in a Narcissistic Age, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993.
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show how a distinctive theological account might aid secular disciplines (in addition 
to helping show secular discour ses their own inner truth -  Chapter 3 above). There is 
also a gr eat deal for theology to learn from secular disciplines. At a very basic level, 
an accormt of evolution offered by the natural sciences poses significant issues for 
some accormts of the doctrine of creation, hr such cases, the natural sciences can help 
to provide a hermeneutical framework for reading the Genesis creation accounts. 
Tliis does not entail giving the natmal sciences ultimate priority, but the operative 
priority of them in a particular instance. Chapters 2-5 above also demonstrate some 
ways in which theological accormts are illuminated by secular discourses.
A danger is also evident here. It is not inconceivable that concern for a 
mutually illuminating dialogue might focus on the parallels and continuities between 
theology and secular discourse to such an extent that the recognition of our epistemic 
alienation from God might be overlooked. Theological enquiry emphatically cannot 
be conducted in a supposedly neutral, sin-free territory. Indeed we might go so far as 
to say that this is impossible.^^ As we have seen in above chapters, all human 
thinking, whether or not it is explicitly theological, is subject to the corrupting effects 
of sin. The question of proper discernment must drive the theologian back, time and 
time again, to Christology, the atonement, and ‘straight systematics’.
Thesis 6: There should be a critical relation between theology and secular discourse 
where both are tested by each other’s understanding and by the empirical realities o f 
the situation.
In the opening pages of his Church Dogmatics Bartli makes this very point: “To set itself in a 
systematic relationship to other sciences, theology would have to regard its own separate existence as 
necessary in principle. But this is the very thing it cannot do. It cannot think of itself as a link in an 
ordered cosmos, but only as a stop-gap in a disordered cosmos”. (Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I/l: 
The Docti'ine o f the Word o f God, (eds.) Geoffrey W. Bromiley, and Thomas F. Torrance, Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1995 plO).
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Thesis 6 is closely related to Thesis 5. In addition to a mutually illuminating 
dialogue, theology and secular discoruse should have a mutually critical relation. 
McFadyen’s Bound to Sin essentially offered a theological critique of some forms of 
secular discourse, as did Barth’s doctrine of das Nichtige. At the same time, the 
doctrine of sin (particularly so in McFadyen’s case) was criticised by some secular 
accormts. Given that most theological and secular* discourses function within a 
different frame of reference, there is often considerable scope for a critical 
engagement with the other, through which both sides of the dialogue can benefit.
Both McFadyen’s anthropology and doctrine of sin testified to the importance 
of theology being related to praxis. One way in which theology was enabled to do 
this in McFadyen’s thought was on accormt of his opemiess to letting theology be 
challenged and reconfigured by the empirical realities of the situation. This was most 
evident in his accomit of the sexual abuse of children and the holocaust. In these 
cases, many traditional accormts of sin would, like some of the secular* accormts 
McFadyen highlighted, also be inadequate. This approach also comes through 
par ticularly clearly in some feminist accounts of sin, not least in their challenge to the 
tradition’s insistence on pride as the root sin.^  ^ Most feminist accormts find the 
tradition’s (over-)emphasis on pride to be an inadequate representation of the 
experience of many women, thus women’s experience helps reconfrgme a theological 
accormt of sin (Chapter 3).^  ^ A similar* approach can also be formd in Fred Berthold’s
See esp. Chapter 3 above, footnote 54.
Although they come to very different conclusions, tliis approach is evident in Rita N. Brock, and 
Susan B. Thistlethwaite, Casting Stones: Prostitution and Liberation in Asia and the United States, 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996. See Chapter 3, footnote 6 above.
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and Daniel Price’s dialogue between Barth and various psychological approaches to 
the self especially by means of psychoanalysis (Chapters 4 and 5)?^
The construction of Thesis 6 might appear to advocate a third position in 
addition to theology and secular discourse -  ‘the empirical realities of the situation’. 
There is a sense in which this is the case, hr addition to their unique object of 
enquiry, all forms of discour se ar e tested by the empirical realities of the situation. So 
to dr aw on an ear lier example, the empirical realities of the situation led Copernicus 
and Galileo to shift from a Ptolemaic to a heliocentric understanding of the universe. 
The truth claims of a Ptolemaic cosmology were called into question by empirical 
method. However, the danger of positing thr ee positions (the theological, the secular, 
and empirical reality) is that it makes them appear much more distinct than they are. 
In the opening chapter above, it was pointed out that the division between theology 
and secular discourse is a forced one. Similarly, there cannot be Icnowledge of the 
empirical realities of the situation without a form of discoru se. Empirical reality does 
not stand apart from discourse as an entity which can be known as ‘a thing-in-itself. 
The relationship is more intertwined. However, it would be fair to say that for many 
fonns of secular discoiurse (especially the sciences), the empirical realities of the 
situation is their object of enquiry.
The key point about ‘testing’ lies in the openness of a particular* discipline 
(whether theological or secular) to be criticised and possibly corTected and 
reformulated by other sources. McFadyen’s doctrine of sin was intended to be a 
theological exercise in this regard. On the one hand, his doctrine was challenged by 
the ‘empirical realities of the situation’ by means of secular discourse. On the other, 
secular discourse was challenged by the interpretation of the pathologies offered by
Fred Beithold Jr., ‘Theology and Self-Understanding: The Christian Model of Man as a Sinner’, in 
Homans, The Dialogue Between Theology and Psychology, Chapter 1, ppl 1-32; and Daniel J, Price, 
Karl Barth’s Anthropology in Light o f Modern Thought, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002.
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theology. As we have seen, the problem with McFadyen’s project is that there is a 
real question about the extent to which this actually happened, or whether a 
theological critique of some foims of secular* discourse was offered.
Testing’ is also to be conducted from within the constraints of the discipline 
itself. So for example, the Holocaust raises significant challenges for a belief in a 
loving, good and omnipotent God such that theology is forced to ask cei*tain kinds of 
‘how’ questions. If satisfactory answers cannot be offered, the very heart of theology 
is called into question. Similarly, if a doctrine of sin cannot offer an account of how 
these sorts of atrocities are possible, theology as a discipline has failed, hi both these 
cases, theology is tested by the empirical realities of the situation.
One further question arises here -  that of how to evaluate the challenges or 
instances of testing that arise, especially when they attack core assumptions. What 
happens when the ultimate object of theology is challenged in this way as in 
connecting the Holocaust to the (non-)existence of God? Only two small points can 
be offered in response to this question. First, there cannot be an Archimedean point 
from which to judge such challenges (cf. Thesis 9). Any form of testing, or 
evaluation of testing, is always fr om a particular standpoint. For the most pai*t, this 
standpoint is from the ultimate criteria functioning within the discipline. When these 
are seriously challenged, they can only be done from another standpoint within the 
discipline, and if the objects of the challenge really are the ultimate criteria, only with 
great difficulty. Ultimate criteria can only be considered temporarily from another 
viewpoint else this position becomes the ultimate one. If the challenge appears to be 
devastating, the theologian will then have to make a choice between conceding to the 
challenge or ignoring it (cf. the principle of non-contradiction in Thesis 3 above). 
However, it is important to bear in mind that there are other* criteria operating in the
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theologian’s armoury in addition to logic -  not least ‘special revelation’. This leads to 
our second point.
For the Christian theologian, there are no a priori, objective criteria from 
which all challenges can be considered (see Thesis 9 below). The best we can do is 
affirm the priority of God in theological method, that is, the centrality of the self­
revelation of God in Christ tlrrough the Spirit. In practice, this means that the 
discipline of theology has to be sensitive to the agency of the Holy Spirit. 
Consequently, prayer and worship from a crucial part of the practice of theology -  as 
we have seen in McFadyen’s work in Chapter 3 above.
Thesis 7: Secular discourse and theology should be taken seriously by attempting to 
understand the other’s position on its own terms, and the (flexible) boundaries 
between the disciplines should be maintained.
The contrast between McFadyen and Barth testifies to the necessity of taking 
the dialogue partner seriously. Although McFadyen’s method lends itself to a more 
open dialogue with secular discourse than Barth’s, Barth recognises a broader range 
of discourses than McFadyen, and to this extent does not homogenise them. Even 
though McFadyen’s argument does stand in both The Call to Personhood and Bound 
to Sin, the former book identifies with forms of secular discourse that fit very well 
with the theological framework that is being developed, and the latter ultimately 
offers a ‘straw man’ version of secular discourse. The dialogue with secular discoruse 
was amongst the most fiiritful and challenging to have appeared in recent years, but 
the argument was weakened by giving insufficient attention to the multifaceted
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accounts of the will apparent in secular discourse. It is a necessary condition for 
engaging with secular discour se that the other is taken seriously.^^
Part of what is meant by taking the other seriously involves an attempt to 
understand the other on its own terms. This does not entail loss of theology’s own 
integrity, it simply means that respecting other disciplines and taking them seriously 
involves attempting to understand them from within their own frames of reference.^® 
This was apparent in both McFadyen and Barth, albeit less so in McFadyen. In 
attempting to imderstand other disciplines on their own terms, theology does not give 
up the ultimate priority of God, but gives operative priority to the other discipline at 
that particular time. To repeat an earlier example, a film can only ‘work’ if the 
audience enters into the framework of understanding (or at least the par ameters of the 
film) for at least its diuation.
One of the great strengths of Barth’s theological anthropology is that it 
recognises and respects the boundaries between the disciplines. The boimdaries are 
not so solid that mutual dialogue cannot occur, nor are they flexible enough to be in 
danger of losing the discipline’s distinctive identity. This means that there is scope 
for each discipline to leam from and be criticised by other disciplines without loss of 
their own integrity.
Thesis 8: The dialogue should move from the particular to the general.
^ Tliis is to be distinguished from BaiHi’s use of the phrase when he suggests that, for instance, evil is 
not to be taken seriously. By this Barth means that the theological agenda is in no way to be set by 
evil, but evil does of course have a place within it. In this sense, evil is taken seriously but is not given 
any authority.
In some cases this may mean ‘leaving God aside’ for the entirety of the dialogue as in Paul Ricoeur’s 
Oneself As Another ((trans.) Kathleen Blarney, Chicago: Cliicago University Press, 1992), in which he 
self-consciously adopts a position o f agnosticism for the purposes of his argument (pp23f.). In doing 
this Ricoeur is giving operative priority to secular discourse for the entirety of his bookj but the 
ultimate priority of God is maintained botli in his tliinking and work as a whole.
Again this kind of dialogue is evident in Jeremy Begbie’s Theology, Music and Time.
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In both Barth’s and McFadyen’s theology the pressure of interpretation moves 
from the particular to the general. In contrast to a theologian like Paul Tillich, Barth 
and McFadyen do not operate with an a priori (Procrustean?) framework into which 
their theological enquiry and engagement with seculai* discourse is forced. Rather, 
both let the object of enquiry determine the foi*m and content of their approach. For 
Barth this entails the absolute priority of Christology in his theological method. For 
McFadyen it means moving from the experience of, say, children who were abused to 
general points about abuse. This is also one of the great strengths of David Ford’s 
theology (Chapter 1 above), in that his conversations occur largely on an ad hoc and 
eclectic basis (hence the difference in his approach from Paul Tillich).
In terms of the subject-matter of this thesis, neither Barth not McFadyen 
operated with a prior conception of what it means to be human, or what sin is. In each 
case the nature of humanity and the natui e of sin was derived from the particular from 
which the general point developed. This also does better justice to the nature of 
theological enquiry in a fallen world as it recognises the provisionality of our claims.
Thesis 9: There cannot bean objective, a priori criteria for discernment or structuring 
the relation between theology and secular discourse. Theology must take the form o f 
a Nachdenken.
Following from Thesis 8, the structure of the relationship between theological 
and secular discourse cannot be determined in advance of the dialogue. 
Consequently, there are no concrete criteria which can prescribe the relationship 
between theology and seculai* discourse. The closest to a criterion that we can get is 
in maintaining the priority of God in theological method (Theses 3 and 4). But again.
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there are no criteria which can be applied in advance of the discussion to prescribe 
how the priority of God is to be maintained. Rather, the dialogue is to be carried out 
with integrity and faithfulness to the ‘field of force’ determined by the theological 
fi-amework. This fiamework cannot be derived in advance, but can only be derived 
from the trinitarian self-revelation of God. Theology therefore takes the form of a 
Nachdenken and is ultimately guided by prayer and the activity of the Holy Spirit.
4. A Return to the Webster/Ford Debate
As an introduction to some of the core issues the thesis addiesses. Chapter 1 
considered the recent Webster/ Ford debate as representative of Types 4 and 3 
(respectively) of Hans Frei’s typology. At the end of a thesis arguing for a position 
between Types 3 and 4, it is only fitting that we return to the terms of the Webster/ 
Ford debate to see whether any fruther light can be shed on it -  perhaps even a 
resolution. In this section, we will offer fruther consideration of the categories ‘Type 
3 and 4’ (including the possibility of a Type 3.5), and highlight some of the strengths 
and weaknesses of both Webster’s and Ford’s positions. In doing this, a move 
towards a resolution will be made.
First, in Chapter 1 above, it was argued that David Ford’s position can be 
placed in Type 3 and John Webster’s in Type 4. However, it was indicated there that 
their placement in this categories was not as clear-cut as it might have been. 
Regarding Ford, there were two caveats. The first caveat was that his thought had a 
leaning towards Type 4. In other words. Ford himself would both envisage his work, 
and hopes that it is determined in large part by the distinct subject-matter of Christian 
theology. His earlier work on Karl Baith and embrace of John Webster’s proposed 
way of approaching a theology of ‘self and salvation’ show this to be the case.
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Similarly, as Ford makes clear in one of his criticisms of Webster, he envisages that 
‘the central truths [of Christianity] aie such that they cry out to be related to the whole 
of reality and to eveiy human being’ and that ‘intensive conversation’ is one 
important way of doing this. In other words. Ford takes the core tenets of the 
Christian faith for gianted, and recognises the need for theological engagement with 
the contemporary world on their basis. Consequently, it might be aigued that Ford’s 
position comes very close to McFadyen’s, so why place him in Type 3?
McFadyen’s thought was argued to be a development of, and stand in basic 
continuity with Barth’s theological orientation towards Type 3. In this regard, there 
are strong similarities between McFadyen and Ford (not least because both combine 
an interest in Bai1h with the influence of Daniel Hai'dy). However, I would argue that 
Ford has moved further towards Type 3 than McFadyen -  so far in fact that he is no 
longer in Type 4 (especially in his later work). In defence of Ford, it miglit be argued 
that his position simply represents Type 4 (or possibly 3.5) done badly, that is, his 
work is in Type 4, he has just failed to give appropriate priority to God’s self­
revelation in Christ through the Spirit. This may or may not be so, but in either case, 
this means that his work as it actually appears is Type 3.
The second caveat is that Ford’s thought is placed in Type 3 for different 
reasons than other theologies of this Type such as Paul Tillich’s or even 
Schleieiinacher’s. The reasons for this have been mentioned on a few occasions 
above, but the core difference is this. Tillich’s thought functions with an existential 
(universal) framework from which he approaches theology, whereas Ford’s work 
proceeds on the basis of ad hoc correlations between particulars. Showing his debt to 
Daniel Hardy, Ford emphatically rejects any kind of universal framework for
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approaching a ‘correlation’. However, because Ford’s work does not give explicit 
priority to either theology or his conversation partners, it falls into Type 3.
A similar problem is evident with John Webster’s theology. His work was 
placed in Type 4 with a leaning towards Type 5 (i.e. Type 4/5). As Ford points out in 
his response to Webster’s review, Webster has a nanower understanding of the task of 
theology than was conceived by Aquinas and Barth (because they ‘took on 
extraordinarily broad theological responsibilities in their situations’). It is for this 
reason -  his desire to do ‘straight systematics’ ‘as though nothing had happened’ -  
that it was argued Iris thought appears in Type 4/5. Webster gives imambiguous 
priority to Frei’s second pole -  approaching Christian theology from within (by giving 
significant weight to the unique subject-matter of Christian theology). The main point 
is clear: neither Ford’s or Webster’s thought fits neatly within the categories in Frei’s 
typology.
This point clearly has a significant bearing on the discussion of the possibility 
of a Type 3.5 in Thesis 2 above. There is was suggested that McFadyen’s position 
could be understood either as a Type 3.5 (that is, a distinct Type from Types 3 and 4), 
or as a variation of Type 4 (albeit close to the boundary with Type 3). It was also 
suggested that, on balance, the latter option is probably the most accuiate. The 
discussion of Ford and Webster confirms this. There is significant scope within the 
types as they stand for a range of positions which may not fall at the heart of each 
type, hi other words, the types are (or can be understood to be) flexible enough to 
incorporate a variety of positions, and that McFadyen’s is ‘Type 4 with a leaning 
towards Type 3’. By way of contrast, Ford’s position leans so far* that it actually ends 
up in Type 3.
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Second, there are some significant strengths and weaknesses which are evident 
in both Webster’s and Ford’s positions which have a beating on this thesis. We will 
address Webster’s position first. The most significant strength of Webster’s position 
is his unambiguous affirmation of the absolute and ultimate priority of God in 
theological method. This is so clear that it impacts the whole of his theology in terms 
of both form and content. Consequently, in his review of Ford, he poses the question: 
Ts there a given shape, a (flexible) canon of texts and problems in which it is the first 
task of the theologian to be instructed and in the face of which originality is 
unimportant?’ -  an approach which is not often reflected in the theological academy. 
It was primarily for this reason, that a dialogue with a Type 4 thinker was considered 
to be more valuable than with a Type 3 thinker, and furthermore, why (if I had to) I 
would side with Webster over Ford. This is also the reason for Webster’s somewhat 
vehement attack of Ford’s approach. However, there is also a corresponding 
weakness which is best highlighted by means of considering Ford’s greatest strength -  
dialogue.
Ford’s approach to theology is clearly much broader than Webster’s. 
Consequently, Ford views his theology as ‘one type of architecture in the theological 
city’. Ford’s approach is a conversational theology based upon the premise that a 
God who relates to eveiyone and everything can have potentially unlimited questions 
and conversations, and the focus of Ford’s project is to engage with some of these. In 
other words, the great strength of Ford’s theology is to engage theology in a wide 
range of conversations, often with non-theological sources, from which theology 
gains many useful insights.
The key to Ford’s approach, and it is one that he may have overlooked, is first 
having a good grasp of ‘theology’. The kind of approach Ford advocates (if it is to be
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done well) is only possible if one is thoroughly grounded in the Webster type 
approach (i.e. ‘straight systematics’). In this regard, we might say that Ford’s task is 
secondary to Webster’s (this is emphatically not to say that it is unimportant). 
However, to say that it is secondary risks calling into question the central argument of 
this thesis, that theological enquiry (‘stiaight dogmatics’) has two main aspects which 
are to be understood as part of a single task: to reflect critically on the tiinitarian self­
revelation of God as testified to in the Christian scriptures, doctrine, tradition and 
histoiy and to engage critically with the social, cultural, and intellectual world in 
which we are living. Put this way, we might argue by way of a caricature, that 
Webster does the former and Ford the latter. This, however, would be to put the 
matter too strongly.
There ar e two main reasons why this caricatur e does not call into question the 
main argument of the thesis. The first is that Ford’s task is one that gives too much 
away from the distinct subject-matter of theology at the expense of his ‘conversations’ 
(hence he was placed in Type 3). In this respect. Ford neglects the ‘straight 
dogmatics’ aspect of theology. The second reason is that it is not possible to do 
‘straight dogmatics’ well without engaging with the determinate situation. Even 
thougli Webster places little weight on this aspect of the theological task, his thought 
still engages with the determinate situation, in much the same way as Barth’s thought 
was ‘indirectly a political commitment’ (Chapter 1 above). It follows from this that 
Webster is in fact engaging with the contemporary situation if for no other reason than 
his use of language (i.e. English that is embodied within a twenty-first century 
conceptuality). His patterns of thought have been shaped by the contemporary 
university with its Enlightenment heritage, and whether or not Webster addresses this 
directly (which he does on occasion), he carmot help but engage with the
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contemporary situation by restating the core tenets of the Christian faith within his 
own time. This was, of course, one of Barth’s main points -  that it is only by 
listening obediently to the Word of God that warranted theological engagement with 
the contemporary context can occm\ What, then, of the possibility of a resolution of 
the debate?
In response to this question, two points must be made. First, there is a sense in 
which a resolution is not possible. Both thinkers differ in their imderstanding of the 
theological task, and although they are engaged in dialogue, are convinced of the 
rightness of their own positions. Similarly, as just indicated, both have significant 
strengths to their positions. This is important to bear in mind when considering a 
‘resolution’. In order for a resolution to occur, one of three things needs to happen: 
either Webster moves to Ford’s position. Ford moves to Webster’s, or a compromise 
needs to be made. Given their arguments, it is unlikely that the first two options will 
occur. This leaves us with compromise. As we have seen. Ford’s position is broad 
enough to incorporate Webster’s, but Webster’s is not broad enough to encompass 
Ford’s. Unless a compromise on Webster’s paii to Ford’s approach to theology is to 
happen, a resolution cannot occur.
However, we might do well to ask in passing why a resolution is important. 
As their positions stand, they both contribute in different ways to the theological 
world. Both have important contributions to make. The problem occurs if we are to 
consider Webster’s ‘either/or’ -  that is, whether theology should be done according to 
a Type4/5 model or a Type 2/3. For Webster, there simply is no other way. We 
could, of course, reject this approach in the same way as Ford. However, given the 
argument of this thesis, especially concerning the ultimate priority of God, there is a 
question about the way theology should be done give this priority. It has been the
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concern of this thesis to unpack this. Put differently, as theologians we are not 
concerned primarily with interesting and, to refer back to Webster, ‘original’ 
conversations with other disciplines in the interests of the academy, we are concerned 
with theological truth. If there is a ‘truth-of-the-matter’, and it is to be determined in 
accordance with affiiTning the ultimate priority of God in theological method, then 
some approaches to theology cannot be considered as usefi.il as others. Some ways of 
approaching the theological task are simply better in that they are more closely 
orientated to and determined by the object of theology. It is for this reason that we 
must consider the possibility of a resolution.
Second, to some extent a resolution is possible and it is one which falls in 
accordance with the central argument of this thesis. The position outlined at length 
throughout the thesis combines the strengths of both Webster’s and Ford’s positions. 
Ultimate priority for theological method rests upon the trinitarian self-revelation of 
God in Christ through the Spirit, but engagement with other disciplines can help shed 
further light on theological truth and vice versa. In other words, it is possible to 
maintain the strengths of both positions, which does involve some compromise, 
without losing Webster’s theological orientation or Ford’s breath of conversations. 
The compromise will have to rest primarily with Webster’s concern to do ‘straight 
dogmatics’ as he defines it. As we have seen, Barth (and McFadyen) do this, but also 
engage explicitly with secular d i s c o u r s e . I t  is also worth repeating that Barth 
recognises theological truth in the secular sphere, but thinks that the Christian 
theologian should not spend time searching for this, rather use the primary sources of 
the theologian’s tool-kit to expound the content of theology (which is aided by 
engagement with secular discourse). This does not by any means eliminate the
Again see Barth, CD IV/3J, ppll8-135 and Hunsinger, ‘Epilogue: Secular Parables of the Truth’.
290
importance of engagement with seculai* discourse. The basis for the dialogue between 
theology and secular discourse was not to recognise theological truth in secular 
discour se per S6y rather that tlirough the dialogue the interests of theological truth 
might be serwed. One way of doing this, I suggest, is by approaching theology 
through the nine theses outlined above. In this respect, the nine theses can be 
understood as a significant move towards a resolution of Webster’s and Ford’s 
positions. Secular discourse can enable theology to do its job better. This is a task 
which I hope both Webster and Ford would embrace.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to bring McFadyen’s and Barth’s thought into an 
explicit dialogue so that the differences between their positions could be clarified and 
some more general conclusions could be drawn for structuring the relation between 
theology and secular discourse more widely. The first main section considered the 
respective methods of McFadyen and Barth in relation to their anthropology and 
hamartiology. It was concluded that McFadyen’s approach is a further extension of 
Barth’s basic orientation towards Type 3, but also remains consistent to Barth’s 
premises and fundamental outlook. Following from this, it was argued that 
McFadyen is more open to dialogue with secular* discourse than Barth, but Barth takes 
it more seriously than McFadyen.
The distinction between theology and secular discourse which has been 
functioning throughout the thesis was also called into question, particularly with 
reference to Barth’s thought. It was argued that there is a sense in which it is an 
inappropriate distinction to apply to Barth’s thought because of his apparent lack of 
concern with secular discourse, and at the same time an extremely appropriate
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distinction for Barth because the boundaries between theology and secular discourse 
are drawn more rigidly and narrowly. For Bailh, any thought foim (including many 
‘theologies’) that do not conform to the Word of God is ‘secular’.
The second main section set out nine theses which had a twofold purpose. 
First, they operated as conclusions to the exposition of McFadyen and Barth which 
occurred in Chapter 2-5. In this respect, they were dependent upon the preceding 
material and cannot be read apart from it. Secondly, they have a more general 
function in accordance with the wider concerns of this thesis, that is, giving a 
stnictured response to the question ‘how ought theology to be done?’, hi this respect, 
the nine theses have a wider significance than simply being conclusions to an 
exposition of McFadyen and BaiHi and have the potential to contiibute to a range of 
theological discussions, not least the ‘theology of culture’.
The third main section picked up the Webster/ Ford debate which was used in 
the opening chapter for setting out the teims of the debate. A return to tliis debate not 
only had the effect of rounding off the thesis as a whole, but enabled fiuther 
discussion of the two main types operative in the thesis and confirmed the core 
ai'gument of the thesis as a move towards a resolution of Webster and Ford. In doing 
this, the nine theses could be seen to set out a theological method in which the priority 
of God is maintained as well as critical engagement with the contemporary context by 
means of secular discourse.
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CONCLUSION
The primary concern of this thesis has been with a dialogical approach to 
theology. From the outset it was argued that theological enquiry (‘straight dogmatics’) 
has two main aspects which are to be understood as part of a single task. The first 
aspect is to reflect critically on the trinitarian self-revelation of God to which testimony 
is borne in Christian scriptme, doctrine, tradition and history. The second aspect is to 
engage critically with the social, cultural and intellectual world in which we are living. 
From this understanding of theology it follows that it is crucial for theology to engage 
with secular discomse. The specific concern of the thesis has been to identify how 
theology should engage with secular discourse.
Chapter 1 offered a siuwey of various approaches to the relationship between 
theology and secular discourse drawing heavily from Hans Frei’s ‘types’ of theology. 
David Ford’s and John Webster’s work was then used to expound the two polar 
positions of this thesis -  Type 3 and Type 4. Type 3 gives equal weight to Christian 
self-description and philosophical frameworks and proceeds by way of a ‘correlation’ 
between the Christian faith and other disciplines, whereas Type 4 gives priority to 
Christian self-description. The pressure of interpretation moves from theology to other 
disciplines. It recognises that other disciplines can make important and significant 
contributions to the Christian faith but that the trinitarian self-revelation of God retains 
ultimate priority. It was also suggested that Alistair McFadyen’s approach falls 
between Types 3 and 4, and further, that this is how theology should engage with 
secular discourse. Karl Barth’s thought was also introduced as a conversation partner. 
His thought falls into Type 4 which was considered a better point of comparison than
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Type 3 because of the necessity of giving God’s self-revelation ultimate priority over 
secular discourse.
Chapters 2 and 3 considered the relationship between theology and secular* 
discourse in Alistair McFadyen’s theological anthropology and doctrine of sin, and 
Chapters 4 and 5 Karl Barth’s respective approach. These chapters involved detailed 
textual analyses of the approaches of McFadyen and Barth, the results of which were 
brought together in Chapter 6, In Chapter 6 Barth’s and McFadyen’s work was 
compared, and on the basis of the comparison some conclusions were drawn. More 
specifically, it was argued that McFadyen’s approach is a further* extension of Barth’s 
basic orientation towards Type 3, but remains consistent to Barth’s basic premises and 
fimdamental outlook. Additionally, it was suggested that McFadyen is more open to 
dialogue with secular* discourse than Barth, but that Barth takes it more seriously than 
McFadyen.
The distinction between theology and secular discourse which has been 
operative fiom Chapter 1 was also called into question, particularly with reference to 
Barth’s thought. It was argued that there is a sense in which it is an inappropriate 
distinction to apply to Barth’s thought because of his apparent lack of concern with 
secular* discourse, and at the same time an extremely appropriate distinction for Barth 
because the boundaries between theology and secular discourse are drawn more rigidly 
and narrowly. For Barth, any thought form (including many ‘theologies’) that do not 
conform to the Word of God is ‘secular’.
The chapter continued by setting out nine theses which operate as conclusions 
to the exposition of McFadyen and Barth in Chapters 2-5, as well as expositing them in 
a more widely applicable form. These nine theses have the potential to contribute to a 
range of theological discussions extending well beyond the constraints of this thesis. 
A return to the Webster-Ford debate from Chapter 1 also helped illustrate this as well
294
as clarify the concluding position of the thesis. In short, secular discomse enables 
theology to do its job better.
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